Judgment :- As against the judgment of acquittal dated 28.03.2005 pronounced by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Namakkal in S.C.No.48/2004, the de-facto complainant who was examined as P.W.1 in the said case has preferred the present Criminal Revision Case under Sections 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C. 2. The circumstances leading to the filing of the present Criminal Revision Case can be briefly stated as follows: i) P.Ws.1 and 2 are the parents of the deceased Kavitha. P.Ws.3 and 4 are respectively the sister and brother of the said Kavitha. P.W.5 is the husband of P.W.3. The deceased Kavitha had been given in marriage to one Arthanareeswaran, a resident of Tiruchengode Kailasampalayam. Their marriage took place in the year 2001. They had a daughter. Kavitha, her husband Arthanareeswaran and their female child were living as a joint family along with A1 and A2 (parents of the Arthanareeswaran) and A3, the brother of Arthanareeswaran. There had been some misunderstanding between the deceased Kavitha and the accused persons, as the deceased Kavitha wanted to set up a separate residence for herself, her husband and their daughter, whereas the accused persons insisted upon remaining in the joint family till A3 would get married. ii) On 06.09.2003, the deceased Kavitha was taken to Tiruchengode Government Hospital in a serious condition with 100% burns in a fire service van for treatment. P.W.10 - Dr.Suguna was informed that the deceased sustained burns in an accident. The same was recorded in Ex.P6-Accident Register by P.W.10 who gave first aid treatment to the deceased and referred her to the Government Hospital, Erode for better management. Meanwhile, P.Ws.1 to 4 were informed by the accused, of the fact that the deceased had been taken to the hospital in a serious condition. Based on Ex.P4-Memo received from the hospital, dying declaration of the deceased marked as Ex.P5 was recorded by P.W.9 - Judicial Magistrate-2, Erode. Ex.P7-Intimation was also sent to the police. Meanwhile, P.Ws.1 to 4 were informed by the accused, of the fact that the deceased had been taken to the hospital in a serious condition. Based on Ex.P4-Memo received from the hospital, dying declaration of the deceased marked as Ex.P5 was recorded by P.W.9 - Judicial Magistrate-2, Erode. Ex.P7-Intimation was also sent to the police. Subsequently, the deceased Kavitha died on the very same day in Erode Government Hospital at 8.30 p.m. iii) P.W.1 - Karupanasamy, the father of the deceased, who had arrived at the Government Hospital, Erode while the deceased Kavitha was alive in the hospital, after the death of Kavitha gave a complaint marked as Ex.P1 informing the police that the deceased, before her death and while she was in the hospital, informed P.W.1 that the respondents 1 to 3 herein/accused 1 to 3 had set her on fire after dousing her with kerosene while she was sleeping in her husbands house. Based on the said complaint, P.W.19-Shanmugam, the then Inspector of Police, Tiruchengode Rural Circle prepared Ex.P19-First Information Report in the printed format and registered a case against the respondents 1 to 3 herein/accused in Cr.No.372/2003 on the file of Tiruchengode Rural Police Station for alleged offences punishable under Sections 341 and 302 IPC. As the deceased suffered unnatural death within 7 years from the date of marriage, the inquest was conducted by P.W.12 - Tmt.Gajalakshmi, the then Revenue Divisional Officer, Erode who prepared Ex.P10 - Inquest Report in the pesence of panchayatdars. Autopsy was conducted by P.W.13 - Dr.Rajeswari based on the letter of request sent by the Revenue Divisional Officer, marked as Ex.P11. Based on the observations made during autopsy and after getting the Chemical Report, P.W.13 opined that Kavitha had died of shock and asphyxia due to 100% burns. The postmortem report and the report containing the final opinion are produced and marked as Ex.P12 and P13 respectively. The Revenue Divisional Officer, in her report, opined that there was no demand of dowry involved in the case. P.W.18, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police who conducted initial investigation prepared Ex.P2-Observation Mahazar, recovered M.O.1 and M.O.2 [waste cotton from the mattress (burnt and unburnt)] under Mahazar-Ex.P3, prepared Ex.P20-rough sketch and recorded the statements of P.Ws.1 to 5 and Arthanareeswaran, the husband of the deceased. P.W.18, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police who conducted initial investigation prepared Ex.P2-Observation Mahazar, recovered M.O.1 and M.O.2 [waste cotton from the mattress (burnt and unburnt)] under Mahazar-Ex.P3, prepared Ex.P20-rough sketch and recorded the statements of P.Ws.1 to 5 and Arthanareeswaran, the husband of the deceased. As he came to know from his investigation that there was no dowry harassment and was of the view that the death of Kavitha was a planned murder, he directed further investigation to be conducted by P.W.19, the then Inspector of Police, Tiruchengode Rural Police Station. P.W.19 conducted further investigation, showed arrest of the accused and recovery of M.O.3 can, M.O.4 - match box under Ex.P9 -Mahazar based on the alleged information furnished by A3 in the admissible part of his confession statement marked as Ex.P8, completed investigation and submitted a final report alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 302 r/w Section 34 IPC by the respondents 1 to 3 herein/accused. iv) After committal proceedings, the case was taken on file by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Namakkal as S.C.No.48/2004. The same was made over by the said court to the Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court) Namakkal for disposal according to law. Necessary charges were framed in the said trial court and the accused persons pleaded not guilty. v) P.Ws.1 to 19 were examined, Ex.P1 to P20 were marked and M.Os.1 to 5 were produced on the side of the prosecution in order to substantiate the charges framed against the respondents 1 to 3 herein/accused persons. Thereafter the incriminating materials found in the evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution were brought to the notice of the accused persons and they were examined under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C regarding such incriminating materials. They denied them as false. No witness was examined and no document was marked on the side of the accused persons. vi) The learned trial Judge who heard the arguments advanced on either side and considered the evidence in the light of such arguments, came to the conclusion that the charges made against the accused were not proved beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the respondents 1 to 3 herein/ accused in respect of the offences with which they stood charged. 3. vi) The learned trial Judge who heard the arguments advanced on either side and considered the evidence in the light of such arguments, came to the conclusion that the charges made against the accused were not proved beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the respondents 1 to 3 herein/ accused in respect of the offences with which they stood charged. 3. Aggrieved by and questioning the correctness and legality of the judgment of acquittal pronounced by the trial court, the father of deceased, namely P.W.1, who was the de-facto complainant has brought-forth this Criminal Revision Case on various grounds set out in the grounds of criminal revision case. 4. The point that arises for consideration is, "whether there is any manifest error or illegality in the judgment of acquittal pronounced by the learned trial court capable of being interfered with by this court in exercise of its revisional power?" 5. This court heard the arguments advanced by Mr.N.Manokaran, learned counsel for the revision petitioner/de-facto complainant (P.W.1), by Mr.D.Selvaraj, learned counsel representing Mr.C.S.Saravanan, counsel on record for respondents 1 to 3 herein/accused and by Mr.J.C.Durairaj, learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) representing the 4th respondent/Investigating Officer. The materials available on record were also perused. 6. Advancing arguments on behalf of the revision petitioner/de-facto complainant (P.W.1), Mr.N.Manokaran, learned counsel made the following submissions:- i) The judgment of the trial court is against law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case. The trial Court failed to appreciate the fact that there are clear evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution to the effect that A1 and A2 caught hold of the deceased by holding her hands and legs respectively and A3 doused her with kerosene and set fire. The clear evidence adduced by P.Ws.1 and 2 to the effect that on the date of occurrence at about 12.00 noon, the deceased contacted them over phone and informed that she was tortured by the accused, has not been properly appreciated by the trial court. ii) The trial Court committed an error in accepting the evidence of P.Ws.6 to 8 to the effect that the deceased would have committed suicide without considering the overwhelming evidence regarding the overt acts committed by the accused. ii) The trial Court committed an error in accepting the evidence of P.Ws.6 to 8 to the effect that the deceased would have committed suicide without considering the overwhelming evidence regarding the overt acts committed by the accused. The trial Court committed an error in holding that the first accused was all along helping P.W.1 and P.W.5 by lending them money and that he would not have chosen to go to the extent of killing his own daughter-in-law. The minor discrepancies found in the evidence of prosecution witnesses compared with the dying declaration have been blown out of proportion to arrive at a conclusion that the charges made against the accused were not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Even though there are some improvements in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and a few contradictions, they should have been disregarded as minor discrepancies not affecting the prosecution case. The same shall not be enough to totally disbelieve the case of the prosecution and discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. iii) The trial Court, while appreciating the evidence of the prosecution, failed to note that the benefit of doubt could be given to the accused but a bonus could not be given in favour of those who are guilty of killing the deceased, a mankind. A proper consideration of evidence will reveal the perversity of the finding arrived at by the court below which is capable of being interfered with and reversed in a revision case in exercise of the High Courts revisional power. 7. A proper consideration of evidence will reveal the perversity of the finding arrived at by the court below which is capable of being interfered with and reversed in a revision case in exercise of the High Courts revisional power. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 3 herein/accused contended that the trial Court, with an unbiased approach, appreciated the evidence in proper perspective and came to a correct conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused to the hilt; that many improbabilities in the prosecution case and the material contradictions in the evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution were all brought to the surface by the judgment of the trial court which alone led to the ultimate and proper conclusion that the charges made against the accused were not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the court below also rightly pointed out the probable suppression of a statement of the deceased recorded by the police while she was alive, as evidenced by the admission made by the prosecution witnesses P.Ws.1 to 5; that there had been an improvement in the case of the prosecution with conscious embellishment with a view to get respondents 1 to 3 herein/accused convicted for the offences; that all such suppression, improvements, embellishments and contradictions found in the evidence of the prosecution made the trial court arrive at a conclusion that there was reasonable suspicion regarding the story of the prosecution as to how the deceased sustained burns; that the court dealing with a criminal revision case against acquittal at the instance of a private person should not re-appreciate the evidence and should not normally interfere with the judgment of acquittal unless there was a defect in the law or procedure adopted by the trial court resulting in gross injustice or miscarriage of justice; that there was no scope for interference with the well considered judgment of the court below and that hence the criminal revision case should be dismissed as devoid of merits. 8. The learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) representing the fourth respondent is some what non-committal. However, he has submitted that he could not find out any illegality or defect in the judgment of the court below causing grave injustice or miscarriage of justice. 8. The learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) representing the fourth respondent is some what non-committal. However, he has submitted that he could not find out any illegality or defect in the judgment of the court below causing grave injustice or miscarriage of justice. By making such a submission, the learned Government Advocate (Crl.Side) has supported the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 3 herein/accused regarding the merits of this criminal revision case. 9. In support of the above said contention of the respondents, the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh @ B.P.Singh & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkand) & Anr. reported in 2002(5) Supreme 332 has been cited. In the said judgment, the Honble Supreme Court has made the following observation:- "It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from that of the trial court. But that by itself is no justification for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a judgment of acquittal. We cannot say that the judgment of the trial court in the instance was was perverse. No defect of procedure has been pointed out. There was also no improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial vitiating the trial itself. At best the High Court thought that the prosecution witnesses were reliable while the rial court took the opposite view. This Court has repeatedly observed that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party, the Court exercises only limited jurisdiction and should not constitute itself into an appellate court which has a much wider jurisdiction to go into questions of facts and law and to convert an order of acquittal into one of conviction. It cannot be lost sight of that when a re-trial is ordered, the dice is heavily loaded against the accused and that itself must caution the Court exercising revisional jurisdiction." 10. The following principles can be deduced from the above said observation made by the Honble Supreme Court:- i) If there is no illegality either in the procedure or in the conduct of trial, the High Court cannot interfere with the judgment of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The following principles can be deduced from the above said observation made by the Honble Supreme Court:- i) If there is no illegality either in the procedure or in the conduct of trial, the High Court cannot interfere with the judgment of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. ii) The High Court, may, on appreciation of evidence on record, reach a conclusion different from that of the trial Court. But the same shall not be enough to exercise the revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 Cr.P.C against the judgment of acquittal. iii) Though there may be a defect in the procedure or in the conduct of trial, it should have led to the miscarriage of justice warranting exercise of the revisional jurisdiction against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party. iv) perversity of the finding shall be an exception to the general rule that the revisional Court shall not appreciate the evidence. v) Even if High Court, on exercise of its revisional power comes to the conclusion that there is legal infirmity in the procedure or in the conduct of trial leading to miscarriage of justice, it cannot convert an acquittal into one of conviction. vi) Even in a case wherein there is justification for interference with the judgment of acquittal, after setting aside the same, it has to be sent back to the trial court for retrial. vii) While deciding the question whether to exercise the revisional jurisdiction against an order of acquittal, the court should not lose sight of the consequences, namely when a re-trial is ordered, the dice is heavily loaded against the accused and that itself must caution the court exercising revisional jurisdiction. 11. The de-facto complainant, based on whose complaint the case was registered by the police, and who was also examined as P.W.1 in the trial court, has come forward with the present criminal revision case against the judgment of acquittal pronounced by the trial court. Of course, it is true that as many as 19 witnesses were examined and 20 documents were marked on the side of the prosecution in order to substantiate the charges framed against the respondents 1 to 3 herein/accused. Of course, it is true that as many as 19 witnesses were examined and 20 documents were marked on the side of the prosecution in order to substantiate the charges framed against the respondents 1 to 3 herein/accused. The fact that quite a large number of witnesses have been examined on the side of one of the parties to the case, shall not be enough to arrive at a conclusion that the case propounded by such party shall be probable. Quantitative measurement of the evidence is not the basis on which an issue in a case has to be decided. On the other hand, it is the quality of the evidence adduced and the trustworthiness of the witnesses examined on the side of the party, which shall weigh with the court in arriving at a decision regarding a particular issue. 12. In this case, out of 19 witnesses examined on the side of the prosecution, none has been projected to be an eye witness for the occurrence. P.Ws.1 to 5 are the close relatives of the deceased Kavitha. They alone have stated that there had been some kind of problem between the deceased and the in-laws of the deceased, namely respondents 1 to 3 herein/accused before the death of the deceased Kavitha. P.Ws.6 to 8 being neighbours of accused as well as the deceased have not supported the prosecution case. The said independent witnesses have stated that the deceased Kavitha committed suicide by setting herself on fire after locking herself inside the bed room. It is their clear evidence that on seeing smoke emanating from the bed room in the first floor of the house of the accused where the deceased was also residing, they rushed to the spot, found the door of the bed room locked from inside, broke open the same and found the deceased with extensive burns. It is their further evidence that they called the fire service van and with the help of fire service personnel they transported the deceased in the fire service van to the hospital for treatment. All of them have given statement before the Executive Magistrate-cum-Revenue Divisional Officer, examined as P.W.12 to the effect that there was no dowry harassment. Therefore, the said evidence of P.W.6 to 8 shall not be helpful to prove the prosecution case that the deceased was done to death by the respondents 1 to 3 herein/accused persons. All of them have given statement before the Executive Magistrate-cum-Revenue Divisional Officer, examined as P.W.12 to the effect that there was no dowry harassment. Therefore, the said evidence of P.W.6 to 8 shall not be helpful to prove the prosecution case that the deceased was done to death by the respondents 1 to 3 herein/accused persons. 13. The other witnesses examined on the side of the prosecution are doctors, police officials, Judicial Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration of the deceased and the Village Administrative Officer who allegedly attested the confession statement of A3 leading to the recovery of M.O.3-can and M.O.4-match box. The story of the prosecution regarding the arrest of the accused persons and recovery of M.Os.3 and 4 is clouded with many a suspicion created by the evidence of P.W.1 to 8. The occurrence took place on 06.09.2003 at about 2.45 p.m. On the same day the deceased was taken to the Government Hospital, Tiruchengode. After first aid treatment, she was referred to the Government Hospital, Erode for better management. But there is a vacuum in the prosecution case as to the time at which the deceased was admitted in Government Hospital, Erode. The Accident Register prepared by P.W.10 - Dr.Suguna at the Government Hospital, Tiruchengode and the Memo issued by her to the police alone have been produced and marked as Exs.P6 and P7 respectively. Ex.P7 was received by the police at 3.30 p.m as per the endorsement found in it. The Accident Register prepared at Government Hospital, Erode has not been produced on the side of the prosecution. Ex.P4 is the intimation issued to the Judicial Magistrate for recording the dying declaration of the deceased. The same was received by the Judicial Magistrate No.2, Erode at 5.00 p.m on 06.09.2003. The dying declaration marked as Ex.P5 was recorded at 5.15 p.m on 06.09.2003. Therefore, it is quite clear that the deceased had been admitted in the Government General Hospital, Erode before 4.00 p.m on 06.09.2003. According to the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2 and 4, who are the parents and brother of the deceased, all of them went to the Government Hospital, Erode and met the deceased even before the learned Judicial Magistrate came there to record the dying declaration of the deceased Kavitha. According to the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2 and 4, who are the parents and brother of the deceased, all of them went to the Government Hospital, Erode and met the deceased even before the learned Judicial Magistrate came there to record the dying declaration of the deceased Kavitha. All of them have stated in unambiguous terms that before she died, her statement was recorded by the police in the said hospital. It is the assertion of P.W.1 that a head constable from Tiruchengode Police Station came and recorded the statement of Kavitha. Likewise P.W.2 has also stated that the police came and recorded the statement of Kavitha. Similar admission was also made by P.W.4. From the said evidence of P.Ws.1, 2 and 4, it is quite obvious that the police came to Government Hospital, Erode after the dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate and before she died. P.W.1 is more specific in his assertion that a head constable from Tiruchengode did get the statement of the deceased. But such a statement seems to have been suppressed and a new statement has been obtained from P.W.1 to form the basis of the FIR. The only inference that can be made from such a suppression is that the contents of the statement should have been against the prosecution version. 14. Apart from the said suppression of the earlier statement recorded by the police, there are quite a number of discrepancies in the evidence of prosecution, which will give rise to an inference that there had been a calculated improvement and embellishment made in the case of the prosecution. If at all the police have recorded the statement of the deceased, the same should have been the basis on which FIR should have been registered. That has not been done. On the other hand, the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2 and 4 are clear that the Judicial Magistrate came first and recorded the dying declaration of the deceased. Only after the death of the deceased Kavitha, Ex.P1-complaint statement was recorded by the police at 9.00 p.m on 06.09.2003. There was a time gap of more than 3 ½ hours between the time of recording of the dying declaration and Ex.P1-statement. Only after the death of the deceased Kavitha, Ex.P1-complaint statement was recorded by the police at 9.00 p.m on 06.09.2003. There was a time gap of more than 3 ½ hours between the time of recording of the dying declaration and Ex.P1-statement. The suppression of fact has culminated to an apex point when P.W.18, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police who conducted initial investigation has stated in his evidence that he was not aware of the fact whether any dying declaration of the deceased had been recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. P.W.19 who completed the investigation and submitted a final report, in his evidence in cross examination, has admitted that the deceased had given a dying declaration before the Judicial Magistrate, Erode. At the same time he has also stated that he did not go through the dying declaration and hence he was not aware of the contents of the dying declaration. But curiously, he has cited the Judicial Magistrate No.2, Erode by designation alone as witness No.9 in the list of witnesses and the dying declaration of the deceased as document No.11 in the list of documents annexed to the charge-sheet (final report). Having done so, he got the audacity to say that he did not go through the dying declaration and hence he was not aware of its contents. P.W.18, the initial Investigating Officer was a higher official in the Police Department, namely Deputy Superintendent of Police. The first statement that came into existence in this case was the dying declaration of the deceased. However, P.W.18 would state that he was not aware of the fact that such a dying declaration had been recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. It cannot be believed that the Investigating Officer in a murder case would have failed to come across the dying declaration recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. Then why there is such a denial of knowledge regarding the dying declaration and its contents? The answer is that the contents of the dying declaration will have the effect of demolishing the prosecution version as a result of improvements made by the prosecution after the death of the deceased. 15. It is the clear admission of P.Ws.1 to 5 and P.Ws.6 to 8 that the husband of the deceased, namely Arthanareeswaran, was not present in the scene of occurrence. 15. It is the clear admission of P.Ws.1 to 5 and P.Ws.6 to 8 that the husband of the deceased, namely Arthanareeswaran, was not present in the scene of occurrence. On the other hand, the statement of the deceased recorded as dying declaration contains a recital to the effect that her husband Arthanareeswaran was also present in the scene of occurrence. TAMIL In the said dying declaration, the deceased had stated that her husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law and brother-in-law would have set her on fire. She had not asserted that she was set on fire by the accused persons. On the other hand, it had been stated in the dying declaration that the accused persons 1 to 3 and Arthanareeswaran (husband of the deceased) would have set her on fire. It was only a belief or assumption expressed by her. On the other hand, in Ex.P1 P.W.1 has stated that before her death the deceased informed him that while she was sleeping, A1 to A3 entered the bed room and A3 doused her with kerosene and set her ablaze whereas, A1 caught hold of her hands and A2 caught hold of her legs in order to facilitate the act on the part of A3. As per the dying declaration marked as Ex.P5, Arthanareeswaran, the husband of the deceased was very much present in the scene of occurrence. But as per Ex.P1-complaint and the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 8, Arthanareeswaran was not there in the scene of occurrence. From this it shall be seen that there was an initial attempt by instigating the deceased to give a statement in her dying declaration implicating her husband also, but, later on, when they came to know that Arthanareeswaran was having a strong alibi, they changed their version and created Ex.P1-complaint as if A1 to A3 alone were there in the scene of occurrence. That is the reason why the statement of the deceased recorded by the police as seen from the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2 and 4, has been suppressed. There is also the evidence in the form of Ex.D1, the statement of Arthanareeswaran recorded by the Revenue Divisional Officer. From the said statement, it is quite obvious that Arthanareeswaran was very much available in the hospital when inquest was conducted by the Revenue Divisional Officer. There is also the evidence in the form of Ex.D1, the statement of Arthanareeswaran recorded by the Revenue Divisional Officer. From the said statement, it is quite obvious that Arthanareeswaran was very much available in the hospital when inquest was conducted by the Revenue Divisional Officer. That is why a shift in the prosecution story within hours happened to be brought in by suppressing the statement of the deceased recorded by the police and substituting the statement of P.W.1, namely Ex.P1 as the basis of first information report. .16. It is a case wherein either there is no eye witness or the eye witnesses have not supported the prosecution theory. P.Ws.1 to 5 are admittedly not eye witnesses. In a way P.Ws.6 to 8 can be stated to be eye witnesses. According to them they, being neighbours, on seeing smoke coming out of the bed room in the first floor portion of the house of the accused, rushed to the spot, found the door of the bed room locked from inside, broke open the same and then took the deceased, who was found with extensive burns, to the hospital after summoning the fire service van. All the three witnesses have spoken to the effect that there was no dowry harassment and that the deceased had committed suicide by self-immolation. When such is the case, the prosecution can, at the best try to prove its case by circumstantial evidence alone. When a case is sought to be proved by circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstances should be complete without there being any missing link. In this case, one of the circumstances projected in support of the prosecution story is that the deceased was treated with cruelty and was humiliated by the accused persons because the father of the deceased, namely P.W.1 and the sisters husband of the deceased, namely P.W.5 had not repaid the amounts borrowed from the first respondent/A1. It was also the contention of the prosecution that the respondents 1 to 3 (accused 1 to 3) who did not want the accused and her husband setting up a separate residence for themselves breaking away from the joint family, had reason to see that the deceased was eliminated. In this regard, so many loop holes are found in the evidence of prosecution case. In this regard, so many loop holes are found in the evidence of prosecution case. First of all, it is admitted by the prosecution witnesses that the first respondent (A1) even volunteered to help P.W.1 and P.W.5 to bail them out of their indebtedness by offering a loan of Rs.1,00,000/- to each one of them at a lower rate of interest viz. Rs.1.50 per Rs.100/-per month (18% per annum). It is the evidence of P.W.1 that earlier he had borrowed from others for an exorbitant interest of 36% to 48% per annum and the first respondent volunteered to lend a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- at a lower rate of interest. Similarly, there are evidence to the effect that when the property of P.W.5 was facing the threat of being auctioned, it was the first respondent (A1) who helped him to clear his debt and save the property. The theory of the prosecution regarding the motive seems to be contradictory. On the one hand it was sought to be projected as if the accused had a motive to harass the deceased and ultimately caused the death of the deceased, because P.Ws.1 and 5 had not discharged the loan obtained from A1. At the same time, there is the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 5 that the first respondent (A1) did not insist upon repayment of the principal and on the other hand was telling that it would be sufficient to pay the interest alone and that the same was the reason why P.Ws.1 and 5 did not repay the principal. From the same, the inbuilt contradiction in the prosecution story regarding motive shall be obvious. 17. Yet another motive has been projected by the prosecution. According to the prosecution case, the deceased experienced some difficulties in coping up with her in-laws and hence she wanted her husband to set up a separate residence for them and that the in-laws of the deceased (accused persons) informed them they would not be allowed to set up a separate residence unless and until the 3rd respondent (A3) got married. But the evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution in this regard seem to be sceptical to some extent. But the evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution in this regard seem to be sceptical to some extent. Two types of evidence have been adduced in this regard: one to the effect that the accused persons were against the deceased and her husband setting up a separate residence for themselves before ever 3rd respondent/A3 would get married and the other to the effect that the accused 1 and 2 were telling the deceased that even if the 3rd respondent/A3 would get married and set up a separate residence, the deceased and her husband would not be allowed to go out of the joint family. The said contradiction gives rise to a clear and reasonable suspicion regarding the prosecution version relating to the alleged motive. .18. Nowhere in the complaint or in the statement of P.W.5 it was stated that the husband of the deceased had fixed a house on rent for setting up their separate residence. On the other hand, there is an improvement during the course of trial, whereby P.W.5 stated that the husband of the deceased informed him that he had fixed a house for rent for setting up their separate residence. Apart from that, though the other witnesses, namely P.Ws.1, 2, 3 and 5 have admitted that neither P.W.1 nor P.W.5 repaid the principal amount of debt borrowed from the first respondent/A1, P.W.4 would state that he was informed by the first respondent/A1 that P.W.5 had repaid the amount. When there is a clear admission by the prosecution witnesses that the first respondent (A1) did not want the principal amount to be repaid and he had informed P.Ws.1 and 5 that it would be sufficient to make payment of interest alone, the case of the prosecution that the deceased was harassed because the loan amount was not repaid by P.Ws.1 and 5, becomes highly improbable. 19. Apart from projecting a story that the accused were inimically disposed towards the deceased and were proclaiming that they would get another women married to Arthanareeswaran if the deceased would continue to insist upon setting up a separate residence breaking away from the joint family, the prosecution witnesses, namely P.Ws.1 to 5 have also made an attempt to show that there was an insult to the modesty of the deceased in the hands of the accused. They have made an attempt to show that despite her disliking, the accused persons and the husband of the deceased wanted the deceased to learn computer applications from the 3rd respondent/A3 and that when she refused to do so, the 3rd respondent/A3 pulled her catching hold of her hands. It was also stated by the said witnesses that the complaint made by the deceased to A1 that a kerosene merchant who had borrowed money from him was lying in the house with unruly posture, was not taken seriously. All these aspects were not found either in the complaint or in the statements of the said witnesses recorded by the Investigating Officer. The contradictions in this regard have been properly elicited by cross-examining the witnesses relating to such statements and eliciting admissions from the Investigating Officer regarding such omissions in the statements of the witnesses in this regard. The evidence of P.Ws.1 to 5 in this regard show improvement and embellishment as a result of deliberation. .20. On the other hand the admissions made by the prosecution witnesses will make probable the defence theory that the deceased committed suicide because of the attitude on the part of her parents and husband of her sister. According to the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, on the date of occurrence at about 12.00 noon, the deceased rang them up and informed them over phone that she celebrated the birthday of her daughter. It is also their evidence that during the said telephonic conversation, she wanted P.Ws.1 and 5 to discharge the loans obtained from the first respondent (A1). As her father and sisters husband had borrowed Rs.1,00,000/- each from her father-in-law (namely A1), she might have felt belittled and guilty in the presence of other members of her in-laws family so long as the debts remained undischarged. That should be the reason why she would have insisted upon her father and sisters husband to discharge the said loans. There are materials to make it probable that P.W.1 and his family members should have instigated the deceased to demand setting up of a separate residence for them by breaking away from the joint family so that A1 would not venture to pressurise for repayment of the amount advanced by him to P.Ws.1 and 5. There are materials to make it probable that P.W.1 and his family members should have instigated the deceased to demand setting up of a separate residence for them by breaking away from the joint family so that A1 would not venture to pressurise for repayment of the amount advanced by him to P.Ws.1 and 5. It becomes more probable by the fact that the prosecution witnesses have admitted that after they paid a visit to the temple of their family deity, the deceased started cooking for herself and her husband separately in the house of the accused itself. Therefore, it is quite probable that the deceased, who was caught between the devil and the deep sea would have chosen to end her life by self-immolation. That is why there are too many distortions, contradictions and discrepancies in the evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution, besides suppression of material documents. 21. The very version allegedly given by the deceased to P.W.1 which formed the basis of Ex.P1-complaint is quite contra to Ex.P5-dying declaration. There was attempt to implicate the husband of the deceased by making her to state in the dying declaration that he was present in the scene of occurrence. However absence of such an averment in Ex.P1 is conspicuous. On the other hand, evidence has been adduced to the effect that Arthanareeswaran, husband of the deceased was not present in the scene of occurrence. 22. Apart from the above said discrepancies, there is yet another lacuna in the prosecution case. The accused are shown to be arrested on 11.06.2003. A story of confession statement leading to recovery of M.Os.3 and 4 has also been propounded. The place of occurrence was inspected by the first Investigating Officer, namely P.W.18 on 17.06.2003 itself. Nothing has been mentioned about the presence of kerosene can and match box. On the other hand, evidence has been adduced through P.W.19 and P.W.11 to the effect that A3 gave a confession statement based on which M.Os.3 and 4 were recovered under Ex.P9-Mahazar. The admissible part of the confession statement has been marked as Ex.P8. First of all it is quite improbable that the said articles would have missed the attention of P.W.18 when he prepared Ex.P2-Observation Mahazar and Ex.P10-rough sketch on 07.09.2003, wherein the vacant site from which M.Os.3 and 4 were allegedly recovered at a later point of time, has also been noted. First of all it is quite improbable that the said articles would have missed the attention of P.W.18 when he prepared Ex.P2-Observation Mahazar and Ex.P10-rough sketch on 07.09.2003, wherein the vacant site from which M.Os.3 and 4 were allegedly recovered at a later point of time, has also been noted. Secondly, P.Ws.1 to 4 have uniformly stated that the accused 1 to 3 were taken into custody by the police on 07.03.2003; that they were kept in the police station for five days and that only there after they were sent to the court. When that is so, the alleged arrest on 11.09.2003, confession statement and recovery should necessarily be disbelieved. P.W.11 (VAO) and his village menial are said to be the witnesses for the arrest, confession statement and recovery. The village menial has not been examined. P.W.11, in his cross-examination has admitted that he was not present at the time of arrest and that when he was summoned by the police, all the three accused were in front of his office. He has pleaded ignorance as to from what place they were taken by the police. He has also not denied the stand that the accused persons were taken into custody by the police on 07.03.2003 itself and that the kerosene can and match box had been recovered by the police personnel on the said date itself. On the other hand, he has stated that he was not aware of it. When such is the evidence regarding the arrest and recovery, this court has to necessarily disbelieve the prosecution story relating to arrest and recovery. Even assuming that M.Os.3 and 4 could have been recovered as stated by the prosecution, there is no clear cut evidence to link them with the death of the deceased. 23. Clinching evidence is there which will disprove the case of the prosecution. The case of the prosecution, as projected in Ex.P1 is that while the deceased was sleeping in the bed room, all the three accused stealthily entered the bed room and A3 set the deceased ablaze after dousing her with kerosene. It is the further case of the prosecution that A1 and A2 caught hold of respectively the hands and legs of the deceased so as to facilitate the act of the third accused in pouring kerosene on the deceased and set her on fire. It is the further case of the prosecution that A1 and A2 caught hold of respectively the hands and legs of the deceased so as to facilitate the act of the third accused in pouring kerosene on the deceased and set her on fire. It is the case of the prosecution that after setting her ablaze the accused persons went out of the bed room. But, unfortunately there is no direct admissible evidence to prove such a story of the prosecution. The circumstantial evidence are also against the prosecution story. The prosecution has not proved by sufficient evidence that the door of bed room was either locked from outside or was not at all locked. On the other hand, there are clear evidence adduced through P.Ws.6 to 8 that the bed room was locked from inside and they had to break open the door to gain access to the deceased who was found with extensive burns in the bed room. When such is the case, it is quite natural and imperative on the part of the Investigating Officer, who makes a spot visit, to verify whether the inside padlock or lock of the door was found broken. But, curiously the same is not found in Ex.P2-Observation Mahazar. In Ex.P2 nothing has been mentioned about the door of the bed room. P.W.18 would say that he did not notice whether any lock or padlock in the door of the bed room was found broken. Under such circumstances, we have to accept the evidence of P.Ws.6 to 8 that the door had been locked from inside and they had to break open the door to gain access in an attempt to save the deceased who was found inside the bed room with burns. The report of fire service personnel has also not been obtained and produced. Therefore the finding of the court below that the deceased would have committed suicide by self-immolation cannot be termed a finding based on unreliable evidence or against the weight of evidence and in short perverse. The evidence of P.W.13 assumes importance in this regard. It is her clear testimony that there would be extensive burns over the parts of the body which were doused with kerosene and on the other parts where kerosene was not present, there would be comparatively lesser burns. The evidence of P.W.13 assumes importance in this regard. It is her clear testimony that there would be extensive burns over the parts of the body which were doused with kerosene and on the other parts where kerosene was not present, there would be comparatively lesser burns. It is also her evidence that in a case of self-immolation one may sustain extensive burns all over the body and on the other hand, if kerosene is splashed on a person while he/she is lying and set on fire, there would not be burns on the other side of the body, which did not come in contact with the kerosene splashed. In this case, the deceased had sustained burns all over the body. That factor also will go to show that the case propounded by the prosecution as if the accused persons doused her with kerosene and set her on fire while she was sleeping becomes improbable. The finding of the Medical Officer who conducted autopsy coupled with the evidence of P.Ws.6 to 8 to the effect that the bed room in which the fire broke out was locked from inside will probablise the case of the defence that the deceased committed suicide by self-immolation and improbablise the case of murder propounded by the prosecution. No defect in procedure or the law applied by the court below has been proved in this revision. The finding of the court below also cannot be termed perverse. There is no valid ground for interfering with the well considered judgment of the court below. 24. If the principles laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh @ B.P.Singh & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkand) & Anr. reported in 2002(5) Supreme 332 cited supra are applied to the facts of the case on hand, this court has to necessarily come to the conclusion that the revision petitioner has not made out a case for interference with the judgment of the court below in exercise of this courts revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. There is no merit in the criminal revision case and the same deserves to be dismissed. 25. In the result, the criminal revision case is dismissed and the order of acquittal acquitting the respondents 1 to 3 herein/accused 1 to 3 passed by the learned Additional District Sessions Court/Fast Track Court, Namakkal is confirmed.