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Allahabad High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 2022 (ALL)

MOHD. PARVEZ KHAN v. STATE OF U. P.

2009-05-06

SURENDRA SINGH

body2009
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Surendra Singh, J.—By the present application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. the applicants have invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court praying for quashing of the criminal proceedings of Criminal Case No. 1206 of 2008 (State of U.P. v. Mohd. Parvez Khan and others) under Sections 498-A/323/506, IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate I, Allahabad. The secondary, prayer is for stay of further proceedings of the aforesaid case during the pendency of this application before this Court. 2. The background facts in a nutshell are as follows : Mohd. Parvez Khan applicant No. 1 was married with Opposite Party No. 2 Smt. Bushra Begum, who is informant of the case crime No. 10 of 2008 under Sections 498-A, 323, 506, IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act of P.S. Mahila Thana, District Allahabad. The FIR of the said crime number was lodged by her on 13.3.2008 at about 5 p.m. in respect of the incident dated 9.1.2005. In the said FIR all these applicants were mentioned as accused persons. Applicant No. 1 is husband, applicant No. 2 is widowed mother-in-law, applicant Nos. 3 and 4 are Nanads while applicant Nos. 5 and 6 are Dewars of the complainant opposite party No. 2. 3. The allegations in brief were that opposite party No. 2 was married with applicant No. 1 on 9.1.2005, she was subjected to cruelty and harassment for a motorcycle and one lac rupees as additional dowry by the applicants after marriage. It is alleged that on the date and time of the incident she was beaten and was turned out from their house by the applicants on account of non-fulfilment of the said demand. In order to settle the dispute, a Panchayat was convened but the attempt of compromise could not be materialized. Thereafter on the basis of said allegations the FIR was registered in pursuance of the order passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. 4. The police after usual investigation submitted a charge-sheet against the applicants on 3.5.2008 under the aforesaid sections vide Charge-sheet No. 25 of 2008 in the concerned Court of Magistrate. The concerned Magistrate took the cognizance of the offence on 3.5.2008 against all the applicants. Hence this application, by the accused persons for quashing of the aforesaid proceeding pending against them. The police after usual investigation submitted a charge-sheet against the applicants on 3.5.2008 under the aforesaid sections vide Charge-sheet No. 25 of 2008 in the concerned Court of Magistrate. The concerned Magistrate took the cognizance of the offence on 3.5.2008 against all the applicants. Hence this application, by the accused persons for quashing of the aforesaid proceeding pending against them. In the meantime, opposite party No. 2 also filed a case against applicant No. 1 in the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Allahabad as Case No. 35 of 2008 (Smt. Bushra Begum v. Mohd. Parvez Khan and others) under Section 125, Cr.P.C. After some gap of time informant as well as charge-sheeted accused persons settling their differences, came to terms and entered into a compromise with the help of some respectable persons. During the pendency of the case under Section 125, Cr.P.C. the matter has been set at rest between the parties as both of them have entered into compromise. In terms of such compromise an application was filed before the Family Court by respondent No. 2 on 25.3.2009 praying for dismissal of Case No. 35 of 2008 under Section 125, Cr.P.C. The Principal Judge, Family Court, Allahabad vide order dated 25.3.2009 had allowed the said application in terms of compromise and had closed the proceedings of the said case. This fact has not been denied rather an affidavit has been filed by her before this Court mentioning the factum of compromise and divorce. 5. I have heard Sri Abdul Majeed, Advocate on behalf of the applicants and Sri Khalid Mahmood, Advocate on behalf of opposite party No. 2, informant Smt. Bushra Begum and the learned AGA at a great length and perused the material placed on record. 6. Learned counsel for the applicants urged that since it is a case of matrimonial dispute and the parties have come to a compromise, therefore, no useful purpose will be served to drag both the parties to the Court for the purposes of completing the formalities of the case and more so when the parties have divorced by mutual consent and applicant No. 1 had also paid an amount of Mehar as well as the amount of Iddat period to opposite party No. 2 and when relationship of the husband and wife also does not exist. Therefore, it is in the interest of justice to quash the proceedings against the applicants pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate I, Allahabad. 7. Having heard Shri Majeed learned counsel for the applicants and Shri Khalid Mahmood, Advocate for the respondent No. 2 and having gone through the material placed on the record, I find that the matter relates to a matrimonial dispute on account of petty matter and both of them have settled their dispute and entered into a compromise and they do not want to further proceed in the matter. In such eventuality, there would almost be no chance of conviction, therefore, it would not be proper to decline the exercise of power for quashing of the proceedings on the ground that the offence is not compoundable. 8. It has been held by the Apex Court in the case of B.S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2003 SCC (Cri) 848, that the power of the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. is not circumscribed by Section 320, Cr.P.C. It has been further held, in para 14 of the said judgment that— “There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498-A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against the interest of woman and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likely-hood that the non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX-A of the Indian Penal Code.” 9. Some and substance of the dictim of the Apex Court does not permit me to take different view except the view expressed by the Apex Court. 10. It becomes the duty of the Court to encourage the genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes. It will, therefore, be proper to truncate or snip the proceeding against the applicants at this stage itself. In these circumstances the ends of justice would be subserved if this application is allowed. 11. 10. It becomes the duty of the Court to encourage the genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes. It will, therefore, be proper to truncate or snip the proceeding against the applicants at this stage itself. In these circumstances the ends of justice would be subserved if this application is allowed. 11. Resultantly, this application is allowed. Criminal proceedings of Criminal Case No. 1206 of 2008 (State of U.P. v. Mohd. Parvez Khan and others) under Sections 498-A/323/506, IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act relating to P.S. Mahila Thana, District Allahabad pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate I, Allahabad, is quashed. ———