JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner Jain Shiksha Samiti and it is prayed that the entire record pertaining to the case No. 178/95 from Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal may be called and after examining the same, the order dated 06.12.1995 may be quashed and set-aside. Prima facie by the aforesaid judgment, the appeal filed by respondent No. 1 has been allowed. 2. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Tribunal has committed error in holding that Section 18 of the non-governmental organisation would apply to the case of the respondent. It is contended that the Act come into force w.e.f. 01.01.1993, the date on which the services of respondent was terminated. The learned counsel cited two orders; first dated 10.08.1991 by which the respondent was given appointment, similar order was passed in 1992 by which the services of respondent was extended. It has been contended that the appointment of the respondent came to an end on 1.1.93 when the Act of 1989 came into force. It is contended that it could not be done because there was no provision in the act to give it retrospective effect. In the present case, the learned Tribunal held that since there was no positive order of termination passed by the petitioner and since the appointment of the respondent was beyond specific only upto 31.12.1992 and on that date, no extension was granted, therefore, his appointment automatically came to an end on 01.01.1993. Learned counsel for the respondent opposed the writ petition and submitted that on 01.01.1993, the date on which his services were terminated, should be taken on the date of termination. It is submitted that since the respondent had been continuing upto 31.12.1992, his services suddenly cannot be discontinued. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Tribunal was not justified in allowing the claim of the respondent because it would not be regard to comply with Section 18 of the Act prior to coming into force of the Act. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the order impugned. 5. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Tribunal was not justified in allowing the claim of the respondent because it would not be regard to comply with Section 18 of the Act prior to coming into force of the Act. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the order impugned. 5. I find that appointment of the respondent was specific only upto 31.12.1992 and thereafter, no appointment order was issued in this case or any material has been produced before the tribunal to show that any extension of time was given to the respondent. However, for that the petitioner has placed on record the order of appointment granted to respondent from time to time, but the same was confined to specific time period and the last appointment order dated 01.01.1992 was also time specific, which came to an end on 31.12.1992. It cannot, therefore, be accepted that Act of 1989 Which came into the effect from 01.01.1993 restrospectively would apply to the case of the respondent because his services came to an end on 31.12.1992. The Tribunal, in my considered opinion, has committed an error in holding that the provision of Act of 1989 would apply to the case of respondent whose services come to an end on 01.01.1993. 6. Therefore, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 06.12.1995 passed by the Tribunal is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.Writ Petition Allowed - Order of Tribunal set Aside. *******