Judgment K.Kannan, J. 1. The revision is against the order rejecting an application for amendment of the plaint. By the application, the petitioner wanted to contend that the sale deeds executed by the husband and the father of the petitioner respectively purported to have been sold the property in favour of the defendant on 01.09.2000 and that the sales were required to be set aside. The suit had been instituted in the year, 2004 and even on the date of the institution of the suit, more than 3 years had elapsed from the date of the execution of the sale deeds. The contention by the purchaser-defendant was that the amendment which was proposed to be taken, was barred by limitation even on the date of the institution of the suit and was equally barred on the date when the application had been filed. The Court accepted the contention and rejected the petition. 2. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner went on to contend that as per the averment in the plaint in para 5, he had stated that the defendant had no right, title or interest in the property and that he was denying the title of the plaintiffs to the property on the basis of the mutation effected wrongly in his favour in revenue entries and therefore, the plaintiff was filing the suit for declaration and for injunction restraining the defendant from alienating during the disposing on the suit. In defence the defendant pleaded that he had actually purchased the property under two transactions of sale: one at the instance of the husband of the first plaintiff Harjap Singh and another by Harjap Singh acting on behalf of the father Fateh Singh. In the ultimate analysis, by the amendment which the plaintiff was seeking, he wanted to contend that Harjap Singh, the vendor, had been made the victim of fraud to sell the property and therefore, the sales were required to be set aside. If the property was claimed by the plaintiffs as heirs to Harjap Singh, they could claim as heir only from the ancestral property. If he had sold the property during his life time and the vendor himself had not taken any action during his life for 4 years to have the sales set aside, it does not avail to the plaintiff to claim for similar relief. If he had sold the property during his life time and the vendor himself had not taken any action during his life for 4 years to have the sales set aside, it does not avail to the plaintiff to claim for similar relief. The limitation for assailing a transaction on the ground of fraud is 3 years from when the fraud was committed or when he had knowledge thereof. The person, who had executed the sale deeds, was bound to have the knowledge of transactions on the date when he accepted the same and if he had not taken any action during his life time within a period of limitation, a fortiorari, the plaintiffs cannot also take any action. The claim was patently barred by limitation. 3. If the plaintiff succeed on the ground that the sale was not merely a fraudulent transaction, but it was void transaction, the need for setting aside does not arise. The learned counsel refers to a decision in Jai Singh v. Smt. Sukhjit Kaur, 2007(4) R.C.R. (Civil) 307 that if the plaintiff was seeking to give particulars of fraud which are already pleaded, the defendant could not be stated that any new pleadings were made. In this case, it is not a case of pleading particulars of fraud. It was a case of introducing a plea for setting aside a sale on the ground of fraud. No amendment could be ordered in a case where by such an amendment a right which had already accrued to the defendant could be put in jeopardy. By introducing the plea through an amendment, the plaintiff was literally asking for the bar of limitation to be given a go bye. The learned counsel also referred to another decision in Surjit Kaur v. Malkiat Singh, 1991 P.L.J. 412, where a decree obtained by fraud and a mutation sanctioned on the basis of such a decree was not required to be set aside or cancelled. A decree could be declared to be not binding on the owner and suit would fall under Article 59 of Limitation Act. A decree could be declared to be not binding on the owner and suit would fall under Article 59 of Limitation Act. The said decision also is an authority for the proposition for where mutation was sanctioned on the basis of fraudulent decree, the period of limitation of 3 years was to start from time when possession was sought to be disturbed and not when their mutation was sanctioned on the basis of decree obtained by fraud. The issue is not whether the mutation could be sanctioned or not. The right to title in the property does not depend on mutation. Mutation is but one facet of ownership and not the document of title itself. The document of title itself is the sale deed and in this case the sale deed in favour of the defendant was of the year 2000 which sale deed was sought to be set aside by the plaintiff by the amendment. The two decisions of this Court do not advert to a situation of the plaintiffs who file a suit seeking for a declaration in relation to immovable property find that when the defendant was setting up title in himself through a transaction of a sale from the person under whom the plaintiffs themselves made the claim and they had perforce to give reasons as to how the property could not be validly stood transferred to the purchaser. If the property stood vested with the first plaintiffs husband Harjap Singh then on his death, the property would fall to be succeeded by the plaintiffs. If he had himself divested the right to the property by sales, the claim by the plaintiffs would be wholly without basis. If the plaintiffs were to be contend that notwithstanding the sales the property continued in possession of Harjap Singh and they continued in possession of the property and that further the defendant had no title of the property at all, it is for the plaintiffs to establish a case in the manner which they had pleaded, but they cannot be permitted to bring in a pleading which is at variance with what is already contended and which if permitted, would allow the plaintiffs to defeat the claim of the defendant on the bar of limitation. The impermissibility of allowing an amendment to get over the bar of limitation was dealt with by the Honble Supreme Court, under somewhat similar circumstanced in Vishambar v. Lakshminarayan} (2001)6 S.C.C. 163. While the Courts will be liberal in construing applications for amendment, there are at least two definite exceptions: (i) when a right accrued to the defendant by a bar of limitation is sought to be defeated; (ii) when the plaintiff is seeking to withdraw admission that has already comes through his pleadings. The present application falls within the first of such exceptions which shall be impermissible. The application was correctly dismissed and there is no scope for revising the order passed. Any of these observations made in this order are only for the purpose of deciding the interlocutory application and shall have no bearing to the merits of the case as originally pleaded by the plaintiff. The civil revision is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.