Judgment M.R. Shah, J.—Rule. Ms. Krina Calla, learned AGP waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the Respondents No. 1 and 3 and Shri J.B. Pardiwala, learned Advocate waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the Respondent No. 2. With the consent of the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing today. 2. By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners who are staff members of the District Court, Gandhinagar have prayed for an appropriate writ, direction and order directing the Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 to award the benefit of higher pay scale to them as provided in the Government Resolution dated 16.8.1994 issued by the Finance Department, State of Gujarat on completion of 9 years of service from the date of their first appointment. 3. Petitioner No. 1 was appointed as an Assistant (Junior Clerk) initially with the Principal Civil Judge (J.D.), Bhuj vide appointment order dated 10.10.1996. He joined the services on 17.10.1996. He requested for voluntary transfer and he was transferred on 1.9.2000 to work with the Civil Judge (J.D.), Sanand. It is the case on behalf of the Petitioner No. 1 that he cleared his departmental examination on 29.10.2005 and thereafter considering 9 years service from 17.10.1996 he applied for higher pay scale on 23.1.2007. The Petitioner No. 2 was appointed as an Assistant ((Junior Clerk) initially with the Civil Judge (J.D.), and JMFC, Umreth vide appointment order dated 10.04.1997. He joined the services on 17.04.1997. He requested for voluntary transfer and he was transferred on 29.4.2000 to work with the Assistant Judge, Gandhinagar. It is the case on behalf of the Petitioner No. 2 that he cleared his departmental examination on 29.10.2005 and thereafter considering 9 years service from 17.04.1997 he applied for higher pay scale on 6.12.2007. Petitioner No. 3 was appointed as an Assistant (Junior Clerk) with the Civil Judge (S.D.), Nadiad vide appointment order dated 10.4.1997. She joined the service on 21.4.1997. At her request, she was transferred on 20.3.1999 to work with the District Court, Ahmedabad (Rural). She cleared her departmental examination on 29.10.2005. She applied for higher pay scale on 27.3.2008 on completion of 9 years of service as an Assistant (Junior Clerk). She joined the service on 21.4.1997. At her request, she was transferred on 20.3.1999 to work with the District Court, Ahmedabad (Rural). She cleared her departmental examination on 29.10.2005. She applied for higher pay scale on 27.3.2008 on completion of 9 years of service as an Assistant (Junior Clerk). Petitioner No. 4 was appointed as Gujarati Stenographer (Grade-3) with the Civil Judge (J.D.) and JMFC, Santrampur, District Panchmahals vide appointment order dated 13.5.1983. He joined the service on 30.12.1983. At his request, he was transferred on 13.7.1987 to work with the District Judge, Vadodara and on 10.11.1997 to work with the District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural). He cleared departmental examination on 24.6.1994. Thereafter, he has applied for higher grade pay scale on 21.11.2007 as by then he had completed 24 years of service as Gujarati Stenographer. Petitioner No. 5 was appointed as a Peon with the District Court, Panchmahals vide appointment order dated 1.12.1983. He joined the services on 30.12.1983. At his request, he was transferred on 13.7.1987 to work with the District Judge, Vadodara and on 10.11.1997 to work with the District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural). Thereafter, he applied for higher grade pay scale on 28.6.2007 on completion of 9 years of service on 1.12.1992 and 24 years of service on 30.12.2007 as a peon. 4. It is the case on behalf of the respective petitioners that they are entitled to higher pay scale on completion of 9 years of service in the same cadre/post by Government Resolution dated 16.8.1994 issued by the Finance Department, State of Gujarat. That, thereafter the Principal District Judge, Gandhinagar forawarded the case of the petitioners for granting the benefit of higher grade pay scale from the respective date on completion of 9 years of service from the date of their initial appointment with necessary recommendation. It is the case on behalf of the respective petitioners that in the case of petitioner Nos. 1 and 5, Respondent No. 3 has raised an objection against the grant of higher pay scale to the effect that their earlier seniority/ services prior to their request transfer cannot be considered while granting the benefit of higher pay scale as on request transfer they have agreed to forgo their seniority and they have agreed that they may be placed at the bottom of the seniority at the transferred place. It is the case on behalf of the respective petitioners that so far as other petitioners are concerned, though the Respondent No. 3 has raised no objection to the grant of higher pay scale, however they have also not been extended the benefit of higher grade pay scale on the aforesaid ground. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the same and in not awarding the benefit of higher pay scale as per the Government Resolution dated 16.8.1994 and on not counting the service /seniority prior to their request transfer, respective petitioners have preferred present Special Civil Application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. Shri Shalin Mehta, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has vehemently submitted that in spite of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Uttam Vishun Pawar reported in 2008 AIR SCW 937 and even in so many decisions of the Division Bench as well as learned Single Judge of this Court, though it is within the knowledge of Respondent Nos. 1 and 3, office of Respondent No. 3 is raising same and similar objection every time dragging the every employee to litigation and the respective employees are compelled to approach before this Court to obtain the similar order. It is submitted that once a decision is taken by this Court on a particular point and the controversy, authority is bound to act as per the same and apply the same in the subsequent cases also and grant the benefit considering the decision on a particular point either by this Court or by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is submitted that same would save the Court’s time and avoid the further litigation and even the employee might not have to incur further expenditure. Shri Mehta, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respective petitioners has heavily relied upon the decision of the learned Single Judge in the case of Smt. Dhanlakshmiben Liladhar Suchak vs. Director of Ayurved and Others reported in 1992 (2) GLH 478 . Shri Mehta, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respective petitioners has also relied upon the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Secretary, Labour Social Welfare & Tribunal Development Department & Anr. reported in 1982 (1) GLR 61 . Shri Mehta, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respective petitioners has also relied upon the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Secretary, Labour Social Welfare & Tribunal Development Department & Anr. reported in 1982 (1) GLR 61 . It is submitted that even the Full Bench of this Court has gone to the extent observing that not to follow the decision of this Court by the State authority in a similar type of case would tantamount to committing civil contempt. 6. On merits, Shri Shalin Mehta, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respective petitioners has heavily relied upon the following decisions inclusive of recent decision of this Court in the case of Naynaben Manubhai Vyas & Others vs. State of Gujarat & Others, dated 12.3.2009 in Special Civil Application No. 1446 of 1994 and other allied matters. (1) Unreported decision of the learned Single Judge dated 24.07.2001 in Special Civil Application No. 8076 of 1995 in the case of Jayesh Balashanker Dave vs. State of Gujarat confirmed by the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 187 of 2003 and further confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as the Special Leave Petitions against the said decision has been dismissed. 2. Unreported decision of the Division Bench dated 05.05.2003 in Letter Patent Appeal No. 229 of 2003 and other cognate appeals in the case of Paragbhai Bhagwandas Patel and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. 3. Unreported decision of the Division Bench dated 20.12.2003 in Letter Patent Appeal No. 761 of 2003 in Special Civil Application No. 10469 of 1999 in the case of State of Gujarat and Ors. vs. Mulchandbhai Lavjibhai Patel and Ors. 4. Ajitsinh Chaturji Rathod vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2004 (4) GLR 3181. 5. State vs. Muchandbhai L. Patel reported in 2004 (1) GLR 536 6. Unreported decision of the learned Single Judge dated 12.02.2008 in Special Civil Application No. 12721 of 2007 and Anr. Confirmed by the Division Bench dated 06.10.2008 in Letter Patent Appeal No. 789 of 2008 and other cognate appeals in the case of District Development Officer and Anr. vs. Devenkumar Rameshchandra Yagnik 7. Ms. Calla, learned AGP appearing on behalf of the Respondent Nos. Confirmed by the Division Bench dated 06.10.2008 in Letter Patent Appeal No. 789 of 2008 and other cognate appeals in the case of District Development Officer and Anr. vs. Devenkumar Rameshchandra Yagnik 7. Ms. Calla, learned AGP appearing on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 at the outset conceded that the objection raised by the Respondent No. 3 shall not sustain in view of the various decision of the Division Bench as well as learned Single Judges of this Court as well as the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Uttam Vishun Pawar (Supra). It is further submitted by her that the Respondent No. 3 was in fact not aware of the decision of this Court. It is further submitted that it was not the slightest intention on the part of the authority, more particularly Respondent No. 3 to disregard and / or disrespect and / or not to follow the decision of this Court on the point. Ms. Calla, learned AGP has tendered unconditional apology on behalf of the Respondent No. 3 for raising an objection that the petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of Government Resolutions dated 16.8.1994, 31.3.1994 and 15.7.2004 as the Respondent No. 3 was not aware about the judgment and proposition of law governing field of granting of higher pay scale to the employee who has been transferred on his own request. He has assured on oath that due care will be taken while dealing with these kind of cases with utmost care and caution. Ms. Calla, learned AGP has fairly conceded that the Respondent No. 3 is withdrawing the objection raised by him and on return of the case of the petitioners by the learned Principal District Judge, Gandhinagar the benefit of higher pay scale shall be extended to all the petitioners on counting their earlier seniority/services prior to their request transfer also and necessary payment /arrears shall be paid at the earliest. Shri J.B. Pardiwala, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 has submitted that Respondent No. 2 shall return the case of the respective petitioners for grant of benefit of higher grade scale within a period of 10 days for necessary orders by the Respondent No. 3 8. Heard the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties. 9. Heard the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties. 9. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the objection raised by the Respondent No. 3 that while granting the benefit of higher pay scale on completion of 9 years service/seniority prior to the request transfer is not required to be counted is not sustainable in view of the many decisions of the Division Bench as well as learned Single Judges of this Court. Even, the controversy in question is now not res integra in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Uttam Vishun Pawar (Supra). All the decisions have been considered by this Court in the recent decision of this Court in the case of Naynaben Manubhai Vyas & Others (Supra) dated 12.3.2009 in Special Civil Application No. 1446 of 1994 and other allied matters. In spite of the above decisions of this Court, since long the office of the Respondent No. 3 is raising same and similar objection driving the employee to the Court and to obtain the similar order. If, on a particular point there is a decision of this Court every authority of the State Government is bound to follow the same unless it is upset by the higher forum. The authority has to apply its mind before raising objection and grant the benefit accordingly and shall not compel the employee to obtain similar order from the Court. To raise the objections again and again which are overruled by the Court by decision would not only compelling the employee to incur the expenditure towards the legal proceedings but it will also increase the litigation and burden to the Courts, which are otherwise today heavy burdened due to backlog of cases and Courts are trying their best to get out of the backlog. In the case of Smt. Dhanlakshmiben Liladhar Suchak (Supra) the learned Single Judge of this Court as far as back in the year 1992 has observed that the Government should be model employer. The model employer is one who would not deny just claim of his employee and employees on any technical ground. Such model employer would not wait for any direction to be given to accept just claim of the employee/employees. The model employer is one who would not deny just claim of his employee and employees on any technical ground. Such model employer would not wait for any direction to be given to accept just claim of the employee/employees. It is further observed that once it is found that an employee is similarly situated the benefits flowing from a judgment in a case of other similarly situated employee, it should be given to other similarly situated employee and employee should not be driven to the Court for addressing just grievances. Even in the case of Secretary, Labour, Social Welfare & Tribunal Development Department & Anr. (Supra), the Full Bench of this Court in Para 9 and 10 has observed and held as under: “9. The legal position regarding the binding nature of judgments delivered by High Courts was clearly explained as far back as 1962 by the Supreme Court. In East India Commercial Co. Ltd. vs. Collector of Customs, Calcuttam, AIR 1962 SC 1893 , Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) speaking for himself and Mudholkar, J., has explained though A.K. Sarkar J. who was the legal position, the legal position in Paragraph 29 of the report as follows: This raises the question whether an administrative tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest Court in the State and initiate proceedings in direct violation of the law so declared. Under Article 215, every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Under Article 226, it has a plenary power to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Article 227 it has jurisdiction over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that Court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. If a tribunal can do so, all the subordinate courts can equally do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of Supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate Courts. If a tribunal can do so, all the subordinate courts can equally do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of Supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate Courts. It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior tribunal that all the tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working: otherwise, there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for law would irretrievably suffer, We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest Court in the State is binding on authorities or tribunals under its superintendence, and that they cannot ignore it either in initiating a proceeding or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. If that be so, the notice issued by the authority, signifying the launching of proceedings contrary to the law laid down by the High Court would be invalid and the proceedings themselves would be without jurisdiction.” The position was reiterated in Makhan Lal vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1971 SC 2206 . It was the context of the law declared by the Supreme Court that the decision laid down to that effect so far as Article 141 of the Constitution was concerned, but what has been observed in Paragraph 5 at page 2209 by Grover, J. speaking for the Supreme Court has equal application so far as pronouncements by the High Courts are concerned. Grover, J. observed at page 2209: “The Judgment which was delivered did not merely declare the promotions granted to the respondents in the writ petition filed at the previous stage as unconstitutional but also laid down in clear and unequivocal terms that the distribution of appointments, posts or promotions made in implementation of the communal policy was contrary to the constitutional guarantee of Article 16. The law so declared by this Court was binding on the respondent State and its officers and they were bound to follow it whether a majority of the present respondents were parties or not to the previous petition.” It cannot, therefore, be contended by anyone, that since Acharya, the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 2215 of 1979, was not a party to Special Civil Application No. 806 of 1975, that the law laid down by D.A. Desai, J. in his judgment in that case on August 7, 1975 was not applicable to the case of Acharya. Whether the law is declared by the Supreme Court or whether the law is declared by the High Court, the legal position as regards authorities and tribunals subordinate to the Supreme Court and High Courts respectively is the same as pointed out by Subba Rao, J. in East India Commercial Co. case (Supra). 10. In Shri Baradakanta Mishtra vs. Shri Bhimsen Dixit, AIR 1972 SC 2466 , the legal position regarding binding nature of the High Court’s decision was once again reiterated by the Supreme Court and after quoting the above passage which we have extracted from the judgment of Subba Rao, J. in East India Commercial Co. case (Supra) in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the judgment, Dwiveid J. speaking for the Supreme Court observed at page 2169: “The conduct of the appellant in following the previous decision of the High Court is calculated to create confusion in the administration of law. It will undermine respect for law laid down by the High Court and impair the constitutional authority of the High Court. His conduct is therefore comprehended by the principles underlying the law of contempt. The analogy of the inferior court’s disobedience to the specific order of a superior Court also suggests that his conduct falls within the purview of the law of contempt. Just as the disobedience to a specific order of the Court undermines the authority and dignity of the Court in a particular case, similarly any deliberate and mala fide conduct of not following the law laid down in the previous decision undermines the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court. Indeed, while the former conduct has repercussions on an individual case and on a limited number of persons, the latter conduct has a much wider and more disastrous impact. Indeed, while the former conduct has repercussions on an individual case and on a limited number of persons, the latter conduct has a much wider and more disastrous impact. It is calculated not only to undermine the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court generally, but is also likely to subvert the Rule of law and engender harassing uncertainty and confusion in the administration of law.” In Hashmukhlal C. Shah vs. State of Gujarat, 19 GLR 378, a Division Bench of this High Court consisting of J.B. Mehta and P.D. Desai, JJ. after examining several decisions on the point, observed: “... in a Government which is ruled by laws, there must be complete awareness to carry out faithfully and honestly lawful orders passed by a Court of law after impartial adjudication. Then only will private individuals, organizations and institutions learn to respect the decisions of Court. In absence of such attitude on the part of all concerned, chaotic conditions might arise and the function assigned to the Courts of law under the Constitution might be rendered a futile exercise. “ From these four decisions, the following propositions emerges: (1) It is immaterial that in a previous litigation the particular petitioner before the Court was or was not a party, but if law on a particular point has been laid down by the High Court, it must be followed by all authorities and tribunals in the State. (2) The law laid down by the High Court must be followed by all authorities and subordinate tribunals when it has been declared by the highest Court in the State and they cannot ignore it either in initiating proceeding of deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. (3) If in spite of the earlier exposition of law by the High Court having been pointed out and attention being pointedly drawn to that legal position in utter disregard of that position proceedings are initiated, it must be held to be a wilful disregard of the law laid down by the High Court and would amount to civil contempt as defined in Section 2(b) of the Contempt Courts Act, 1971.” Thus, even the Division Bench has held that not following the law laid down by the High Court and disregarding the same would amount to Civil Contempt as defined in Section 2(b) of the of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. However, in view of the unconditional apology tendered by the concerned officer, which is accepted, no further order is passed. 10. In view of the above, the action of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 and more particularly, Respondent No. 3 i.e. office of the Local Fund raising the same/ similar objection again and again while considering the grant of benefit of higher grade pay scale is highly deprecated. As such it is not believable that the Respondent No. 3 was not aware of the decision of this Court. In fact, in the communication from the office of the Respondent No. 2 there is a reference to the decision of this Court, therefore, the submission on behalf of the Respondent No. 3 that he was not aware of the decision of this Court cannot be accepted. However, in view of the unconditional apology tendered by the Respondent No. 3 and assurance to this Court that in future Respondent No. 3 and its Office shall take care and that it was not his intention to disregard and / or disrespect the orders passed by this Court, unconditional apology is accepted. Respondent Nos. 1 and 3, more particularly Respondent No. 3 and its Officers are warned that as and when not only in the case of grant of higher pay scale but in any other cases as and when it is brought to their knowledge the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and / or this Court in other similar case they will apply their mind and grant the benefit without insisting for individual orders from the Court. All the authorities under the State are bound to consider the decisions of this Court as well as the Hon’ble Supreme Court even if the decisions are with respect to other similarly situated employees. The same would avoid the further litigation and decrease the burden of the Court and also similarly situated employee may not have to incur expenditure on the legal proceedings. If, in future it is found that the authority has insisted for the individual orders from the Court though covered by the decisions of the Court with respect to other similarly situated employees and the employee is driven to the litigation and the Courts it would be viewed very seriously. If, in future it is found that the authority has insisted for the individual orders from the Court though covered by the decisions of the Court with respect to other similarly situated employees and the employee is driven to the litigation and the Courts it would be viewed very seriously. The Secretary Legal Department as well as Secretary General Administrative Department are hereby directed to issue necessary circular to all the departments accordingly not to insist for individual order when the controversy is concerned by the decision in other employees case. 11. Now, so far as the present petition is concerned, in view of the statement made by Ms. Calla, learned AGP appearing on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 recorded herein above and that the Respondent No. 3 is now withdrawing the objection raised by him with respect to grant of benefit of higher grade pay scale to the respective petitioners, on return of case papers of the respective petitioners by the Respondent No. 2 to the Respondent No. 3, the Respondent No. 3 is directed to pass an appropriate order with respect to grant of the benefit of higher grade scale in accordance with the Government Resolution dated 16.8.1994 of the Finance Department considering the seniority/service of the respective petitioners from the date of their first appointment as an Assistant (Junior Clerk) i.e. inclusive of seniority/service prior to their request transfer within a period of 3 weeks from the date of the receipt of the case papers from the office of the Respondent No. 2 and pay the arrears within a period of 4 weeks thereafter without fail. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.