Judgment :- D. Murugesan, J. The matter relates to the appointment on compassionate ground. As there appears to be some judgments on the basis of which both the learned counsel for the appellants and the respondent seek to sustain their respective claim, we are inclined to deal with the matter elaborately as to the correct approach with regard to the scheme framed by the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. 2. Even before we enter upon to discuss the above question, we may hastily add that the appointment on compassionate ground is made only to tide over the situation in the family and there is no automatic right vested in a person for such appointment. Appointment on compassionate ground cannot be considered if the application is made after a considerable lapse of time or if such application is made beyond the period of time prescribed under the Scheme. In fact we may usefully refer to a Division Bench judgment of this Court, to which one of us was a party, in M. Raja v. Union of India rep. by its Secretary to Government, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi and Others, (2009) 4 MLJ 237 . For the said proposition, the Division Bench, after considering the Supreme Court judgments in State Bank of India v. Somvir Singh, 2007-II-LLJ 230, State of Haryana v. Rani Devi, AIR 1996 SC 2445 , State of J & K v. Sajad Ahmed Mir, (2006) 4 MLJ 605, Sushma Gosain v. Union of India, 1990-I-LLJ 169 and Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, 1995-I-LLJ 798, ultimately held that there is no automatic right vested for appointment on compassionate ground and no individual can claim that he is entitled to such appointment merely because the breadwinner of the family died in harness. 3. The respondent by name P. Venkatesan is the son of Thiru Ponnusamy, who was employed as a Wireman in Vellore division of the Tamil Nady Electricity Board. The father of the respondent died in harness on 20.3.99 leaving his wife, three daughters and the respondent as his legal heirs. At the time of the death of the father of the respondent, the respondent was aged about 12 years. After attaining the age of 18 years on 27. 2005, on the same day, he made an application for appointment on compassionate ground. At the time of the death of the father of the respondent, the respondent was aged about 12 years. After attaining the age of 18 years on 27. 2005, on the same day, he made an application for appointment on compassionate ground. That application came to be rejected by the proceedings of the Superintending Engineer, Vellore Electricity Distribution Circle on the ground that he is not eligible as per the Board’s proceedings, as he submitted the application after the cut-off period viz., the application should have been submitted within three years from the date of death of the board employee. The writ petition filed by the respondent came to be allowed following the judgment of this Court in T. Meer Ismail Ali v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board through its Chairman and another, (2004) 3 CTC 120. Hence this appeal by the electricity board. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the respondent. 5. The appellant-Board, admittedly, has evolved a scheme for providing appointment on compassionate ground. It appears that initially the scheme provided for the compassionate appointment to the dependants of the employees of the Board who died while in service without prescribing any time limit for the submission of application and that the sons/unmarried daughters, widowed or deserted daughters, divorced daughters should not be more than 30 years of age and in the case of widow 40 years on the date of death of the Board employee. Thereafter, the appellant-Board thought it fit to modify the scheme relating to compassionate appointment and issued the proceedings in Permanent B.P.Ms.(FB).No.46 (Adm. Branch) dated 110. 95 by directing that (i) the application for appointment on compassionate grounds should be made within three years from the date of death of employees of the Board, (ii) the maximum age limit for such appointment be raised to 50 in the case of widows of the deceased employees of the Board and (iii) in case of already expired staff while in service the dependant should apply for employment assistance within three years from the date of issue of this order. 6. Nevertheless, the appellant-Board issued the proceedings in Memo No.147941/921/R.6(2)/96 dated 16. 97 , which reads as follows:- “(1) As per the B.P.(F.B.) No.46 dated 110. 6. Nevertheless, the appellant-Board issued the proceedings in Memo No.147941/921/R.6(2)/96 dated 16. 97 , which reads as follows:- “(1) As per the B.P.(F.B.) No.46 dated 110. 1995, the legal heirs of the deceased employees shall give application within 3 years from the date of death of Board employee as mentioned in the letter under reference cited. .(2) Board employees who died prior to implementation of B.P.No.46 dated 110. 1995, the legal heir of the deceased employees shall apply for employment assistance within 3 years from the date of issue of the said B.P. (3) If the applicants who applied for employment assistance within 3 years from the date of death and not completed 18 years of age, such cases will be requested to apply again after completion of 18 years of age. .(4) If the applicants applied again after completion of 18 years of age, the applicants will be intimated that such applications will be examined as per the Board’s Rules in force at that time.” 7. However, paragraphs (3) & (4) of the above memo dated 16. 97 were sought to be withdrawn by the Board by a subsequent memo dated 4. 2002 with effect from the said date. The respondent, after attaining the age of 18 years, has immediately made an application in terms of the memo dated 16. 97. However, the said application was not entertained by the Board in view of the Board’s proceedings dated 195. The application of the said circular dated 110. 95 came up for consideration before this court in the judgment in D. Ramadoss v. The Chief Engineer (Personnel), Tamilnadu Electricity Board, Chennai and another, 2001 Writ L.R. 601. 8. In fact, a similar question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.3050 of 2003 dated 3. 2005 (Indiraniammal v. The Chief Engineer (Personnel), Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Chennai and another). The issue that fell for consideration before the Division Bench was not only the applicability of the circular dated 16. 97, but also the subsequent cancellation of the provision for making an application even after a person attaining majority i.e., on 4. 2002. The Division Bench in paragraph-16 set aside the subsequent Circular dated 4. 2002. Out attention was also drawn that though the said order was taken on appeal, the Supreme Court by judgment dated 18. 97, but also the subsequent cancellation of the provision for making an application even after a person attaining majority i.e., on 4. 2002. The Division Bench in paragraph-16 set aside the subsequent Circular dated 4. 2002. Out attention was also drawn that though the said order was taken on appeal, the Supreme Court by judgment dated 18. 2005 in S.L.P. (C) No.16518 of 2005, while directing the notice on the application for condonation of delay, further directed that the petitioner’s case shall be considered in accordance with the judgment of the Supreme Court and subject to the result of the Special Leave Petition. In the absence of any stay order by the Supreme Court, the Division Bench Judgment in Indiraniammal’s case should alone be applied to the facts of this case. 9. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-Board has brought to our notice the judgment of another Division Bench in E. Ramasamy v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board rep. by its Chairman, Chennai and others (2006) 4 MLJ 1080 . The said judgment was rendered by following the circular dated 4. 2002, whereby the provision for an application to be made even after a person attaining majority was deleted. Inasmuch as the validity of the very circular was put in issue before the earlier Division Bench in Indiraniammal’s case and the same was set aside, in our considered opinion, with great respect to the Division Bench which rendered the judgment in Ramasamy’s case, the judgment in Ramasamy’s case cannot be applied, particularly when the challenge to the order of the Division Bench in Indiraniammal’s case was not stayed by the Supreme Court. We have rendered the above finding by simply following the earlier Division Bench judgment in Indiraniammal’s case and we are not embarking into the validity of the circular dated 16. 97 or the subsequent circular dated 4. 2002, as the matter is pending before the Supreme Court. 10. As we have already pointed out that the matter concerns only about the eligibility to make an application and not for an automatic appointment on compassionate ground, even in case if this Court directs the application to be entertained, it is open to the Tamil Nady Electricity Board, the appellants herein to consider the application on its own merit and decide whether the applicant could be granted compassionate appointment or not. The consideration of the application for compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule, where any vacant post in Government or public sector undertaking etc., should be filled up only by the usual method of recruitment as per the rules. Having regard to the fact that the Board themselves have come forward with a decision to entertain the applications from the candidates even after they attained majority, though there is a considerable lapse of time in making such application, it cannot now reject the application of the respondent on the ground that it was filed with considerable lapse of time. 11. For all the above reasons, we are of the considered view that the application made by the respondent cannot be rejected on the ground that it was filed after a lapse of time and the said application should be considered by the Board on its own merits and be disposed of within a period of two months. We once again make it clear that by the above direction, we do not mean that the respondent would be automatically entitles for compassionate appointment merely because we have directed the consideration of his application. With the above observation, the writ appeal is dismissed. Consequently, M.P.No.1 of 2007 is also dismissed. No costs.