Judgment :- Manjula Chellur, J. These two contempt proceedings are initiated contending that these is failure on the part of the respondent-contemnors to comply with the orders dt.14.6.2004 and subsequent order dt.3.8.2004 in W.P.Nos. 22238/04 and 22239/04. 2. After initiation of contempt proceedings, notice was ordered to the respondents. Subsequently, in reply, the respondents appeared and filed their objection statements. Later on, this Court after hearing both the parties opined that there was prima facie material indicating disobedience of the orders passed by this Court dt.14.6.04 and 3.8.04, therefore charges have to be famed. Accordingly, charges were framed and evidence was also let in. when the matter was posted for hearing the arguments, the respondents took objection to the representation by the Counsel for the complainant Mr. Aditya Sondhi on the ground that Rule 11 of The High Court of Karnataka (Contempt of Court Proceedings) Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as Rules) do not provide for Advocate of choice of complainant to appear and conduct the proceedings against the accused. In view of the above objection, an occasion arose for this Court to have an in depth consideration of the matter with reference to Rule 11 as stated above. 3. The learned Advocate for the respondents represented by Senior Counsel Sri S.P. Shankar was heard and Sri Aditya Sondhi, was heard on behalf of the complainant. The Government Advocate was also called upon to address the arguments in this regard and accordingly, he was heard. 4. According to the learned Counsel for the respondent accused on 6.9.06, this Court permitted the participation of the Counsel/Advocate for the complainant in the proceedings without deciding the intensity and veracity of the objections raised by the respondents. The order dated 6.9.06 reads as under: “For the present, we will request Sri Adithya, learned Counsel to assist us in these proceedings. Call on 07.09.2006” 5. This would indicate as early as 2006 itself, the respondents took objection to the appearance of Mr. Aditya Sondhi, the Advocate on record for the complainants to conduct the proceedings. When the matter came up for the arguments as stated above, both the parties submitted to the Court that this question needs to be decided once for all to have uniformity. 6. Aditya Sondhi, the Advocate on record for the complainants to conduct the proceedings. When the matter came up for the arguments as stated above, both the parties submitted to the Court that this question needs to be decided once for all to have uniformity. 6. According to the learned Counsel for the respondent-accused, as contemplated under Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act, several High Courts have framed Rules and most of the High Courts have allowed only the Advocate General to conduct the proceedings in contempt matters, some High Courts have reserved the right to have Advocate of ‘his choice’ while other High Court have framed the Rule to the effect that Advocate General or any Counsel as directed by the High Court can conduct proceedings for complainant. However, according to the learned Senior Counsel Sri S.P. Shankar, the words ‘any other Advocate’ definitely would not include the Advocate’ definitely would not include the Advocate of choice of the complainant. According to him, the Advocate who represent the complainant cannot be allowed to take part in the proceedings after framing of charges. It is further submitted, in order to maintain majesty and dignity of the institution, proceedings under Contempt of Courts Act were thought of and they are meant to punish the contemnor for bringing down the majesty or for causing interference with the administration of justice by willful disobedience of the judgment, decree, order etc. According to him, when once the Court concludes that a prima facie case is made out and charges are framed on accused pleading not guilty of the charges, the proceedings would be only between the Court and the contemnor, therefore, the participation of the complainant is not required. He also relies on Section 19 of the Act to support his contention that complainant has no right to take the matter in appeal if the Court drops the proceedings of contempt. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the following judgments: 1. (1990) 1 SCC 259 (Noorali Babul Thanewala Vs. K.M.M. Shetty and Others) 2. (2003) 5 SCC 376 (M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India) 3. (1995) 6 SCC 249 (J. Vasudevan Vs. T.R. Dhananjaya) 4. (2004) 7 SCC 261 (Prithawl Nath Ram Vs State of Jharkhand and Others) 5. (1993) 2 SCC 533 (Major Genl. B.M. Bhattacharjee (Retd) and another Vs. Russel Estate Corporation and Another 6. K.M.M. Shetty and Others) 2. (2003) 5 SCC 376 (M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India) 3. (1995) 6 SCC 249 (J. Vasudevan Vs. T.R. Dhananjaya) 4. (2004) 7 SCC 261 (Prithawl Nath Ram Vs State of Jharkhand and Others) 5. (1993) 2 SCC 533 (Major Genl. B.M. Bhattacharjee (Retd) and another Vs. Russel Estate Corporation and Another 6. (1998) 1 Supreme Court Cases 349 (Commissioner, Agra and others Vs. Rohtas Singh and Others) 7. (2001) 2 Supreme Court Cases 171 (S.K. Sundaram: in Re suo motu contempt petition) 8. (1988) 3 Supreme Court Cases 26 (D.N. Taneja Vs. Bhajan Lal) 7. He further contends that when Rule 11 mandates that proceedings have to be done in a particular manner, it shall be done as provided. He relies on paras 31 & 32 reported in AIR 1999 SC 1281 . 8. As against this, learned Counsel for the complainant Mr. Sondhi contends that normally, the Advocate on record for the complainant should be allowed to conduct the proceedings as he would know the intensity of the contempt committed by the accused and Rule 11 would come into play only when suo motu cognizance of contempt is taken note of by the Court when no proper assistance is forthcoming. He further contends that in the absence of positive prohibition under Rule 11 for the Advocate on record to conduct the proceedings, the word ‘any other advocate’ means other than the Advocate General but includes Advocate appearing on record for the complainant also. He refers to the following decisions in support of his contentions. 1. AIR 2000 SC 1136 (Om Prakash Jalswal Vs. Mittal and another) 2. (1998) 4 Supreme Court 409 (Supreme Court Bar Assn. Vs. Union of India and another) 3. (1997) 7 Supreme Court Cases 438 (N.C. Das Vs. M.A. Mohsin and another) 4. (2000) Crl.L.J. 4700 (Laxman T. Vs Som Nath Pandey and Others) 5. AIR 1986 SC 791 (Shri Amrit Nahata Vs. Union of India & Others) 9. Learned Govt. Advocate Shri Shridhar Hiremath while referring to Rule 20 of the Rules submits ‘any other Advocate’ at Rule 11 includes advocates of choice of complainant. M.A. Mohsin and another) 4. (2000) Crl.L.J. 4700 (Laxman T. Vs Som Nath Pandey and Others) 5. AIR 1986 SC 791 (Shri Amrit Nahata Vs. Union of India & Others) 9. Learned Govt. Advocate Shri Shridhar Hiremath while referring to Rule 20 of the Rules submits ‘any other Advocate’ at Rule 11 includes advocates of choice of complainant. According to him, if the choice of the Advocate of complainant is permitted to conduct the proceedings, the Court will be in a better position to assess the situation as the Advocate of choice of complainant would know the facts and circumstances of the case better than any other Advocate. 10. It is contended, in the absence of absolute prohibition for the Advocate of choice of complainant, there is no embargo or impediment for the complainant to engage an Advocate of his choice to conduct the proceedings. The very provisions of Rule 11 would indicate that Advocate General or any Advocate is only to assist the Court and he should not prejudice the mind of the Court in any manner. 11. The point that would arise for our consideration is “whether the complainant could engage an Advocate of his choice to prosecute the complaint filed by him and at what stage”? 12. In order to appreciate the question of controversy posed before us, it would be necessary to quote relevant sections of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and so also Rules framed under the Act by the High Court of Karnataka. Section 17 deals with the procedure how the notice shall be served and how proceedings should be held once the Court takes cognizance of the contempt. Section 19 refers to preferring of appeals wherein no appeal would lie against an order of acquittal of the accused in respect of the alleged contempt. Section 20 deals with Limitation for actions for contempt. Section 22 indicates that the provisions of this contempt of courts Act in addition to and not in derogation of, other laws relating to contempt. Section 23 indicates that High Courts are empowered to frame Rules and those Rules must be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act whenever it pertains to its procedure. 13. So far as Contempt of Court Proceedings Rules, 1981 framed by the High Court of Karnataka, Section 6 deals with taking of cognizance, Section 7 deals with the initiation of proceedings on information. 13. So far as Contempt of Court Proceedings Rules, 1981 framed by the High Court of Karnataka, Section 6 deals with taking of cognizance, Section 7 deals with the initiation of proceedings on information. Thereafter, Section 8 deals with Preliminary hearing and notice when once the concerned Bench considers it expedient to take action under the Act as provided under Section 7. 14. When the matter appears for preliminary hearing before the appropriate Bench, if Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, notice may be directed to be issued otherwise, the Court will proceed to dismiss the petition or reject the reference. 15. Rule 9 deals with the appearance of the accused. Sub-Section (ii) of Rule 9 refers to civil contempt proceedings are concerned. With reference to an accused in a case of civil contempt, he is entitled to appear either in person or through an Advocate on all dates of hearing but he shall appear before the Court whenever directed by the Court. Rule 10 deals with hearing of cases and the trial which includes framing of charge and the consequences of pleading guilty or pleading innocence. Rule 11 deals with the conducting of proceedings which is relevant for the purpose of deciding the question of controversy before us. Rule 11 – Conducting of proceedings:- The Court may direct the Advocate-General or any other Advocate to appear and conduct the proceedings against the accused. 16. It would be appropriate and pertinent to know what exactly ‘civil contempt’ would mean. Sub-section (b) of Section 2 of Contempt of Courts Act, ‘civil contempt’ means “willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of the Court”. In other words, when there is failure to comply with or carry out an order or direction of the Court made in favour of a party, it would amount to contempt. The person in whose favour such an order or direction is issued can move the Court initiating the proceedings for contempt against the alleged contemnor. However, such proceedings cannot be equated with an execution proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure, though the party in whose favour such an order or direction was issued is entitled to the benefit of such direction or order. However, such proceedings cannot be equated with an execution proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure, though the party in whose favour such an order or direction was issued is entitled to the benefit of such direction or order. So far as punishment for not having complied with the direction or order is, whether the alleged contemnor should be punished for his mere non-compliance or mere disobedience? There would be several factors resulting in non-compliance of direction or order without the contemnor being the cause for such failure to carry out the direction or order of the Court. Therefore, while defining ‘civil contempt’, the framers of the Act in their wisdom have added the word ‘wilful disobedience’ to any judgment, decree, direction etc. Therefore, it is not mere non-compliance of direction of the Court but willful non-compliance of direction, order, decree which would ultimately book the contemnor for action under Contempt of Courts Act. Therefore, the paramount consideration would be court’s satisfaction that there was willful disobedience or non-compliance to any judgment, direction order etc. 17. No doubt, once a decree or order has been passed, it is the duty of the Court to execute the decree whatever may be the consequences thereof. However, this would not mean that every disobedience would haul the contemnor for action under Contempt of Courts Act. There has to be intentional or willful disobedience. Even an undertaking given to the court can lead to an action for contempt. However, the same principle would apply i.e. satisfaction of the Court that there was willful or intentional disobedience on the part of the contemnor. 18. In several cases contemnor was hauled up for non-compliance of an undertaking given to the Court. It was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in more than one case that mere tendering of an apology by the contemnor will never amount to a weapon of defence. Hence, such apology would not purge the guilt of the offence, if the disobedience was willful or intentional. Reliance is placed on the following decisions: 1. (1990) 1 Supreme Court Cases 259 (Noorali Babul Thanewala Vs. K.M.M. Shetty and Others) wherein it is held at para 11, as under: 11. When a court accepts an undertaking given by one of the parties and passes orders based on such undertaking, the order amounts in substance to an injunction restraining that party from acting in breach thereof. (1990) 1 Supreme Court Cases 259 (Noorali Babul Thanewala Vs. K.M.M. Shetty and Others) wherein it is held at para 11, as under: 11. When a court accepts an undertaking given by one of the parties and passes orders based on such undertaking, the order amounts in substance to an injunction restraining that party from acting in breach thereof. The breach of an undertaking given to the court by or on behalf of a party to a civil proceedings is, therefore, regarded as tantamount to a breach of injunction although the remedies were not always identical. For the purpose of enforcing an undertaking that undertaking is treated as an order so that an undertaking, if broken, would involve the same consequences on the persons breaking that undertaking as would their disobedience to an order for an injunction. It is settled law that breach of an injunction or breach of an undertaking given to a court by a person in a civil proceeding on the faith of which the court sanctions a particular course of action is misconduct amounting to contempt. The remedy in such circumstances may be in the form of a direction to the contemnor to purge the contempt or a sentence of imprisonment or fine or all of them. On the facts and circumstances of this case in the light of our finding that there was a breach of the undertaking we think that mere imposition of imprisonment or fine will not meet the ends of justice. There will have to be an order to purge the contempt by directing respondent 1 contemnor to deliver vacant possession immediately and issuing necessary further and consequential directions for enforcing the same. 2. (2003) 5 Supreme Court Cases 376 (M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India) wherein it is held as under: …….. In para 9 of the affidavit, as quoted above, though it is stated that he tenders unconditional apology, it is not really so, as in para 6 of the affidavit he as defended his action. Therefore, the apology so tendered by the contemnor is not a product of remorse or contrition. …….. An apology is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilt of the offences nor is it intended to operate as a panacea. Therefore, the apology so tendered by the contemnor is not a product of remorse or contrition. …….. An apology is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilt of the offences nor is it intended to operate as a panacea. It is intended to be evidence of real contriteness, the manly consciousness of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted and the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies in the wrongdoer’s power. We do not find the apology to be so in this case. The conduct of contemners is highly reprehensible. 19. In a situation when the contemnor knowingly commits willfull disobedience of a direction/order, he cannot escape by contending that he had to act so on the advise of a Counsel. While exercising jurisdiction under contempt proceedings, the Court cannot exercise mercy jurisdiction as its prime duty is to uphold the majesty of law and dignity of court. Reliance is placed on (1995) 6 Supreme Court Cases 249 (J. Vasudevan Vs. T.R. Dhananjaya) wherein it is held as under: 10. The entire emphasis of Shri Nariman is that the petitioner had acted the way be had done on legal advice, more so, in the background of the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka passed in WP. No.15458 of 1991 and batch rendered on 31-3-1994. Shri Nariman has taken us through the relevant part of that judgment in which the High Court accepted that the claim of one M. Venkatesh was fully protected, despite the order which had been passed by this Court on 26-7-1993 in IA No.3. In the order which we had passed on 25-8-1995, this fact had been noted, to which our attention was drawn by Shri Santosh Hegde, who had then appeared for the petitioner. In the order we stated that after Venkatesh had been promoted nothing could have reasonably stood in the way of T.R. Dhananjaya to get appointed to the supernumerary post which had been created by the Bangalore Corporation pursuant to the order passed by this Court. That was, however, not done. In the order we stated that after Venkatesh had been promoted nothing could have reasonably stood in the way of T.R. Dhananjaya to get appointed to the supernumerary post which had been created by the Bangalore Corporation pursuant to the order passed by this Court. That was, however, not done. Shri Nariman’s submission is that this was not done by the petitioner, not because he did not desire to comply with this Court’s order, but because he had been advised by his counsel to act the way he subsequently did and which ultimately resulted in the proceeding dated 10-7-1995 the purport of which has been noted by us in the order in question. 11. Shri Nariman strenuously urges that the petitioner’s sentence for imprisonment be remitted because he acted under wrong legal advice, and not malafide. It may be pointed out that in our order we had not attributed mala fide to the petitioner but had concluded that he was guilty of willful disobedience. As to the advice by the counsel, which is said to be available in the file, may we mention, as noted in our earlier order, that a submission had been made before this Court itself on 10-5-1995 by Shri Hegde to grant time till after vacation for implemention of the order. We had allowed this prayer. According to us, therefore, nothing was left except to implement the order which had not been done. The fact that the order has been implemented subsequently has no relevance. 14. Coming to the mercy jurisdiction, let it be first stated that while awarding sentence on a contemnor the Court does so to uphold the majesty of law and not with any idea of vindicating the prestige of the Court or to uphold its dignity. It is really to see that unflinching faith of the people in the courts remains intact. But, if the order of even the highest court of the land is allowed to be willfully disobeyed and a person found guilty of contempt is let off by remitting sentence on plea of mercy, that would send wrong signals to everybody in the country. It has been a sad experience that due regard is not always shown even to the order of the highest court of the country. It has been a sad experience that due regard is not always shown even to the order of the highest court of the country. Now, if such orders are disobeyed, the effect would be that people would lose faith in the system of administration and would desist from approaching the Court, by spending time, money and energy to fight their legal battle. 20. It is also well settled awarding of sentence on a contemnor is not to vindicate the contemnor but to uphold the majesty of law. This ultimately is to see that faith of the people in the Courts remain unshaken or un-shattered. Therefore, even if in given case ultimately the interim order which led to contempt proceedings was vacated or relief in the main proceedings is not granted to a party seeking contempt action, the same cannot be a ground of defence contending that the complainant did not have the relief in the end. Therefore, the criterion would be not the ultimate result of the case against the accused but the consequences of willful disobedience. Hence, irrespective of the result of the main matter, there can be an action for contempt of court. For this principle, reliance is placed on (2004) 7 Supreme Court Cases 261 (Prithawi Nath Ram Vs State of Jharkhand and Others) wherein it is held as under: 9. In a given case, even if ultimately the interim order is vacated or relief in the main proceeding is not granted to a party, the other side cannot take that as a ground for disobedience of any interim order passed by the Court. 21. Many a time, the contemnors may be under the impression that unconditional apology would ensure to their benefit. No doubt, unconditional apology must be without any conditions being attached. If a contemnor while offering unconditional apology tries to defend his action of disobedience, it will not be an unconditional apology. Still, the Court can proceed against him for contempt. The Apex Court had an occasion to deal with similar matter in the case of (Major Genl. B.M. Bhattacharjee (Retd) and another Vs. Russel Estate Corporation and Another) reported in 1993 2 Supreme Court Cases 533 wherein it is held as under: 2. Still, the Court can proceed against him for contempt. The Apex Court had an occasion to deal with similar matter in the case of (Major Genl. B.M. Bhattacharjee (Retd) and another Vs. Russel Estate Corporation and Another) reported in 1993 2 Supreme Court Cases 533 wherein it is held as under: 2. For the purpose of this petition, it is enough to mention that each of the petitioners in these SLPs is claiming to be entitled to allotment of one or more of the flats being constructed by the respondents at Calcutta. Their complaint has been that ignoring the agreements in their favour, the respondents have been allotting the constructed flats in favour of third parties thereby seeking to defeat their rights. On August 1, 1991, a Bench of this Court comprising S. Rangananthan M. Fathima Beevi and N.D. Ojha JJ passed the following order in I.A.No.2 of 1991 after the respondents: “Counsel accepts notice. In the meantime, till this special leave petition is disposed of, respondents 1 and 2 should not make any further allotment of any other flats in the building in dispute, with effect from today. Counsel for the petitioner contends that the allotment of the flat originally allotted to him, to some other person violates an oral order of a Division Bench of the High Court. It will be open to the petitioner to move the High Court for appropriate relief in this regard if so advised.” 17. So far as the apology contained in para 3 of the second respondent’s further affidavit is concerned, it may firstly be mentioned that it is not really an unconditional apology though it purports to say so. While tendering unconditional apology in para 3, the second respondent has tried to defend his action in the subsequent paragraphs. Secondly, even if we construe paragraph 3 as tendering an unconditional apology, we are not inclined to accept the same having regard to the conduct of the respondent which we have adverted to hereinbefore with reference to the order of this Court and the report of the Receiver. Accordingly, we reject the apology tendered in para 3 of the further affidavit. 22. Accordingly, we reject the apology tendered in para 3 of the further affidavit. 22. In any other legal proceedings like suit, appeal, the person who knocks at the door of the Court seeking relief or against whom relief been sought or persons interested in the matter who have to be necessarily heard, must be made parties to the proceedings. It is so because they are interested in the decision pertaining to the relief sought in a particular case. The Judges who tries a person for contempt cannot be equated with such parties i.e. litigants, who come before the Court claiming relief or to defend the relief sought for against them because in a contempt proceedings, they are expected to decide the matter without evincing personal interest though it is a contempt against the Court, therefore, the decision of the Judge in a contempt proceedings has to be like any other decision made by those Judges pertaining to any other litigation which come before them. In other words, the jurisdiction of contempt court is not invoked with an idea of vindicating the party but it is only to uphold the rule of law. Reliance is placed on AIR 1961 SC 1367 in the case of (B.K. Kar Vs. Hon’ble the Chief Justice and his companion Justices of the Orissa High Court and another), wherein it is held as under: a) Contempt of Court – Parties – High Court convicting person for contempt – Appeal to Supreme Court – High Court Judges not to be made parties In every suit or appeal persons who claim relief or against whom relief has been given or persons who have or who claim the right to be heard must undoubtedly be made parties. That is because they have an interest in the decision or the result of that case. But where Judges of a High Court try a person for contempt and convict him they merely decide a matter and cannot be said to be interested in any way in the ultimate result in the sense in which a litigant is interest. The decision of Judges given in a contempt matter is like any other decision of those Judges, that is, in matters which come up before them by way of suit, petition, appeal or reference. The decision of Judges given in a contempt matter is like any other decision of those Judges, that is, in matters which come up before them by way of suit, petition, appeal or reference. Hence, there is no warrant for the practice which is in vogue in India today and which has been in vogue for over a century, of making the Chief Justice and Judges parties to an appeal against the decision of a High Court in a contempt matter. The present practice should, therefore, be discontinued and instead, as in England, the Title of such proceedings be “in re….. (the alleged contemner)”. 23. With the above settled principles, what should be the role of the complainant and what exactly is his right to prosecute the contempt proceedings? 24. It is well settled that if manner of a particular act is prescribed under any Statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. Therefore, when a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. While interpreting Rule 11, it mandates that proceedings have to be done in a particular manner with regard to the direction in conducting the contempt proceedings. Therefore, it has to be done in accordance with the intention of the legislature. This Court relies upon the decision reported in AIR 1999 SC 1281 (Babu Verghese and Others Vs. Bar Council of Kerala and Others) wherein it is held as under: 31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of going a particular act is prescribed under any Statue, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The original of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor V. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch.D 426 which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad Vs. King Emperor, 63 Ind App 372; AIR 1936 PC 253 who stated as under: “Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all”. 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh Vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh. 1954 SCR 1098 : AIR 1954 SC 322 and again in Deep Chand Vs. 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh Vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh. 1954 SCR 1098 : AIR 1954 SC 322 and again in Deep Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan, (1962) 1 SCR 662 : AIR 1961 SC 1527 . These cases were considered by a Three Judge Bench of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Slinghara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358 : (1964) 1 SCWR 57 and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad’s case (supra) was again upheld. The rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by Courts and has also been recognized as a salutary principle of administrative law. 25. It is the bounden duty of everyone whose liberty, freedom and equality are protected under the Constitution of the country to see that majesty of law and dignity of Rule of Law is maintained. The Court Could suo motu initiate contempt proceedings when it comes to its notice the commission of contempt of Court either civil or criminal. When a party to the litigation files an application or petition seeking action against the contemnor, what is his status? Can he be allowed to have the relief he was fighting in the main litigation? Therefore, time and again, the Courts have clarified the position of a petitioner or complainant in a contempt proceedings. He is only an informant. When once he brings to the notice of the Courts the facts revealing the alleged willful disobedience of an order or direction, his duty ends, therefore, he can be only an informant though he may continue to assist the Court during the proceedings at the instance of the Court. The role that has to be played by the complainant is that of an informant, therefore, ultimately, it lies within the discretion of the Court to act or not to act on the material brought to the notice of the Court by the complainant. Therefore, the Court may at its discretion allow the party i.e. the informant to assist the Court or it can command the assistance of any Advocate to assist the Court in the Process of contempt action against the contemnor. In other words, the complainant has no role to play when once the Court is satisfied that there is prima facie case made out to take action for contempt. In other words, the complainant has no role to play when once the Court is satisfied that there is prima facie case made out to take action for contempt. Therefore, the Courts should be cautious to allow the private party who acts as an informant as he may likely to wreck vengeance against the alleged contemnor. It is a matter between the Court and the contemnor. Therefore, even if the complainant, for the reasons beat known to him, intends to withdraw the proceedings for contempt, it is for the Court to decide whether proceedings could be dropped or not. Because, it is a matter between the Court and the contemnor and the duty of the informant ends once he brings to the notice of the Court of alleged contempt. 26. As already stated above, whenever special jurisdiction is invoked, it is in the domain of the Court to act or not to act on the information given. Therefore, when the Court is seized of matter, the complainants’ role comes to an end. Reliance is placed on the following decisions: 1. AIR 2000 SC 1136 (Omprakash Jalswal Vs. Mittal and another), wherein it is held as under: However, such person filing an application or petition before the Court does not become a complainant or petitioner in the proceedings. He is just an informer or realtor. His duty ends with the facts being brought to the notice of the Court. It is thereafter for the Court to act on such information or not to act though the private party or litigant moving the Court may at the discretion of the Court continue to render its assistance during the course of proceedings. That is why it has been held that an informant does not have a right of filing an appeal under Sec.19 of the Act against an order refusing to initiate the contempt proceedings or disposing the application or petition filed for initiating such proceedings. He cannot be called an aggrieved party. 2. (1998) 4 Supreme Court 409 (Supreme Court Bar Assn. Vs. He cannot be called an aggrieved party. 2. (1998) 4 Supreme Court 409 (Supreme Court Bar Assn. Vs. Union of India and another), wherein it is held as under: D. Constitution of India – Arts.129 and 215 – Contempt of court – jurisdiction of court – Not adversarial in nature – Party who brings to the notice of the court the contumacious conduct is only an informant and not a litigant – when and how the jurisdiction to be exercised stated. 41. When this Court is seized of a matter of contempt of court by an advocate, there is no ‘case, cause or matter’ before the Supreme Court regarding his ‘professional misconduct’ even though, in a given case, the contempt committed by an advocate may also amount to an abuse of the privilege granted to an advocate by virtue of the licence to practice law but no issue relating to his suspension from practice is the subject-matter of the case. The Powers is this Court, under Art.129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution being supplementary powers have “to be used in exercise of the jurisdiction” in the case under consideration by this Court. Moreover a case of contempt of court is not stricto sensu a cause or a matter between the parties inter se. It is a matter between the court and the contemner. It is not, strictly speaking, tried as an adversarial litigation. The party, which brings the contumacious conduct of the contemner to the notice of the court, whether a private person or the subordinate court, is only an informant and does not have the status of a litigant in the contempt of court case. 3) (1997) 7 Supreme Court Cases 438 (N.C. Das Vs. M.A. Mohsin and another) Contempt of Court – Generally – Contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked to wreck personal vengeance against the alleged contemners. 3. The contempt jurisdiction is not to be invoked or allowed to be invoked to enable the appellant to wreck personal vengeance against the alleged contemners. 4. (2000) Crl.L.J. 4700 (Laxman T. Vs. Som Nath Pandey and Others) Contempt of Courts Act – S.20 Contempt proceedings – initiation of – Is matter between court and alleged contemner – one else can insist upon court to initiate proceedings for contempt. 5) AIR 1986 Supreme Court 791 (Shri Amrit Nahata Vs. Union of India & Others) Contempt of Court Act Ss. Som Nath Pandey and Others) Contempt of Courts Act – S.20 Contempt proceedings – initiation of – Is matter between court and alleged contemner – one else can insist upon court to initiate proceedings for contempt. 5) AIR 1986 Supreme Court 791 (Shri Amrit Nahata Vs. Union of India & Others) Contempt of Court Act Ss. 15 – 17 Petition for withdrawal of proceedings for contempt – Factors to be considered – Petitioners is not entitled as a matter of right to withdraw petition – Matter is primarily between court and contemnor – Proceedings for contempt and that for filling complaint under Ss.120-B, 193. 199. IPC. – Petitions for withdrawal of – on facts, allowed 6) (1988) 3 Supreme Court Cases 26 (D.N. Taneja Vs. Bhajan Lal) Any person who moves the machinery of the court for contempt only brings to the notice of the court certain facts constituting contempt of the court. After furnishing such information he may still assist the court, but it must always be borne in mind that in a contempt proceedings there are only two parties, namely the court and the contemner. 27. In view of the above discussion in the light of law laid down by the Apex Court on law of contempt referred to above, now the crucial question is “whether the words ‘any other Advocate’ under Rule 11 would include ‘advocate of choice of complainant or it indicates that only when suo motu contempt proceedings are initiated by the Court, the Advocate General or any other Advocate as directed by the Court should conduct the proceedings? 28. The plain reading of Rule 11 exfacie does not indicate any bar or embargo for the Advocate of choice of complainant to appear and conduct the proceedings. But the fact remains, under the guise of personal vendetta, he may be very active to prosecute the contempt proceedings. The Rule commences with the words “court may direct”. These three words definitely indicate and refer to the discretion of the Court to give direction at its choice or option. 29. The learned Govt. Advocate was submitting that it would be embarrassing for the Government Advocate to prosecute government officials whenever they are hauled up for action of contempt. In that situation, is it the Static which prosecutes the contemnor? The State is also like any other litigant before the Court of law. 29. The learned Govt. Advocate was submitting that it would be embarrassing for the Government Advocate to prosecute government officials whenever they are hauled up for action of contempt. In that situation, is it the Static which prosecutes the contemnor? The State is also like any other litigant before the Court of law. Its officials are not above the rule of law. Then, whether the Government Advocate can assist the Court in prosecuting such officials for contempt?. 30. Though contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, because of provision of punishment for the contemnor, it cannot be equated with the prosecution of a criminal by the State. The Courts are aware that the Advocate General and the Government Advocates as it is are over burdened with the duty of prosecuting or defending the interest of the State in vast litigation before the Courts of law. If Advocate General or Government Advocate is asked to handle contempt proceedings, they are duty bound to assist the Court to prosecute the contempt proceedings. In that view of the matter, their Lordships of the Apex Court who had an occasion to hold what should be done when government officials are hauled up for contempt action. In (1998) 1 Supreme Court Cases 349 (Commissioner, Agra and Others Vs. Rohtas Singh and Others), has held as under: These appeals are from a judgment of the Allahabad High Court holding that the Government Advocates and Standing Counsel for the State of U.P. cannot be allowed to appear and defend government officials against whom notices for contempt of court are issued. In the Allahabad High Court advocates for the State appearing in criminal matters are designated as Government Advocates while advocates on behalf of the State appearing in civil matters are designated as Standing Counsel. The High Court has held that neither category of advocates can appear in contempt proceedings on behalf of an alleged cantonment who is an official of the State Government. The Allahabad High Court has further held that no monetary help from the State Exchequer can be extended to such government officials towards litigation expenses care to be incurred personally by the government officials concerned which can be subsequently reimbursed to them if they are honourably exonerated in contempt proceedings. 6. The High Court seems to have proceeded on the basis that it is for the State to prosecute contemners. 6. The High Court seems to have proceeded on the basis that it is for the State to prosecute contemners. Therefore, counsel for the State cannot appear for the ‘accused’ contemner. This foundation of the high Court’s reasoning is unfortunately not sound. A contempt proceeding is often described as a quasi-criminal proceedings because it results in punishment for the contemner. The proceeding, however, cannot be equated with the prosecution of a criminal by the State. Contempt proceedings are essentially a matter between the court and the contemner. Contempt jurisdiction enables the court to ensure proper administration of justice and maintenance of the rule of law. It is meant to ensure that the courts are able to discharge their functions properly, unhampered and unsullied by wanton attacks on the system of administration of justice or on officials who administer it and to prevent willful defiance of orders of the Court or undertakings given to the court. That is why the Supreme Court and the High Courts have an inherent power to punish for contempt even dehors legislation pertaining to contempt of court. 7. This is apparent also from the definition of “:contempt” under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Two types of contempt are defined. Under Section 2(b), civil contempt means willful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful each of an undertaking given to a court. While criminal contempt is defined under Section 2(c) to mean the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise), of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which – (I) scandalizes or tends to lower the authority of any court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding, or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner. From this definition, it is clear that the courts’ power to punish for contempt is a power which is required in furtherance of proper administration of justice and preserving the authority of the court. This power is expressly preserved under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution. That is why the question of contempt is a question which is essentially between the court and the contemner. 8. This power is expressly preserved under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution. That is why the question of contempt is a question which is essentially between the court and the contemner. 8. Explaining this position, this Court in the case of D.N. Taneja Vs. Bhajan Lal in (1988 (3 SCC 26) observed: A contempt is a matter between the court and the alleged contemner. Any person who moves the machinery of the court for contempt only brings to the notice of the court certain facts constituting contempt of court. After furnishing such information, he may still assist the court, but it must always be borne in mind that in a contempt proceedings, there are only two parties, namely the court and the contemner. In that case this Court held that the person who had lodged the complaint was not entitled to any right of appeal because he was not a necessary party in contempt proceedings. 9. It is on account of the mistaken notion that the State has to prosecute an action for contempt of court against the contemner that the High Court, in the present case, came to the conclusion that the advocates appointed by the State to represent it in courts of law cannot appear for an Officer of the State who is charged with contempt. It is, therefore, open to the State to nominate its advocates to appear for its officials in contempt proceedings. From the reading of the above decision, it is very clear that in order to save the embarrassment for the official and the Government Advocate, the State could always nominate one of its Advocate to attend to these matters. 31. The contempt jurisdiction being very special for upholding the dignity of law, have to be dealt sternly and cautiously. But at the same time, such jurisdiction has to be invoked when an act tends to shake the public confidence in the very administration of justice. No one can malign the administration of justice. Ultimately, it is at the option of the Court such proceedings would continue against the contemnor. Whether the Advocate of choice of the complainant could assist the Court in prosecuting the contemnor? 32. As already stated, the contempt issue being a matter between the Court and the contemnor, the complainant or the informant has a very small role to play. Ultimately, it is at the option of the Court such proceedings would continue against the contemnor. Whether the Advocate of choice of the complainant could assist the Court in prosecuting the contemnor? 32. As already stated, the contempt issue being a matter between the Court and the contemnor, the complainant or the informant has a very small role to play. If that is so, the Advocate of choice of the complainant has even a smaller role to play. It is pertinent to mention Section 19 of the Act, which reads as under: “Appeals.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt- (a) where the order or decision is that of a single judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that- (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended: (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. (3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). (4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed- (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.” 33. Under this Section, the accused/contemnor has a right to appeal against the order of conviction. Similar provision is not provided wherein the informant or the complainant could pursue the proceedings by filing an appeal if contempt proceedings result in acquittal of the accused. The Complainant virtually has no right to appeal against the order of acquittal or dropping of the proceedings against the contemnor. Similar provision is not provided wherein the informant or the complainant could pursue the proceedings by filing an appeal if contempt proceedings result in acquittal of the accused. The Complainant virtually has no right to appeal against the order of acquittal or dropping of the proceedings against the contemnor. Therefore, when once the Court is seized of the issue, the matter is between the Court and the contemnor only. The rights of the contemnor or the accused is very much protected by giving him an opportunity to appeal against the order of conviction as his personal liberty is at stake. 34. In view of the above discussion, can it be said the duty of the complainant ends with the facts being brought to the notice of the Court? Can be as a matter of right demand to engage an advocate of his choice to pursue the contempt proceedings even after the Court takes note of prima facie material constituting an act of contempt to proceed with the matter? 35. It is well settled that the petitioner or plaintiff can withdraw either with or without condition any litigation as he is the master of his own cause. However, the complainant can never be equated himself with the status of a litigant pertaining to other civil litigation. 36. Then the next question would be, at what stage Advocate should be appointed by the Court? 37. When such a matter came up before the Apex Court in S.K. Sundaram case, a suo motu contempt proceedings, their Lordships held that power of the Court to make appointment of an amicus curiae in contempt proceedings is unrestricted and the same can be ordered at any stage. Reference is made to 2001(2) SCC 171 , wherein it is held as under: 8. The third objection relates to the appointment of Shri Harish N. Salve, learned Solicitor General for India, as amicus, as to assist the Court. The said objection was elaborated by the contemnor by stating that the rules governing contempt proceeding envisage the appointment of Solicitor General only on the court framing the charge and when the Court intends to proceed with the case. He felt that the appointment of the Solicitor General to assist the Court made in these proceedings amounted to putting the cart before the horse. 9. There is neither any substance in nor any purpose for raising such an objection. He felt that the appointment of the Solicitor General to assist the Court made in these proceedings amounted to putting the cart before the horse. 9. There is neither any substance in nor any purpose for raising such an objection. It appears to us to be a frivolous objection. When the Court appoints an advocate as an amicus it is for the court to get assistance in the proceedings. Power of court in making such appointment is plenary and cannot be objected to by others. 10. That apart, the said objection was raised without reference to the relevant rules. The Supreme Court formulated rules in exercise of the powers under Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act r/w Article 145 of the Constitution of India. It is called “Supreme Court of India Rules to Regulate proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975”. Rule 10 says, the court may direct the Attorney General or Solicitor General to appear and assist the Court. Nowhere in the Rules a particular stage has been fixed for the Court to make such appointment: The power of the Court to make such appointment is thus unrestricted and it can be ordered at any stage. We, therefore, repel the said objection. 38. Therefore, as a matter of right, the complainant cannot choose an Advocate of his choice though Court can at its discretion allow the Advocate of choice of complainant to assist the Court. When the contemnor takes objection to such assistance, it is not open to the complainant to insist for an Advocate of his choice. Ultimately, the complainant cannot choose any particular Advocate to prosecute the proceedings without the consent of the Court. Therefore, Court has to consider the entire matter very discreetly while permitting the complainant to have an Advocate of his choice to conduct the proceedings in the light of the fact the matter is between the Court and the contemnor. So far as contemnor, the very proceeding would indicate he can claim as a matter of right, an Advocate of his choice as his personal liberty is involved. Therefore, it is very much within the domain or powers of the court to take a decision who should prosecute the contempt proceedings? It could be Advocate General or any Advocate of choice of the Court to conduct the proceedings against the contemnor. Therefore, it is very much within the domain or powers of the court to take a decision who should prosecute the contempt proceedings? It could be Advocate General or any Advocate of choice of the Court to conduct the proceedings against the contemnor. Therefore, the Court has to say at what stage the Advocate General or my other Advocate of choice of the Court to proceed with the contempt proceedings once the stage of framing of charge is completed. Accordingly, the controversy is answered as under: 1) Generally, complainant cannot insist to have an Advocate of his choice to prosecute the complaint once Court takes cognizance of the matter by framing the charges. 2) Under special and peculiar circumstances, if an occasion arises to allow the complainant to have the Advocate of his choice to proceed with the trail of the charges, Court has to decide the same by passing an order.