JUDGMENT : B.K. Patel, J. - By the judgment and order dated 05.02.2007 passed by learned C.J.M., Jagatsinghpur in G.R. Case No. 120 of 1996 (Trial No. 42 of 2001), the Petitioner was convicted u/s 409 of the Indian Penal Code (for short the 'I.P.C') and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand), in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four months. In Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 2007 preferred by the Petitioner, while upholding the Petitioner's conviction u/s 409 of the I.P.C., the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jagatsinghpur modified the sentence directing the Petitioner to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and pay a fine of Rs. 4,000/- (Rupees four thousand), in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner has preferred this revision. 2. The Petitioner was working as a postman of Nalibar Sub-Post Office. Case was registered by the Officer-ln-Charge of Tirtol Police Station and investigation was taken up by S.I. of Police P.W.13 on presentation of F.I.R. Ext.1 by informant P.W.2, the Postal Sub-Divisional Inspector, Kujanga. It was alleged that the Petitioner forged the signatures of the payees and misappropriated (i) Rs. 1,000/- payable to Natabar Das P.W.6 on 09.11.1991 under Money Order No. 359 issued on 04.11.1991, (ii) Rs. 1,000/ - payable to Kanduri Parida on 24.12.1991 under Money Order No. 2822 issued on 18.12.1991, (iii) Rs. 1,000/ - payable to Babuli Samal P.W.1 on 24.09.1991 under Money Order No. 1391 issued on 20.09.1991, (iv) Rs. 100/- payable to Santilata Rout P.W.8 on 27.12.1991 under Money Order No. 2964 issued on 21.12.1991 and (v) Rs. 200/- payable to Purusottam Mohanty P.W.7 on 04.10.1991 under Money Order No. 2380 issued on 27.09.1991. On completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the Petitioner for commission of offences under Sections 409 and 468 of the I.P.C. Defence plea was complete denial of the allegations. In order to substantiate the charge, prosecution examined thirteen witnesses and also relied upon documents marked Ext.1 to 14. P.Ws.1, 2, 6, 7, 8 and 13 have already been introduced. P.W.12 was the Post Master of the concerned Sub-Post Office during the period of alleged occurrence. P.W.5 happens to be P.W.8's son and P.W.9 happens to be P.W.7's son. P.W.3 was the Post Master during the period between 1993 and 1995. P.Ws.1, 2, 6, 7, 8 and 13 have already been introduced. P.W.12 was the Post Master of the concerned Sub-Post Office during the period of alleged occurrence. P.W.5 happens to be P.W.8's son and P.W.9 happens to be P.W.7's son. P.W.3 was the Post Master during the period between 1993 and 1995. P.W.4, who was working as a Postal Assistant of the office of Superintendent of Post Offices, Cuttack, and P.W.10, who was working as an Inspector of Post Office, Keonjhar, were witnesses to seizures. P.W.11, who was working as Assistant Superintendent of Post (Out-door), Cuttack South Division, Cuttack, was also a witness to seizure. He also took zima of documents seized under seizure list Ext.2. It appears that as P.Ws.5 to 9 did not support the allegations, they were subjected to cross examination by the prosecution. Learned trial Court acquitted the Petitioner of the charge u/s 468 of the I.P.C. Also, learned trial Court appears to have held that allegations in respect of misappropriation of amounts payable under Money Order Nos. 2822 and 1391 were not proved. However, relying upon the evidence of P.Ws.5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 12, the Petitioner was found guilty of commission of offence u/s 409 of the I.P.C. in respect of money payable under the other three Money Orders. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that evidence adduced by the prosecution falls far short of proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish that the Petitioner misappropriated any amount payable to P.Ws.6, 7 and 8. Referring to evidence of P.Ws.5 to 9, it was also submitted that payees of Money Orders admit to have received the money payable to them. Prosecution has not led any evidence to indicate that the Petitioner misappropriated or kept with him any such amount for any period with dishonest intention. On the basis of such submissions, it was argued that the conviction of the Petitioner is based solely on surmises drawn mainly from the evidence of hostile witnesses and of P.W.12 without any evidence on record to indicate either misappropriation or dishonest intention on the part of the Petitioner. 4. Learned Counsel for the State contended that both the Courts below having found the Petitioner guilty of commission of offence u/s 409 I.P.C. the concurrent findings are not liable to be interfered with. 5. 4. Learned Counsel for the State contended that both the Courts below having found the Petitioner guilty of commission of offence u/s 409 I.P.C. the concurrent findings are not liable to be interfered with. 5. In this revision legality of the finding that the Petitioner committed misappropriation in respect of money payable under three Money Orders to P.Ws.6, 7 and 8 is under challenge on the basis of the contention that there is no basis to sustain such finding. As has been pointed out by this Court in Kartikeswar Nayak Vs. State of Orissa, : 3. To bring home the charge of 'criminal breach of trust' punishable u/s 409 IPC the prosecution is required to prove; (i) that a public servant was entrusted with property or with dominion over it; (ii) that being so entrusted, he dishonestly misappropriated or converted to his use that property or dishonestly used or disposed of that property in violation - (iii) (a) of any direction of law prescribing the more in which such trust is discharged, or (b) any legal contract made touching the discharge of such trust. The word "entrust" is not a term of law. It has different implications in different contexts. According to Chambers English Dictionary, "Entrust" means to give in trust; to commit as a trust; to charge trustingly. In its most general significance it imparts handling over possession for some purpose other than conferring proprietary right. The ownership or beneficial interest in the property in respect of which offence of criminal breach of trust is alleged to have been committed must be with some person other than the accused and the latter must held it on account of some person or for his benefit. 4. The next most essential ingredient for proof of criminal breach of trust is 'misappropriation with a dishonest intention'. Breach of trust is not an offence if it is not associated with intention which is dishonest. Word 'dishonestly' defined in Section 24 IPC means doing anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another. So offence is complete when misappropriation or conversion of the property has been made dishonestly. Even temporary misappropriation falls within the ambit of the offence. 6. What the section requires is something much more than mere failure or omission to account for the property entrusted with the accused. So offence is complete when misappropriation or conversion of the property has been made dishonestly. Even temporary misappropriation falls within the ambit of the offence. 6. What the section requires is something much more than mere failure or omission to account for the property entrusted with the accused. The prosecution has to go further and show that the accused dishonestly misappropriated or converted to his own use or dishonestly used or disposed of such property. In this connection, decision of the Supreme Court in Sardar Singh Vs. State of Haryana, and this Court in State of Orissa v. Birabar Panda 7976 C.L.R. 169 relied upon on behalf of the Petitioner may be referred to. 7. In the present case, though misappropriation was alleged in respect of the amount payable under five Money Orders, the prosecution was found to have failed to establish entrustment of money payable under two Money Order bearing Nos. 2822 and 1391. As regards the other three Money Orders bearing Nos. 359, 2964 and 2380, on the basis of endorsements stated to have been made by the Petitioner himself in the 'Register of Telegram Money Order and Money Order Received', it was held that the Petitioner was entrusted with money payable thereunder. However, admittedly, the three Payees, P.Ws.6, 7 and 8, did not allege that they did not receive money. P.W.6 said that he received Rs. 1000/- payable under Money Order after 8 days. P.W.7 deposed that he received Rs. 200/- payable under Money Order after 12 days. P.Ws.6 and 7 did not elaborate as to from which date there was delay in receipt of money order. P.W.8 testified that she received Rs. 1000/- payable under Money Order after 10 to 15 days of the remittance. P.W.8's son P.W.5 also deposed that his mother received money 8 to 10 days after remittance. None of the payees deposed regarding the exact date of receipt of money orders. Evidence of P.W.8 and his son reveals that the payees testified regarding period between the remittance and the receipt of money order while saying that there was delay in receipt of money order. P.W.9 proved Ext.3/1 and testified that as per instruction of his father P.W.7, he scribed the same alleging non-receipt of Rs. 200/ - payable to his father. Evidence of P.W.8 and his son reveals that the payees testified regarding period between the remittance and the receipt of money order while saying that there was delay in receipt of money order. P.W.9 proved Ext.3/1 and testified that as per instruction of his father P.W.7, he scribed the same alleging non-receipt of Rs. 200/ - payable to his father. However, P.W.7 himself stated that he had not complained before Postal Authorities but his elder son who remitted the money had lodged complaint. P.W.7 also denied that as per his instruction P.W.9 scribed Ext.3/1. Evidence of P.Ws.5 to 9 contains no allegation whatsoever against the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prosecution was constrained to cross-examine them. Conviction of the Petitioner appears to have been based solely on evidence of P.W.12. P.W.12 deposed regarding entrustment of amounts payable under three Money Orders to the Petitioner. There is nothing in his evidence to infer that the Petitioner dishonestly misappropriated any amount. Though P.W.12 testified that some of the Payees made allegations regarding non-receipt of money, P.Ws.6, 7 and 8 did not support such allegations. Learned Courts below appear to have drawn adverse inference against the Petitioner from the testimony of P.W.12 regarding recovery and realization of money from the Petitioner. However, such bald assertions regarding recovery and realization of money without indicating any nexus between the money recovered and the money payable under the three Money Orders payable to P.Ws.6, 7 and 8 does not establish misappropriation of money payable to them. That apart, P.W.12 in his cross-examination testified that he had verified the Money Order coupon with regard to disbursement and to his knowledge it was correct. P.W.12 also admitted in his evidence that he had confidence on the Petitioner and he did not find dishonestly with him during his tenure. Allegation of delay of some days in disbursements of Money Orders amounts by itself looses potentiality, if any, to lead to any inference of misappropriation in view of admission of P.W.12 to the effect that ordinarily payment of Money Orders take about one or two months. 8. Such being the fact and nature of evidence adduced by the prosecution there is absolutely no scope to hold that the evidence on record established beyond reasonable doubt that the Petitioner dishonestly misappropriated money payable to P.Ws.6, 7 and 8. 8. Such being the fact and nature of evidence adduced by the prosecution there is absolutely no scope to hold that the evidence on record established beyond reasonable doubt that the Petitioner dishonestly misappropriated money payable to P.Ws.6, 7 and 8. In absence of such evidence, there is no basis for recording conviction of the Petitioner u/s 409. The Petitioner is entitled to be acquitted. 9. In the result, the revision is allowed. The impugned judgments and orders passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jagatsinghpur in Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 2007 and the C.J.M., Jagatsinghpur in G.R. No. 120 of 1996 (Trial No. 42 of 2001) are set aside. Final Result : Allowed