JUDGMENT 1. Heard counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner is challenging the order dated 14/12/2004 passed by the Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Amravati, on the application for condonation of delay in preferring an appeal No. 19/1997 to challenge the termination order dated 20.1.1992, rejecting his application. 3. The petitioner had preferred an appeal under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (in short MEPS Act), to challenge his termination dated 20.1.1992 issued at the instance of Respondent Nos. 1 & 2. As the appeal was filed in 1997, he had preferred an application for condonation of delay of about 5 years in preferring that appeal. According the petitioner, he was involved in litigations against Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 in Civil Court. Even a criminal case was initiated by Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 against him under Sections 465, 468 and 471 of the IPC, later on Chief Judicial Magistrate, Akola, discharged him in the said Criminal Case -RCC No. 1070 of 1993. That case was instituted on the allegations that he had fabricated a document of confirmation letter to take advantage of the same; to get confirmation in the service and to challenge the termination. According to him, when he was discharged by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Akola, on 24.2.97, he received the support to challenge the termination order dated 20.1.92 and as such he filed the instant appeal under Section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act. As this appeal was delayed, he preferred the delay condonation application claiming that there was sufficient cause in not preferring the appeal during the limitation period prescribed for such appeal by the M.E.P.S. Act i.e. of 30 days. The learned Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Amravati, rejected that application on the ground that he had failed to make out sufficient cause for condoning the delay. According to the learned Presiding Officer, the appellant (Petitioner) has not established that he had under wrong assumption taken a remedy before the Civil Court. He was aware that the remedy against his termination was available before the School Tribunal. It was full, complete and speedy remedy and therefore, he should have approached to the School Tribunal. He found that the authorities referred by the appellant were not indicative that prosecution of his case before the civil court was sufficient to condone the delay. He was aware that the remedy against his termination was available before the School Tribunal. It was full, complete and speedy remedy and therefore, he should have approached to the School Tribunal. He found that the authorities referred by the appellant were not indicative that prosecution of his case before the civil court was sufficient to condone the delay. According to him, the ignorance of law was no excuse and therefore, the delay could not be condoned. He, therefore, held that the application for condonation of delay was required to be dismissed on failure of the appellant to establish the sufficient cause. 4. This order is challenged in this petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the School Tribunal has wrongly held that the suit was prosecuted by the petitioner to challenge the termination order. According to him, the suit was for securing the injunction against the respondent-management to appoint one Shri Solanki in his place. Therefore, that suit was not a remedy persuaded for challenging his termination. According to him, the document Exh.76 therein which was confirmation letter produced by him to challenge the proposed appointment of one Shri Solanki in his place, was branded by the respondents as a fabricated & false document to suit his purpose and therefore, inquiry was held against him, so also he was prosecuted in criminal case for the relevant offence and when he was discharged with the finding that the said letter was not fabricated & false one, he could have been proved that his termination dated 20.1.92 was illegal. Therefore, the proceedings of appeal under Section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act, which he had filed after his discharge from the criminal case were filed well within limitation. In any case, there was sufficient cause to condone the delay. He has relied on certain authorities i.e. AIR 1985 SC 1 ; Sital Prasad Saxena (dead) by Lrs., vs. Union of India and others; and AIR 1998 SC 3222 ; N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy, wherein the Apex Court has observed in para 11 thus- “11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer cause would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reimpublicate up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation), Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.” Therefore, the delay could have been condoned. According to him, there was no deliberate attempt or delaying tactics on the part of the petitioner and in fact after his discharge from the criminal charges regarding confirmation letter, he has filed this appeal immediately and therefore, the delay; though it is of five years; should have been condoned, more so in the interest of justice. 6. Shri Rohit Sharma, learned counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 has submitted that the criminal court's findings are not binding on the civil courts in view of the decision reported in AIR 2005 PATNA 51; Lalmuni Devi and others vs. Jagdish Tiwary and others, and therefore, the discharge of the petitioner in criminal case has no bearing in the matter. According to him, rightly the petitioner was terminated in the year 1992. Whatever would have been the status of the civil proceedings instituted by him, he could have filed the appeal under Section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act. There is no reason as to why he could not file the appeal, though his civil suit or criminal case against him was pending. Whatever would have been the status of the civil proceedings instituted by him, he could have filed the appeal under Section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act. There is no reason as to why he could not file the appeal, though his civil suit or criminal case against him was pending. According to him, the petitioner had acted with considerable negligence and therefore, the tribunal has rightly refused to condone the delay. 7. In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties, it is necessary to note that the civil suit filed by the petitioner was of 1990. The said suit seems to be decided in the year 1992, which was dismissed. The petitioner challenged the same in appeal, which was also dismissed. The same was challenged again in this Court; ending with dismissal in 1996. The question is whether prosecution of such civil suit was a cause sufficient to condone the delay. 8. It is not made out by the petitioner that he was not in the knowledge of the provisions of Section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act. Even if he was engaged in conduct of civil suit, which according to the petitioner was for injunction to restrain the management from sacking his service and appointing one Shri Solanki in his place, that would not have been a sufficient cause to condone the delay. The contention of the petitioner is that unless the said confirmation letter was declared to be non fabricated or false document by the criminal court, he would not have been entitled to institute appeal against his termination. It is not so. The appeal of the petitioner/appellant under section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act was to challenge the oral termination effected by the respondent management on 20.1.1992. It had nothing to do at that time with the said confirmation letter. The confirmation letter may have boosted the petitioner's case, but then, only the relevant factor for the decision of the appeal under section 9 of M.E.P.S. Act was whether the oral termination was valid or not. The challenge could have been made in the appeal within the limitation period prescribed by Section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act. Therefore, there was no reason for him to wait till he was cleared from the criminal case. Thus, his contention in this regard is far from acceptance. 9. The challenge could have been made in the appeal within the limitation period prescribed by Section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act. Therefore, there was no reason for him to wait till he was cleared from the criminal case. Thus, his contention in this regard is far from acceptance. 9. It is pertinent to note that as he was prosecuting civil suit, he would have been in touch with the counsel. He could have received advise in that behalf. To say that he was under wrong belief that unless his confirmation letter gains some trustworthiness because of the discharge of the petitioner from criminal case, that fact by itself would not be sufficient cause for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal under Section 9 of M.E.P.S. Act, which was solely on new cause of action and independent of earlier pending proceedings. 10. No doubt, the School Tribunal has observed something inconsistent with the subject matter of the petitioner's suit, fact remains that the petitioner had failed to make out a case for condonation of delay, which was to the extent of about 5 years. His engaging in a civil suit or in defending the criminal case and departmental inquiry is of no avail in this regard. 11. The decisions referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner reported in AIR 1985 SC 1 and AIR 1998 SC 3222 (Supra) would not be of any benefit to the petitioner. 12. As regards decision of Patna High Court referred by the learned counsel for the respondents, suffice it to say that , it is also not relevant. 13. The crucial issue in the present case, in my opinion, was whether the petitioner was prevented for any sufficient cause from instituting the appeal under Section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act. The answer in the circumstances of the case is in negative. The sequel, therefore, is that the petition will have to be dismissed. The same is dismissed. No order as to costs.