JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner, a student of class XII, being represented through his father, has prayed in this writ petition that the respondent No.1 be directed to declare his result. 2. The petitioner had appeared in Secondary School Examination conducted in April, 2007 by the National Institute of Open School. As the petitioner did not clear his Social Study Paper, he had to appear in supplementary examination in the said subject, which was conducted by the National Institute of Open School in October, 2007. The result of the supplementary examination was declared in December, 2007 and the petitioner was declared successful. 3. Thereafter the petitioner took admission in class XI, in the month of January 2008. He had then cleared the examination of class XI as conducted by the school namely; Lawrence and Mayo Public School, Ajmer, respondent No.2, which is affiliated to the respondent No.1. Thereafter the petitioner took admission in class XII. The petitioner had later on filled the examination form as a regular student, after depositing the requisite fee. A permission letter for the examination was issued to the petitioner in February, 2009. In furtherance thereof the petitioner appeared in the examination of class XII. But when the result of the said class was declared by the respondent No.1, it was found that result of the petitioner was withheld.Thereafter the father of the petitioner contacted the authorities of the respondent-Board and came to know that the result of the petitioner has been withheld as the total period of attending the school by the petitioner, during class X to class XII, was less than two years. The petitioner had then sent notices for demand of justice on 13.6.2009 and 15.6.2009. The petitioner had also filled the form on 20.6.2009, seeking admission in the first year of degree course at Bhupal Noble's P. G. College, respondent No.3. But the respondent-college did not accept the admission form of the petitioner on the ground that it was incomplete as his result of XII class had not been declared. 4. The petitioner had also filled the form on 20.6.2009, seeking admission in the first year of degree course at Bhupal Noble's P. G. College, respondent No.3. But the respondent-college did not accept the admission form of the petitioner on the ground that it was incomplete as his result of XII class had not been declared. 4. On the other hand, the case of the respondent No.1, as given in the reply, is that the admission sought by the petitioner in class XI of respondent No.2 was illegal inasmuch as, the petitioner had passed class X examination from National Institute of Open School, Delhi in the month of December 2007 and as such he could not have completed 75% attendance upto 31.1.2008 so as to be eligible for class XI examination. Further, it is stated that as per the Bye- Laws, permission should have been sought by the school authorities (respondent No.2) from respondent-Board in case the admission was given after 31st August of the year. According to the Bye-Laws, 75% of attendance is mandatory and likewise it is also essential to complete the entire course of class IX, X, XI and XII before the commencement of the examination. As the petitioner did not complete the entire course of class XI, as such he was not eligible for appearing in the examination of the respondent-Board. In this regard, reference has been made to Rule 12 and 13 of the Examination Bye- Laws, 1995. Further, reference has been made to Rule 14, which relates to condonation of shortage of attendance.In the last, it has been stated in the reply that respondent No.2, affiliated with the respondent-Board, ought to have sent the case of the petitioner for approval by the Board in regard to admission of the petitioner after 31st August 2008. When the petitioner was not eligible, as per the Examination Bye-Laws of 1995, his result was rightly withheld by the respondents. 5. On behalf of the petitioner, the averments made in reply of the Board have been sought to be controverted by way of filing a rejoinder. The primary averment made in the rejoinder is in respect of Rule 6.5 of the Examination Bye- Laws, 1995 wherein permission of the Board is not required for admission to higher class after the stipulated time because of the late declaration of result by a Board. 6. The primary averment made in the rejoinder is in respect of Rule 6.5 of the Examination Bye- Laws, 1995 wherein permission of the Board is not required for admission to higher class after the stipulated time because of the late declaration of result by a Board. 6. It has been contended by the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had appeared in the supplementary examination of class X and as soon as the result of the same was declared, admission was sought to the next class. Thereafter, the petitioner had cleared the examination of class XI and he was given admission to class XII. After pursuing his studies as a regular student, the petitioner had filled the form for the ensuing examination of the said class and the respondent had issued the permission letter. In consequence thereof the petitioner made preparation and appeared in the examination of class XII. But the respondent had not declared the result of the petitioner only on the ground that he had not completed full period of studies in class XI and class XII, as he had sought admission in class XI only in January, 2008. Therefore, it has been submitted that there had been no fault of the petitioner either in late declaration of the result of supplementary examination or in seeking admission to the higher class i.e. Class XI in January 2008. It has also been submitted that the petitioner was given permission for the examination and he had appeared in the same with the hope that his result would be declared. He had all confidence that he would be successful. It has also been submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that once the respondent had permitted the petitioner to appear in the examination then it did not lie with it not to declare the result. 7. After issuance of notices to the non-petitioners, this Court, vide order dated 2.9.2009, had directed the respondent-Board to produce result of the petitioner in respect of his class XII examination. Accordingly, the result was brought on 16.9.2009 wherein the petitioner is declared pass. Therefore, this Court had thought it proper to finally adjudicate the petition on merits. 8. 7. After issuance of notices to the non-petitioners, this Court, vide order dated 2.9.2009, had directed the respondent-Board to produce result of the petitioner in respect of his class XII examination. Accordingly, the result was brought on 16.9.2009 wherein the petitioner is declared pass. Therefore, this Court had thought it proper to finally adjudicate the petition on merits. 8. On having given my anxious and thoughtful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the present case and also the submissions made by the counsels for the rival parties, I am of the considered opinion that the writ petition has merit. There is no dispute about the fact that after seeking admission to class XI and having passed in the examination, the petitioner was pursuing his studies in class XII. Thereafter the petitioner had filled up the form for the examination of class XII, which was sent to the respondent- Board through his school, respondent No.2. The respondent- Board had then issued the permission letter to petitioner and in furtherance thereof he had appeared in the examination. Withholding of the result of the petitioner by the respondent Board subsequently, in my view was neither just nor proper. In fact the respondent-Board, after having issued the permission letter to the petitioner and made him appear in the examination of class XII, is estopped from withholding his result. The principles of promissory estoppel will apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In Miotlal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. In fact the respondent-Board, after having issued the permission letter to the petitioner and made him appear in the examination of class XII, is estopped from withholding his result. The principles of promissory estoppel will apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In Miotlal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh : AIR 1979 SC, 621 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court enunciated the principle of promissory estoppel and observed as follows : "The true principle of promissory estoppel seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term. It is an equitable principle evolved by the Courts for doing justice and there is no reason why it should be given only a limited application by way of defence. There is no reason in logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action, if necessary to satisfy the equity. It is not necessary, in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, that the promisee, acting in reliance on the promise, should suffer any detriment. What is necessary is only that the promisee should have altered his position in reliance on the promise. But if by detriment we mean injustice to the promise which would result if the promisor were to recede from his promise, then deteriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient. What is necessary is only that the promisee should have altered his position in reliance on the promise. But if by detriment we mean injustice to the promise which would result if the promisor were to recede from his promise, then deteriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient. The detriment in such a case is not some prejudice suffered by the promisee by acting on the promise, but the prejudice which would be caused to the promisee if the promisor were allowed to go back on the promise. If this is the kind of detriment contemplated, it would necessarily be present in every case of promissory estoppel, because it is on account of such detriment which the promisee would suffer if the promisor were to act differently from his promise, that the Court would consider it inequitable to allow the promisor to go back upon his promise. In India not only has the doctrine of promissory estoppel been adopted in its fullness but it has been recognised as affording a cause of action to the person to whom the promise is made." 9. Furthermore, after pursuing studies in class XII, the petitioner had timely filled up the form of examination and the same was duly sent to the Board through the school, respondent No.2. The petitioner had prepared for the examination and appeared in the same. Subsequently, if the result of the said examination is withheld by the respondent- Board, then in my view it amounts to infringement of rights of the petitioner. When a student appears in an examination on the permission having been granted by the Board then he has an implicit right to have the result of the examination declared. 10. It may also be noticed that in respect of the objection raised by the responded-Board for procedural lapses committed by it or the school, the student cannot be held responsible and he is not be penalised. Even if any permission etc was to be sought from the respondent-Board at the time of admission or at the time of submitting the examination form, as per the Examination Bye-Laws of 1995, it is an admitted position that the Board itself had given permission to the petitioner for appearing in the examination. Even if any permission etc was to be sought from the respondent-Board at the time of admission or at the time of submitting the examination form, as per the Examination Bye-Laws of 1995, it is an admitted position that the Board itself had given permission to the petitioner for appearing in the examination. In such a situation also, the result of the student-petitioner cannot be withheld if some procedure had not been followed by the school, as the respondent-Board had not taken the objection at the appropriate time. In fact, the responsibility was also of the respondent-Board to have raised the objection in respect of eligibility of the petitioner for his appearance in class XII examination at the time of considering the examination form and before issuing permission letter for his appearance in the same. The petitioner was not guilty of any fraud or misrepresentation in submitting the examination form and therefore holding of his result by the Board was improper. The petitioner is not to suffer for the delay on the part of the Board in noticing the procedural lapses. Permitting such a course is to ignore the well established principle of equitable estoppel, which must operate against the Board in the present case. In this respect reliance may be placed on the case of Arshdeep d/o Gurudeo Singh Puri v. Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education, Nagpur Divisional Board, Nagpur & Ors. : 1950-91 (2) AIEC 524 (Bom.) . 11. The matter can be looked into from yet another angle. The Examination Bye-Laws, 1995 of respondent-Board also has the provision in Rule 14, for condoning the shortage of attendance. The reference of the same has also been made by the respondents in their reply. The power for condoning shortage of attendance is vested with the Chairman of the respondent-Board. In my view, instant case was a fit one where the Chairman of the respondent-Board ought to have exercised his power and shortage of attendance should have been condoned. As mentioned above, it is an undisputed fact that the result of the supplementary examination of class X was declared late by the Board concerned and it was only in January, 2008 that the petitioner had passed the same. Only thereafter the petitioner could take admission in the higher class. 12. As mentioned above, it is an undisputed fact that the result of the supplementary examination of class X was declared late by the Board concerned and it was only in January, 2008 that the petitioner had passed the same. Only thereafter the petitioner could take admission in the higher class. 12. A look to Clause 6.5 of Bye-Laws, 1995 goes to show that in case where the admission could not be taken by a student in a higher class by the stipulated date on account of late declaration of the result by the Board, then permission is not required, provided the candidate applies for admission within a fortnight of the declaration of the result. It is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner had faulted in taking the admission within the time prescribed for the next higher class, after declaration of the result of his supplementary examination of class X in January 2008.For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered opinion that the prayer made by the petitioner deserves to be accepted. Consequently the writ petition is allowed and it is ordered that the respondent No.1 shall declare the result of the petitioner in respect of class XII examination. Accordingly, the petitioner shall be issued the mark-sheet. It goes without saying that in view of above, the respondent college should consider the petitioner for the purpose of admission to First Year Degree Course, as a special case.Petition allowed. *******