ORDER : C.A. No. 5903/2006 Application for deletion of the name of respondent No. 1 is allowed at the risk of the appellant. Let the index be corrected accordingly. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and the matter remanded to the Division Bench of the High Court. Appeal allowed. No order as to the costs. C.A. Nos. 1257/22007, 1925/2007 and 708/2008 In view of the order passed in C.A. No.5903/2006 the impugned judgments and orders are set aside and the matters are remanded to the Division Bench of the High Court. ORDER C.A. NO. 5903/2006 1. Application for deletion of the name of respondent No. 1 is allowed at the risk of the appellant. Let the index be corrected accordingly. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 25.8.2005 of the High Court of Madras. The facts in detail have been given in the impugned judgment and hence we are not repeating the same here. 3. Initially a lease was granted in favour of the appellant for a period of 10 years commencing from 1.9.1959 which was extended for a further period of 10 years i.e. till 30.8.1979. In view of the provisions of the Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertaking in India) Act 1976 the lease came to be extended for another 10 years and was to come to an end in 1989. As stated in para 10 of the plaint, the landlord gave a notice dated 30.10.1995 to terminate tenancy of the tenant. Thereafter a suit for eviction was filed by the landlord-respondents for eviction of the appellant from the suit premises. 4. The appellant-tenant claimed the benefit of Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921 (hereainafter for short ’the Act’). The tenant filed an application under Section 9 of the said Act in which by order dated 16.8.2000 an Advocate Commissioner was appointed to find out the extent of land which was necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the appellant herein and for smooth running of the business and to find out the extent of land over which any superstructure has been put. An appeal was filed by the landlord against the said order dated 16.8.2000 in the City Civil Court which was allowed by order dated 12.12.2001. An appeal was filed by the landlord against the said order dated 16.8.2000 in the City Civil Court which was allowed by order dated 12.12.2001. Against the said order dated 12.12.2001, a revision petition was filed by the appellant-tenant before the High Court which has been dismissed by the High Court. Hence, the appellant is before us. 5. Mr. R.F. Nariman, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant has invited our attention to Section 2(4) of the Act, which reads as under :- "2. Definitions- In this Act unless there is anything etc. repugnant in the subject or context- (4) ’Tenant’ in relation to any land - (i) means a person liable to pay rent in respect of such land, under a tenancy agreement express or implied, and (ii) includes - (a) any such person as is referred to in sub-Clause (i) who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement, (b) any person who was a tenant in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement to which this Act is applicable under sub-Section (3) of Section 1 and who or any of his predecessors in interest had erected any building on such land and who continues in actual physical possession of such land and building, notwithstanding that- (i) Such person was not entitled to the right under this Act by reason of the proviso to Section 12 of this Act as it stood before the date of the publication of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Tamil Nadu Act IV of 1972), or (2) a decree for declaration or a decree or an order for possession or for similar relief has been passed against such person on the ground that the proviso to Section 12 of this Act as it stood before the date of the publication of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Tamil Nadu Act IV of 1972) disentitled such person from claiming the rights under this Act, and (c) The heirs of any such person as is referred to in sub-Clause (i) or sub-Clause (ii) or (ii)(b); but does not include a sub-tenant or his heirs] 6. Mr. Nariman submitted that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of both sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Section 2(4) of the Act. 7. Mr. Nariman submitted that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of both sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Section 2(4) of the Act. 7. As regards sub-clause (b) of Section 2(4), we do not agree with the contention of Mr. Nariman. On a plain reading of sub-clause (b) we notice that it uses the words "actual physical possession". Had the word ’possession’ alone been used in clause (b), as has been done in clause (a), the legal position may have been different. However, the words ’actual physical possession’ are strong and emphatic. That means that the factual state of affairs has to be seen, not the legal or deemed state of affairs. There is no doubt that the appellant had handed over possession to his licensee/agent who was in actual physical possession of the suit premises. When a Statute uses strong and emphatic words, we cannot twist or give a strained interpretation to the said words. The literal rule of interpretation is the first rule of interpretation which means that if the meaning of a Statute is plain and clear then it should not be given a twisted or strained meaning. We will be giving a strained and artificial interpretation to the words ’actual physical possession’ if we say that the appellant is deemed to be in actual physical possession. We cannot give such an interpretation to sub-clause (b) of Section 2(4) of the Act particularly since clause (a) only uses the word ’possession’ and not ’actual physical possession’. Hence, we reject the contention of Mr. R.F. Nariman, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and hold that the appellant was not in actual physical possession. 8. The Preamble of the Act makes it clear that the Act applies where superstructure is constructed on the land, which is leased. Hence, the submission that clause (a) applies when there is no superstructure erected on the vacant land which was leased is not correct. In fact, the Act was meant to give some protection to leased land on which the tenant constructed some superstructure. 9. As regards the submission of Mr. Nariman that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of sub-clause (a) of Section 2(4) of the Act, it appears that this aspect has not been considered by the High Court. In fact, the Act was meant to give some protection to leased land on which the tenant constructed some superstructure. 9. As regards the submission of Mr. Nariman that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of sub-clause (a) of Section 2(4) of the Act, it appears that this aspect has not been considered by the High Court. In our opinion, the High Court should have considered whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Section 2(4)(i) and sub-clause (a) of Section 2(4)(ii) of the Act. 10. We are not expressing any final opinion on the question whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Section 2(4) (i) and 2(4)(ii)(a) of the Act as in our opinion it was incumbent upon the High Court to have recorded a finding on the said issue. Therefore, we set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court and remand the matter back to the Division Bench of the High Court to record a finding on the question whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Section 2(4)(i) and sub-clause (a) of Section 2(4)(ii) of the Act. Needless to mention, that the Division Bench of the High Court shall decide the said question in accordance with law and uninfluenced by any observation made by us in this order except the finding that the appellant is not covered by sub-clause (b) of Section 2(4) of the Act. We make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion of our own on the other issue. We hope and trust that the Division Bench of the High Court will dispose of the case expeditiously and preferably within a period of six months from the date a copy of this order is produced before it. Appeal allowed. No order as to the costs. C.A. No. 1257/2007, C.A. No. 1925/2007 and C.A. No. 708/2008 11. In view of our order passed in C.A. No. 5903/2006, we hold that the appellant in these cases are not in actual physical possession of the land in question and hence they are not covered by Section 2(4)(ii)(b) of the Act. However, in our view the High Court should have considered whether the appellant is covered by Section 2(4)(i) and 2(4)(ii) (a) of the Act. 12. However, in our view the High Court should have considered whether the appellant is covered by Section 2(4)(i) and 2(4)(ii) (a) of the Act. 12. We are further of the opinion that where the lessee is in actual physical possession of the land over which he has made construction then he is entitled to an additional benefit given by Section 9(1)(a) (ii) of the Act. However, if the lessee who has made construction on the land let out to him but was not subsequently in possession of the same, as is the case of the appellants in the present cases, then he is not entitled to the benefit of Section 9(1)(a)(ii) though he may be entitled to the benefit of Section 9 (1)(a)(i). These are the questions on which the Division Bench of the High Court will record a finding. 13. Therefore, we set aside the impugned judgments and orders of the High Court and remand the matter back to the Division Bench of the High Court to record a finding on the question whether the appellant is covered by Section 2(4)(i) and sub-clause (a) of Section 2(4)(ii) of the Act and is entitled to the benefit of Section 9(1). Needless to mention, the Division Bench of the High Court shall decide the said question in accordance with law and uninfluenced by any observation made by us in this order except our finding about clause (b) of Section 2(4). We make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion of our own on other issues. We hope and trust that the Division Bench of the High Court will dispose of these cases expeditiously and preferably within a period of six months from the date a copy of this order is produced before it.