Judgment : G. Rajasuria, J. Compendiously and concisely, the relevant facts which are absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this Criminal Revision petition would run thus: The police laid the police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. as against the accused for the offences under Sections 279, 304-A (4 counts) and 337 (6 counts) I.P.C. The accused on entering appearance pleaded not guilty where upon trial was conducted. On the side of the prosecution, P.Ws.1 to 13 were examined and Exhibits P-1 to 20 were marked. However, neither oral nor documentary evidence was adduced on the side of the accused. The trail Court, ultimately, convicted the accused and imposed sentences as under: Table (ii) Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the conviction recorded and the sentence imposed by the Trial Court, the accused preferred appeal before the learned Additional District Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court No.2), Salem, for nothing but to be dismissed confirming the trial Court’s order. (iii) Impugning and challenging the judgment of both the Courts below, this revision is filed on various grounds; the warp and woof of them would run thus: The first appellate Court should have reduced the quantum of sentence, as on the date of the appellate Court rendering its judgment, 11 years had lapsed from the date of occurrence. The so called eye witnesses are not believable. Even though both the Courts below placed reliance on the deposition of the witnesses, the Doctor, who conducted post mortem, was not examined before the Court. Accordingly, he prayed for setting aside the Judgment of both Courts below. 2. Despite printing the name of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, there is no representation. The revision petitioner is also absent. The Additional Public Prosecutor has argued the matter. 3. The point for consideration is as to whether there is perversity or non application of law by both the Courts below in recording the conviction and imposing the sentence, and Whether both the Courts below ignored the factum of the Doctor who conducted post mortem having not been examined before the trial Court. 4. Pithily and precisely the case of the prosecution is that on 31.05.1955 the revision petitioner/accused was driving the Government bus bearing registration No: TN 27 N 407 along the National Highway from Salem towards Namakkal. 4. Pithily and precisely the case of the prosecution is that on 31.05.1955 the revision petitioner/accused was driving the Government bus bearing registration No: TN 27 N 407 along the National Highway from Salem towards Namakkal. At that time, near Parapatti branch road, he rashly and negligently attempted to overtake a lorry which was going in front of the bus, and in that process, he came in violent contact as against the car which was coming on the proper side of the road in the opposite direction and ultimately caused the death of four persons and injuries to six persons. 5. Both the Courts below, appropriately and appositely, correctly and convincingly dealt with the deposition of P.W.1, the eye witness who also happened to be an injured person in the accident, as he was traveling in the said car. During the cross examination, nothing was elicited so as to discard his testimony. The evidence of P.Ws.7 and 9 is also relied on by the prosecution as they are eye witnesses. In matters of this nature, the evidence of the injured witnesses cannot be termed or labelled as partisan one. They would be the most competent persons to speak about the accident. It is for the accused to cross examine and point out all flaws in their depositions. But in this case, absolutely there is no shard or shared (sic) molecular or iota of falsity in the evidence of P.W.1 as well as in the evidence of other eye witnesses. At this juncture, my mind is reminiscent and redolent of the following two decisions of the Apex Court: (i) Bindeshawari Prasad Singh alias B.P. Singh and Others v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) and Another AIR 2002 SC 2907 : (2002) SCC (Cri) 1448: (2002) MLJ (Crl) 939 an excerpt from it would run thus at p. 942 of MLJ (Crl): “13. The instant case is not where any such legality was committed by the trail Court. In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High court should not reappreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trail Court. In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High court should not reappreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trail Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases it not warranted. 14. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction at the instance of the informant. It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from that of the trail Court. But that by itself is no justification for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a judgment of acquittal. We cannot say that the judgment of the trial Court in the instant case was perverse. No defect of procedure has been pointed out. There was also no improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial vitiating the trial itself. (ii) Sathyajit Banerjee and Others v. State of W.B. and Others AIR 2005 SC 4161: (2005) SCC (Cri) 276, an excerpt from it would run thus: “22. The cases cited by the learned counsel show the settled legal position that the revisional jurisdiction, at the instance of the complainant, has to be exercised by the High Court only in very exceptional cases where the High Court finds defect of procedure or manifest error of law resulting in flagrant miscarriage of justice.” 6. A bare poring over and perusal of the above judgments would exemplify and demonstrate that the revisional Court should be reluctant to interfere with the findings recorded by the lower Court, unless there is perversity or non-application of law in appreciating the evidence. In this case, both the Courts below gave a factual finding to the effect that the driver, namely the accused herein, was rash and negligent in driving the vehicle. In this case, both the Courts below gave a factual finding to the effect that the driver, namely the accused herein, was rash and negligent in driving the vehicle. It is ex facie and prima facie clear that the revision petitioner, the accused, in the process of overtaking the lorry which was going in front of his bus, was rash and negligent in his driving and in that process alone he caused the accident. It is a common or garden principle of law that whenever the drive of a heavy passenger vehicle attempts to overtake a lorry or any other vehicle proceeding before it, he should get hand signal from the driver of the vehicle which is proceeding in front and, thereafter alone he should overtake the vehicle. In this case, it is quite obvious that the revision petitioner herein, had not taken any such step and had he resorted to such a procedure the accident would not have occurred. Hence, the finding rendered by both the Courts below that the revision petitioner was rash and negligent in driving the bus warrants no interference as there is no perversity in the decision at all. 7. The point that the Post mortem Doctor was not examined deserves some consideration. The post mortem certificate Exhibits P-17 to 19 were marked through the Investigating officer without any objection and during the cross examination also, not even a suggestion was put to the investigating officer relating to such non examination of the post mortem Doctor. It is a peculiar case, in which, out of four persons, three persons namely Rasumath Beevi, Azarudheen and Manimaran died on (sin) the spot itself so as to say, and one other persons namely Jalboom Bee who was taken to the Hospital, where she died subsequently. P.W.11, Dr. Swaminathan was examined and through him Exhibits P-4 to P-9, the wound certificates were marked to prove the number of injuries sustained by the six injured persons. As such, this is a peculiar case, in which almost three deaths occurred at the spot itself and to that effect, eye witnesses have spoken. It is a trite (sic) proposition of law that in matters of this nature when there is enormous gap between the date of the accident and the date of the death, the question would arise as to whether death was due to that accident or not. It is a trite (sic) proposition of law that in matters of this nature when there is enormous gap between the date of the accident and the date of the death, the question would arise as to whether death was due to that accident or not. Furthermore, in this case, without any objection, the post mortem certificates were marked through the investigating officer and there is no doubt about the cause of death. 8. At this juncture, my mind is reminiscent and redolent of the Full Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court Saddiq and Others v. State (1981) Cri.L.J 379. An excerpt from it would run this: “11. In Jagdeo Singh v. State (1979) Cri LJ 236 a Division Bench of this Court held “it was not permissible to exhibit the post mortem report under Section 294 Cr.P.C and even if it was done the report could not be used as substantive piece of evidence until and unless the doctor concerned was examined in Court. Documents that Section 294, Cr.P.C contemplates reading in evidence upon admission about genuineness by the opposite party are only such documents which when formally proved speak for themselves. It does not refer to any document, which even if exhibited cannot be read in evidence as substantive evidence.” With great respect, we are unable to agree with the view taken by this Court in the above mentioned case. As mentioned earlier, there is no restriction placed on documents in sub-section (1) of Section 294, Cr.P.C and it applies to all documents filed by the prosecution or the accused. If the genuineness of any document filed by the prosecution or the accused under sub-section (1) of Section 294, Cr.P.C is not disputed by the opposite party sub-section (3) of Section 294, Cr.P.C is applicable and it may be read as substantive evidence. If the genuineness of any document filed by the prosecution or the accused under sub-section (1) of Section 294, Cr.P.C is not disputed by the opposite party sub-section (3) of Section 294, Cr.P.C is applicable and it may be read as substantive evidence. It is true that prior to the coming into force of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the post-mortem report after it was proved was not substantive evidence but only corroborated the statement of the doctor made in Court and even now if the genuineness of the post-mortem report is disputed by the accused, the doctor must be examined to prove the injuries found on the body of the deceased and also the post-mortem report and the post-mortem report may only be used to corroborate or discredit his testimony which is the substantive evidence. This however, cannot lead to the conclusion that the post-mortem report cannot be read as substantive evidence under sub-section (3) of Section 294, Cr.P.C if its genuineness is not disputed by the accused. As already mentioned the very object of enacting Section 294 Cr.P.C would be defeated if the signature and the correctness of the contents of the post-mortem report are still required to be proved by the doctor concerned even if its genuineness is not disputed by the accused. Section 294 Cr.P.C is clear and unambiguous. It is only when the genuineness of the post-mortem report filed by the prosecution is not disputed by the accused that sub-Section (3) of Section 294, Cr.P.C is applicable and the post-mortem report may be read as substantive evidence and the signature and the correctness of its contents need not be proved by the doctor concerned. We are therefore, clearly of the opinion that if the genuineness of the postmortem report riled by the prosecution under sub-section (1) of Section 294, Cr.P.C is not disputed by the accused, it may be read as substantive evidence under sub-section (3) of Section 294, Cr.P.C.” Hence, in these circumstances, the non examination of the Post Mortem Doctor is not fatal. Accordingly, I could see no infirmity in the judgments passed by both the Courts below regarding the finding that the revision petitioner/accused was guilty of the offences under Section 304-A (4 counts, Section 337 (6 counts) and also under Section 279 I.P.C. The fact remains that for the offence under Section 279 I.P.C. no separate sentence was imposed by the lower Court even though law permits such imposition of sentence separately. Since this is only a revision and there is no appeal as against the inadequacy of sentence passed by the Courts below at the instance of the State, I am inclined to leave it as such without imposing any separate sentence for the offence under Section 279 I.P.C. 9. However, the fact remains that the accident occurred on 31.05.1991 and that now we are in the year 2009. I would like to highlight that mere lapse of time alone should not be the criterion for reducing the sentence. However, taking into consideration the age of the accused person that he is in his 50’s, I am of the opinion that awarding of 9 months imprisonment would meet the ends of justice and accordingly, the substantive sentence of one year R.I. is reduced to nine months S.I. and the rest of the findings on sentence of fine an other aspects are left in tact. Accordingly, the revision is partly allowed. On receipt of a copy of this order, the Magistrate shall issue a warrant as against the revision petitioner and secure the presence of the convict to undergo the rest of the period of imprisonment, if he had not already undergone.