SABHAJEET YADAV, J. By this petition, the petitioner has challenged the letter/communication of Executive Engineer, Irrigation Department, Obra Dam Khand, Obra, Sonebhadra dated 23. 2. 2008 wherein it is stated that the compassionate appointment of petitioner would be considered after the decision in Original Suit No. 631 of 2004 instituted by Sri Mohan Prasad son of Jaipati in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Deoria. The aforesaid letter was communicated to the petitioner in pursuance of direction given by this Court in Writ Petition No. 58491 of 2007 decided on 28. 1. 2007, earlier filed by petitioner. 2. The brief facts of the case are that one Sri Triveni Prasad, who was a permanent class IV employee in the office of Executive Engineer, Irrigation Department, Obra Dam, Obra, district Sonebhadra/respondent no. 2, died while in service on 4. 10. 2003. The petitioner claims to be adopted son and dependent of said Triveni Prasad thus moved an application in the office of respondent no. 2 for his appointment on compassionate ground against class IV post on 13. 1. 2004. Since no action was taken by the respondent no. 2 for appointment of petitioner in spite of several representations and reminders, he filed writ petition referred herein before and while deciding said writ petition vide order dated 28. 11. 2007 this Court has directed the respondent no. 2 to decide the claim of compassionate appointment of petitioner within a period of three months. In pursuance thereof vide impugned order/letter dated 23. 2. 2008 the respondent no. 2 while deciding the representation of the petitioner has deferred the consideration of claim of compassionate appointment of petitioner and declined to appoint him at the moment on account of pendency of Suit No. 631 of 2004 in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Deoria instituted by Sri Mohan Prasad son of Jaipati @ Jairasi Prasad respondent no. 3, hence this petition. 3. It is stated in writ petition that Late Triveni Prasad adopted the petitioner as his son during the life time of his wife when the petitioner was only two years of age. The adoption was made according to rites and after adoption, the petitioner has started living with his adoptive father and mother. The adoption deed was also got regisrered by Triveni Prasad, adoptive father of the petitioner which is on record as Annexure-2 of the writ petition. The adoption was made according to rites and after adoption, the petitioner has started living with his adoptive father and mother. The adoption deed was also got regisrered by Triveni Prasad, adoptive father of the petitioner which is on record as Annexure-2 of the writ petition. It is also stated that the wife of Triveni Prasad i. e. adoptive mother of petitioner had died earlier, therefore, the petitioner was only heir and legal representative of his adoptive father Triveni Prasad. Thus in his service book, he had also recorded the name of petitioner for the purpose of benefit of death-cum-retirement gratuity as well as for family pension. A copy of relevant extract of service book of Late Triveni Prasad is on record as Annexure-3 of the writ petition. It is also stated that the adoption of petitioner as son of Triveni Prasad was entered in the school register wherein the name of Triveni Prasad has been shown as father of petitioner. Even in the copy of family register issued by Gram Panchayat Mohan Mundera Vikas Khand, Rampur, district Deoria, which is native place of Triveni Prasad, the petitioner has been shown as adopted son of Late Triveni Prasad. A copy of family register issued by Gram Panchayat Mohan Mundera Vikas Khand, Rampur is on record as Annexure-5 of the writ petition. 4. In para 11 of the writ petition, it is stated that respondent no. 3 Mohan Prasad has no concerned with Late Triveni Prasad as he does not come within the purview of family of Triveni Prasad as defined under U. P. Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974. Even in suit instituted by respondent no. 3 he has shown himself as son of Jaipati and not as son of Late Triveni Prasad. True copy of the plaint of suit no. 631 of 2004 instituted by Mohan Prasad in Civil Court, Deoria is on record as Annexure-8 of the writ petition. It is further stated in para 12 of the writ petition that respondent no. 2 in his written statement filed in Suit No. 631 of 2004 on his own behalf as well as on behalf of State of U. P. has specifically stated in para 17 and 18 of the said written statement that the respondent no. It is further stated in para 12 of the writ petition that respondent no. 2 in his written statement filed in Suit No. 631 of 2004 on his own behalf as well as on behalf of State of U. P. has specifically stated in para 17 and 18 of the said written statement that the respondent no. 3 cannot be given appointment on compassionate ground as he is not son of Late Triveni Prasad and does not fall within the definition of family of deceased Government servant. In this view of the matter he could not decline to accept the claim of compassionate appointment of petitioner, who is only son (adopted by Late Triveni Prasad) and his name has already been mentioned by Late Triveni Prasad in his service book as well as in the documents for gratuity and family pension as adopted son of Triveni Prasad. A copy of written statement filed by respondent no. 2 in Suite No. 631 of 2004 filed by respondent no. 3 Sri Mohan Prasad is on record as Annexure-9 of the writ petition. In para 15 of the writ petition, it is specifically stated that the sole case of respondent no. 3 is that he is legal representative and heir of deceased Triveni Prasad. A legal representative/heir of a deceased person, if he died issueless, cannot be given appointment under dying in harness rules unless such legal heir and representative comes within the definition of family defined under said rule and further unless he is found to be dependent upon a deceased Government servant. 5. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents no. 1 and 2 wherein the relevant replies of various paragraphs of the writ petition given in paras 3,4,5,6,7, and 8 are as under:- "3. That in reply to the contents of para 1 of the writ petition it is stated that as for the same dispute and controversy, involved in the present writ petition, the respondent no. 3 Mohan Prasad has filed a suit in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) Deoria, which is pending for consideration, as such, due to this reason, the claim of the petitioner being the legal heir of late Triveni Prasad is pending. 3 Mohan Prasad has filed a suit in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) Deoria, which is pending for consideration, as such, due to this reason, the claim of the petitioner being the legal heir of late Triveni Prasad is pending. Hence, due to pendency of the matter for declaration of legal heir of deceased Triveni Prasad in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Deoria, it is not possible for the answering respondents to dispose of the matter for declaration of heir of deceased Triveni Prasad. 4. That the contents of paras 2,3,4,5 and 6 of the writ petition do not need any specific reply, being matter of record. 5. That in reply to the contents of para 7 of the writ petition it is stated that due to pendency of suit for declaration of legal heir of deceased Triveni Prasad, in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Deoria, no consideration on the petitioners application for his appointment on compassionate ground, is being possible by the answering respondents. 6. That the contents of para 8 of the writ petition, as stated, need no reply, for want of specific knowledge. 7. That in reply to the contents of para 9 of the writ petition, it is stated that the copy of the order dated 28. 11. 2007 passed in Writ Petition No. 85491 of 2007 was made available in the office of answering respondents on 1. 1. 2008. But due to pendency of the dispute regarding declaration of legal heir of deceased Triveni Prasad in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Deoria, the answering respondents are not in a position to decide the application of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground. 8. That in reply to the contents of paras 10 to 17 of the writ petition it is stated that suitable reply in detail have already been given in the foregoing part of this counter affidavit, which may kindly be perused here and the same need not be repeated here over again. As the claim of the petitioner and respondent no. 3 for declaration of legal heir of deceased Triveni Prasad, is pending consideration in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Deoria, as such, the respondent no. 2 has rightly passed the impugned order dated 23. 3. 2008. As the claim of the petitioner and respondent no. 3 for declaration of legal heir of deceased Triveni Prasad, is pending consideration in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Deoria, as such, the respondent no. 2 has rightly passed the impugned order dated 23. 3. 2008. Until and unless the claim for declaration of legal heir of deceased Triveni Prasad is not decided by the Civil Court, the answering respondent no. 2 is not in a position to decide the claim of the petitioner. In view of the aforesaid facts, the impugned order dated 23. 2. 2008 passed by the respondent no. 2, is wholly just, valid and legal and the same does not suffer from any legal infirmity. The petitioner is not entitled to any of the relief, at present. The entire action taken by the respondent no. 2 is wholly just and legal. " 6. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing counsel for respondents no. 1 and 2 but in spite of service of notice upon the respondent no. 3 no one is present on his behalf. 7. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner in nut shell is that it is not disputed by the respondents no. 1 and 2 in their counter affidavit filed in this petition that the petitioner is adopted son of deceased Government employee namely Sri Triveni Prasad and is also nominee in his service records as his adopted son for post retiral benefits and family pension. It is also not disputed that in the school and family register the name of the petitioner has been shown as adopted son of Late Sri Triveni Prasad. It is also not disputed that he was dependent upon Triveni Prasad, therefore, merely because of the fact that Sri Mohan Prasad respondent no. 3 has instituted a suit for declaring him to be heir and legal representative of deceased Triveni Prasad, compassionate appointment cannot be denied to the petitioner. 8. It is also not disputed that he was dependent upon Triveni Prasad, therefore, merely because of the fact that Sri Mohan Prasad respondent no. 3 has instituted a suit for declaring him to be heir and legal representative of deceased Triveni Prasad, compassionate appointment cannot be denied to the petitioner. 8. While elaborating his submission learned counsel for the petitioner further urged that although the suit No. 631 of 2004 instituted by Sri Mohan Prasad can not be decreed as it stands but assuming for the sake of argument, even if the relief claimed in the suit that he is heir and legal representative of Late Triveni Prasad is granted to him even then no compassionate appointment can be given to him for the simple reason that Sri Mohan Prasad respondent no. 3 has described himself as son of Jaipati who was brother of Triveni Prasad and has claimed merely to be heir and legal representative of Late Triveni Prasad on the basis of any will alleged to be executed by him in his favour. Therefore, unless he would prove himself to be member of family of deceased Government servant as defined under the rules concerned, and further found to be dependent upon him, relief for compassionate appointment can not be given to him by decreeing said suit, as such respondent no. 2 could not defer and decline to consider the claim for compassionate appointment of petitioner merely on account of pendency of aforesaid suit. In support of his case learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decisions rendered by this Court in Ravindra Kumar Dubey Vs. State of U. P. and others, 2005 (4) E. S. C. (All. J) 2706, Singhasan Gupta Vs. State of U. P. and another { (1996) 1 UPLBEC 4 and Robin Mritunjai Tewari Vs. State of U. P. and others, { 2008 (4) ESC 2895 (All)}. 9. In order to appreciate the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to examine the legal impact and implication of pendency of suit for succession and compassionate appointment filed by the respondent no. 3, referred herein before. State of U. P. and others, { 2008 (4) ESC 2895 (All)}. 9. In order to appreciate the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to examine the legal impact and implication of pendency of suit for succession and compassionate appointment filed by the respondent no. 3, referred herein before. In this connection it would be useful to examine the definition of "family" given under U. P. Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 hereinafter referred to as Dying in Harness Rules 1974 as well as provisions of Sections-12 and 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act-1956 hereinafter referred to as 1956 Act, which have material bearing with the question in controversy involved in the case. 10. The relevant part of Rule 2 of Dying in Harness Rules 1974 containing the definition of "family" is extracted as under:- "2. Definitions.-- In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) x x x x x x x x x x x x x (b) x x x x x x x x x x x x x (c) "family" shall include the following relations of the deceased Government servant-- (i) Wife or husband; (ii) Sons; (iii) Unmarried and widowed daughters; (iv) if the deceased was unmarried Government servant, brother, unmarried sister and widowed mother dependant on the deceased Government servant;" 11. Now before proceeding to deal with the import of word or expression "family" defined under definition clause of Rule 2 of Dying in Harness Rules 1974 it is necessary to make reference to a decision of Honble Apex Court rendered in S. K. Gupta and another Vs. K. P. Jain and another, AIR 1979 S. C. 734, wherein Honble Apex Court has dealt with the manner in which the words and expressions defined under the definition clause of a statute has to be interpreted. The pertinent observations of Honble Apex Court made in para 25 of the said decision are extracted as under:- "25. K. P. Jain and another, AIR 1979 S. C. 734, wherein Honble Apex Court has dealt with the manner in which the words and expressions defined under the definition clause of a statute has to be interpreted. The pertinent observations of Honble Apex Court made in para 25 of the said decision are extracted as under:- "25. The noticeable feature of this definition is that it is inclusive definition and where in a definition clause the word include is used, it is so done in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things which they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include (see Dilworth v. Commr. of Stamps (1899) AC 99 at p. 105) ). Where in a definition section of a statute a word is defined to mean a certain thing, wherever that word is used in that statute, it shall mean what is stated in the definition unless the context otherwise requires. But where the definition is an inclusive definition, the word not only bears its ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that would be applicable but it also bears its extended statutory meaning. At any rate, such expansive definition should be so construed as not cutting down the enacting provisions of an Act unless the phrase is absolutely clear in having opposite effect (see Jobbins v. Middlesex Country Council (1949) 1 KB 142 ). Where the definition of an expression in a definition clause is preceded by the words unless the context otherwise requires, normally the definition given in the section should be applied and given effect to but this normal rule may, however, be departed from if there be something in the context to show that the definition should not be applied (see Khanna, J. in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) Supp. SCC 1 at p. 97 : ( AIR 1975 SC 2299 ). It would thus appear that ordinarily one has to adhere to the definition and if it is an expansive definition the same should be adhered to. SCC 1 at p. 97 : ( AIR 1975 SC 2299 ). It would thus appear that ordinarily one has to adhere to the definition and if it is an expansive definition the same should be adhered to. The frame of any definition more often than not is capable of being made flexible but the precision and certainty in law requires that it should not be made loose and kept tight as far as possible. " 12. It appears that in Rule-2 of Dying in Harness Rules which defines various words or expressions mentioned in the definition clause, these words and expressions are preceded by the words unless the context otherwise requires. It means that the definitions given in the definition clause should be normally applied and given effect to but this normal rule may however be departed from if there be something in context to show that definition should not be applied. In view of legal position stated by Honble Apex Court referred hereinbefore, the definition of expression family given in the definition clause appears to be an inclusive definition as the definition clause used the word include in the definition of family. Such definition is known as expansive definition and is used to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of statute and when it is so used, the words or phrases should be construed as comprehending not only such thing which they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. Where the definition is an inclusive definition, the word not only bears its ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that would be applicable but it also bears its extended statutory meaning. Contrary to it, where in a definition clause of a statute a word is defined to mean certain thing whenever that word is used in that statute, it shall mean what is stated in the definition unless the context otherwise requires. Such definition is known as restrictive definition and used to restrict the meaning of expression defined in the definition clause and whenever such word or expression is used in the body of the statute, it shall be restricted to meaning assigned in the definition clause and popular or natural meaning of such word or expression shall not be applied. 13. Such definition is known as restrictive definition and used to restrict the meaning of expression defined in the definition clause and whenever such word or expression is used in the body of the statute, it shall be restricted to meaning assigned in the definition clause and popular or natural meaning of such word or expression shall not be applied. 13. Now the provisions of Sections 12 and 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956 are extracted as under:- "12. Effects of adoption.-- An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family: Provided that-- (a) the child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth; (b) any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth; (c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption. 16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption.--Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved. " 14. " 14. From a joint reading of Section 12 and Section 16 of 1956 Act it is clear that with effect from the date of adoption, the adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes and would be engrafted in the family of his/her adoptive mother and father and from such date all the ties in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by adoption in adoptive family. It implies that in Hindu law on such adoption the adopted child gets all the rights, privilege and obligations of child in the adoptive family, therefore, there remains no difference between real child and adopted child and if the adoption is registered under any law for time being in force, it shall be presumed that adoption has been done in accordance with the provisions of law unless and until it is disproved. 15. Late Jagdish Swarup, eminent jurist and author, in his Book- Legislation and Interpretation (4th Edition page 304 to 311) has observed that a legal fiction is one which is not an actual reality but which the law requires the court to accept it as reality, therefore, in case of legal fiction the court believes something to exist which in reality does not exist. In other words it is nothing but a presumption of existence of a state of affairs which in actual reality is non-existent. When viewed from this context there is not much difference between a legal fiction and presumption. However, it cannot be said that legal fiction and presumption are wholly identical in all respects. A presumption may be conclusive or it may be rebuttable. A presumption gives rise to a legal fiction it is conclusive, if no evidence can be permitted to be led to deny it. In case of presumption which is rebuttable unless the contrary is established, fictitious state of affairs is presumed to exist as if it is an actual reality. As held by Honble Apex Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Vs. State of Bihar (1955) 2 SCR 603 , Braithwaite and Company (India) Ltd. Vs. Employees State Insurance Corporation AIR 1968 SC 413 and Income Tax Commissioner Vs. As held by Honble Apex Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Vs. State of Bihar (1955) 2 SCR 603 , Braithwaite and Company (India) Ltd. Vs. Employees State Insurance Corporation AIR 1968 SC 413 and Income Tax Commissioner Vs. Express Newspaper Ltd. AIR 1965 SC 33 , that the legal fictions are created only for some definite purpose for which they are created and they should not be extended beyond the legitimate field. In this view of the matter, there can be no scope for doubt to hold that by Section 12 of 1956 Act the legislature has created a legal fiction requiring the court to accept adopted child as real child of adoptive father and mother. In my opinion, such legal fiction was created for this legitimate and limited purpose. 16. It is stated in the writ petition that the petitioner is adopted son of deceased Government Servant Late Triveni Prasad through registered adoption deed, therefore, in my opinion, unless aforesaid adoption is disproved and the registered document relating to his adoption is cancelled, he shall be deemed to be the real son of Late Triveni Prasad for all the purposes including for compassionate 0 appointment under Dying in Harness Rules 1974. The inclusive definition of said Rules further fortified the aforesaid view and in my opinion the adopted son shall be included within the meaning of son, defined as member of family of deceased Government servant under Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 and the petitioner can claim all the benefits like real son of Late Triveni Prasad including compassionate appointment under aforesaid Rules. 17. Further the petitioner has stated in the writ petition that he is also nominee of Late Triveni Prasad in his service book for the purposes of post retiral dues including death-cum-retirement dues as well as family pension and in the family register and school register the name of petitioner has been shown as adopted son of Triveni Prasad and he claims to be dependent of Late Triveni Prasad. These statements of fact made in writ petition have not been denied by the respondents, therefore, I have no option but to assume them as correct. These statements of fact made in writ petition have not been denied by the respondents, therefore, I have no option but to assume them as correct. In this view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is entitled to be considered for compassionate appointment on account of death of Triveni Prasad as his son under Dying in Harness Rules 1974, unless his adoption is disproved and registered adoption deed is cancelled or declared null and void and inoperative. The aforesaid view taken by me also finds support from several decisions of this Court rendered in Sunil Saxena Vs. State of U. P. and others 1994 (68) F. L. R. 283, Singhasan Gupta Vs. State of U. P. and another (1996) 1 U. P. L. B. E. C. 4 and Ravindra Kumar Dubey Vs. State of U. P. and others 2005 (4) E. S. C. (All) 2706. 18. Now coming to the case of Sri Mohan Prasad son of Jaipati, it is clear that he is brothers son of deceased Government servant and does not come within the definition of family under the said rule even if inclusive definition of family is applied, therefore, he can not claim compassionate appointment on account of death of Late Triveni Prasad irrespective of the fact that he has instituted a suit for declaration that he may be declared heir and legal representative of deceased employee. In my opinion, even on such declaration also he can not claim compassionate appointment on account of death of Triveni Prasad. Therefore, on account of pendency of aforesaid suit instituted by the respondent no. 3 the action of respondent no. 2 deferring the consideration of claim of compassionate appointment of the petitioner can not be held to be justified. Accordingly the impugned order/letter dated 23. 2. 2008 passed by respondent no. 2 cannot be sustained and the same is hereby quashed, in the result writ petition succeeds and is allowed. 19. The respondent no. 2 is directed to consider the claim of compassionate appointment of the petitioner within two months from the date of production of certified copy of this order before him by ignoring the pendency of suit referred hereinbefore filed by the respondent no. 3 and offer him appointment if he is found otherwise eligible for any Class-III or Class-IV post under Dying in Harness Rules 1974. 20. 3 and offer him appointment if he is found otherwise eligible for any Class-III or Class-IV post under Dying in Harness Rules 1974. 20. With the aforesaid observation and direction, writ petition stands allowed. .