Judgment K.Kannan, J. 1. The above two writ petitions challenge the correctness of the awards directing two of the workmen namely Mohan Shyam Sharma and Joginder Singh to be reinstated, while setting aside the order of termination of service by discharging the services of the workmen without stigma. The point urged by the management was that in instances where the management passed orders of termination simpliciter and awarded to the workmen the amounts that were due to them without forfeiting any of their claims for gratuity provident fund etc., the workmen could have no recourse to an action complaining of such termination. On the other hand, the Labour Court accepted the contentions of the workmen that a Court was entitled to examine the real motivations of the management for removal and the services that stood terminated without constituting an enquiry when the management had entertained doubts about the integrity of the workmen and affirmed by an earlier order that they were guilty of theft of vehicles, the termination was really in the nature of a punishment and although termed as simpliciter termination, it amounted to a retrenchment. The termination orders made without framing chargesheets against the workmen and establishing the alleged misconduct were contrary to law. 2. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the management, Mr. Sarin makes no bones about the original suspicion that it entertained that the workmen were involved in theft of vehicles. The point that he was, however, trying to make was that in spite of such suspicion, what prey vailed with the management ultimately was not to take punitive action against the workmen but provide for an honourable exit to he workmen by giving to them what was due for the services rendered by them and merely recording the fact that the management had, lost the confidence in the workmen. The learned counsel would refer to several authorities to bring home the point that when a management had lost confidence in the workman, it was entitled to terminate the services by resort to relevant clause in the standing order that provided for termination and in such case, there was no need to constitute an enquiry. No misconduct was attributed to the workmen and therefore, the Labour Court is not entitled to examine whether any misconduct was proved. No misconduct was attributed to the workmen and therefore, the Labour Court is not entitled to examine whether any misconduct was proved. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent-workmen would respond to the arguments with equal vehemence referring to several decisions to show that even orders simpliciter could be merely facade and it could veil a true intention of punishment of the management, guide as it were by a different motivation for a concealed agenda. Learned counsel, Sh. H.S. Sethi and Ms. Abha Rathore would, therefore, urge that the Court is not without power to find whether it was merely termination simpliciter or a termination by way of punishment. 3. The facts that would be relevant for consideration, which both parties admit are that 20 vehicles had been stolen from the Maruti factory which they claimed had not been sold and 16 of the vehicles were recovered through applications before Criminal Courts for custody of the vehicles on proof of ownership. The management contended that they had the first inkling of some thefts caming through some secret information on 31.08.1992. A F.I.R. & was lodged against the two workmen here and nine others and when the matter was entrusted to the police, they recovered the vehicles, acting on alleged disclosure statements made by the workmen and others about the thefts and the exact location of the vehicles. The workmen had, in the meantime, been placed under suspension on 01.12.1992 and the recoveries were made and produced before the Criminal Court. The cases before the Criminal Court were pending and the management had decided during the pendency of the case to terminate the services of the workmen alleged to have been involved in the incident. Original order was passed on 29.05.1995 setting out the incident of alleged disclosure statements and making out a ground for the loss of the confidence that the incident involved. The initial order of 29.05.1995 contemplated discharge of the workmen without any stigma in terms of clause 25.1.1 of the Standing Order but ultimately the orders of termination themselves came to be issued on 31.10.1995 by providing to them compensation of three months salary and salary for the notice period together with subsistence allowance, leave encashment, gratuity, retrenciment compensation etc. The initial order of 29.05.1995 contemplated discharge of the workmen without any stigma in terms of clause 25.1.1 of the Standing Order but ultimately the orders of termination themselves came to be issued on 31.10.1995 by providing to them compensation of three months salary and salary for the notice period together with subsistence allowance, leave encashment, gratuity, retrenciment compensation etc. The point of contention, how the termination came about and what motivations drove them for taking such a decision are to be seen through how the matter was addressed at the time when orders of termination of service had been issued to the workmen and how the workmen responded to the same. The first objection to the termination comes through claim statements raised by the workmen and references sought before the Labour Court when the workmen contended only to the point regarding the effect of termination of services without any enquiry. 4. The consideration of the respective claim statements of the workmen Mohan Shyam Sharma and Joginder Singh, would be relevant. In the claim statement before the Labour Court, Mohan Shyam Sharma had contended n paragraphs 3 to 5, which are reproduced as follows : "3. That the applicant/workman was drawing a salary of Rs. 10,000/- per month at the; time of termination of his services illegally by the respondent. 4. That the service of the applicant was terminated without issuing any charge sheet of without holding any inquiry against the applicant and even without issuing show cause notice poor to the termination of the service of the applicant. 5. That the service of the applicant was terminated against the principle of natural justice and against the established law." Joginder Singh had stated in his claim statement from pass 5 to 10 as follows : 5. That on the basis of length of service and performance the applicant was promoted to level 05 w.e.f. 01.03.1992 vide letter dated 29.04.1992. This establishes that the work and conduct of the applicant had been ever unspotish (sic) during the entire course of his employment. 6. That, therefore, vide suspension order dated 30.09.1992 the applicant was placed under suspension with immediate effect with continued to the time of termination of services of the applicant. 7. This establishes that the work and conduct of the applicant had been ever unspotish (sic) during the entire course of his employment. 6. That, therefore, vide suspension order dated 30.09.1992 the applicant was placed under suspension with immediate effect with continued to the time of termination of services of the applicant. 7. That no charge was issued nor any enquiry was held against the applicant and thus without the issuance of the specific charge sheet in respect of the alleged criminal allegations as per F.I.R., it cannot be automatically presumed and deemed that the applicant had committed any misconduct. The applicant never committed any such theft of the vehicles nor made any admission as alleged in the order dated 29.05.1995 enclosed with the termination order dated 31.10.995. The disclosure statement which the management is referring and has made a base for terminating the services of the applicant is false, and obtained under threat, coercion and duress, the same is not binding upon the applicant. This is not at all to be documents of free will even otherwise on the basis of the said alleged document, two persons have already been discharged from the criminal case wherein the Learned Judge held that it was hard to presume that they had committed any offence and thus they were discharged. 8. That under the law, the respondent/management was bound to issue charge-sheet to the applicant and hold an enquiry against him to arrive at proper conclusion and thus in the absence of same, the order of termination passed by the management is not legally sustainable and on this ground alone, the termination order dated 31.10.1995 is liable to be quashed. 9. That the service of the applicant have been terminated department manager (service) Maruti Udyog Limited Gurgaon whereas in fact the appointment of the applicant was made by the General Manager Maruti Udyog Limited Gurganon and thus in his case the termination has been made by the Authority lower in rank to the appointing authority and as such on this ground also the termination is liable to be set aside. 10. 10. That they services of the applicant has been terminated by the management w.e.f. 31.10.1995 wrongly illegally malafidely, exercising unfair labour practices, in violation of principle of natural justice and contrary to the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947 and thus the applicant is entitled to be reinstated with continuity of service, all back wages and other legal entitlements." 5. The contentions could be paraphrased as that the workmen were claiming that they had unblemished service and that no charge sheet had been levied lore termination of the service. The workmen themselves had not been guilty of any misconduct and the termination had been effected by an authority, who was lower in rank to the appointing authority. The orders of termination were illegal, mala fide and amounted to an exercise of the power by unfair labour practice and in violation of principles of natural justice and the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. 6. The defence in both the contentions of the workmen were that the termination could not have been effected without conducting enquiry. The matter will have to be, therefore, examined whether for the nature of orders that were passed, there was any requirement for conducting an enquiry. The impugned order of termination for both the workmen were issued on the same date namely 31.10.1995. Except as regards the paragraph relating to the amount of compensation which was being sent along with the letter, the relevant terms are : "Please note that your services are hereby terminated with immediate effect on payment, of three months salary in lieu of three months notice in terms of clause 25.1.1 of the Certified Standing Orders read with Clause 40 of your appointment letter dated 22.04.1981, applicable to you. Even though your termination of services in accordance with Clause No. 25 of the Certified Standing Orders which constitutes contact between the parties does not amount to retrenchment the management is also paying to you 15 days wages for each completed year of service as services/retrenchment compensation." 7. These letters do not attribute any misconduct. Even though your termination of services in accordance with Clause No. 25 of the Certified Standing Orders which constitutes contact between the parties does not amount to retrenchment the management is also paying to you 15 days wages for each completed year of service as services/retrenchment compensation." 7. These letters do not attribute any misconduct. The letters of termination have been issued in purported affirmation of the power vested in the management to terminate the service provided for under the Certified Standing orders, which in clause 25.1 reads as follows : (Sic) the workman after giving following notice of after payment of wages in lieu thereof." Clause 25.1.1 reads "in the case of termination of a permanent workman; one months notice." No enquiry is contemplated for termination simpliciter. If we go merely by the letter of contract, it would be not difficult for us to see that the management went by the terms to a `T and the termination that it brought about was unexceptional. The issue now is whether this could be treated as termination simpliciter and the workmen are entitled to insist that even passing such a letter of termination, an enquiry was required to be constituted and it could not have been made without such enquiry. 8. Herein lies the divergence of the approach of the respective counsel. The Senior Counsel for the petitioner, Sh. Sarin would submit that the workmen had at no point of time alleged that the termination was a camouflage or it was a deliberate ploy to conceal a different intent or it amounted to any victimization. There was no warrant for the Court to examine what prompted the management to take the decision that it ultimately did. The Court while examining the contention of the workmen that the management was adopting an unfair labour practice and did not even hold an enquiry must only be satisfied whether there was lack of bona fides on the part of the management. The management had lost confidence in the workmen since they had to cope with a reality that 20 of the vehicles were stolen from the factory but 16 vehicles could be recovered from the competent Criminal Court on furnishing appropriate bonds, after a criminal complaint and the alleged confessional statement led to recovery and production of vehicles before the criminal court. The extent of reliability of such confessional statements before Police Officers could be a matter of relevance for a Criminal Court to grapple with, but for a managerial decision whether they should persist with the service of certain workmen on whom they had a suspicion, could the court place no fetters on the ground that some of the workmen had been charge sheeted for criminal offences of theft, breach of trust etc. and that no action could be taken without an enquiry of proof of charges ? The Management had lost confidence in the workmen and it was stated so by an express order of the management on 29.05.1995. They did not, however, want to hound the workmen by imputing any charge of theft and on due consideration of the service rendered by them, one being young in age, who had long years of service and another, who was old and was going to soon retire, the management chose, not to take the path of confrontation of the workmen and decided to merely terminate the services and afforded to them all the monetary benefits that had accrued to them. This decision of termination for want of confidence could not be said to be mala fide. The Labour Court, while answering a reference to decide whether the termination was proper or not had no more to examine the issue than what the pleadings permitted. The pleadings merely complained of lack of enquiry and for the order of termination of service, there was no need for an enquiry. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the management would, therefore, rely on decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Air India Corporation, Bombay v. V.A. Rabello and another AIR 1972 S.C. 1343 that if the service regulations provided for termination of service and when the management had lost confidence in an employee resulting from suspicion about his suitability for the job in which he was employed, termination could not be termed to be mala fide and could not be subject of review by industrial adjudication. Reliance was also made to a decision of, the Honble Supreme Courts in The workmen of Sudden office, Cinnamara, Management of Sudder Office, (1972) 4 S.C.C. 746, which while dealing with the case of removal of some articles from a companys godown in an unauthorized manner, served the godown clerk with a charge sheet but without ordering enquiry proceeded to terminate the services on the ground that the management lost confidence. He was also paid all the benefits, which he would earned in case of simplicter termination of service. The Honble Supreme Court rejected the contention of the Union on behalf of the workman that the order of the termination was a camouflage adopted by the management to cover up what was really an order of dismissal and proceeded to examine the relevant standing orders, found that even the Labour Court had not found that the action of the management was in any way mala fide or amounted to unfair labour practice or a case of victimization and found ultimately that though it might appear that the management was charging the workmen in respect of a matter, which may be misconduct under the Standing Orders ultimately it merely passed an order of termination simpliciter that would not amount to dismissal by war of punishment. The Honble Supreme Court was actually dealing with an extreme situation where the management had even laid down a charge sheet and started an enquiry but without any further action proceeded to terminate the workman. The Honble Supreme Court found that the fact that the management paid all the amounts due to the workman without forfeiting any claims as regards gratuity and provident fund was sufficient to infer that the action taken by the management could not be said to be one by way of dismissal and that it was only a ease of termination of service simpliciter. The above two decisions spell out the proposition that if the management was contemplating termination of service without casting any aspersion on the workmen and when the power rested in the management to terminate the services as per the Standing Order, it was competent for the management to do so, provided no unfair labour practice or mala fides or victimization was practised on the workmen. 10. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the workmen sought to distinguish the above decisions by reference to other decisions of the Honble Supreme Court only in the context of how the Court has a duty to see whether the management was trying to conceal its real intentions and referred to several decisions and it will be my endeavour to see whether the decisions fit with the facts, which have been already enumerated or here exists any deviation that would make inapplicable the decisions cited by the learned counsel. In KC. Sharma v. Delhi Stock Exchange and others (2005) 4 S.C.C. 4, the Honble Supreme Court dealing with a case of termination of service with immediate effect on payment of three months salary in purported exercise of powers under the letters of appointment and the challenge had been made directly before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution without reference to an adjudication before the Labour Court. The case was, therefore, being decided by the High Court only by examining the exchange of letters between the management and the workman that found that there had been bad blood between the parties and although held that the termination of service the mala fide and unjustified, the Court took into note the loss of confidence expressed by the management and provided for compensation. This decision was considered in the context of the employer being an instrumentality of the State and the service being protected by Article 311 of the Constitution. This does not provide to us the guide that is necessary in industrial jurisprudence, where the case has no trappings of Art 311 and which has to be examined in the context of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Referring to L. Michael and Another v. M/s. Johnson Pumps Ltd. (1975) 1 S.C.C. 574, Ms. Abha Rathore contended that the decision dealt with a case of permanent employee of proved efficiency and six years standing but had been discharged from service purporting to be a termination simpliciter with one months notice pay. The employee challenged the order as wrongful, mala fide, illegal and and act of victimization for participation in `Union activities. The management claimed loss of confidence because of smuggling out secret information of the company. The employee challenged the order as wrongful, mala fide, illegal and and act of victimization for participation in `Union activities. The management claimed loss of confidence because of smuggling out secret information of the company. The question that arose was wherther it was a colourable exercise of the power of discharge simpliciter to deprive the workman of the procedural safeguards available in case of dismissal. The Court held that in a reasonable case of confidental or responsible post being misused or a sensitive or strategic position being abused, it may be a high risk to keep the employee, once suspicion has started ad a disciplinary enquiry cannot be forced on the master. There a termination simpliciter may be bona fide, not colurable, and loss of confidence may be evidence of good faith of the employer. Even while conceding that the loss of confidence will be appropriate basis for termination simpliciter, the Honble Supreme Court cautioned that ipse dixit of the employer that he had lost confidence may not be sufficient justification to jettison the latter without levelling and proving the objectionable conduct which had undermined the confidence. The Court stated that the suspicion must rest on some tangible basis and the power has to be exercised by the employer objectively in good faith which means honesty with due care and prudence. The decision in L. Michaels case allows for a Court the width of discretion to examine the motive, where a workman sought an adjudication that the termination was activated by mala fides and it was a case of victimization of a workman, who was involved in union activities. The court was, therefore, examining whether there had been any tangible basis on which the suspicion could be rested. It found that there existed none and intervened in favour of the workman but still leaving it to the management to constitute due enquiry if it has sufficient material to proceed against the workman for misconduct or any other ground valid in law. This decision again, in my view, will have no application in a case where the workman had not attributed any motivations against the management. V. Loss of confidence a need for objective consideration 11. The learned Ms. Abha Rathore would contend that even a pleat the workman that the termination has been effected without enquiry must be understood to mean that the motivations of the management were not proper. V. Loss of confidence a need for objective consideration 11. The learned Ms. Abha Rathore would contend that even a pleat the workman that the termination has been effected without enquiry must be understood to mean that the motivations of the management were not proper. Such and inference, in my view, will be wholly unjustified. The management could be expected to prove only what is stated in the claim statement. If the workmans contention was that no enquiry had been made, all that it was expected to be said in reply were the facts that would be relevant for consideration whether the termination was in the nature of punishment in a case where the management was offering all the benefits and had stated no more than the fact that, it has lost its confidence and that it was not expected to constitute an enquiry. In Kanhaiyalal Agrawal and others v. The Factory Manager, Gwalior Sugar Company Limited 2001(4) S.C.T. 428 : 2001(4) S.L.R. 360, Honble Supreme Court held that loss of confidence cannot be subjective, based upon the mind of the management but objective facts would have to lead to a definite inference of apprehension in the mind of the management regarding the trustworthiness or the reliability of an employee. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. D T C. Mazdoor Congress and others 1991(1) S.C.T. 675 : 1990(5) S.L.R. 361(S.C.) a challenge to the regulation contained in Delhi Road Transport Authority (Condition of Appointment and Services) Regulation, 1952 providing of Termination of service of giving one months notice or pay in lieu thereof without assigning any reason was held, on its constitutionality, arbitrary, discriminatory, lacking in clarity and precision, which are essential for the guidelines for action. Such unrestricted and unqualified power given to the management for terminating the services of the employee was found to be bad. There is no such challenge to the relevant clause in the Standing Order nor are we upholding the termination on the only ground that the management is entitled to terminate employment without any basis or even without recording an objective assessment of whether there could be a valid ground for suspicion. Delhi Consumer Co-op. Wholesale Store Ltd. v.. There is no such challenge to the relevant clause in the Standing Order nor are we upholding the termination on the only ground that the management is entitled to terminate employment without any basis or even without recording an objective assessment of whether there could be a valid ground for suspicion. Delhi Consumer Co-op. Wholesale Store Ltd. v.. S.L. Thakural 1999(4) S.C.T. 431 : 2000 (1) R.S.J. 300 is a decision of the Honble Delhi High Court that noted with approval the observation of the Labour Court that a plea of the loss of confidence of the employer cannot be accepted as a matter of routine. This plea has to be specifically taken by the employer in the pleadings and it has to be proved by evidence. In Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India and others 2000(2) S.C.T. 523 : 2000 Lab. I.C. 1377, a casual labour in a Governments Department, who had attained to a "temporary status", was prosecuted for criminal offences of assaulting gateman and when the termination was effected on the basis of the very same incident, the termination without a proper enquiry was held to be punitive in nature and liable to be set aside. The learned counsel has also referred to several other decisions, relating to workmen terminated to whom the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution applied. I do not propose to examine them, since they are governed by different constitutional considerations. 12. From the authorities referred to by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the workmen, one thing becomes clear that there needs to be an objective basis for the loss of confidence. The management has gone on record stating that 20 vehicles were stolen from the factory and they also adduced proof before the Labour court that they had applied to the Criminal Court and secured the return of 16 vehicles. The fact that the management had lost and secured back the vehicles are themselves not denied. The point that has to be still noticed, whether there existed a reasonable cause, for, even the basis of suspicion to the management was that there was a secret information; a FIR had been lodged and the recovery of vehicles from various places had been made by the police and handed over to court, acting on the alleged confessional statements of the workmen. Dealing with the issue relating to the fact of confessional statements and effect of admissibility in departmental proceedings de hors the interdict placed regarding admissibility under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Honble Supreme Court held in Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab 1996(4) S.C.T. 595 : (1996) 10 S.C.C. 569 that, "....it is true that a confession or admission of guilt made by a person accused of an offence before or while in the custody of a police office is not admissible in a court of law according to Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, 1872 but it is equally well settled that these rules of evidence do not apply to departmental enquiries - see State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa Shivappa Makapur (AIR 1963 S.C. 375) and State of Assam v. Mahendra, Kumar Das (1970)1 S.C.C. 709) - wherein the only test is compliance, with the principles natural justice - and of course, compliance with the rules governing the enquiries, if any. In this context, it is well to remember that in India, evidence recorded or discovered as a result of an illegal search is held relevant departing from the law in the United States. We may refer to the following observations of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Kurma v. R, quoted approvingly by, the Constitution Bench of this Court in Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection (Investigation) : (1974)1 SCC p. 365, para 24) "The test to be applied, both in civil and in criminal cases, in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the Court is not concerned with how it was obtained." (Sic) relevant; the fact that it was made to the police or while in the custody of the police may not be of much consequence for the reason that strict rules of Evidence Act do not apply to departmental/disciplinary enquiries. In a departmental enquiry, it would perhaps be permissible for the authorities to prove that the appellant did make such a confession/admission during the course of interrogation and it would be for the disciplinary to decide whether it is a voluntary confession/admission or not. If the disciplinary authority comes to the conclusion that the statement was indeed voluntary and true, he may well be entitled to act upon the said statement. If the disciplinary authority comes to the conclusion that the statement was indeed voluntary and true, he may well be entitled to act upon the said statement. Here, the authorities say that they were satisfied about the truth of the appellants confession. There is undoubtedly no other material. There is also the fact that the appellant has been acquitted by the Designated Court....." 13. The distinction that was sought to be made against this judgment by the learned counsel, Ms. Abha Rathore was that it referred to a case of adjudication under Article 311 of the Constitution. In matter relating to procedure for enquiry or termination, the constitutional provisions, for civil service indeed different and I have already rejected out of consideration decisions for considering whether enquiry was necessary, because Art. 311 itself prescribes a procedure for termination of service. But the above principle relating to extent to admissibility of statements to police has no bearing to cases of civil services alone. It has immediate relevance and applicabillity to all labour and industrial jurisprudence that has a value of stare decisis. The Honble Supreme Court was laying down a proposition of law with law reference to the extent of admissibility of confessional statement before a police officer in a Criminal Court and in a departmental proceeding. While the issue relating to security of tenure and the procedure to be followed for termination could be different between the service governed by Article 311 and other service of private employment, the proposition regarding the extent of admissibility of certain evidence in these two types of services cannot be different. In this case, the management had before it some statements of the workmen that led to recoveries. The workmen contended before the Labour Court that they had not made the statements voluntarily. It transpired at the time of the trial of the Labour Court that the criminal cases had already concluded and the Criminal Court had entered verdicts of acquittal against the workmen. The Criminal Court had come to consider the effect of confessional statements in a different jurisprudential setting, for the statements could have no bearing except to the extent of matters leading to recovery, permitted under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. If the management had a reason to believe that the statements of the workmen had led to the recovery, it had a reasonable cause for grounding its suspicion. If the management had a reason to believe that the statements of the workmen had led to the recovery, it had a reasonable cause for grounding its suspicion. We are merely examining whether the management had any basis or was it acting in utter mala fides against the workmen looking for excuses to jettison them. As regards the Mohan Shyam Sharma, the purported confessional statement was, he had committed theft of Maruti Gypsy and Maruti Car and the had sold them at Rs. 50,000/- in Delhi to certain named persons. Learned counsel refers to the judgment of the criminal court to show that not proof had been adduced before the Criminal Court that the vehicles had ever been sold to any person. Similarly, as regards the alleged confessional statement was that the workman, Joginder Singh, the confessional statement was that the workman had committed theft of 4 Maruti Cars and sold to Manjit Singh and the recovery leading to such confessional statement was with reference to a vehicle in DL-4CA-3929. Referring to the Criminal Courts judgment that found that the vehicle that was recovered was indeed the car belonged to the son of the workman and therefore, they could not have theft of his own vehicle, Sh. Sethi argued that suspicion was baseless. The Criminal Court judgment does not correlate the recovery of other three. (sic)In my view, the Criminal Court judgment would be relevant only to the extent that the workmen were of proceeded against before a Criminal Court and that the charges levelled against the workmen were not established and they were acquitted. The findings of the Criminal Court will be have no bearing on the circumstances that compelled the Criminal Court to find that guilt had not been established will not dilute the suspicion, which the management had at the time when they decided to terminate their services. 14. It must be noticed that the decision of the management to terminate the services was effected not after the Criminal Court judgment or in spite of the Criminal Court judgment. It was decided during the pendency of a criminal case when they were faced with hard reality that some of the vehicles that had been produced within the factory had rolled out of it stealthily, which could not have happened except with the connivance of its own workmen. It was decided during the pendency of a criminal case when they were faced with hard reality that some of the vehicles that had been produced within the factory had rolled out of it stealthily, which could not have happened except with the connivance of its own workmen. It had a basis for suspicion that the vehicles which were reported as lost could be recovered, thanks to police intervention and that recoveries were possible through the police on statements of certain persons belonging to the factory. Every one of the ingredients necessary for founding the suspicion existed. I have no doubt left in my mind that the management was not acting mala fide and it is wholly irrelevant that even vehicles suspected by the management to have been stolen respective workmen was not really established in any court of law and that they were actually involved in such theft. If we are looking for a reason whether there existed a reasonable cause for suspicion and whether the managements loss of confidence for termination of service, the answer in my view has to be an aye. 15. Learned counsel, Mr. Sethi still urged that the loss of confidence will have to apply only to persons, who really held position of trust. In his view, the workman-Joginder Singh, who was a Mechanic and who was entrusted with probably certain automotive parts and its assembly could be answerable only to the parts which are missing or the articles, which had been entrusted to him and not in respect of cars which were found to have been stolen. According to him, the position of trust will always have bearing to matters entrusted and cannot be expanded even to include instances when a whole assembled car was found stolen and the management cannot state that there had been a loss of confidence in such a situation. I do not accept this reasoning as conforming to canons of logic or understanding. A workman fulfills the need of the management by his ability to produce, the same way as the management evokes the confidence in the workman by fulfilling the commitment to remunerate him for the services. It is in some sense mutual and la shared trust. It could be possible for a management to breach to trust, the same way as a workman could, breach the trust viz-a-viz his employment. It is in some sense mutual and la shared trust. It could be possible for a management to breach to trust, the same way as a workman could, breach the trust viz-a-viz his employment. He only his overall conduct but even a singular instance can erode such confidence. It will be meaningless to urge that a confidence can be lost or the trust could be defied, only on a particular aspect or if the particular items which were entrusted to him were misused or stolen. A larger understanding must visit a situation like this. We are not dealing with instance of a criminal case of a breach of trust to examine what was actually entrusted to the person. We are examining it from the perspective of what cause could erode the confidence of the management against its workmen. If his conduct had led to disappearance of any article within its factory and so it was believed by the Management, no matter it was not specifically entrusted to him, it would still be an issue of loss of confidence and loss of trust. 16. The learned counsel, Ms. Abha Rathore referred me to my own decision in M/s. Kegg Farms Private Limited v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal- cum-Labour Court Gurgaon and another 2009(4) S.C.T. 484, where I have held that lack of confidence cannot be merely a matter of inference with no details, holding of domestic enquiry shall be conditions precedent in order that termination is effected on the ground that there is lack of confidence. This was so dated relying on the observation of the Honble Supreme Court in Chandu Lal v. Management of M/s. Pan American World Airways (1985)2 S.C.C. 727. In that case, it had been brought out through evidence on the basis of finding recorded by the Labour Court that although the letter of termination was simpliciter discharge, the decision was taken only on account of alleged parting of secret information of the company. The said suspicion was subject of challenge during the course of enquiry and the Labour Court found that no evidence was forthcoming and the witnesses who ought to have known the same were not examined. The said suspicion was subject of challenge during the course of enquiry and the Labour Court found that no evidence was forthcoming and the witnesses who ought to have known the same were not examined. The Labour Court had also found that even the witnesses who were examined could not say whether there were any secret codes and the witnesses also could not give the names of any particular person to whom the codes were purported to have been revealed by the Workman. The suspicion in that case was in relation to revealing of secret codes for some pharmaceutical product to a person outside the factory. When evidence was bereft of all such details and even when the subjective Satisfaction of lack of confidence had no basis, the finding of the Labour Court directing reinstatement was not interfered with. 17. In this case, the suspicison had a basis. The theft of vehicles was a matter of admission. Who the culprit was, was what was not admitted. The management secured the vehicles on the basis of the statements alleged to have been given by the workmen themselves. The Police Officers were examined in the Labour Court to say that they secured the confession statements and the recovery had been made. The extent of reliability of confession statement to police in departmental proceedings has already been referred to above. The facts in this case are definitely different from how this Court dealt with in M/s. Kegs Farms Private Limited. I, therefore, reject the contention of learned counsel appearing for the workmen that the loss of confidence cannot be invoked by the management for loss of vehicles and that it should be restricted only to loss of articles respectively entrusted to them. VI. Present disposition 18. In the ultimate analysis, I am of the view that the orders of termination were not in the nature of punishment for any misconduct and therefore, the absence of enquiry prior to such termination was not unjustified. To ascertain whether it was an act of termination simpliciter or retrenchment or a termination for misconduct, the words employed in the termination orders themselves would be the first guide. The fact that the management also provided for all the benefits without forfeiting any one of them will also be another relevant factor. To ascertain whether it was an act of termination simpliciter or retrenchment or a termination for misconduct, the words employed in the termination orders themselves would be the first guide. The fact that the management also provided for all the benefits without forfeiting any one of them will also be another relevant factor. In a case where the termination simpliciter is put on dock by a challenge through reference, unless a plea of victimization a veiled action that could amount to camouflage of managements motivation or unfair labour practice is attributed and established, the Court cannot interfere, except when the termination betrayed lack of bona fides. There was no such pleadings requiring the Court to lift the veil and find whether the management was spirited by any motivations other than how the ultimate orders of termination made them appear. The motivations of an act being mala fide would be seen in the context of what basis the management had in its decision. The management had lost the vehicles and got them back knowing fully well that some of heir workmen had contributed for the thefts. It suspected, some and there was a basis for such suspicion. These facts were themselves enough to prove lack of mala fides. If there were no mala fides, the termination orders have to be only upheld. The decisions to the contrary as find expressed in the awards of the Labour Court, are erroneous and they are, therefore, set aside. 19. The writ petitions are allowed.. There shall be, however, no direction as to costs.