The above three Writ Petitions, inter alia, seeking to challenge orders regarding renewal of mining lease have been filed. As similar facts and common questions of law are involved in all-the three Writ Petitions, therefore, the same are being disposed of by this common judgment. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36599 of 2004 is being treated as the leading case, and the facts of the said Writ Petition are narrated in detail hereunder. 2. The petitioner-Tejender Malik in the said Writ Petition has, inter alia, sought quashing of the orders dated 26. 5. 2003 (Annexure-11 to the Writ Petition) and 19. 6. 2003 (Annexure-15 to the Writ Petition) passed by the respondent No. 1-State of U. P. and the orders dated 9. 6. 2003 (Annexure-13 to the Writ Petition) and 26. 6. 2003 (Annexure-16 to the Writ Petition) passed by the respondent No. 2-District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, and has further sought quashing of the renewed mining lease deed executed on 8. 7. 2003 and registered on 13. 8. 2003 (Annexure-17 to the Writ Petition ). Further prayer has been made for issuance of writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to allow the respondent No. 4-Okhla Sand Supply Company Ltd. to carry out mining operation on the basis of the said renewed lease deed executed on 8. 7. 2003 and registered on 13. 8. 2003. 3. From the averments made in the above three Writ Petitions, it appears that the minor mineral involved in these Writ Petitions is sand. The minor mineral areas involved in these Writ Petitions are (i) Village Raipur Khadar, (ii) Village Asgarpur Jagir, and (iii) Village Chak Basantpur. Mining leases in respect of the said areas were granted to different lessees under the lease system as provided in Chapter II of the U. P. Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 (in short "the 1963 Rules") in the year 1989 for various tenures. Some of the said leases expired in the year 1992 while some of the said leases expired in the year 1994. 4. In the circumstances, certain applications were moved for grant of mining leases under Rule 6 of Chapter II of the 1963 Rules. One such application was moved by the respondent No. 4 in Civil Misc. Some of the said leases expired in the year 1992 while some of the said leases expired in the year 1994. 4. In the circumstances, certain applications were moved for grant of mining leases under Rule 6 of Chapter II of the 1963 Rules. One such application was moved by the respondent No. 4 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36599 of 2004 for grant of mining lease for Plot No. 30/1 and 30/2, Village Chak Basantpur and an area of 156 acres received from the State of Haryana. 5. It is pointed out in the Writ Petition that during the said period a Government Order No. 5235, dated 5. 9. 1990 issued under Rule 68 of the 1963 Rules was in operation whereunder the entire mining areas in the State of U. P. were declared under Rule 23 (1) of the 1963 Rules for grant of mining lease under Chapter IV by auction and tender. 6. In continuation of the said Government Order dated 5. 9. 1990, another Government Order No. 6134, dated 16. 12. 1990 was issued in regard to the settlement of mining leases by way of auction/tender/auction-cum-tender system as provided under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules. Copy of the said Government Order dated 5. 9. 1990 has been filed as Annexure-1 to the Writ Petition. Copy of the said Government Order dated 16. 12. 1990 has been filed asannexure-3 to the Writ Petition. 7. In view of the said Government Orders dated 5. 9. 1990 and 16. 12. 1990, the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar sent a communication dated 20. 9. 1993 to the Principal Secretary, Heavy Industries, Uttar Pradesh, inter alia, seeking guidelines in respect of the applications received for grant of leases under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules in respect of the aforesaid three villages. 8. Copy of the said communication, dated 20. 9. 1993 has been filed as Annexure-2 to the Writ Petition. 9. In response to the said communication dated 20. 9. 1993 sent by the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, the Special Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh sent a Government Order dated 22. 11. 8. Copy of the said communication, dated 20. 9. 1993 has been filed as Annexure-2 to the Writ Petition. 9. In response to the said communication dated 20. 9. 1993 sent by the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, the Special Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh sent a Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993 to the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, inter alia, intimating the decision of the State Government for grant of mining leases in regard to the aforesaid three villages in accordance with the mining lease system under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules subject to the conditions mentioned in the said Government Order. 10. Copy of the said Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993 has been filed as Annexure-4 to the Writ Petition. 11. Pursuant to the said Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993, the Joint Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh sent a communication/order dated 25. 11. 1993 to the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad, inter alia, directing that the applications received for grant of mining leases in respect of the aforesaid three villages be disposed of in accordance with mining lease system under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules. 12. Copy of the said communication/order dated 25. 11. 1993 has been filed as Annexure-5 to the Writ Petition. 13. Pursuant to the said Government Orders, the mining lease was granted in favour of the respondent No. 4 on 2. 3. 1994 in regard to the said Plot Nos. 30/1 and 30/2 of Village Chak Basantpurand an area of 156 acres received from the State of Haryana. The lease deed was executed on 10. 6. 1994 and the same was got registered on 23. 6. 1994. The period of the said lease was 9 years 7 months. 14. It appears that a Government Order dated 2. 11. 2002 was issued wherein it was, inter alia, provided that mining leases in regard to all the vacant areas in respect of sand, morum, bazri and boulder would be granted by auction system under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules in accordance with various conditions laid down in the said Government Order. 15. As noted above, the mining lease granted to the respondent No. 4 was for a period of 9 years 7 months i. e. upto October, 2003. The respondent No. 4 submitted an application dated 7. 2. 15. As noted above, the mining lease granted to the respondent No. 4 was for a period of 9 years 7 months i. e. upto October, 2003. The respondent No. 4 submitted an application dated 7. 2. 2003 under Rule 6-A of the 1963 Rules before the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar for renewal of its mining lease granted in respect of Plot Nos. 30/1 and 30/2 of village Chak Basantpur and an area of 156 acres received from the State of Haryana. 16. On receiving the said application of the respondent No. 4 for renewal of mining lease and other applications for renewal of mining leases in respect of the aforesaid three villages, the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar sent a communication dated 30. 3. 2003 to the Secretary, Geology and Mining, Government of Uttar Pradesh seeking information on various points, inter alia, in view of the said Government Order dated 2. 11. 2002. 17. Copy of the said communication dated 30. 3. 2003 has been filed as Annexure-8 to the Writ Petition. 18. In response to the said communication dated 30. 3. 2003 sent by the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, the Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh sent a communication/order dated 23. 4. 2003, inter alia, directing the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar to take action in accordance with Rules in respect of the applications for renewal of leases moved by the lease-holders in respect of the aforesaid three villages after considering the entire circumstances. 19. Copy of the said communication/order dated 23. 4. 2003 has been filed as Annexure-9 to the Writ Petition. 20. In response to the said communication/order dated 23. 4. 2003 sent by the Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar sent a communication dated 13. 5. 2003 to the Secretary, Industrial Development Department, Lucknow, inter alia, seeking directions/guidelines as to whether the renewal of leases is to be granted on the renewal applications moved in regard to the aforesaid three villages or the leases are to be granted by adopting auction system, and further, in case the renewal of the leases was to be granted, clear directions/guidelines be given regarding tenure of the leases and the percentage of enhancement of annual royalty. 21. Copy of the said communication dated 13. 5. 2003 has been filed as Annexure-10 to the Writ Petition. 22. 21. Copy of the said communication dated 13. 5. 2003 has been filed as Annexure-10 to the Writ Petition. 22. In response to the said communication dated 13. 5. 2003, the Special Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh issued a Government Order dated 26. 5. 2003, inter alia, directing that renewal of leases under Rule 6-A in Chapter II of the 1963 Rules be granted in respect of the aforesaid areas in question, namely, Plot Nos. 483/2 and 483/3, area 47. 00 acres, in Village Asgarpur Jagir; Plot No. 220, area 31. 0479 acres in Village Raipur Khadar and an area of 150. 00 acres received from Village Madanpur Khadar of Delhi; and Plot Nos. 30/1 and 30/2 of Village Chak Basantpur and an area of 156 acres received from the State of Haryana. It was, inter alia, further provided that the renewal be done for the same period as was given in the original lease. Directions were also given for settlement of the annual royalty consequent to the renewal of leases. 23. Copy of the said Government Order dated 26. 5. 2003 has been filed as Annexure-11 to the Writ Petition. 24. Pursuant to the Government Order dated 26. 5. 2003, it appears that the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar sought legal opinion from the District Government Counsel (DGC), Gautam Budh Nagar. The DGC, Gautam Budh Nagar submitted his legal opinion dated 31. 5. 2003, inter alia, opining that in view of the prevailing Government Orders dated 22. 9. 1994 and 30. 12. 2000, the renewal of mining leases be granted fora period of three years. 25. Copy of the said legal opinion of the DGC, Gautam Budh Nagar has been filed as Annexure-12 to the Writ Petition. 26. Thereafter, the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar issued an order dated 9. 6. 2003 granting renewal of mining lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 for a period of three years in respect of Plot Nos. 30/1 and 30/2 of village Chak Basantpur and an area of 156 acres received from the State of Haryana subject to the conditions mentioned in the said order. 27. Copy of the said order dated 9. 6. 2003 has been filed as Annexure-13 to the Writ Petition. 28. The District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, thereafter, sent a communication dated 17. 6. 27. Copy of the said order dated 9. 6. 2003 has been filed as Annexure-13 to the Writ Petition. 28. The District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, thereafter, sent a communication dated 17. 6. 2003 to the Special Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Industrial Development Anubhag-5, Lucknow, inter alia, intimating that the renewal of mining leases in respect of various areas in the aforesaid three villages and an area of 150 acres received from Village Madanpur Khadar of Delhi and an area of 156 acres received from the State of Haryana has been granted for a period of three years for the mining of sand. 29. Copy of the said communication dated 17. 6. 2003 has been filed as Annexure-14 to the Writ Petition. 30. In response to the said communication dated 17. 6. 2003 sent by the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, the Special Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh sent a communication/order dated 19. 6. 2003, inter alia, stating that despite directions given in the Government Orders for renewal of the leases for the same period as granted in the original lease (i. e. 9 years 7 months), the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar had renewed the leases only for three years which was not proper, and that the directions given in the Government Orders be strictly complied with. 31. Copy of the said communication/order dated 19. 6. 2003 has been filed as Annexure-15 to the Writ Petition. 32. Pursuant to the said communication/order dated 19. 6. 2003, the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar issued an order dated 26. 6. 2003, inter alia, modifying his earlier order dated 9. 6. 2003 and granting renewal of mining lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 for a period of 9 years 7 months subject to the conditions mentioned in the said order dated 26. 6. 2003. 33. Copy of the said order dated 26. 6. 2003 has been filed as Annexure-16 to the Writ Petition. 34. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 32523 of 2003 filed by Pushpendra Kumar, the original lease was granted in favour of the respondent No. 3 (M/s National Sand Supply Company) on 2. 3. 1994 in respect of Plot No. 220, area 31. 0479 acres of village Raipur Khadar and an area of 150 acres received from the village Madanpur of Delhi. By the order dated 9. 6. 2003 read with the order dated 26. 6. 3. 1994 in respect of Plot No. 220, area 31. 0479 acres of village Raipur Khadar and an area of 150 acres received from the village Madanpur of Delhi. By the order dated 9. 6. 2003 read with the order dated 26. 6. 2003, the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar granted renewal of the said mining lease for a period of 9 years 7 months in favour of the respondent No. 3. Prayer has been made in the Writ Petition, inter alia, for quashing the order of renewal of mining lease in favour of the respondent No. 3. 35. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48207 of 2004 filed by Sunil Kumar the original lease was granted in favour of the respondent No. 4 (M/s Oriental Sand Supply Company Ltd.) on 2. 3. 1994 in respect of Plot Nos. 483/2 and 483/3, area 47. 00 acres of village Asgarpur Jagir. By the order dated 9. 6. 2003 read with the order dated 26. 6. 2003, the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar granted renewal of the said mining lease for a period of 9 years 7 months in favour of the respondent No. 4. Prayer has been made in the Writ Petition, inter alia, for quashing the order of renewal of mining lease in favour of the respondent No. 4. 36. Counter affidavits and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged between the parties in the above three Writ Petitions. 37. We have heard S/shri Mukesh Prasad and Deo Prakash Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri S. P. Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Jai Singh Parihar, learned counsel for the contesting respondent and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the other respondents, and perused the record. 38. Keeping in view the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the following questions arise for determination in the present Writ Petition: (1) Whether the petitioner has locus standi to challenge the grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4? (2) Whether the writ petition is not maintainable on account of non disclosure of the names and addresses of the partners or the name and address of the managing partner of the respondent No. 4, or on account of the address, name and location of the respondent No. 4 against whom the allegations have been levelled, being not correct? (2) Whether the writ petition is not maintainable on account of non disclosure of the names and addresses of the partners or the name and address of the managing partner of the respondent No. 4, or on account of the address, name and location of the respondent No. 4 against whom the allegations have been levelled, being not correct? (3) Whether the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on account of the availability of alternative remedy to the petitioner? (4) Whether the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches? (5) Whether the original lease granted to the respondent No. 4 on 2. 3. 1994 was valid? (6) Whether the renewal of mining lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 by the order dated 9. 6. 2003 read with the order dated 26. 6. 2003 passed by the District Magistrate, Gautambudh Nagar was valid? Question No. 5 39. Question No. 5, as noted above, is as to whether the original lease granted to the respondent No. 4 on 2. 3. 1994 was valid. 40. Before proceeding to deal with this question, it is necessary to note that even though the submissions have been made regarding the validity of the original lease granted to the respondent No. 4 on 2. 3. 1994, no proper factual foundation appears to have been laid in the writ petition for raising the said question nor does any ground appear to have been taken in the writ petition in regard to the said question. No relief has been sought in the prayer clause of the writ petition regarding the original lease granted on 2. 3. 1994. 41. However, as submissions have been made in regard to the said question, we are proceeding to consider the said submissions in so far as it is possible on the material available on record. 42. Let us consider the first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in regard to the validity of the original lease granted on 2. 3. 1994. This submission pertains to the maintainability of the application of the petitioner for grant of lease during the period when the declaration under Rule 23 (1) of the 1963 Rules was operative. In order to appreciate the said submission, certain relevant facts may be noticed. 43. By the Government Order dated 5. 9. 3. 1994. This submission pertains to the maintainability of the application of the petitioner for grant of lease during the period when the declaration under Rule 23 (1) of the 1963 Rules was operative. In order to appreciate the said submission, certain relevant facts may be noticed. 43. By the Government Order dated 5. 9. 1990 issued under Rule 68 of the 1963 Rules, the entire mining areas in respect of the minor minerals in the State of Uttar Pradesh were declared under Rule 23 (1) of the 1963 Rules for grant of mining lease under Chapter IV of the said Rules by auction and tender. In continuation of this Government Order dated 5. 9. 1990, another Government Order dated 16. 12. 1990 was issued for settlement of mining leases by way of auction/tender/auction-cum-tender system as provided in Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules, keeping in view the amendments made by the U. P. Minor Minerals (Concession) (Seventeenth Amendment) Rules, 1990 (in short "the 17th Amendment Rules, 1990" ). 44. The existing leases in respect of the areas in question, as noted in the earlier part of this judgment, expired in the years 1992 and 1994. In the circumstances, certain applications were moved for grant of mining lease under Rule 6 of Chapter II of the 1963 Rules. As the system of settlement of mining leases by way of auction/tender/auction-cum-tender was in operation during the said period in view of the said Government Order dated 5. 9. 1990 read with the said Government Order dated 16. 12. 1990, the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad sent a communication dated 20. 9. 1993 to the Principal Secretary, Heavy Industries, Uttar Pradesh, inter alia, seeking guidelines in respect of the applications received for grant of lease under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules in respect of the areas in question. It is, inter alia, stated in the said communication dated 20. 9. 1990, the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad sent a communication dated 20. 9. 1993 to the Principal Secretary, Heavy Industries, Uttar Pradesh, inter alia, seeking guidelines in respect of the applications received for grant of lease under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules in respect of the areas in question. It is, inter alia, stated in the said communication dated 20. 9. 1993 that the areas in question were towards south of NOIDA and were adjacent to the boundary of NOIDA; and that mining operation in respect of sand in the areas in question was done subject to the restriction that there might not be adverse effect on Yamuna River in NOIDA area; and that the Irrigation Department had also constructed important dam in the said area; and that the Irrigation Department keeps control over the mining operation in the said area as excessive and unrestricted mining might cause adverse effect on the dam and the flow of water in the said area. It is, inter alia, further stated in the said communication that from technical point of view, report of the Executive Engineer, Irrigation, Construction Division, Ghaziabad was also obtained; and that the said Executive Engineer in his Report dated 25. 6. 1993 intimated that it would be in the interest of the Government to settle mining leases in the said area under the lease system (i. e. Chapter II of the 1963 Rules) rather than under the auction system (i. e. under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules ). It is, inter alia, further stated in the said communication that there is earning of the Government by restricted mining in the said area and the restricted mining also provides supply of essential minor mineral in the said area. 45. In response to the said communication dated 20. 9. 1993 sent by the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad, the Special Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh sent a Government Order dated 22. 11. 45. In response to the said communication dated 20. 9. 1993 sent by the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad, the Special Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh sent a Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993 to the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad, inter alia, noting that there was likelihood of damage to the dam of the Irrigation Department in case there would be unrestricted mining of minor mineral sand in the areas in question, and further intimating the decision of the State Government for grant of mining leases in regard to the areas in question in accordance with the mining lease system under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules subject to the following conditions mentioned in the said Government Order: 0 (1) The lessee would follow the instructions of Yamuna Committee, and an Officer of the Directorate of Geology & Mining would be included in the Yamuna Committee for this purpose only, who would control over mining of sand in the areas in question. (2) The lessee would in no circumstance collect the excavated sand in the river. 46. Pursuant to the said Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993, the Joint Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh sent a communication/order dated 25. 11. 1993 to the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad, inter alia, directing that the applications received for grant of mining leases in respect of the areas in question be disposed of in accordance with mining lease system under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules. 47. Pursuant to the said Government Orders, the mining lease was granted in favour of the respondent No. 4 on 2. 3. 1994. The lease-deed was executed on 10. 6. 1994, and the same was got registered on 23. 6. 1994. Period of the said lease was 9 years 7 months. 48. Rule 23 of the 1963 Rules, as substituted by the 17th Amendment Rules, 1990 with effect from September 26,1990, provides as follows: "23. Declaration of area for auction/tender/auction-cum-tender lease.- (1) The State Government may by general or special order declare the area or areas which may be leased out by auction or by tender or by auction-cum-tender. 48. Rule 23 of the 1963 Rules, as substituted by the 17th Amendment Rules, 1990 with effect from September 26,1990, provides as follows: "23. Declaration of area for auction/tender/auction-cum-tender lease.- (1) The State Government may by general or special order declare the area or areas which may be leased out by auction or by tender or by auction-cum-tender. (2) Subject to directions issued by the State Government from time to time in this behalf no area or areas shall be leased out by auction or by tender or by auction-cum-tender for more than five years at a time: Provided that the period in respect of in situ rock type mineral deposit shall be five years and in respect of river bed mineral deposit shall be one year at a time. 1 (3) On the declaration of the area or areas under sub-rule (1) the provisions of Chapters II, III and VI of these rules shall not apply to the area or areas in respect of which the declaration has been issued. Such area or areas may be leased out according to the procedure described in this Chapter. (4) The District Officer shall get the area or areas declared under sub-rule (1), evaluated for quality and quantity of mineral for fixing minimum bid or offer by the Director, Geology and Mining, Uttar Pradesh or by an officer authorised by him before the date fixed for auction or tender or auction-cum-tender, as the case may be. " Rule 24 of the 1963 Rules, as substituted by the 17th Amendment Rules, 1990 with effect from September 26,1990, is as under: "24. Withdrawal of area from auction or tender or auction-cum-tender.- The State Government may by declaration withdraw any area or areas declared under sub-rule (1) of Rule 23 or part thereof from any system of lease referred to therein and from the date of withdrawal specified in the declaration which shall not be the date during the subsistence of a lease granted under this Chapter, the provisions of Chapters II, III and VI of these rules shall become applicable to such area or areas. " Rule 68 of the 1963 Rules lays down as follows : "68. " Rule 68 of the 1963 Rules lays down as follows : "68. Relaxation of rules in special cases.- The State Government may, if it is of opinion that in the interest of mineral development it is necessary so to do, by order in writing and for reasons to be recorded authorise in any case the grant of any mining lease or the working of any mine for the purpose of winning any mineral on terms and conditions different from those laid down in these rules. " 49. As noted above, the Government Order dated 5. 9. 1990 read with the Government Order dated 16. 12. 1990 declared the entire mining areas in the State of Uttar Pradesh under Rule 23 (1) of the 1963 Rules for grant of mining lease under Chapter IV of the said Rules by way of auction/tender/auction- cum-tender system. The said declaration under Rule 23 (1) of the 1963 Rules stood withdrawn in respect of the areas in question by the said Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993. It was open to the State Government to withdraw the declaration under Rule 23 (1) of the 1963 Rules by exercising its power under Rule 24 of the said Rules. 2 50. As the declaration under Rule 23 (1) of the 1963 Rules stood withdrawn by the said Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993, the provisions of Chapters II, III and VI of the 1963 Rules became applicable to the areas in question in view of the provisions of Rule 24 of the said Rules. 51. Accordingly, the said communication/order dated 25. 11. 1993 was sent by the Joint Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh to the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad, inter alia, directing that the applications received for grant of mining leases in respect of the areas in question be disposed of in accordance with mining lease system under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules. Pursuant to the said Government Orders, the mining lease was granted in favour of the respondent No. 4 on 2. 3. 1994. Thus, grant of mining lease under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules was legal and valid. 52. Pursuant to the said Government Orders, the mining lease was granted in favour of the respondent No. 4 on 2. 3. 1994. Thus, grant of mining lease under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules was legal and valid. 52. It is further noteworthy that under Rule 68 of the 1963 Rules, the State Government may, if it is of opinion that in the interest of mineral development, it is necessary so to do, by order in writing and for reasons to be recorded authorise in any case the grant of any mining lease or the working of any mine for the purpose of winning any mineral on terms and conditions different from those laid down in the 1963 Rules. 53. As noted above, the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad in his communication dated 20. 9. 1993 indicated the reasons as to why it would be proper to settle the mining leases in the areas in question under the mining lease system as contemplated in Chapter II of the 1963 Rules as compared to the auction system as contemplated in Chapter IV of the said Rules. 54. From a perusal of the contents of the said communication dated 20. 9. 1993, it is evident that in order to avoid adverse effect on Yamuna River in NOIDA area and the dam constructed by the Irrigation Department in NOIDA area, excessive and unrestricted mining could not be permitted, and only controlled mining could be permitted. 55. Keeping in view the contents of the said communication sent by the District Magistrate, the said Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993 and the said communication/order dated 25. 11. 1993 were issued, inter alia, intimating the decision of the State Government for grant of mining leases in respect of the areas in question in accordance with the mining lease system under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules subject to the conditions mentioned above. 3 56. It is pertinent to note that development of mineral is for public utility. If mining is to be done in an area near a river or a dam, it is necessary that controlled mining be done so as to avoid adverse effect on the river or the dam. Such factors are relevant as is clear from the provisions of Rule 41 of the 1963 Rules, particularly Clauses (e) and (g) thereof. If mining is to be done in an area near a river or a dam, it is necessary that controlled mining be done so as to avoid adverse effect on the river or the dam. Such factors are relevant as is clear from the provisions of Rule 41 of the 1963 Rules, particularly Clauses (e) and (g) thereof. Controlled mining is possible under the mining lease system contemplated in Chapter II of the 1963 Rules. 57. Keeping in view the said circumstances, the State Government issued the said Government Orders dated 22. 11. 1993 and 25. 11. 1993, and such Government Orders were evidently based on the opinion of the State Government that it was necessary in the interest of mineral development that the mining leases in respect of areas in question be granted in accordance with the mining lease system under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules subject to the conditions indicated in the said Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993. 58. In view of the provisions of Rule 68 of the 1963 Rules, the State Government had power to issue the said Government Orders. 59. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that even if the Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993 were to be treated as amounting to withdrawal under Rule 24 of the 1963 Rules, the application for grant of lease should have been invited/filed after 22. 11. 1993, and any application filed prior to it was premature, and was liable to be rejected since the declaration under Rule 23 (1) of the said Rules in respect of the areas in question was operative prior to 22. 11. 1993. It is submitted that the communication of the District Magistrate dated 20. 9. 1993 showed that the application of the respondent No. 4 for grant of lease was filed prior to 20. 9. 1993. The said application, the submission proceeds, being anterior to 22. 11. 1993, was liable to be rejected, and the grant of lease on 2. 3. 1994 on the basis of the said application was void ab initio. 60. We have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 61. Even if it be assumed, as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the application of the respondent No. 4 for grant of mining lease was received prior to 22. 60. We have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 61. Even if it be assumed, as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the application of the respondent No. 4 for grant of mining lease was received prior to 22. 11. 1993, the same remained pending, and in the meantime the said Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993 was issued. The application of the respondent No. 4 was thereafter dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of the 1963 Rules and the lease was granted in favour of the respondent No. 4 on 2. 3. 1994. As no order rejecting the application of the respondent No. 4 had been passed prior to 22. 11. 1993, no illegality was 4 committed in considering the said application after the issuance of the said Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993. The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard, cannot, in our view, be accepted. 62. As regards sub-rule (3) of Rule 23 of the 1963 Rules, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the said Rule lays down that on the declaration of the area or areas under sub-rule (1) of Rule 23 of the 1963 Rules, the provisions of Chapters II, III and VI of the said Rules shall not apply to the area or areas in respect of which the declaration has been issued and such area or areas may be leased-out according to the procedure described in Chapter IV of the said Rules. 63. It is true that in view of the declaration made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 23 of the said Rules by the Government Orders dated 5. 9. 1990 and 16. 12. 1990, the provisions of Chapters II, III and VI of the said Rules were not applicable to the areas in question prior to withdrawal of the said areas by the Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993 in view of the provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 23 of the 1963 Rules. Therefore, in case the application was filed by the respondent No. 4 for grant of lease under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules prior to 22. 11. 1993, the said application was premature. 11. 1993 in view of the provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 23 of the 1963 Rules. Therefore, in case the application was filed by the respondent No. 4 for grant of lease under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules prior to 22. 11. 1993, the said application was premature. However, as noted above, the said application was not rejected and the same remained pending, and in the meantime the said Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993 was issued withdrawing the areas in question under Rule 24 of the 1963 Rules. The said application was thereafter dealt with in accordance with Chapter II of the 1963 Rules. 64. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 23 of the 1963 Rules, in our opinion, does not prohibit entertainment of the premature application after the declaration under sub-rule (1) of Rule 23 of the 1963 Rules is withdrawn under Rule 24 of the said Rules. 65. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of this Court in M/s. Bundelkhand Minerals and Alkali Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 1992 (3) AWC 1506. 66. In the said case, a Division Bench of this Court opined as under (paragraph 8 of the said AWC): "8. We have carefully examined the GO. dated November 16,1990, and in our opinion it amounts to a general declaration to the effect that the entire area of minor minerals in the State shall be leased out on the basis of auction/tender/auction-cum-tender as contemplated by sub-rule (1) of Rule 23. Since the State Government has issued a declaration under sub-rule (1) of Rule 23 with regard to the entire 5 mining area available in the State, provisions of Chapter II, III and VI shall not apply to any mining area in the State in view of sub-rule (3) of Rule 23. The effect of the declaration made by the State Government is that lease of mining area can be granted only in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Rules 27,27-A, or27-B of the Rules. The petitioner had moved the application on 9-3-1987 in Form MM-1 for grant of mining lease in accordance with Chapter II. In view of this development such an application could not have been allowed by the State Government as the provisions of Chapter II do not apply to the area for which application was moved. The petitioner had moved the application on 9-3-1987 in Form MM-1 for grant of mining lease in accordance with Chapter II. In view of this development such an application could not have been allowed by the State Government as the provisions of Chapter II do not apply to the area for which application was moved. In this view of the matter we are of opinion that the petitioners application was rightly rejected and there is no illegality in the order dated 4-10-1991 passed by the State Government. " 67. A perusal of the above-quoted paragraph shows that the petitioner in the above case had moved an application on 9. 3. 1987 in Form MM-1 for grant of mining lease in accordance with Chapter II of the 1963 Rules. The State Government issued a Government Order on November 16,1990 declaring that the entire area of minor minerals in the State would be leased-out by auction or by tender or by auction- cum-tender in accordance with Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules. In the circumstances, the State Government rejected the said application of the petitioner by its order dated 4. 10. 1991. The Division Bench held that the application of the petitioner was rightly rejected as in view of declaration under sub-rule (1) of Rule 23 of the 1963 Rules by the said Government Order dated November 16, 1990, the provisions of Chapters II, III and VI were not applicable to the mining area in question in view of sub-rule (3) of Rule 23 of the said Rules. 68. The above decision is distinguishable on facts. In the above decision the application of the petitioner was rejected in view of the declaration under sub-rule (1) of Rule 23 of the 1963 Rules having been in operation. In the present case the application even if assumed to be filed prior to the Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993, was never rejected while the declaration under sub-rule (1) of Rule 23 of the 1963 Rules was in operation in respect of the areas in question. The said application was considered after the said declaration was withdrawn on 22. 11. 1993 under Rule 24 of the 1963 Rules. 69. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the original lease granted to the respondent No. 4 on 2. 3. The said application was considered after the said declaration was withdrawn on 22. 11. 1993 under Rule 24 of the 1963 Rules. 69. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the original lease granted to the respondent No. 4 on 2. 3. 1994 was granted for an area of about 200 acres whereas there was a specific bar under Rule 10 of the 1963 Rules to grant of one or more mining leases to a person covering a total area of more than 30 acres. No reasons as contemplated in the proviso to Rule 10 of the 1963 Rules were recorded by the State Government for grant of lease for an area of more than 30 acres. 6 70. We have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 71. As already noted, no proper factual foundation appears to have been laid in the writ petition for raising the said submission nor does any ground appear to have been taken in the writ petition in regard to the said question. As relevant factual averments have not been made in the writ petition, it is not possible to ascertain as to whether the State Government gave permission in writing as contemplated in the proviso to Rule 10 for grant of lease of an area of more than 30 acres. 72. Even otherwise, we do not find any merit in the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Rule 10 of the 1963 Rules, as it stood at the relevant time, provides as under: "10. Maximum area for which a mining lease maybe granted.- No person shall acquire in respect of any minor mineral, one or more mining leases covering a total area of more than thirty acres : Provided that if the State Government is of opinion that in the interests of mineral development it is necessary so to do, it may, for reasons to be recorded, permit any person to acquire one or more mining leases covering an area in excess of the aforesaid maximum of thirty acres. Explanation.- For the purpose of these rules, a person acquiring by or in the name of an other person a mining lease which is intended for himself shall be deemed to be acquiring it himself. " 73. Explanation.- For the purpose of these rules, a person acquiring by or in the name of an other person a mining lease which is intended for himself shall be deemed to be acquiring it himself. " 73. Thus, Rule 10 of the 1963 Rules provides that no person shall acquire in respect of any minor mineral, one or more mining leases covering a total area of more than 30 acres. However, the proviso to Rule 10 lays down that if the State Government is of opinion that in the interests of mineral development, it is necessary so to do, it may, for reasons to be recorded, permit any person to acquire one or more mining leases covering an area in excess of the aforesaid maximum of 30 acres. It has been noted above that the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad in his communication dated 20. 9. 1993 indicated the reasons as to why it would be proper to settle the mining leases in the areas in question under the mining lease system as contemplated in Chapter II of the 1963 Rules as compared to the auction system as contemplated in Chapter IV of the said Rules. 7 74. Having regard to the contents of the said communication sent by the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad, the said Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993 and the said communication/order dated 25. 11. 1993 were issued, inter alia, intimating the decision of the State Government for grant of mining leases in respect of the areas in question in accordance with the mining lease system under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules subject to the conditions indicated in the said Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993. The said Government Orders were evidently issued in the interest of mineral development, and the State Government had power to issue the same in view of the provisions of Rule 68 of the 1963 Rules. 75. Pursuant to the said Government Orders, the mining lease was granted in favour of the respondent No. 4 on 2. 3. 1994. The lease-deed was executed on 10. 6. 1994, and the same was got registered on 23. 6. 1994. 76. The grant of lease and the execution of the lease-deed were evidently on behalf of the State Government and with the concurrence of the State Government. 77. Keeping in view the circumstances in which the Government Order dated 22. 11. 1994. The lease-deed was executed on 10. 6. 1994, and the same was got registered on 23. 6. 1994. 76. The grant of lease and the execution of the lease-deed were evidently on behalf of the State Government and with the concurrence of the State Government. 77. Keeping in view the circumstances in which the Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993 and the communication/order dated 25. 11. 1993 were issued in the interest of mineral development and the lease having been granted and the lease-deed having been executed on behalf of the State Government, it is evident that the State Government was of opinion that in the interests of mineral development, it was necessary to grant lease of more than 30 acres and there was, thus, substantial compliance of the proviso to Rule 10 of the 1963 Rules. 78. It is further noteworthy that the original lease granted on 2. 3. 1994 having expired in October, 2003, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground of Rule 10 of the 1963 Rules is no longer relevant. 79. The last submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner for attacking the validity of the original lease granted on 2. 3. 1994 is that the said lease was granted without any notice or advertisement, thus, depriving the prospective applicants from participating in the grant of public largess. 80. We have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 81. We may again note that no proper factual foundation appears to have been laid in the writ petition for raising the said submission nor does any ground appear to have been taken in the writ petition in regard to the said submission. As relevant factual averments have not been made in the writ petition, it is not possible to ascertain as to whether any notice or advertisement was in fact issued prior to the grant of original lease on 2. 3. 1994, nor is it possible to ascertain as to whether any alleged prospective applicant was deprived of opportunity to apply for grant of lease on account of the notice or advertisement having not been issued. 82. In the circumstances, the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the said submission. 83. Even otherwise, as already noted, the Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993 and the communication/order dated 25. 11. 82. In the circumstances, the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the said submission. 83. Even otherwise, as already noted, the Government Order dated 22. 11. 1993 and the communication/order dated 25. 11. 1993 were relatable to the exercise of power by the State Government under Rule 68 of the 1963 Rules. Hence, even assuming there was any deviation from the requirements of issuance of notice as contemplated under Rule 72 of the 1963 Rules, the same was of no consequence in view of the power given in Rule 68 of the 1963 Rules. 84. It is further noteworthy that the period of the original lease having run out in October, 2003, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding notice or advertisement is no longer relevant. 85. In view of the above, it is concluded that the original lease granted to the respondent No. 4 on 2. 3. 1994 was valid. Question No. 6 86. Question No. 6, as noted above, is as to whether the renewal of mining lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 by the order dated 9. 6. 2003 read with the order dated 26. 6. 2003 passed by the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar was valid. 87. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner on this question may be considered in two parts: (I) It is submitted that since the original lease granted on 2. 3. 1994 was void ab initio being contrary to the 1963 Rules, the lease could not have been renewed in favour of the respondent No. 4. 88. Reliance in this regard has been placed on a Judgment dated December 5,2003 given by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 9581 of 2003, Abhimanyu Prasad and others v. State of U. P. and another. 89. In Abhimanyu Prasad case (supra), the original lease was granted in terms of Rule 9-A of the 1963 Rules which gave a preferential right to persons belonging to certain specified backward classes. The said Rule 9-A was held to be unconstitutional and was accordingly struck down. Question for consideration was as to whether in such circumstances renewal of lease could be granted. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down that if the original grant was unconstitutional, the renewal would also be tainted and invalid. 90. The said Rule 9-A was held to be unconstitutional and was accordingly struck down. Question for consideration was as to whether in such circumstances renewal of lease could be granted. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down that if the original grant was unconstitutional, the renewal would also be tainted and invalid. 90. In the present case, it has already been concluded above while considering Question No. 5 that the original lease granted to the respondent No. 4 on 2. 3. 1994 was valid. The submissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner for challenging the validity of the original lease, have been considered and have been found to be not acceptable. The original lease granted to the respondent No. 4 was neither void nor unconstitutional. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court in Abhimanyu Prasad case (supra) is not applicable to the present case. 91. The renewal of lease in the present case cannot, therefore, be denied on the ground of any invalidity in the original lease. (II) It is submitted that renewal of mining lease in favourof the respondent No. 4 by the order dated 9. 6. 2003 read with the order dated 26. 6. 2003 passed by the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar was invalid on merits also. The submissions in this regard are being dealt with below: (i) The original mining lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 was granted on 2. 3. 1994. Rule 6-A providing for renewal of mining leases was inserted in the 1963 Rules by the U. P. Minor Minerals (Concession) (20th Amendment) Rules, 1994 (in short the 20th Amendment Rules, 1994) with effect from 27. 8. 1994, i. e. , subsequent to the grant of original mining lease. Further, there was no clause in the 0 original mining lease granted on 2. 3. 1994 in regard to renewal of the mining lease. It is submitted that in the circumstances the right to get mining lease renewed was not available to the respondent No. 4. 92. We have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 93. Rule 6-Aof the 1963 Rules as inserted by the 20th Amendment Rules, 1994, was as follows: "6-A. Application fee etc. 92. We have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 93. Rule 6-Aof the 1963 Rules as inserted by the 20th Amendment Rules, 1994, was as follows: "6-A. Application fee etc. for renewal of mining lease.- An application for renewal of mining lease may be made at least six months before the date of expiry of the mining lease alongwith four copies of the map of leasehold area showing clearly the area applied for renewal and the provisions of clause (a) and (d) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 shall mutatis mutandis apply. " 94. Rule 6-A was substituted by the UP. Minor Minerals (Concession) (23rd Amendment) Rules, 2001 (in short "the 23rd Amendment Rules, 2001") with effect from 1. 3. 2001, as under: "6-A. Application fee etc. for renewal of mining lease.- (1) An application for renewal of mining lease may be made at least six months before the date of expiry of the mining lease alongwith four copies of the map of leasehold area showing clearly the area applied for renewal and the provisions of clause (a) and (d) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 shall mutatis mutandis apply. (2) The State Government may condone the delay caused in making the application for renewal of mining lease after the period specified in sub-rule (1 ). " 95. The above provision of Rule 6-A, as inserted with effect from 27. 8. 1994, and also as substituted with effect from 1. 3. 2001, thus permitted an application for renewal of mining lease to be made at least six months, before the expiry of the mining lease. In the present case, the original mining lease granted to the respondent No. 4 was for a period of 9 years 7 months, i. e. , upto October, 2003. The respondent No. 4 submitted an application dated 7. 2. 2003 under Rule 6-A of the 1963 Rules before the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar for renewal of its mining lease. 1 96. It will, therefore, be noticed that Rule 6-A of the 1963 Rules was inserted with effect from 27. 8. 1994 when the original lease granted in favour of the respondent No. 4 was operative, and the said Rule 6-A was substituted with effect from 1. 3. 2001 when also the said original lease was still operative. 1 96. It will, therefore, be noticed that Rule 6-A of the 1963 Rules was inserted with effect from 27. 8. 1994 when the original lease granted in favour of the respondent No. 4 was operative, and the said Rule 6-A was substituted with effect from 1. 3. 2001 when also the said original lease was still operative. There is nothing in Rule 6-A as inserted with effect from 27. 8. 1994, as also in Rule 6-A as substituted with effect from 1. 3. 2001, to show that the said Rule was not applicable to the existing leases. On the contrary, a perusal of the said Rule in the context of other Rules of the 1963 Rules shows that the said Rule was intended to apply to existing leases also. 97. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the said Rule 6-A was applicable to the existing leases, and, therefore, the respondent No. 4 was entitled to the benefit of the said Rule. The application for renewal of mining lease was submitted by the respondent No. 4 about 8 months prior to the expiry of the original mining lease which was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 6-A of the 1963 Rules. (ii) It is submitted that in view of the Government Order dated 2. 11. 2002, mining leases in regard to vacant areas in respect of sand, morum, bazri and boulder was to be granted by auction system under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules in accordance with various conditions laid down in the said Government Order. In view of the said Government Order, the right of the respondent No. 4 to get the lease renewed on its expiry in October, 2003 stood extinguished, and, therefore, no renewal of mining lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 under Rule 6-A of the 1963 Rules was permissible. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgment dated 5. 2. 2001 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 42636 of 2000, Abdul Salam v. State of U. P. and others. 98. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 99. A perusal of the Government Order dated 2. 11. 2. 2001 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 42636 of 2000, Abdul Salam v. State of U. P. and others. 98. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 99. A perusal of the Government Order dated 2. 11. 2002, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-7 to the writ petition, shows that the said Government Order, inter alia, provided that mining leases in regard to all the vacant areas in respect of sand, morum, bazri and boulder would be granted by auction system under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules in accordance with various conditions laid down in the said Government Order. 2 100. When the said Government Order came into force on 2. 11. 2002, the original lease, which had been granted in respect of the areas in question, was still operative, and the areas in question were not vacant areas available for grant of mining lease by auction system under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules as contemplated in the said Government Order. The mining lease in respect of the areas in question was upto October, 2003, and it was only at that point of time that the question of applicability of the said Government Order dated 2. 11. 2002 and the grant of mining leases by auction system under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules, could have arisen. However, as noted above, about 8 months prior to October, 2003, the respondent No. 4 submitted an application dated 7. 2. 2003 under Rule 6-A of the 1963 Rules before the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar for renewal of its mining lease in respect of the areas in question. The District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, thereupon sent a communication dated 30. 3. 2003 to the Secretary, Geology and Mining, Government of Uttar Pradesh seeking information on various points, inter alia, in view of the said Government Order dated 2. 11. 2002. 101. In response to the said communication dated 30. 3. 2003 sent by the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, the Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh sent a communication/order dated 23. 4. 2003 to the Secretary, Geology and Mining, Government of Uttar Pradesh seeking information on various points, inter alia, in view of the said Government Order dated 2. 11. 2002. 101. In response to the said communication dated 30. 3. 2003 sent by the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, the Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh sent a communication/order dated 23. 4. 2003, inter alia, directing the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar to take action in accordance with Rules in respect of the applications for renewal of leases moved by the lease-holders in respect of the areas in question after considering the entire circumstances. 102. In response to the said communication/order dated 23. 4. 2003 sent by the Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar sent a communication dated 13. 5. 2003 to the Secretary, Industrial Development Department, Lucknow, inter alia, seeking directions/guidelines as to whether the renewal of leases is to be granted on the renewal applications moved in regard to the areas in question or the leases are to be granted by adopting auction system, and further, in case the renewal of the leases was to be granted, clear directions/guidelines be given regarding tenure of the leases and the percentage of enhancement of annual royalty. 103. In response to the said communication dated 13. 5. 2003, the Special Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh issued a Government Order dated 26. 5. 2003, inter alia, directing that renewal of leases under Rule 6-A in Chapter II of the 1963 Rules be granted in respect of the areas in question it was, inter alia, further provided that the renewal be done for the same period as was given in the original lease. Directions were also given for settlement of the annual royalty consequent to the renewal of leases. 104. Pursuant to the Government Order dated 26. 5. 2003, the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar obtained legal opinion from the DGC, Gautam Budh Nagar, and thereafter, issued an order dated 3 9. 6. 2003 granting renewal of mining lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 for a period of three years subject to the conditions mentioned in the said order. 105. The District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, thereafter, sent a communication dated 17. 6. 6. 2003 granting renewal of mining lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 for a period of three years subject to the conditions mentioned in the said order. 105. The District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, thereafter, sent a communication dated 17. 6. 2003 to the Special Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Industrial Developmentanubhag-5, Lucknow, inter alia, intimating that the renewal of mining leases in respect of the areas in question has been granted for a period of three years for the mining of sand. 106. In response to the said communication dated 17. 6. 2003 sent by the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, the Special Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh sent a communication/order dated 19. 6. 2003, inter alia, stating that despite directions given in the Government Orders for renewal of the leases for the same period as granted in the original lease (i. e. 9 years 7 months), the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar had renewed the leases only for three years which was not proper, and that the directions given in the Government Orders be strictly complied with. 107. Pursuant to the said communication/order dated 19. 6. 2003, the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar issued an order dated 26. 6. 2003, inter alia, modifying his earlier order dated 9. 6. 2003 and granting renewal of mining lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 for a period of 9 years 7 months subject to the conditions mentioned in the said order dated 26. 6. 2003. 108. A perusal of the communications and Government Orders, referred to above, shows that the decision to grant renewal of mining leases in respect of the areas in question under Rule 6-A of Chapter II of the 1963 Rules and not to grant mining leases in respect of the said areas by auction, was evidently taken for the same reasons which were taken into consideration by the State Government while withdrawing the said areas from auction system under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules and granting permission for grant of mining leases in respect of the said areas in accordance with the mining lease system under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules. The reasons, as already noted, were to prevent excessive and uncontrolled mining so that adverse effect would not be caused to Yamuna River at NOIDA and the dam constructed by the Irrigation Department at NOIDA. The reasons, as already noted, were to prevent excessive and uncontrolled mining so that adverse effect would not be caused to Yamuna River at NOIDA and the dam constructed by the Irrigation Department at NOIDA. Accordingly the said communication/order dated 23. 4. 2003, the said Government Order dated 26. 5. 2003 and the said communication/order dated 19. 6. 2003 were issued by the State Government. The said Government Orders evidently amounted to withdrawal of the declaration under Rule 23 (1) of the 1963 Rules as contemplated in the Government Order dated 2. 11. 2002 in so far as the areas in question were concerned. Such withdrawal of declaration was permissible under Rule 24 of the 1963 Rules. Moreover, the reasons for the decision to grant renewal of mining leases under Rule 6-A of Chapter II of the 1963 Rules showed that the said decision as contained in the above Government Orders was taken in the interest of mineral development, and the 4 State Government had power to issue the said Government Orders under Rule 68 of the 1963 Rules. It will thus be noticed that much before the expiry of the original lease in October, 2003, the renewal of mining lease in respect of the areas in question had been granted by the order dated 9. 6. 2003 read with the order dated 26. 6. 2003. Therefore, there was no question of extinction of the right of the respondent No. 4 to seek renewal of its mining lease. 109. As regards the decision of this Court in Abdul Salam case (supra), the mining leases were granted in favour of the petitioners in the said case under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules. After the grant of leases to the petitioners in the said case, the State Government made declaration under Rule 23 of the 1963 Rules for grant of mining leases in respect of the areas under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules. The term of mining leases of the petitioners in the said case expired while the declaration under Rule 23 of the 1963 Rules was still operative. 110. After the expiry of the leases of the petitioners in the said case, the State Government again took a policy decision through a Notification dated 30. 12. The term of mining leases of the petitioners in the said case expired while the declaration under Rule 23 of the 1963 Rules was still operative. 110. After the expiry of the leases of the petitioners in the said case, the State Government again took a policy decision through a Notification dated 30. 12. 2000 withdrawing the areas earlier declared under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules to be now available for settlement of mining leases under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules. 111. The argument of the petitioners in the said case was that in view of the Notification dated 30. 12. 2000 the petitioners rights to get renewal of mining leases stood automatically revived, and they were entitled to get renewal of their mining leases. 112. This Court rejected the said argument and held as under: ". . . . . . . . . Having examined the matter in detail the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is fallacious and has to be rejected. Aright under the M. M. C. Rules is subject to the State Governments declaration made from time to time in accordance with the exigency of policy decision. Applying Chapter-II or Chapter-IV to mining areas is the absolute prerogative of the State Government. An area which fell within Chapter-II could subsequently be directed to be governed by the provisions of Chapter- IV. Similarly, the latter decision of the Government of recalling Chapter IV and applying Chapter-II will not revive an individual right which stood extinguished earlier by application of Chapter IV. . . . . . . . . . " 113. It will be noticed that in the above case, the Notification dated 30. 12. 2000 was issued after the term of leases of the petitioners had already expired. As the term of leases had expired at the time 5 when the declaration under Rule 23 of the 1963 Rules was operative and the provision for renewal was not applicable to the areas in question at the time of the expiry of the term of leases, it was held that the rights of the petitioners to get renewal of their leases stood extinguished. Subsequent withdrawal of the declaration by the Notification dated 30. 12. Subsequent withdrawal of the declaration by the Notification dated 30. 12. 2000 could not revive the rights of the petitioners to get renewal of their mining leases as the said rights had already extinguished prior to issuance of the said Notification dated 30. 12. 2000. 114. In the present case, before the expiry of the mining leases in October, 2003, the areas in question were withdrawn under Rule 24 of the 1963 Rules and the decision was taken to grant renewal of the mining leases, and the renewal of mining leases was in fact granted. 115. The decision in Abdul Salam case (supra) is, therefore, not applicable to the present case. (iii) It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the annual lease rent of the renewed lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 as fixed by the District Magistrate, comes to Rs. Eight lacs @ Rs. 4,000/-per acre which is totally in contravention of Rule 14 (3) of the 1963 Rules, which specifically provides that the lease amount is to be determined on the basis of the average of the amounts received during the last three years. Thus, the submission proceeds, undue favour has been shown to the respondent No. 4, and the State Exchequer has been deprived of crores of rupees in the form of royalty, stamp duty and Trade Tax. 116. We have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It may be noted that no proper factual foundation appears to have been laid in the Writ Petition for raising the said submission nor does any ground appear to have been taken in the Writ Petition in regard to the said submission. 117. Even otherwise, we find ourselves unable to accept the said submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Rule 14 of the 1963 Rules, in so far as is relevant, as substituted by the U. P. Minor Minerals (Concession) (21st Amendment) Rules, 1994 (in short "the 21st Amendment Rules, 1994"), provides as under: "14. 117. Even otherwise, we find ourselves unable to accept the said submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Rule 14 of the 1963 Rules, in so far as is relevant, as substituted by the U. P. Minor Minerals (Concession) (21st Amendment) Rules, 1994 (in short "the 21st Amendment Rules, 1994"), provides as under: "14. Lease deed to be executed within three months.- (1) Where an order has been made for the grant of mining lease other than a mining lease for sand or morrum or bajri or boulder or any of these in mixed state, a lease deed in Form MM-3 or in a form as near thereto as the circumstances of each case 6 may require, shall be executed within three months of the communication of the said order or within such further period as the State Government may allow in this behalf. If no such deed is executed within the aforesaid period due to any default on the part of the applicant, the State Government may revoke the order granting the lease and in that event the application fee and security amount shall be forfeited to the State Government. (2) The date of the commencement of a mining lease referred to in sub-rule (1), shall be the date on which the deed is executed under the said sub-rule. (3) Where an order has been made for the grant of a mining lease for sand or morrum or bajri or boulder or any of these in mixed state, twenty-five percent of the annual lease amount shall be deposited within seven days of the order or within such further period as may be allowed by the District Officer not exceeding seven days and a lease deed in Form MM-3 or in a Form as near thereto as the circumstance of each case may require, shall be executed within one month of the communication of the said order or within such further period as the State Government may allow in this behalf. The lease amount shall in respect of sand or morrum be determined on the basis of the average of the amounts received during the last three years from that area or the amount received in the preceding year from such area, whichever is higher and in respect of sand, bajri, and boulder or any of these in mixed state, be determined on the basis of the highest amount received during the last three years. If no lease amount is deposited or no lease deed is executed within the aforesaid period due to any default on the part of the applicant, the State Government may revoke the order granting the lease and in that event the application fee and security amount shall be forfeited to the State Government. (4) The date of commencement of mining lease referred to in sub-rule (3) shall be the date on which the deed is executed under the said sub-rule or the date of actual commencement of mining operation whichever is earlier. (5) In case a lease referred to in sub-rule (3) is granted during the period of one year mentioned in Column I of the Schedule below, the annual lease amount shall be deposited, in respect of the first and subsequent years of the period of lease in the instalments of such percentage of the annual lease amount and before such dates as are mentioned against each in this respective columns thereof namely: Schedule of Deposit. . . . . . . . . . " 7 118. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 14, thus, inter alia, provides that". . . . . . . . . . . . . The lease amount shall in respect of sand or morrum be determined on the basis of the average of the amounts received during the last three years from that area or the amount received in the preceding year from such area, whichever is higher and in respect of sand, bajri and boulder or any of these in mixed state, be determined on the basis of the highest amount received during the last three years. . . . . . . . . . . " 119. As noted earlier, the Government-Order dated 26. 5. 2003 (Annexure-11 to the Writ Petition) also gave directions for settlement of the annual royalty consequent to the renewal of the leases. . . . . . . . . . . " 119. As noted earlier, the Government-Order dated 26. 5. 2003 (Annexure-11 to the Writ Petition) also gave directions for settlement of the annual royalty consequent to the renewal of the leases. It accordingly provided that the annual lease rent be determined under the provisions of the Government Orders and procedures and the relevant rules/sub-rules in force at present. 120. Thus, the said Government Order contemplated determination of the annual lease rent in accordance with the relevant rules/sub-rules, procedures and the Government Orders in force at present. This evidently includes sub-rule (3) of Rule 14 of the 1963 Rules. 121. Pursuant to the said Government Order dated 26. 5. 2003, the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar issued an order dated 9. 6. 2003 (Annexure-13to the Writ Petition) granting renewal of mining lease in favour of the respondent No. 4. As regards the annual lease rent, it was, inter alia, provided in the said order dated 9. 6. 2003 that the same would be the maximum amount received during the preceding three years as increased by 15% or the average amount received during the preceding three years as increased by 15%, whichever is higher. 122. Thus, the method of determination of annual lease rent as provided in the said order dated 9. 6. 2003 is in accordance with sub-rule (3) of Rule 14 of the 1963 Rules. 123. Subsequently, as noted earlier, the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar issued an order dated 26. 6. 2003 (Annexure-16 to the Writ Petition), inter alia, modifying his earlier order dated 9. 6. 2003. The order dated 26. 6. 2003, inter alia, quantified the amount of annual lease rent at Rs. 4,000/- per acre. Reading the Government Order dated 26. 5. 2003 and the orders dated 9. 6. 2003 and 26. 6. 2003 together, it is evident that the fixation of annual lease rent has been done in accordance with the provisions of the relevant rules/sub-rules and Government Orders including sub-rule (3) of Rule 14 of the 1963 Rules. Nothing has been shown on behalf of the petitioner as to how the figure of Rs. 4,000/-per acre per year as mentioned in the order dated 26. 6. 2003 is not in accordance with sub-rule (3) of Rule 14 of the 1963 Rules. 8 124. Nothing has been shown on behalf of the petitioner as to how the figure of Rs. 4,000/-per acre per year as mentioned in the order dated 26. 6. 2003 is not in accordance with sub-rule (3) of Rule 14 of the 1963 Rules. 8 124. In view of the above, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard cannot be accepted. (iv) It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in case mining lease had been settled by way of auction under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules instead of renewing the lease under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules, several lacs of revenue would have been fetched to the public exchequer, and the petitioner and similarly situated other citizens could have participated in the public auction. 125. The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is misconceived. 126. As noted earlier, the decision to grant renewal of mining leases in respect of the areas in question under Rule 6-A of Chapter II of the 1963 Rules and not to grant mining leases in respect of the said areas by auction, was evidently taken for the same reasons, which were taken into consideration by the State Government while withdrawing the said areas from auction system under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules and granting permission for grant of mining leases in respect of the said areas in accordance with the mining lease system under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules. The reasons, as already noted, were to prevent excessive and uncontrolled mining so that adverse effect would not be caused to Yamuna River at NOIDA and the dam constructed by the Irrigation Department at NOIDA. Accordingly, the Communication/order dated 23. 4. 2003, the Government Order dated 26. 5. 2003 and the Communication/order dated 19. 6. 2003 were issued by the State Government. The said Government Orders evidently amounted to withdrawal of the declaration under Rule 23 (1) of the 1963 Rules as contemplated in the Government Order dated 2. 11. 2002 in so far as the areas in question were concerned. Such withdrawal of declaration was permissible under Rule 24 of the 1963 Rules. 6. 2003 were issued by the State Government. The said Government Orders evidently amounted to withdrawal of the declaration under Rule 23 (1) of the 1963 Rules as contemplated in the Government Order dated 2. 11. 2002 in so far as the areas in question were concerned. Such withdrawal of declaration was permissible under Rule 24 of the 1963 Rules. Moreover, the reasons for the decision to grant renewal of mining leases under Rule 6a of Chapter II of the 1963 Rules show that the said decision as contained in the above Government Orders was taken in the interest of mineral development, and the State Government had power to issue the said Government Orders under Rule 68 of the 1963 Rules. 127. In view of the various relevant considerations, as mentioned above, taken into account for arriving at a decision to grant renewal of mining leases in respect of the areas in question under Rule 6a of Chapter II of the 1963 Rules, the considerations governing grant of mining lease by auction under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules cease to have relevance, and the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the basis of such considerations, therefore, cannot be accepted. 9 128. In view of the above, it is concluded that the renewal of mining lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 by the order dated 9. 6. 2003 read with the order dated 26. 6. 2003 passed by the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar was valid. Question No. 1 129. Question No. 1, as noted above, is as to whether the petitioner has focus standi to challenge the grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4. 130. The respondent No. 4 has raised a preliminary objection that the petitioner has no focus standi to challenge the grant of renewal of lease. As the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner in regard to the grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 have already been examined on merits while dealing with Question No. 6, it is not necessary to deal with question of focus standi of the petitioner to challenge the grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4. However, as the submissions have been made on the question of focus standi also, we are proceeding to deal with the said question. However, as the submissions have been made on the question of focus standi also, we are proceeding to deal with the said question. 131. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 that the petitioner has no focus standi to challenge the grant of renewal of lease. The petitioner is a resident of different district, and he has not disclosed as to how and in what manner he is aggrieved by the grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4. There is no disclosure by the petitioner regarding any step taken by him for the purpose of obtaining permit, lease or any sanction to win the mineral. It is submitted that the petitioner is a rank stranger and is a busy body, and the writ petition is not maintainable at the instance of the petitioner. 132. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a prospective applicant and is entitled to participate in any auction held for the purpose of settlement of mining leases under the provisions of the 1963 Rules. It is submitted that any prospective applicant has a right of approaching a Court of Law challenging the illegal and arbitrary action of the authorities. Reliance in this regard is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the following decisions : (a) Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. v. Union of India and others, AIR 1996 SC 2462 . (b) Charan Singh v. State of U. P. and others, 2005 (3) AWC 2302 (DB ). 133. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 134. In order to show his focus standi, the petitioner has made averments in paragraph 3 of the writ petition, which is reproduced below: "3. That the petitioner is permanent resident of Village Kurewa Tehsil Budhna District Muzaffarnagar and is a citizen of India and as such in accordance with the provisions of U. P. Minor, Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1963) is entitled to participate in any auction held for the purposes of settlement of mining leases under Chapter IV, Rule 26 of the Rules of 1963". 135. The preliminary objection regarding locus standi has been taken in sub-paragraph (A) of paragraph 2 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No. 4. 135. The preliminary objection regarding locus standi has been taken in sub-paragraph (A) of paragraph 2 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No. 4. The said sub-paragraph (A) of paragraph 2 of the counter affidavit is as under: (A) The petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the grant of renewal of lease. The petitioner is resident of different district. The petitioner has not disclosed. anywhere now and in which manner he is aggrieved to the grant of mining lease in favour of the deponent. Even he did not disclose anywhere regarding any step taken by him for the purpose of obtaining permit, lease or any sanction to win the mineral. The petitioner is a rank stranger. He is a busy body and is filing writ petition only to extract money from the deponent. Thus, the writ petition is not maintainable on the behest of the petitioner. " 136. Reply to the averments made in the above-quoted sub-paragraph (A) of paragraph 2 of the counter affidavit has been given in paragraph 5 of the rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner in reply to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No. 4. Paragraph 5 of the said rejoinder affidavit is reproduced below: "5. That in reply to the contents of paragraph No. 2 (a) of the counter affidavit, it is stated that the assertion made in the paragraph under reply is not only incorrect, false and misconceived but is also illegal and hence is emphatically denied. In reply it is submitted that the petitioner being a citizen of India and as at the relevant time there being proceeding for settlement of mining leases under Chapter 1 IV in accordance with auction proceedings, each and every citizen of India was entitled to proceed to participate in the auction. The petitioner was deprived to participate in the said proceedings. The assertion made to the contrary in the paragraphs under reply is illegal and bad in the eye of law. Moreover, it is stated that initially grant of mining lease was granted contrary to the provisions of U. P. Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1963 for the sake of brevity ). As no application was invited in pursuance whereof, the lease was granted to the respondent No. 4. Moreover, it is stated that initially grant of mining lease was granted contrary to the provisions of U. P. Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1963 for the sake of brevity ). As no application was invited in pursuance whereof, the lease was granted to the respondent No. 4. The same being contrary to the provisions of the Rules of 1963 is liable to be declared null and void. It is further stated that the petitioner is not a stranger but he being a citizen of India has a right in view of the provisions of the Rules of 1963. " 137. From the averments made in paragraph 3 of the writ petition as well as the averments made in paragraph 5 of the rejoinder affidavit, it is evident that the averments made by the petitioner to show his locus standi are that the petitioner is a citizen of India, and that as such the petitioner is entitled to participate in any auction held for the purposes of settlement of mining leases under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules, and that on account of grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4, the petitioner was deprived of opportunity to participate in the auction proceedings in case any auction was held in accordance with Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules. 138. Rule 4 of the 1963 Rules occurring in Chapter II of the said Rules, provides as follows: "4. Restriction on the grant of mining lease.- No mining lease shall be granted to any person who is not an Indian National. Explanation.- For the purpose of this rule a person shall be deemed to be an India National - (a) in the case of a public company as defined in the Companies Act, 1956, only if the majority of the directors of the company are citizens of India and not less than fifty-one percent of the share capital thereof is held by persons who are either citizens of India, or companies as defined in the Companies Act, 1956. (b) in the case of a company as defined in the Companies Act, 1956 only if all the members of the company are citizens of India. (b) in the case of a company as defined in the Companies Act, 1956 only if all the members of the company are citizens of India. 2 (c) in the case of a firm or other association of individuals only if all the partners of the firm or members of the association are citizens of India, and (d) in the case of an individual, only if he is a citizen of India. " 139. Rule 4, thus, lays down that no mining lease shall be granted to any person who is not an Indian National. Explanation (d) to Rule 4 shows that an individual shall be deemed to be an Indian National only if he is a citizen of India. 140. Therefore, mining lease under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules may be granted to an individual only if he is a citizen of India. 141. Similarly, Rule 26 of the 1963 Rules occurring in Chapter IV of the said Rules, provides as follows: "[26. Restriction of grant of lease.- No person who is not an Indian national or against whom mining dues are outstanding shall be allowed to bid at the auction or take part in the tender proceeding for a lease. ]" 142. Rule 26, thus, inter alia, lays down that no person who is not an Indian national, shall be allowed to bid at the auction or take part in the tender proceeding for a lease. 143. Therefore, a person may be allowed to bid at the auction or take part in the tender proceeding for a lease under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules, only if he is an Indian national. 144. Consequently, in view of the averments made by the petitioner that he is a citizen of India, mining lease under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules may be granted in favour of the petitioner. Further, being an Indian national/citizen of India, he may be allowed to bid at the auction or take part in the tender proceeding for a lease under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules. 3 145. Further, being an Indian national/citizen of India, he may be allowed to bid at the auction or take part in the tender proceeding for a lease under Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules. 3 145. However, while it is true that the petitioner being citizen of India/indian national is entitled to grant of mining lease under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules, or to bid at the auction or take part in the tender proceeding for a lease under Chapter IV of the said Rules, this fact in itself does not give locus standi to the petitioner to question the grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 under Chapter II of the 1963 Rules. 146. We are of the opinion that for a person to have locus standi to question any action of an authority in regard to any subject-matter or transaction, he must show his material or substantial interest in such subject-matter or transaction, and further, as to how such interest has been adversely affected by the action of such authority giving rise to grievance of the petitioner. Mere academic possibility that the petitioner may get an interest in any subject-matter or transaction on account of his qualification/eligibility will not entitle such a person to question any action taken with regard to such subject-matter or transaction. It is only when he, in fact, gets material and substantial interest in such subject-matter or transaction, that he gets locus standi to question any action in regard to such subject- matter or transaction. 147. In the present case, except for the assertion that the petitioner is a citizen of India, nothing has been shown as to how the petitioner has any material or substantial interest in the subject-matter, namely, grant of mining lease in respect of the areas in question. There is no averment to show that the petitioner ever made any effort for grant of mining lease in respect of the areas in question. There is no averment by the petitioner regarding any step having been taken by him for grant of mining lease in his favour in respect of the areas in question while the matter regarding grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 was under consideration. There is no averment by the petitioner regarding any step having been taken by him for grant of mining lease in his favour in respect of the areas in question while the matter regarding grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 was under consideration. No averment has been made by the petitioner regarding any step having been taken by him to oppose grant of renewal of lease of the areas in question in favour of the respondent No. 4 before such renewal was done. No averment has been made by the petitioner that he was at all in picture till the grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4. In the circumstances, the petitioner has failed to show any material or substantial interest which might have been adversely affected by the grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4. Mere possibility that the petitioner could have participated in case the auction was held in accordance with Chapter IV of the 1963 Rules does not give him any interest, much less, any material or substantial interest to question the grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4. Hence, the petitioner has no locus stand/to file the present writ petition challenging the grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4. 148. As regards the decision of the Supreme Court in Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. case (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd. (in short "tisco") was having a mining lease in respect of the area in question for Chromite for a period of twenty years with effect from January 12, 1953. The lease was to expire on January 12, 1973. TISCO sought its 4 renewal, which was duly granted under Section 8 (2) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (in short "the 1957 Act") in respect of 1261. 476 hectares fora period of 20 years i. e. till January 11,1993, subject to the condition that it would set up a beneficiation plant. 149. On October 3,1991, more than a year prior to the date of expiry of the lease, TISCO applied fora second renewal under Section 8 (3) of the 1957 Act for a further period of 20 years. 149. On October 3,1991, more than a year prior to the date of expiry of the lease, TISCO applied fora second renewal under Section 8 (3) of the 1957 Act for a further period of 20 years. On November 28,1992, the State Government, acting on the basis of a favourable report dated March 31,1992 submitted by the Director of Mines and Geology, Orissa, recommended to the Central Government that the entire lease of TISCO be renewed for a period of 10 years under Section 8 (3) of the 1957 Act. On April 27,1993, the Indian Bureau of Mines recommended to the Central Government that TISCOs lease be renewed in its entirety. 150. On June 3,1993, the Central Government authorized the renewal of the lease over the entire area of 1261. 476 hectares. However, before the formal lease could be executed, the Union Minister of State for Steel and Mines wrote a letter on September 27,1993 to the Chief Minister of Orissa stating that the lease area of TISCO should be reduced by half and the balance should be distributed in an equitable manner taking into consideration the need of genuine consumers for captive consumption. 151. On October 5, 1993, the Central Government superseded its earlier approval dated June 3,1993, and renewed TISCOs lease over a reduced area of 651 hectares. On October 19,1993, TISCO filed a writ petition in the High Court of Orissa under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated Octobers, 1993. Meanwhile, Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd. (in short "facor"), Ispat Alloys Ltd. , M/s Jindal Strips Ltd. (in short "jsl") and Jindal Ferro Alloys Ltd. applied for mining leases of the area held by TISCO, but the State Government refused to entertain them as being premature under Rules 59 and 60 of the Mineral Concession Rules, framed under the 1957 Act. 152. While the TISCOs writ petition was pending, M/s Indian Charge Chrome Limited (in short "iccl") and JSL filed writ petitions challenging the renewal of TISCOs lease by the Central Government; both the order dated June 3, 1993 (which had authorised the renewal of the entire lease area of 1261. 476 hectares) and the order dated October 5,1993 (which subsequently reduced the authorization to 651 hectares) were challenged. 153. 476 hectares) and the order dated October 5,1993 (which subsequently reduced the authorization to 651 hectares) were challenged. 153. By the order dated April 4,1995 the High Court of Orissa struck-down the renewal of TISCOs lease granted by the Central Government through its decisions dated June 3, 1993 and October 5, 1993, and directed the Central Government to reconsider TISCOs application for renewal of the lease in 5 accordance with law. The Central Government was also directed to give a personal hearing to, and consider the applications of, the other parties before the High Court. 154. An objection was raised on behalf of TISCO before the High Court of Orissa regarding locus sfancf/of prospective applicants in proceedings considering the renewal of TISCOs lease. The High Court of Orissa rejected the said objection, and held that prospective applicants were proper parties even if not necessary parties. 155. The Supreme Court upheld the above view of the High Court of Orissa. Relevant portion of the judgment of the Apex Court is reproduced below (paragraphs 43 and 46 of the said AIR): "43. In its impugned judgment, the High Court adopted the view that the other parties before it did have an interest in the proceedings regarding renewal of TISCOs lease. Describing their interest as being of a contingent nature, the High Court stated that if the Central Government did not think it fit to renew TISCOs lease, it would have to declare the area as available for grant and would have to invite prospective applicants. In that situation, the other parties would have a claim. The Court pointed out that, though none of the other parties could, as a matter of right, claim to be heard while the Central Government was considering the issue of renewal of TISCOs lease, since its two Orders in this regard had, in fact, adversely affected their rights, the other parties would be entitled to challenge them. In other words, according to the High Court, they were proper parties even if not necessary parties. 46. We are of the view that the High Court had taken the correct step in allowing the prospective applicants to put forth their points of view with regard to the renewal of TISCOs lease. In other words, according to the High Court, they were proper parties even if not necessary parties. 46. We are of the view that the High Court had taken the correct step in allowing the prospective applicants to put forth their points of view with regard to the renewal of TISCOs lease. As we have already pointed out, these issues involve considerably high stakes, both in terms of commercial value and the effect that such a decision will have on the concept of mineral development and the consequent national interest. To that extent, those likely to be affected and indeed, those who can legitimately have a stake in the proper formulation of such a vital policy, can be heard. No exception can be taken to the High Court treating them as proper parties and directing the Committee to hear them. " 156. From the narration of the facts of Tata Iron and Steel Co, Ltd. case (supra), it is evident that FACOR, Ispat Alloys, JSL and Jindal Ferro Alloys Ltd. had applied for mining leases of the area held by TISCO while the matter regarding renewal of lease in favour of TISCO was under consideration - namely, whether renewal be made regarding the entire area or regarding the reduced area. The State Government refused to entertain these applications as being premature. 6 Further, during the pendency of the writ petition filed by TISCO, ICCLand JSL filed writ petitions before the High Court of Orissa challenging the renewal of TISCOs lease by the Central Government. 157. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it was held by the High Court of Orissa that the said other parties did have an interest, though contingent in nature, in the proceedings regarding renewal of TISCOs lease, and they were proper parties even if not necessary parties. This view of the High Court of Orissa was upheld by the Supreme Court. 158. It will, thus, be seen that the facts of Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. case (supra) are distinguishable from those of the present case. 159. In Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. case (supra), the other parties were in picture while the matter regarding renewal of lease in favour of TISCO was under consideration. These other parties were prospective applicants who were in picture while renewal matter was under consideration. 160. 159. In Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. case (supra), the other parties were in picture while the matter regarding renewal of lease in favour of TISCO was under consideration. These other parties were prospective applicants who were in picture while renewal matter was under consideration. 160. In the present case, as noted above, the petitioner was not at all in the picture while the matter regarding grant of renewal of lease in respect of the areas in question in favour of the respondent No. 4 was under consideration. As such, the petitioner in the present case cannot be said to have any interest in the subject-matter, and, therefore, he has no locus standiio file the writ petition. 161. As regards Charan Singh case (supra), the relevant facts were as stated hereinafter. 162. An order dated 31. 3. 1997 was passed in favour of the respondent No. 3 (Smt. Bachchi Devi) for grant of lease in respect of the plot in question. A writ petition was filed against the said order dated 31. 3. 1997. An interim order was passed in the said Writ Petition staying the settlement of the lease in favour of the said Smt. Bachchi Devi (respondent No. 3 ). The interim order became inoperative on 5. 5. 1997. By the Government Order dated 9. 5. 1997 all applications which were received including the application of the petitioner (Charan Singh) for grant of lease were directed to be treated to have been cancelled. Smt. Bachchi Devi (respondent No. 3) was, accordingly intimated about the same by letter dated 12. 5. 1997 to the effect that her application for grant of lease was cancelled and she should immediately seek refund of the amount deposited by her. 7 163. Another writ petition was filed with regard to the Government Order dated 9. 5. 1997, in which the direction given to settle the lease by permit was quashed with a further direction to settle the leases in accordance with law. Accordingly, the plot in question was advertised by advertisement dated 16/19. 6. 1997. No applications arrived in respect of the plot in question, as a result whereof it was re- advertised on 15. 11. 1997. Again no application was received. The claim of the respondent No. 3, which she had made by representation dated 28. 11. 1998, was also rejected on 6. 3. 1999. 164. 6. 1997. No applications arrived in respect of the plot in question, as a result whereof it was re- advertised on 15. 11. 1997. Again no application was received. The claim of the respondent No. 3, which she had made by representation dated 28. 11. 1998, was also rejected on 6. 3. 1999. 164. Smt. Bachchi Devi filed another writ petition in the year 2003 wherein an order was passed to decide the representation of Smt. Bachchi Devi. The District Magistrate, Hamirpur, by order dated 29. 4. 2003 rejected the representation of Smt. Bachchi Devi. 165. Another application was moved by Smt. Bachchi Devi to grant mining lease to her. This application was moved before the State Government with a prayer to grant the mining lease by exercising the power under Rule 68 of the 1963 Rules. On this application, the District Magistrate submitted report dated 28. 2. 2004. The State Government thereafter passed an order dated 2. 4. 2004 by extending the benefit of grant of lease under Rule 68 of the 1963 Rules in favour of the respondent No. 3 (Smt. Bachchi Devi ). 166. The petitioner (Charan Singh) filed writ petition before this Court challenging the order dated 2. 4. 2004 and the consequential lease dated 5. 4. 2004. A Division Bench of this Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order dated 2. 4. 2004, and directed the State Government to notify the plot in question afresh and thereafter proceed to settle the lease in respect of the plot in question. 167. Before the Division Bench, an objection was raised on behalf of the respondent No. 3 (Smt. Bachchi Devi) regarding locus standi of the petitioner Charan Singh. This Court rejected the objection observing as follows (paragraph 10 of the said AWC): "10. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied on the decision of Raunaq International Ltd. v. I. V. R. Construction Ltd. and others, (1999) 1 SCC 492 ; Subhash Chandra Chaudhari and others v. Ram Milan and others, JT 1997 (2) SC 503 and Beg Ray Singh v. State of U. P. and others, (2003) 1 SCC 726 . A perusal of the aforesaid decisions would indicate that none of these decisions will apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. A perusal of the aforesaid decisions would indicate that none of these decisions will apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The petitioner before us is not a mere busy body and has genuinely shown his concern for grant of mining lease and has also given an undertaking before us through his counsel as recorded earlier in this judgment. The respondent No. 3, therefore, succeeded in getting the impugned order passed in an unfair manner thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The 8 impugned order has been passed only with a view to favour a single individual thereby causing loss to the exchequer and also preventing person like the petitioner from participating any settlement proceedings in respect of the land in question. The action of the respondents is, therefore, unfair, unreasonable and arbitrary. " 168. The facts of the Charan Singh case (supra) show that the petitioner was one of the applicants for grant of mining lease in respect of the plot in question since the very beginning in 1997. His application as well as the applications of others including the respondent No. 3 were cancelled by the State Government by the order dated 9. 5. 1997. After the rejection of the claim of the respondent No. 3 for grant of mining lease made through representations, she made an application under Rule 68 of the 1963 Rules and the State Government extended the benefit of grant of lease to her under the said Rule. During the course of the arguments before the High Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner-Charan Singh stated before the Court that the petitioner undertook to deposit the same amount as offered by Smt. Bachchi Devi for grant of lease and was ready to compete with the offer made by her. 169. It will, thus, be noticed that the petitioner (Charan Singh) took steps for grant of mining lease in respect of the plot in question in his favour since the very beginning and actively pursued the matter at various stages. On the other hand, in the present case, as noted above, no step was taken by the petitioner for grant of mining lease in respect of the areas in question before the grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4. On the other hand, in the present case, as noted above, no step was taken by the petitioner for grant of mining lease in respect of the areas in question before the grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4. The facts of the present case are, thus, distinguishable from those of Charan Singh case (supra ). 170. As the petitioner in the present case has failed to establish any interest, much less any material or substantial interest, in the subject-matter of the case, he has no locus standi to challenge the grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 in respect of the areas in question. 171. In view of the above, it is concluded that the petitioner has no locus stand/to challenge the grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4. Question Nb. 4 172. Question No. 4, as noted above, is as to whether the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. 9 173. The respondent No. 4 has raised a preliminary objection that the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches on the part of the petitioner in filing the Writ Petition. As the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner on merits have already been examined while deciding Question Nos. 5 and 6, it is not necessary to deal with the question of laches on the part of the petitioner in filing the Writ Petition. However, as the submissions have been made on the question of laches also, we are proceeding to deal with the said question. 174. In order to decide this question, it will be pertinent to note the facts of each of the three Writ Petitions being decided by this judgment. 175. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36599 of 2004 has been filed, inter alia, seeking quashing of the orders dated 26. 5. 2003 and 19. 6. 2003 passed by the respondent No. 1-State of U. P. and the orders dated 9. 6. 2003 and 26. 6. 2003 passed by the respondent No. 2-District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, and further seeking quashing of the renewed mining lease deed executed on 8. 7. 2003 and registered on 13. 8. 2003. 176. It appears that prior to the filing of the aforesaid Civil Misc. 6. 2003 and 26. 6. 2003 passed by the respondent No. 2-District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, and further seeking quashing of the renewed mining lease deed executed on 8. 7. 2003 and registered on 13. 8. 2003. 176. It appears that prior to the filing of the aforesaid Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36599 of 2004, the petitioner had filed a Writ Petition being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 39828 of 2003 (Tejendra Malikv. State of U. P. and others) before this Court. This Court by the order dated 8. 9. 2003 dismissed the said Writ Petition on the ground of alternative remedy. The petitioner thereafter filed an Appeal before the Divisional Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, which was numbered as Mines Appeal No. 4 of 2003- 04. The Divisional Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut by his judgment and order dated 9. 7. 2004 dismissed the said Appeal as not maintainable. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the present Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36599 of 2004 on 4. 9. 2004. 177. The above facts emerge from paragraphs 30,31,32 and 33 of the present Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36599 of 2004. 178. As the Divisional Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut dismissed the said Appeal of the petitioner as not maintainable by the judgment and order dated 9. 7. 2004 and the present Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36599 of 2004 was filed on 4. 9. 2004, we are of the view that there were no laches on the part of the petitioner in filing the present Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36599 of 2004. 0 179. Coming to Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48207 of 2004, the said Writ Petition has been filed, inter alia, seeking quashing of the orders dated 26. 5. 2003 and 19. 6. 2003 passed by the respondent No. 1- State of U. P. and the orders dated 9. 6. 2003 and 26. 6. 2003 passed by the respondent No. 2-District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, and further seeking quashing of the renewed mining lease deed executed on 8. 7. 2003 and registered on 13. 8. 2003. 180. It appears that prior to the filing of the aforesaid Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48207 of 2004, the petitioner had filed a Writ Petition (Sunil Kumarv. State of U. P. and others) before this Court. This Court by the order dated 8. 9. 7. 2003 and registered on 13. 8. 2003. 180. It appears that prior to the filing of the aforesaid Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48207 of 2004, the petitioner had filed a Writ Petition (Sunil Kumarv. State of U. P. and others) before this Court. This Court by the order dated 8. 9. 2003 dismissed the said Writ Petition on the ground of alternative remedy. The petitioner thereafter filed an Appeal before the Divisional Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, which was numbered as Mines Appeal No. 4 of 2003-04. The Divisional Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut by his judgment and order dated 9. 7. 2004 dismissed the said Appeal as not maintainable. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the present Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48207 of 2004 on 8. 11. 2004. 181. The above facts emerge from paragraphs 30,31,32 and 33 of the present Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48207 of 2004. 182. As the Divisional Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut dismissed the said Appeal of the petitioner as not maintainable by the judgment and order dated 9. 7. 2004 and the present Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48207 of 2004 was filed on 8. 11. 2004, we are of the view that there were no laches on the part of the petitioner in filing the present Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48207 of 2004. 183. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 32523 of 2003 has beenfiled, inter alia, seeking quashing of the order dated 9. 6. 2003 passed by the respondent No. 2-District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar. The said Writ Petition was filed on 28. 7. 2003. 184. As the order impugned in the said Writ Petition was passed on 9. 6. 2003, and the said Writ Petition was filed on 28. 7. 2003, we are of the view that there were no laches on the part of the petitioner in filing the said Writ Petition. 185. In view of the above, it follows that there were no laches on the part of the respective petitioner in filing either of the aforesaid three Writ Petitions. Hence, it is concluded that the Writ Petitions are not liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. 1 Question No. 3 186. Question No. 3, as noted above, is as to whether the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on account of the availability of alternative remedy to the petitioner. 187. Hence, it is concluded that the Writ Petitions are not liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. 1 Question No. 3 186. Question No. 3, as noted above, is as to whether the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on account of the availability of alternative remedy to the petitioner. 187. The respondent No. 4 has raised a preliminary objection that the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on account of the availability of the alternative remedy to the petitioner under Rules 77 and 78 of the 1963 Rules. 188. As the submissions on behalf of the petitioner on merits of the Writ Petition have already been examined while considering Question Nos. 5 and 6 above, it is not necessary to deal with the question of availability of alternative remedy to the petitioner for seeking the reliefs sought for in the Writ Petition. However, as the submissions have been made on the question of availability of alternative remedy also, we are proceeding to deal with the question. 189. While dealing with Question No. 4 above, it has been noticed that in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36599 of 2004 as well as in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48207 of 2004, the respective petitioner had already approached this Court in the Writ Petition, and this Court dismissed the Writ Petition on the ground of alternative remedy. Thereupon, the respective petitioner in the said Writ Petitions filed Appeal before the Divisional Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut. The Divisional Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut by the judgment and order dated 9. 7. 2004 dismissed the said Appeal as not maintainable. Without going into the question of correctness or otherwise of the view expressed by the Divisional Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut in the said judgment and order dated 9. 7. 2004, it is evident that the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36599 of 2004 as well as the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48207 of 2004 did avail of alternative remedy pursuant to the orders passed by this Court in earlier Writ Petitions. 190. Hence, there is no question of dismissing the said Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36599 of 2004 and the said Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48207 of 2004 on the ground of alternative remedy. 191. As regards Civil Misc. 190. Hence, there is no question of dismissing the said Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36599 of 2004 and the said Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48207 of 2004 on the ground of alternative remedy. 191. As regards Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 32523 of 2003, it is noteworthy that affidavits have been exchanged between the parties in the said Writ Petition. The said Writ Petition has remained pending 2 before this Court for the last five years. The controversy involved in the said Writ Petition is the same as the one involved in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36599 of 2004 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48207 of 2004. 192. In the circumstances, we are of the view that it will not be appropriate to dismiss the said Writ Petition, namely, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 32523 of 2003 on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. Reference in this regard may be made to a decision of the Apex Court in Ganga Retreat & Towers Ltd. and anotherv. State of Rajasthan and others, 2004 (2) AWC 1117 (SC) (paragraph 18 ). 193. In view of the above, it is concluded that the Writ Petition is not liable to be dismissed on account of the availability of alternative remedy to the petitioner. Question No. 2 194. Question No. 2, as noted above, is as to whether the Writ Petition is not maintainable on account of non-disclosure of the names and addresses of the partners or the name and address of the managing partner of the respondent No. 4, or on account of the address, name and location of the respondent No. 4 against whom the allegations have been levelled, being not correct. 195. The respondent No. 4 has raised a preliminary objection that though the respondent No. 4, a registered partnership firm, has been impleaded in the Writ Petition, but the names of the partners or the managing partner have not been given. It is submitted that the partnership firm can be sued only alongwith the name and address of the partner or partners, but the petitioner did not disclose the name and address of the partner. It is further submitted that the address, name and location of the respondent No. 4 against whom allegations have been levelled, are not correct. In the circumstances, the submission proceeds, the Writ Petition is not maintainable. 196. It is further submitted that the address, name and location of the respondent No. 4 against whom allegations have been levelled, are not correct. In the circumstances, the submission proceeds, the Writ Petition is not maintainable. 196. In reply, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that law does not require the petitioner to implead all the partners as party to any proceeding, even if the relief is being claimed against the partnership firm and the registered firm has been made a party. It is further submitted that the renewal application filed by the respondent No. 4 (copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-CA-1 to the counter affidavit on behalf of the respondent No. 4) has only been filed by the firm and the name and address of the partners have not been mentioned in the renewal application. It is further submitted on behalf of the petitioner that Order XXX, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that any two or more 3 persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on the business in India may sue or be sued in the name of the firm of which such persons were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action. 197. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 198. Explanation (c) to Rule 4 of the 1963 Rules, quoted in the earlier part of this judgment, shows that mining lease may be granted to a partnership firm if all the partners of the firm are citizens of India. 199. A perusal of the renewal application, submitted by the respondent No. 4, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-CA-1 to the counter affidavit, shows that the said application mentions the name and address of the applicant as "okhla Sand Supply Company, 280, Noor Nagar Vistar, Jamia Nagar, Okhla, New Delhi-110025". The said details are substantially the same as mentioned in respect of the respondent No. 4 in the array of parties in the Writ Petition. It is, therefore, incorrect to contend that the address, name and location of the respondent No. 4 have not been disclosed correctly in the Writ Petition. However, there is no mention of the names of the partners or the managing partner in the said renewal application. It is, therefore, incorrect to contend that the address, name and location of the respondent No. 4 have not been disclosed correctly in the Writ Petition. However, there is no mention of the names of the partners or the managing partner in the said renewal application. No disclosure in this regard appears to have been made by the respondent No. 4 in its counter affidavit. There is no dispute between the parties that the respondent No. 4 is a registered partnership firm. 200. Rule 1 of Order XXX of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows: "1. Suing of partners in name of firm.- (1) Any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in India may sue or be sued in the name of the firm (if any) of which such persons were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, and any party to a suit may in such case apply to the Court for a statement of the names and addresses of the persons who were, at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, partners in such firm, to be furnished and verified in such manner as the Court may direct. (2) Where persons sue or are sued as partners in the name of their firm under sub-rule (1), it shall, in the case of any pleading or other document required by or under this Code to be signed, verified or certified by the plaintiff or the defendant, suffice if such pleading or other document is signed, verified or certified by any one of such persons. " 4 201. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order XXX of the Code of Civil Procedure, thus, lays down that any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in India may sue or be sued in the name of the firm (if any) of which such persons were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action. It is further provided in the said sub-rule (1) that any party to a suit may in such case apply to the Court for a statement of the names and addresses of the persons who were, at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, partners in such firm, to be furnished and verified in such manner as the Court may direct. 202. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order XXX of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, shows that the suit against two or more persons being liable as partners may be filed in the name of the firm, and it is not necessary to implead such persons as defendants in the suit. However, the disclosure of the names and addresses of such persons may be obtained by applying to the Court in this regard. 203. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of Order XXX of the Code of Civil Procedure shows that in case a suit is filed against partners in the name of their firm, then pleading or other document may be signed, verified or certified by any of the partners. Evidently, therefore, once the partnership firm has been impleaded as defendant in a suit, it is not necessary to implead the partners of the firm also as defendants in such suit. 204. Rule 3 of Order XXX of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as under: "3. Service, - Where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, the summons shall be served either - (a) upon any one or more of the partners, or (b) at the principal place at which the partnership business is carried on within India upon any person having, at the time of service, the control or management of the partnership business there, as the Court may direct; and such service shall be deemed good service upon the firm so sued, whether all or any of the partners are within or without India: 5 Provided that, in the case of a partnership which has been dissolved to the knowledge of the plaintiff before the institution of the suit, the summons shall be served upon every person within India whom it is sought to make liable. " 205. " 205. Rule 3 of Order XXX of the Code of Civil Procedure, thus, shows that where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, the summons shall be served either upon any one or more of the partners, or at the principal place of the partnership business, upon any person having the control or management of the partnership business. This Rule again shows that once the partnership firm has been impleaded as defendant in a suit, it is not necessary to implead the partners of the firm also as defendants in such suit. 206. Rule 4 of Order XXX of the Code of Civil Procedure is as under: "4. Right of suit on death of partner.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 45 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), where two or more persons may sue or be sued in the name of a firm under the foregoing provisions and any of such persons dies, whether before the institution or during the pendency of any suit, it shall not be necessary to join the legal representative of the deceased as a party to the suit. (2) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall limit or otherwise affect any right which the legal representative of the deceased may have - (a) to apply to be made a party to the suit, or (b) to enforce any claim against the survivor or survivors. " 207. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of Order XXX of the Code of Civil Procedure, thus, shows that in case a suit has been filed against the partners in the name of the partnership firm then no substitution of the legal representatives would be necessary in case of death of any of the partners. This again shows that once the partnership firm has been impleaded as defendant in a suit, it is not necessary to implead the partners of the firm also as defendants in such suit. 6 208. Applying the principles underlying the provisions of Order XXX of the Code of Civil Procedure to the Writ Petition, it is evident that once the respondent No. 4, a registered partnership firm, was impleaded as party-respondent No. 4 in the Writ Petition, it was not necessary for the petitioner to implead the partners or the managing partner of the respondent No. 4 also as the party-respondents in the Writ Petition. 209. 209. In view of the above, it is concluded that the Writ Petition cannot be held to be not maintainable on account of non-disclosure of the names and addresses of the partners or the name and address of the managing partner of the respondent No. 4. Again, the Writ Petition cannot be held to be not maintainable on account of the address, name and location of the respondent No. 4 being not correct as the said details mentioned in the Writ Petition are substantially correct. 210. Similar reasoning and conclusions would apply in case of other two Writ Petitions, namely, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48207 of 2004 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 32523 of 2003. 211. We may now summarise our conclusions on various questions: 212. As regards Question No. 3, it has been concluded that the Writ Petition is not liable to be dismissed on account of the availability of alternative remedy to the petitioner. 213. As regards Question No. 4, it has been concluded that the Writ Petitions are not liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. 214. As regards Question No. 2, it has been concluded that the Writ Petition cannot be held to be not maintainable on account of non-disclosure of the names and addresses of the partners or the name and address of the managing partner of the respondent No. 4. Again, the Writ Petition cannot be held to be not maintainable on account of the address, name and location of the respo,ndent No. 4 being not correct as the said details mentioned in the Writ Petition are substantially correct. 215. As regards Question No. 1, it has been concluded that the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the grant of renewal of lease in favour of the respondent No. 4. 7 216. As regards Question No. 5, it has been concluded that the original lease granted to the respondent No. 4 on 2. 3. 1994 was valid. 217. As regards Question No. 6, it has been concluded that the renewal of mining lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 by the order dated 9. 6. 2003 read with the order dated 26. 6. 2003 passed by the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar was valid. 218. Thus, Question Nos. 3. 1994 was valid. 217. As regards Question No. 6, it has been concluded that the renewal of mining lease in favour of the respondent No. 4 by the order dated 9. 6. 2003 read with the order dated 26. 6. 2003 passed by the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar was valid. 218. Thus, Question Nos. 2, 3 and 4 have been decided in favour of the petitioner and it has been concluded that the Writ Petitions are not liable to be dismissed on the preliminary objections mentioned in the said questions. However, Question Nos. 1,5 and 6 have been decided against the petitioner, and in view of the conclusions on the said questions, we are of the opinion that the above three Writ Petitions lack merits, and are liable to be dismissed. 219. Accordingly, the Writ Petitions, namely, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36599 of 2004, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48207 of 2004 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 32523 of 2003 are dismissed. 220. However, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. .