Judgment :- This appeal by defendants is against the Judgment and decree in O.S.No.50 of 1984, dated 19.03.1990. The plaintiffs filed suit for partition of plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule properties (land admeasuring about Acs.3.55 cents in R.S.No.304/2 situated at Angara Village of Alamur Taluq in East Godavari District and a residential house bearing No.9-52 (183.1 square yards) situated in the said village). Lower Court passed a preliminary decree ordering partition of suit schedule properties into two equal shares by metes and bounds and allotting one such share to the plaintiffs while ordering enquiry into future profits by way of separate application. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as they are arrayed in the suit. Parties to Suit: Kallakuri Ramaswamy belongs to merchant community. He acquired considerable extents of lands, house sites and residential house. Kallakuri Kamaraju is the son through his first wife. After her death, Ramaswamy (or Swamy) took Veerabhadramma as second wife. Pattabhi Ramaswamy is born out of this wedlock. Kamaraju had only son Panasa Ramanna. Plaintiffs 1 to 6 are his sons and plaintiff No.7 is his wife. Defendants 1 and 2 had five sons who are defendants 3 to 7 and one Venkataswamy. Defendants 8 and 9 are wife and son of late Venkataswamy. Admitted facts : The admitted fact of the matter is as follows. Ramaswamy and his two sons partitioned properties under registered partition deed, dated 25.08.1933, which is marked as Ex.A.1. This contains five Schedules (hereafter called, Ex.A.1 schedules). 'A' and 'B' schedules were allotted to Kamaraju and Pattabhi Ramaswamy respectively. An extent of Acs.10.55 cents which formed 'C' schedule was retained by Ramaswamy to be divided after his death between his two sons. Life interest was given to Ramaswamy and his second wife in respect of house (plaint 'B' schedule property) to be enjoyed by them during their life for the purpose of stay and after his death, two sons would get house equally. 'D' schedule in Ex.A.1 consists of two items. Agricultural land in an extent of Acs.2.09 in R.S.No.306/2 was given to Veeraswamy with absolute rights and Acs.3.55 cents in different survey numbers (which is plaint 'A' schedule) was given to her to be enjoyed during her lifetime and after her death, the property to be devolved on two sons of Ramaswamy equally. Agricultural land in an extent of Acs.2.09 in R.S.No.306/2 was given to Veeraswamy with absolute rights and Acs.3.55 cents in different survey numbers (which is plaint 'A' schedule) was given to her to be enjoyed during her lifetime and after her death, the property to be devolved on two sons of Ramaswamy equally. The dispute in the present suit revolves around the house and the land in survey No.304/2. Pursuant to Ex.A.1, partition deed, the parties were enjoying their respective shares. Six years thereafter, Ramaswamy died. Veerabhadramma sold Acs.2.09 cents which was given to her with absolute rights. In respect of Acs.3.55 cents (which was included in 'D' schedule of Ex.A.1) and the house which formed 'E' schedule of Ex.A.1, Veerabhadramma executed a registered will on 30.12.1968 bequeathing these properties in favour of second defendant (her daughter in law) and giving vested remainder to defendants 3 to 7 and husband of defendant No.8. The plaintiffs got issued notice on 26.07.1993 seeking partition of these two items. Defendants did not agree for the same in their reply dated 01.08.1993. Therefore, the suit was filed on 04.04.1984 for partition. It may be mentioned that defendants 2, 4, 5 and 7 filed common written statement, which was adopted by defendants 1, 6, 8 and 9. The facts culled out from rival pleadings as hereinabove are not seriously disputed. Learned trial Court framed four issues, namely, (1) whether late Veerabhadramma died possessed of the plaint property as absolute owner; (2) whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim partition; (3) Whether the suit is barred by time; and (4) Whether the court fee paid is correct. The first plaintiff gave evidence as P.W.1 and marked the partition deed of 1973 as Ex.A.1 and suit notices as Exs.A.2 and A.3. Defendants marked Will as Ex.B.1 and cist receipts from 1975 to 1988 as Exs.B.2 to B.19. Defendants examined D.W.1 and D.W.2. The entire issue vis--vis the competing rights of plaintiffs and defendants revolved around interpretation of Ex.A.1 insofar as allotment of share to Veerabhadramma is concerned, as well as the nature of her possession after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (the Act, for brevity) with effect from 17.06.1956. Defendants examined D.W.1 and D.W.2. The entire issue vis--vis the competing rights of plaintiffs and defendants revolved around interpretation of Ex.A.1 insofar as allotment of share to Veerabhadramma is concerned, as well as the nature of her possession after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (the Act, for brevity) with effect from 17.06.1956. The learned trial Court came to the conclusion that Veerabhadramma was given suit schedule properties under Ex.A.1 with restrictive right and therefore, she would not become absolute owner as a result of which she could not have bequeathed the properties under Ex.B.1, will. It may be mentioned that there was no serious challenge to Ex.B.1 will and it was proved by defendants by examining the attestor of will as D.W.2. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants and the learned counsel for plaintiffs/respondents made detailed submissions touching the core issue. They also relied on various authorities to which reference may be made at appropriate place. The point for determination is whether Veerabhadramma was given restricted right in respect of suit schedule properties while they were allotted to her under Ex.A.1 for her maintenance. Before taking up the nature of the right that was given to her under Ex.A.1, the principles governing the right of a Hindu woman with respect to the property possessed by her under the Act need to be discussed. Principles of Law: A Hindu woman was excluded from inheritance. Manu one of the law givers of Hindu Personal Law even said that woman has a inferior status as she is protected by the father as a child, by husband in her youth, by her son in the old age and therefore she is not fit for independence. Almost all other ancient authors of Hindu Law subscribe to such a view. Either in the Mitakshara School or Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law a woman was to be maintained during her life either by the father, husband or son but not to be given any property to be her own. In 1929 Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act enabled a sister, a son's daughter and daughter's daughter to be admitted as heirs under the Mitakshara Law. Here again a woman is not placed above the male heirs but she was to take a place immediately after father's father and before a father's brother. In 1929 Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act enabled a sister, a son's daughter and daughter's daughter to be admitted as heirs under the Mitakshara Law. Here again a woman is not placed above the male heirs but she was to take a place immediately after father's father and before a father's brother. Even then during lifetime of the owner, no woman heir can claim right to the property or a share in the property, if there is a male heir in the family. Hindu Woman's Rights to Property Act, 1937 brought some changes. If a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu Law or customary law, dies intestate leaving separate property, his widow shall be entitled to the same share as a son and that she shall have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner. She would, however, be entitled only for devolution of limited interest known as Hindu Woman's Estate. This Act, however, does not confer any right on the woman in the coparcenary interest of her husband. Hindu Succession Act drastically altered the right of a Hindu Woman and changed rules of succession, wherein, a woman is conferred the status of First Class heir in property of Hindu during intestate along with son, daughter and other lineal descendants. Section 14 of the said Act is gender specific. It declares that any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after commencement of Hindu Succession Act with effect from 17.06.1956, shall be held by her as a full owner and not a limited owner. This is glaring departure from earlier 1937 Act. In Pratap Singh v Union of India AIR 1985 SC 1695 , Supreme Court repelled the challenge to Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. One of the grounds of challenge was that it favoured Hindu woman only on the ground of sex to the prejudice of male members and therefore constitutionally impermissible. The Supreme Court held that the provision was enacted to remedy to some extent the plight of Hindu woman and there was hardly any justification for men to raise any objection to beneficent provisions contained in Section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act on the ground of hostile discrimination. The impugned provision is protected by the express provisions of Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India and is a special provision enacted for the benefit of Hindu women. The impugned provision is protected by the express provisions of Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India and is a special provision enacted for the benefit of Hindu women. In subsequent decisions in Jagannathan Pillai v Kunjithapadam Pillai AIR 1987 SC 1493 ,Thota Sesharathamma v Thota Manikyamma (1991) 4 SCC 312 , C.Masilamani Mudaliar v Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami AIR 1996 SC 1697 and Velamuri Venkata Sivaprasad v Kothuri Venkateswarlu (2000) 2 SCC 139 , Supreme Court construed beneficial effect of Section 14(1) in empowering women. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act reads as under. 14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.- (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.- In this sub-section, "property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. The heading of the Section contains a declaration to the effect that property of a female Hindu shall be her absolute property. It provides that any property possessed by a female Hindu acquired before commencement of the Act shall be her absolute property. How it can be acquired? Explanation to sub-section (1) enumerates that property can be acquired by female Hindu (i) by inheritance; (ii) by devise; (iii) at a partition; (iv) in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance; (v) by gift from any person; (vi) by her own skill or exertion; (vii) by purchase or by prescription; or (viii) in any other manner whatsoever. Explanation to sub-section (1) enumerates that property can be acquired by female Hindu (i) by inheritance; (ii) by devise; (iii) at a partition; (iv) in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance; (v) by gift from any person; (vi) by her own skill or exertion; (vii) by purchase or by prescription; or (viii) in any other manner whatsoever. Property also includes Stridhana held by female Hindu before commencement of Act. Thus, if a woman is in possession of any movable or immovable property as on the date of coming into force of the Act whatever be the nature of the right, such women shall hold the property as her absolute property. Nevertheless, property possessed or acquired by Hindu women falling in four categories with restrictive rights (restricted estate) does not confer any absolute right. These categories are (i) property acquired by way of a gift; (ii) property acquired under Will; (iii) property acquired under any other instrument; (iv) property acquired under decree or order of civil Court or property acquired under an award in terms of gift, will, instrument or decree. It is interesting to note that the property acquired by inheritance, by her own skill or exertion, by purchase or prescription and/or stridhana are not the categories of properties, which are found mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the act. Section 14(2) of the Act, it is settled now; is an exception to Section 14(1) of the Act, and does not cover all categories of acquisitions enumerated in explanation to Section 14(1) of the Act. The controversy in this case is with regard to the property acquired by Veerabhadramma before commencement of the Act under a partition deed.Therefore, it is not necessary to refer to subtle principles concerning other acquisitions and discussion can be focused only on acquisition of Veerabhdaramma under Ex.A.1, partition deed. The question would be whether property was given to her for maintenance in recognition of her sastric right to maintenance from the joint family properties and whether property was given to her for maintenance with restrictive right of only lifetime enjoyment. This area of Hindu law - post 1956 Succession Act - is no more res integra. The question would be whether property was given to her for maintenance in recognition of her sastric right to maintenance from the joint family properties and whether property was given to her for maintenance with restrictive right of only lifetime enjoyment. This area of Hindu law - post 1956 Succession Act - is no more res integra. In S.S.Munnalal v S.S.Raj Kumar AIR 1962 SC 1493 , Eramma v Verrupanna AIR 1966 SC 16, Mangal Singh v Smt.Ratino AIR 1967 SC 1786 , Sukhram v Gouri Shanker AIR 1968 SC 365 , and Badri Pershad v Smt.Kanso Devi (1969) 2 SCC 586 , Supreme Court considered the scope of Section 14 as well as the interface between its two sub-sections. In V.Tulasamma v Sesha Reddy (1977) 3 SCC 99 : AIR 1977 SC 1944 , a three Judge Bench of Supreme Court elaborately considered Section 14 and laid down various principles. The leading Judgment by Justice S.Murtaza Fazal Ali summarized the legal conclusions as to interpretations of sub-sections (1) and (2) of the Act inter alia as follows. (1) Sub-section (2) of S.14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of S. 14 (1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by S. 14 (1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision. (2) Sub-section (2) of S.14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14 (1) will not operate in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the female is entitled, the sub-section has absolutely no application and the female's limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of Section 14 (1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14 (1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee. (3) The use of express terms like "property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition", "or in lieu of maintenance" "or arrears of maintenance" etc. in the Explanation to Section 14 (1) clearly makes sub-section (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of sub- section (2). (4) That the words "restricted estate" used in S. 14 (2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in Section 14 (1) and they include not only limited interest, but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee. (emphasis supplied) Justice Bhagwati (As His Lordship then was) who wrote concurring opinion laid down as follows. "... It will, therefore, be seen that sub-section (1) of Section 14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance and where such property was possessed by her at the date of commencement of the Act or was subsequently acquired and possessed, she would become the full owner of the property." "... Sub-section (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of sub-section (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to sub-section (1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property." "... Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2), even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property." "... The right of the widow to be maintained is of course not a jus in rem since it does not give her any interest in the joint family property but it is certainly jus ad rem, i.e., a right against the joint family property. Therefore, when specific property is allotted to the widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance, the allotment would be in satisfaction of her jus ad rem, namely, the right to be maintained out of the joint family property. It would not be a grant for the first time without any pre-existing right in the widow. The widow would be getting the property in virtue of her pre-existing right, the instrument giving the property being merely a document effectuating such pre- existing right and not making a grant of the property to her for the first time without any antecedent right or title." (emphasis supplied) In Kalawatibai v Soiryabai AIR 1991 SC 1581 , it was held that a limited owner would become full owner provided she was a female Hindu who was possessed of any property acquired before commencement of the Act and that she should have been that class of female Hindus who could on existence of other circumstances is capable of becoming full owner. It was also held that a female Hindu who became absolute owner in respect of inherited property as well as property received by way of gift or partition or in lieu thereof would become absolute owner even if she has limited interest. In other words, if before coming into force of the Act, the female Hindu became absolute owner by way of gift, partition, purchase, as per Section 14(1) of the Act, she would be absolute owner provided she is in possession of the property. Explaining 'the limited ownership', Supreme Court observed that, "limited owner means person with restricted rights as opposed to full owner with absolute rights and any restriction or limitation on exercise of these rights would result in limited or qualified ownership'. What would be effect of such restricted or limited ownership? Law would not give the benefit of Section 14(1) to a female Hindu. Dealing with this aspect it was held. What would be effect of such restricted or limited ownership? Law would not give the benefit of Section 14(1) to a female Hindu. Dealing with this aspect it was held. Thus if prior to 1956 any alienation was made by a Hindu widow of widow's estate prohibited by law or being beyond permissible limits, it stripped the widow of her rights and she could not acquire any rights under Section 14. And so far as alienees were concerned it could utmost create temporary and transitory ownership precarious in nature and vulnerable in character open to challenge if any attempt was made to cloud reversioner's interest. Her possession may be good against the world, her right in property may not be impeachable by the widow but her interest qua the reversioner was to continue in possession at the maximum till the lifetime of her donor or transferor. ... A female alinee did not enjoy, better or different status as the Hindu Law applied universally and uniformly both to male and female allinees. She did not become limited owner or holder of a limited estate as understood in Hindu Law. And the alienation without legal necessity could be assailed by the reversioner. No change was brought about in this regard by the Act. If the alienation was valid i.e., it was for legal necessity or permitted by law then the donee became an owner of it and the right and title in the property vested in her. But if it was contrary to law, as in this case-the gift being of entire widow's estate, then it did not bind the reversioner who could file a suit after the death of the widow. And the appellant cannot claim to have acquired title to the property, under the gift deed. Nor had she become a limited owner under Hindu Law which could mature into full ownership when the Act came into force. (emphasis supplied) What would be the effect of giving property to female Hindu woman in lieu of maintenance? Does it confer absolute right after the Act? In Tulasamma (supra), Supreme Court referring to authoritative commentaries and textbooks on Hindu Law held that a Hindu woman has a right to maintenance in sastric Hindu law. In addition to such right, the husband or the manager of the joint family may confer additional right not referable to sastric law. Does it confer absolute right after the Act? In Tulasamma (supra), Supreme Court referring to authoritative commentaries and textbooks on Hindu Law held that a Hindu woman has a right to maintenance in sastric Hindu law. In addition to such right, the husband or the manager of the joint family may confer additional right not referable to sastric law. The following propositions were culled out by Supreme Court with regard to the right of Hindu woman's right to maintenance. (1) that a Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on the property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow; (2) though the widow's right to maintenance is not a right to property but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in property, i.e., it is a jus and rem not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court; (3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment and is of such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser has notice of the widow's right to maintenance, the purchaser is legally bound to provide for her maintenance; (4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing right which existed in the Hindu Law long before the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946, and is, therefore, a pre-existing right ; (5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a sort of co-owner in the property of her husband, though her co-ownership is of a subordinate nature; and (6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person who succeeds to property or purchases the same is in a position to make due arrangements for her maintenance. In Raghubar Singh v Gulab Singh (1998) 6 SCC 315 : AIR 1998 SC 2401 , Supreme Court considered distinction between right of a woman to maintenance in recognition of her pre-existing right under Sastric Hindu law and right conferred on woman for maintenance with limitation or restriction placed on the enjoyment of such right. It is beneficial to extract the following. Accordingly, we hold that the right to maintenance of a Hindu female flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife and that right in the case of a widow is "a pre-existing right," which existed under the Shastric Hindu Law long before the passing of the 1937 or the 1946 Acts. Those acts merely recognized the position as was existing under the Shastric Hindu Law and gave it a "statutory" backing. Where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she has a right to be maintained out of it and she is entitled to retain the possession of that property in lieu of her right to maintenance. ... It is by force of Section 14(1) of the Act, that the widow's limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an absolute right notwithstanding any restriction placed under the document or the instrument. So far as sub-section (2) of Section 14 is concerned, it applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc., which create an independent or a new title in favour of the female for the first time. It has no application to cases where the instrument/document either declares or recognizes or confirms her share in the property or her "pre-existing right to maintenance" out of that property. (emphasis supplied) The next authority to be considered is the decision in Balwant Kaur v Chanan Singh (2000) 6 SCC 310 : AIR 2000 SC 1908 . Relying on Tulasamma (supra), it was held that, the property acquired by daughter under a Will for her maintenance, would get enlarged into absolute right. Their Lordships also observed that in case right is created in favour of a female not related to the donor, such beneficiary would not get absolute title and Section 14(2) of the Act would apply. Relying on Tulasamma (supra), it was held that, the property acquired by daughter under a Will for her maintenance, would get enlarged into absolute right. Their Lordships also observed that in case right is created in favour of a female not related to the donor, such beneficiary would not get absolute title and Section 14(2) of the Act would apply. Thus, when property is given and right is created in fulfillment of obligation to provide for maintenance to the mother, wife or daughter, would not be controlled by Section 14(2) unless there is a clear indication that only a limited or restricted right is created while granting property towards maintenance. This is, however, again subject to determination as to whether the maintenance was given in recognition of right of the female under sastric Hindu law and not the additional or new benefit conferred de hors the maintenance under sastric Hindu law. Learned counsel also made reference to three recent decisions of Supreme Court in Sharad Subramanyan v Soumi Mazumdar 2006 (6) SCJ 293 , Sadhu Singh v Gurdwara Sahib Narike 2006 (8) SCJ 555 and Chandrika Singh v Sarjug Singh 2007 (2) SCJ 615, which reiterated the principles laid down in earlier case law of Supreme Court. It is, however, not necessary for the purpose of this case to refer to them in detail. The analysis of Section 14(1) and 14(2) of the Act, in the light of the authorities of Supreme Court would lead to following principles insofar as the property given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance or in lieu of arrears of maintenance. If the property is given to a widow under a deed or instrument or devise like partition deed or settlement deed or a will or award in recognition of her sastric right to maintenance or arrears of maintenance, would become absolute property after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. In such a case, it has to be presumed that grant of property towards pre-existing right to maintenance or towards arrears of maintenance is in recognition of a woman's right to maintenance. In such a case, it has to be presumed that grant of property towards pre-existing right to maintenance or towards arrears of maintenance is in recognition of a woman's right to maintenance. But, if the deed, instrument or device creates an independent or new right or claim in favour of female for first time in addition to her pre-existing right under sastric law, Section 14(1) has no application and Section 14(2) would apply (see para 25 of AIR in Raghubar Singh (supra)). When the property is given to wife when husband was alive, what would be the nature of acquisition by Hindu women? Is it in recognition of her pre-existing right or does it create any new right? In the considered opinion of this Court, when in a family partition between father and sons, the mother, wife or daughter or widow of predeceased son of karta/manager of the family had given property towards maintenance - without anything else; the same shall have to be considered in the light of the language of the document, conferring such right. Kallakuri Ramaswamy, his major son, Kamaraju (through his first wife), minor son, Parrabhiramaswami (through his second wife) and Veerabhadramma (second wife) are parties to Ex.A1, partition deed, dated 25.8.1933. This document contains five scheduled. 'A' schedule was allotted to Kallakuri Kamaraju, grandfather of plaintiffs and 'B' schedule was allotted to first defendant, Pattabhiramaswami. In addition to the properties given to them under Ex.A1, they were also given equal share in the properties delineated in 'C' 'D' and 'E' schedule properties after death of Ramaswamy and Veerabhadramma. While 'C' schedule property in Ex.A.1 was given to father Ramaswamy for his enjoyment during his lifetime to be divided by his two sons after his demise, 'E' schedule house was allotted to Ramawamy and Veerabhadramma with similar arrangement. It is very interesting to notice that 'D' schedule is described as "property given to Veerabhadramma for her maintenance". Item-1 of 'D' schedule admeasuring Acs.2.09 cents was given with absolute right, and insofar as item-2 thereof admeasuring Acs.3.55 cents in survey No.355, partition deed stipulates that Veerabhadramma should enjoy property during her lifetime without any right of alienation and after her death, same will be taken by Kamaraju and Parrabhiramaswami in equal shares. Item-1 of 'D' schedule admeasuring Acs.2.09 cents was given with absolute right, and insofar as item-2 thereof admeasuring Acs.3.55 cents in survey No.355, partition deed stipulates that Veerabhadramma should enjoy property during her lifetime without any right of alienation and after her death, same will be taken by Kamaraju and Parrabhiramaswami in equal shares. This means that under 'A' and 'B' schedules, two sons of Ramaswamy were given separate properties and also equal shares in the properties, namely, in 'C', 'D' and 'E' schedules except Acs.2.09 cents over which second wife of Ramaswamy was given absolute right. There is no dispute about this purport of Ex.A1 insofar as allotment of various shares to parties to document is concerned. Why absolute right was not given to Veerabhadramma in respect of plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule properties and why vested remainder was given to two sons of Ramaswamy? Ramaswamy belongs to merchant community and can be presumed to be worldly wise with considerable vision about things to happen. Going by the recitals in Ex.A1, by the time partition was effected, there were differences in the family for whatever reason. Pattabhiramaswamy was a minor and by that time right of Hindu woman for maintenance was not statutorily recognized. In all probability, Ramaswamy would have been of the opinion that Acs.2.09 cents with absolute right would meet the maintenance needs of Veerabhadramma after his death. In addition to this, a new right was created in her favour in respect of Acs.3.55 cents giving life interest leaving vested remainder to two sons. There is no dispute that in 'A' and 'B' schedules of Ex.A.1, Kamaraju and Pattabhiramaswami were also given Acs.1.75 cents each out of 'A' schedule properties. This will lend support to the submissions of learned Counsel for plaintiffs to the following effect. Veerabhadramma was given absolute rights for Acs.2.09 cents and, therefore, her pre-existing right to maintenance out of joint family properties was satisfied. The life interest in respect of plaint 'A' schedule was created in addition to her recognized right with restrictive enjoyment in that property, which was distributed equally between two sons after her death. Veerabhadramma was given absolute rights for Acs.2.09 cents and, therefore, her pre-existing right to maintenance out of joint family properties was satisfied. The life interest in respect of plaint 'A' schedule was created in addition to her recognized right with restrictive enjoyment in that property, which was distributed equally between two sons after her death. The fact that two items of property were treated differently would support that it is Section 14(2) of the Act, which is attracted, and Veerabhadramma had only absolute right under Section 14(1) of the Act in respect of Acs.2.09 cents and not in respect of Acs.3.55 cents. The distinction in description of property in 'D' schedule of Ex.A.1 is so glaring and that it cannot be ignored. It would have been altogether different if under Ex.A1, Veerabhadramma had been given only Acs.3.55 cents describing it as a limited or restrictive estate. In such an event, it might have been possible to argue that Section 14(1) of Act applies. That is not the case here. Veerabhadramma was given absolute right only for Acs.2.09 cents to enforce her pre-existing right to maintenance and limited or restrictive estate was given in respect of other item. Therefore, she had no right to bequeath property under Ex.A1 Will. Learned Counsel for appellants also contends that when Veerabhadramma died on 06.2.1973, the suit filed on 04.4.1984 is barred by limitation. The contention is misconceived. A right to partition of property held jointly is a continuous cause of action and, therefore, question of limitation does not arise. Secondly under Ex.A1, half of the property in plaint 'A' and 'B' schedules were allotted to Kamaraju branch and when the notice, Ex.A2, was issued, the right was denied. The cause of action accrue on 06.2.1973 and on 01.8.1983 and suit filed on 04.4.1984 based on pre-existing right under Ex.A1, is not barred by limitation. The appeal is devoid of any merit and deserves to be dismissed. Cross objections are limited to claiming mesne profits - both past and further profits. In the plaint, however, no such relief is claimed. What is claimed is partition of plaint 'A' and 'B' into two equal shares and allotment of one such share to the plaintiffs and for future profits. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to go into the question. In the plaint, however, no such relief is claimed. What is claimed is partition of plaint 'A' and 'B' into two equal shares and allotment of one such share to the plaintiffs and for future profits. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to go into the question. In the result, the appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs and the Cross objections are dismissed without costs.