JUDGMENT These two Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeals arise out of execution proceedings in O.S.No. 149 of 1985 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam. The appellants are different, but the respondents are common to both the appeals. 2. The appellants and certain others were said to be in possession of small extents of land, forming part of an area of 50 cents in Sy.No.4/7 of Gopalapatnam Revenue Village, owned by Pandiripilli Madhava Rao, the father of the 151 respondent. When they apprehended that they would be evicted from the sites in their possession, they filed a.S.No.325 of 1985 in the Court of VII Additional District Munsif, Visakhapatnam, for the relief of perpetual injunction. Madhava Rao, in turn, filed a.S.No.149 of 1985 in the Court of Principal Subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam, against 13 defendants, including the appellants herein, for recovery of possession of the entire extent of 50 cents. During the pendency of the suits, Madhava Rao died, and the respondents came on record as legal representatives. 3. O.S.No.149 of 1985 was decreed on 29-10-1991 and O.S. No. 325 of 1985 was dismissed, somewhere at the same time. No appeals were preferred by the appellants herein. Respondents filed E.P.No.244 of 2002 for execution of the decree in O.S. No. 149 of 1985. 4. The appellants filed two similar applications, being E.A. Nos. 135 and 136 of 2003, under Rule 97 of Order 21 C.P.C., for the relief of declaration, to the effect that the decree in O.S.No.149 of 1985 is a nullity, and that it was obtained by fraud. They pleaded that when the suit came up for trial, a compromise was entered into between themselves and the respondents, in writing, and in terms thereof, they paid a sum of Rs.5,500/- each. It was alleged that believing that the respondents would bring the same to the notice of the trial Court, they did not pursue the proceedings. 5. The respondents filed counters, denying the averments made by the appellants. Through separate but similar orders, dated 07-10-2005, the Executing Court dismissed E.A. Nos. 135 and 136. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed A.S. Nos. 310 and 311 of 2005 in the Court of Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam. The appeals were dismissed on 30-06-2008. Hence, these Second Appeals. 6. 5. The respondents filed counters, denying the averments made by the appellants. Through separate but similar orders, dated 07-10-2005, the Executing Court dismissed E.A. Nos. 135 and 136. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed A.S. Nos. 310 and 311 of 2005 in the Court of Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam. The appeals were dismissed on 30-06-2008. Hence, these Second Appeals. 6. Sri P. Satyanarayana, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that when, there existed a settlement between the parties to the suit, it was obligatory on the part of the respondents herein to bring it to the notice of the Court, and suppression thereof amounts to fraud and misrepresentation. He contends that the Courts below did not take into account, the oral and documentary evidence adduced by his clients, and that the judgments rendered by the Courts below cannot be sustained in law or on facts. 7. Sri K.R. Prabhakar, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the very allegation as to the existence of a compromise is without basis and that the applications filed by the appellants were untenable in law. He contends that the only way through which a declaration as to the nature of a decree can be sought is by filing a suit, and that such a relief cannot be claimed in an application under Rule 97 of Order 21 C.P.C. 8. The appellants figured as defendants in O.S.No. 149 of 1985 filed by Sri Madhava Rao, the father of the 151 respondent, for recovery of possession of the suit schedule property. It was decreed on 29-10-1991. The appellants did not file appeal against that decree and permitted it to become final. It was only when the respondents filed E.P., for execution of the decree, that the appellants came forward with applications under Rule 97 of Order 21 C.P.C. The prayer made in their applications reads as under: "Petitioners therefore pray that this Honourable Court may be pleased to adjudicate on the right, title and interest of the 151 petitioner and make an order declaring that, (a) the decree dt. 29-10-1991 made in O.S.149 of 85 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam is not binding or executable against petitioners in general and particularly against the 1st petitioner. 29-10-1991 made in O.S.149 of 85 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam is not binding or executable against petitioners in general and particularly against the 1st petitioner. (b) The 151 Petitioner is entitled to be in absolute possession and peaceful enjoyment of the petition schedule property without being disturbed or dispossessed or meddled with in execution of the decree dt. 29-1 01991 in O.S.149 of 85 or otherwise in any manner whatever." 9. In support of their claim, the appellants examined P.Ws.1 and 2, and filed Exs.A-1 to A-15. No evidence was adduced by the respondents. The Executing Court dismissed the applications. The appeals filed against them were also dismissed. In view of the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the parties, two questions arise for consideration, viz., (a) whether the judgment-debtor under a decree can seek the relief of declaration, as to the binding nature of the decree, or, about his right to possession over the suit schedule property? and (b) whether a compromise said to have been arrived at between the parties to the decree can be taken into account, unless it was recorded by the Court under Order 23 C.P.C. 10. It is not in dispute that the appellants figured as defendants in O.S.No.149 of 1985. The suit was decreed on 29-10-1991, and before that, they were set ex parte. In case they felt aggrieved by the order through which they were set ex parte, or the ex parte decree, necessary applications under Order 9 C.P.C., ought to have been filed at the relevant stages. Another remedy is to prefer a regular appeal against the decree. The appellants did not choose to avail any of those remedies. They became active, only when the respondents filed the E.P. They filed applications under Rule 97 of Order 21 C.P.C. The provision reads as under. "Order XXI, Rule 97: Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property:- (1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained". 11. (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained". 11. A perusal of this provision makes it clear that it is meant basically for the benefit of the decree-holder, to remove the obstruction caused by persons, other than the judgment-debtors. Though the expression "any person' is wide enough, for all practical purposes, the judgment-debtors get excluded from its purview. The reason is that, the obstruction that may be offered by the judgment-debtors, or persons claiming through them, for delivery of the property, under a decree, for possession, is dealt with specifically under Rule 95 of Order 21 C.P.C. Further, by and large, an application under that provision is to be filed by the decree holder. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has widened the scope of this provision, enabling the persons, who are facing dispossession in the process of execution also, to file an application, under it. Reference in this context may be made to the judgment in Shreenath v. Rajesh 1998 (3) ALT 1 (SC) = AIR 1998 SC 1827 = 1998 (3) ALT 21 (DNSC). It was held that while an application, by a person, who is already dispossessed, can be filed under Rule 99, the one, who is facing the threat of dispossession, can file the application under Rule 97 of Order 21 C.P.C. Either way, the Rule does not contemplate an application to be filed by the judgment-debtor. The Supreme Court observed, ".. In other words, when such person is in possession, the adjudication is to be under Rule 97 and in case dispossessed, adjudication is to be under Rule 100 (old law) and Rule 99 under the new law. Thus a person holding possession of an immovable property on his own right can object in the execution proceeding under Order 21, Rule 97. One has not to wait for his dispossession to enable him to participate in the execution proceedings. This shows that such person can object and get adjudication when he is sought to be dispossessed by the decree holder." 12. Assuming that it is also competent for the judgment-debtor to file an application under that provision, the scope of enquiry into it is very limited. This shows that such person can object and get adjudication when he is sought to be dispossessed by the decree holder." 12. Assuming that it is also competent for the judgment-debtor to file an application under that provision, the scope of enquiry into it is very limited. In Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust AIR 1998 SC 1754 = 1998 (3) ALT 4 (DNSC), the Supreme Court indicated the purport of inquiry in an application filed under Rule 99, or 97 of Order 21 C.P.C. It was held: "The questions which the executing Court is obliged to determine under Rule 101, must possess two adjuncts. First is that such questions should have legally arisen between the parties, and the second is, such questions must be relevant for consideration and determination between the parties, e.g. if the obstructor admits that he is a transferee pendente lite it is not necessary to determine a question raised by him that he was unaware of the litigation when he purchased the property. Similarly, a third party, who questions the validity of a transfer made by a decree-holder to an assignee, cannot claim that the question regarding its validity should be decided during execution proceedings." 13. The relief claimed by the appellants in their applications is almost the one, that can be prayed for in a suit for declaration of title. When they have suffered a decree for eviction, the question of their being entitled to be in possession does not arise, as long as the decree operates. The main ground pleaded as to the non-executability is that, the respondents have mis-represented the facts before the trial Court and thereby obtained the decree. 14. Once the decree against the appellants became final, there is nothing that can prevent the execution thereof. If the appellants are of the view, that the decree ought not to have been passed, or that they have been set ex parte, without any basis, the only remedy was, to file an application, to set aside the ex parte decree, or to prefer an appeal. There is hardly anything that the Executing Court can do about it. An application under Rule 97 of Order 21 C.P.C. does not permit the grant of such a relief. Therefore, the answer to the first question framed above, is in the negative. 15. There is hardly anything that the Executing Court can do about it. An application under Rule 97 of Order 21 C.P.C. does not permit the grant of such a relief. Therefore, the answer to the first question framed above, is in the negative. 15. Now, as to the second question: It was strongly urged by the appellants before the Courts below and before this Court, that there existed a compromise between themselves and the respondents. Order 23 Rule of C.P.C. provides for recording of compromise. Unless the compromise is recorded by the Court, any arrangement, even if has taken place, cannot be taken into account, that too by an Executing Court. Analogy in this regard can be drawn from Rule 2 of Order 21 C.P.C. The only distinguished feature is that, while the said provision deals with the matters, after the decrees are passed, Order 23 deals with the adjustments, or arrangements before the suit is disposed of. An arrangement outside the Court, even if true, cannot be pleaded as to a bar for execution of the decree, unless it was recorded by the Court. 16. Viewed from any angle, the applications filed by the appellants are not tenable. The Executing Court as well as the lower Appellate Court have furnished cogent reasons for rejecting the said applications. 17. The C.M.S. As are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.