JUDGMENT : B.S. Chauhan, C.J. - These two writ petitions have been filed for issuance of writ of mandamus directing the learned District Judge, Sundargarh to issue appointment letter to the Petitioners against the available vacancies of Junior Clerk in the district judgeship of Sundargarh. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to these cases are that an advertisement was made inviting application for the post of Junior Clerk in the district judgeship of Sundargarh and Petitioners being eligible submitted their applications and in response thereof they were permitted to participate in the selection process. A merit list dated 21.2.1987 (Annex.-I) containing 41 names of the successful candidates was published. The appointment on the said post at the relevant time was governed by the Orissa District and Subordinate Courts Ministerial Services (Method of Recruitment and Condition of Services) Rules, 1969 (hereinafter called 'the Rules, 1969), which prescribes a detail procedure for mode of recruitment. The select list prepared in the year 1987 and candidates whose names appeared in the select list at SI. Nos. 4 and 5 were offered the appointment on 1st March, 1989. Subsequent thereto, no appointment was made. Thereafter, an advertisement dated 9.4.1991 was issued in newspapers for fresh recruitment only to fill up the vacancies of reserved categories of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes. During the pendency of the said selection process, certain writ petitions were filed claiming relief of appointment in pursuance of the vacancies advertised in the year 1986. Writ petition i.e. O.J.C. No. 10108 of 1993 Madan Mohan Rout and Ors. v. District Judge, Sundargarh and Ors. was allowed vide judgment and order dated 19.09.1994 with certain directions. Subsequently writ petitions, O.J.C. No. 12144 of 1996 Alok Kumar Dey and Ors. v. State of Orissa and Anr. was disposed of vide judgment and order of this Court dated 13.8.2004 and O.J.C. No. 1312 of 1994 Kusumlata Behera and Ors. v. District Judge, Sundargarh and Ors. was allowed following the earlier judgment in Madan Mohan Rout (supra) vide judgment and order dated 24.2.1995. v. State of Orissa and Anr. was disposed of vide judgment and order of this Court dated 13.8.2004 and O.J.C. No. 1312 of 1994 Kusumlata Behera and Ors. v. District Judge, Sundargarh and Ors. was allowed following the earlier judgment in Madan Mohan Rout (supra) vide judgment and order dated 24.2.1995. In the said judgment certain directions were issued for consideration of cases of the applicants for appointment in the posts of Junior Clerk on future vacancies since they had been the successful candidates and their names had been included ill the list prepared by the District Judge in accordance with the statutory rules subject to the Rules of reservation meant for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates. It was further directed that in case any applicant become over-aged, relaxation should be granted. In view thereof, the candidates whose name appeared in the select list dated 9.2.1987 were directed to be appointed. The present two writ Petitioners claim to be similarly situated and these petitions have been filed seeking the same relief. 3. Shri Devashish Panda, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the Petitioners appeared as intervenors in the writ petitions which had been disposed of earlier as they were not impleaded in the writ petitions. As the candidates whose name appeared in the select list dated 9.2.1987 had been offered appointment till 2004 by orders of this Court from time to time in different writ petitions, the Petitioners cannot be discriminated. They are entitled for the same relief and therefore, petitions deserve to be allowed in terms of the earlier judgment. It has further been submitted by Shri Panda that the second petition has been filed as further advertisement has been made on 7.9.2005 without offering any appointment to the Petitioner as his name appeared in the select list dated 9.2.1987 and as this Court while entertaining the writ petition on 15.12.2005 observed that any appointment made pursuant to the said advertisement shall be subject to the result of the writ petition. Petitioners are entitled for the same relief as has been granted to other similarly situated persons. 4. On the contrary Shri P.K. Khuntia, learned Addl. Government Advocate vehemently opposed the petitions and submitted that the advertisement which was issued on 29.6.1986 did not provide any number of vacancies. Petitioners are entitled for the same relief as has been granted to other similarly situated persons. 4. On the contrary Shri P.K. Khuntia, learned Addl. Government Advocate vehemently opposed the petitions and submitted that the advertisement which was issued on 29.6.1986 did not provide any number of vacancies. In a case where the State Government has adopted the reservation policy, certain number of vacancies are to be filled up as per the roster, but the selection in the year 1987 has not been made following the roster point nor the number of vacancies was reflected in the advertisement, therefore, the entire selection process stood vitiated. More so, the present petitions have been filed at a much belated stage taking benefit of the judgments in the cases of other persons who were diligent and approached this Court within a reasonable time. Thus the present Petitioners cannot be permitted to take the benefit given to other diligent persons. In case the number of vacancies are not mentioned and it is not known as what would be the number of posts to be filled up, the ratio of reservation would not be maintained. All these aspects had not been considered by this Court in any of the earlier judgments. When the advertisement itself was void in the eyes of law, the earlier judgments giving relief to the applicants therein cannot be binding in nature. The said judgments remain per incuriam having been decided without taking into consideration the constitutional provisions. Therefore, the present petitions are liable to be dismissed. 5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. It is fairly admitted by Shri Panda that now Petitioners are over-aged. In the first case, Petitioners is 49 years of age and in the second case Petitioner is 44 years of age. Further the second petition has been filed in 2005 to claim the relief in view of the earlier judgments passed by this Court from time to time. 7. It is the settled legal proposition that a person cannot be permitted to take impetus of the judgment if a person has taken a relief from the Court by filing a Writ Petition immediately after the cause of action had arisen, Petitioners cannot take the benefit thereof by filing a writ petition belatedly. 7. It is the settled legal proposition that a person cannot be permitted to take impetus of the judgment if a person has taken a relief from the Court by filing a Writ Petition immediately after the cause of action had arisen, Petitioners cannot take the benefit thereof by filing a writ petition belatedly. They cannot take any benefit thereof at such a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligent person. 8. In State of Karnataka and Others Vs. S.M. Kotrayya and Others the Supreme Court rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches on the ground that he filed the petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. The Court observed that such a plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay and laches. 9. Same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Jagdish Lal and others Vs. State of Haryana and others observing as under: Suffice it to state that Appellants may be sleeping over their rights for long and elected to wake-up when they had impetus from Veerpal Chauhan and Ajit Singh's ratio ... desperate attempts of the Appellants to re-do the seniority, held by them in various cadre ... are not amenable to the judicial review at this belated stage. The High Court, therefore, has rightly dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay as well. 10. In Rup Diamonds and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, the Supreme Court considered a case where Petitioner wanted to get the relief on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court wherein a particular law had been declared ultra vires. The Court rejected the petition on the ground of delay and latches observing as under: There is one more ground which basically sets the present case apart. Petitioners are re-agitating claims which they have not pursued for several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be dormant and close to sit on the fence till somebody else's case came to be decided. Petitioners are re-agitating claims which they have not pursued for several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be dormant and close to sit on the fence till somebody else's case came to be decided. Thus, no litigant is entitled to take benefit of the judgment of the court obtained by a diligent person approaching the Court in time. 11. Be that as it may, it is the settled proposition of law that no appointment can be made over and above the number of vacancies advertised as it would amount to filling up the future vacancies and it will be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the fundamental rights guaranteed to the persons who become eligible subsequent to the date of advertisement and were not eligible to apply when the posts were advertised, (vide Union of India and Ors. v. Ishwar Singh Khatri and Ors. 1992 Suppl. (3) SCC 84 State of Bihar and others Vs. The Secretariat Assistant Successful Examinees Union 1986 and others, ; Gujarat State Deputy Executive Engineers' Association v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 1994 Suppl. (2) SCC 591; Madan Lal and Others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others, ; Ashok Kumar and Others Vs. Chairman, Banking Service Recruitment Board and Others, ; Prem Singh and Others Vs. Haryana State Electricity Board and Others, ; Surinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. AIR 1998 SC 18 ; Kamlesh Kumar Sharma Vs. Yogesh Kumar Gupta and others, ; Virender S. Hooda and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, ; State of Punjab Vs. Raghbir Chand Sharma and Another, ; Sri Kant Tripathi v. State of U.P. and Ors. (2001) 10 SCC 237 ; State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others Vs. Sanjeev Kumar and Others, ; and Mukul Saikia and Others Vs. State of Assam and Others, ). 12. Similar issue has been considered by the Apex Court while examining the provisions of Section 47(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and held that the Transport Authority had no competence to revise the limit fixed by it after the vacancies stood advertised and without specific number of vacancies it was generally impossible to conclude that why there would be only two vacancies for grant of permits and why not four or six. Fixing the number of vacancies was of substance in nature and not of form. Prior determination of the vacancies limit was essential before advertisement. The vacancies on the route could not be decided at the time of grant of permit. More so, if the number of vacancies was not fixed, it would open the flood gate of corruption and nepotism and would give a arbitrary and unreasonable power to the authority to proceed in a whimsical manner and grant permit to any number of persons to any extent. (vide Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kailash Pandey AIR 1963 SC 64 ; R. Obliswami Naidu Vs. The Additional State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras and Others, ; Mohd. Ibrahim, etc. Vs. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras, etc., ; and Gajendra Transport (P.) Ltd. Vs. The Anamallais Bus Transport (P.) Ltd. and Another, ). 13. In view of the above, it is clear that if appointment is not permissible over and above the number of vacancies advertised how the appointment could be made where number of vacancies was not specified. 14. Further, a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shankarsan Dash Vs. Union of India held that appearance of the name of a candidate in the select list does not give him a right of appointment. Mere conclusion of candidate's name in the select list does not confer any right to be selected, even if some of the vacancies remain unfilled. Similar view has subsequently been taken by the Supreme Court in Asha Kaul (Mrs) and Another Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others, ; Union of India Vs. S.S. Uppal and another, ; Hanuman Prasad and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, ; Union of India and others Vs. K.V. Vijesh, ; Bihar Public Service Commission and another Vs. State of Bihar and others, ; Syndicate Bank and others Vs. Shankar Paul and others, ; Vice-Chancellor, University of Allahabad and Others Vs. Dr Anand Prakash Mishra and Others, ; Simanchal Panda Vs. State of Orissa and Others, ; Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Another Vs. S.G. Kotturappa and Another, ; Punjab State Electricity Board and Others Vs. Malkiat Singh, ; State of U.P. and Others Vs. Rajkumar Sharma and Others, ; Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Kali Dass Batish and Another, ; Divisional Forests Officers and Others Vs. State of Orissa and Others, ; Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Another Vs. S.G. Kotturappa and Another, ; Punjab State Electricity Board and Others Vs. Malkiat Singh, ; State of U.P. and Others Vs. Rajkumar Sharma and Others, ; Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Kali Dass Batish and Another, ; Divisional Forests Officers and Others Vs. M. Ramalinga Reddy, ; Jitendra Kumar and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, ; and Subha B. Nair and Others Vs. State of Kerala and Others, . 15. It is also the well settled legal proposition that no relief can be granted to the candidate after expiry of the select list. (Vide J. Ashok Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. (1996) 3 SCC 225; State of Bihar and others Vs. Md. Kalimuddin and others, ; State of U. P. and others Vs. Harish Chandra and others, ; Sushma Suri Vs. Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi and Another, ; State of U.P. Vs. Ram Sawrup Saroj, ; K. Thulaseedharan Vs. The Kerala State Public Service Commission, Trivandrum and Others, ; Deepa Keyes v. Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. (2007) 6 SCC 194 ; and Subha B. Nair and Others Vs. State of Kerala and Others. It has been held therein that if the select list expires as per the rules applicable, as its life is over, no appointment can be made from the said list. 16. The issue regarding the life of a select list under Rule, 1969 had been considered by a Division Benches of this Court in Dasarathi Behera and Ors. v. District Judge, Ganjam and Ors. 84 (1997) CLT 838, and Sagarbala Mallick v. District Judge, Kandhamal, Boudh Phulbani and Anr. 2005 (2) OLR 59 , held that select list once prepared has a life of one year. 17. In order to understand the provisions in correct perspective, it may be necessary to quote the relevant provision. 18. Rule 6 provides for competitive examination and mode of appointment. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 6 provides the standard, syllabus subjects of examination, determination of vacancies, advertisement of vacancies and communication of results shall be as set forth in Appendix 'A', Appendix 'A' to the Rule reads as under; 1. 18. Rule 6 provides for competitive examination and mode of appointment. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 6 provides the standard, syllabus subjects of examination, determination of vacancies, advertisement of vacancies and communication of results shall be as set forth in Appendix 'A', Appendix 'A' to the Rule reads as under; 1. The District Judge shall determine the number of vacancies in the posts of Lower Division Clerks including Copyists and Typists to be filled up on the result of the competitive examination held in each year and shall specify such number of vacancies in the advertisement inviting applications for the examination. Such competitive examination shall ordinarily be held in the month of December.... 19. Thus, it is evident that Sub-rule (4) of Rule 6 of the Rules, 1969 provides that the standard, syllabus, subjects of examination, determination of vacancies, advertisement of vacancies and communication of results shall be as set forth in Appendix-'A'. 20. It is settled legal proposition that every statutory provision is to be given strict adherence, for the reason that the statute creates rights in favour of the citizens, and if any order is passed de hors the same, it cannot be held to be a valid order and cannot be enforced. As the statutory provision creates legal rights and obligations for individuals, the statutory authorities are under a legal obligation to give strict adherence to the same and cannot pass an order in contravention thereof, treating the same to be merely decoration pieces in his office. (vide Sirsi Municipality by its President Sirsi Vs. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis, ; Sukhdev Singh, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation, Industrial Finance Corporation Employees Associations Vs. Bhagat Ram, Association of Clause II. Officers, Shyam Lal, Industrial Finance Corporation, ; Mrs. Sarojini Ramaswami Vs. Union of India and others, ; Ram Chand and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, ; Purushottam Vs. Chairman, M.S.E.B. and Another, ; and Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. and Another Vs. Jabar Singh and Others, ). 21. Therefore, it is evident from the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court that whenever any action of the authority is in violation of the provisions of the statute or the action is constitutionally illegal, it cannot claim any sanctity in law, and there is no obligation on the part of the Court to sanctify such an illegal act. 21. Therefore, it is evident from the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court that whenever any action of the authority is in violation of the provisions of the statute or the action is constitutionally illegal, it cannot claim any sanctity in law, and there is no obligation on the part of the Court to sanctify such an illegal act. Wherever the statuary provision is ignored, the Court cannot become a silent spectator to such an illegal act, and it becomes the solemn duty of the Court to deal with the persons violating the law with heavy hands. (Vide R.N. Nanjundappa Vs. T. Thimmiah and Another, ; B.N. Nagarajan and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, ; Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union Vs. Delhi Administration, Delhi and others, ; State of Orissa and others Vs. Smt. Sukanti Mohapatra and others, ; Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, Jabalpur, M.P. Vs. Bal Kishan Soni and Others State of Himachal Pradesh, through the Secretary, Agriculture to the Govt. of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Nodha Ram and others, ; Ashwani Kumar and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, ; State of Madhya Pradesh and Another Vs. Dharam Bir, ; Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur and Another Vs. Veer Singh Rajput and Others, ; Nazira Begum Lashkar and Ors. v. State of Assam and Ors. AIR 2001 SC 102 ; Dr. (Mrs.) Chanchal Goyal Vs. State of Rajasthan, ; M.D., U.P. Land Dev. Corpn. and Another Vs. Amar Singh and Others, ; State of Haryana and Another Vs. Tilak Raj and Others, ; Haryana Tourism Corporation Ltd. Vs. Fakir Chand, etc. etc., ; Sultan Sadik Vs. Sanjay Raj Subba and Others, ; and A. Umarani Vs. Registrar, Cooperative Societies and Others, ). 22. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that in absence of any determination of number of vacancies, the entire selection process was a farce. However, it gives rise to the further question as to whether it is permissible for this Bench to ignore the judgments delivered by the Coordinate Benches in respect of the same selection process. 23. Now the question does arise as to whether selection process is permissible without determining the number of vacancies, particularly, where the reservation policy is adopted by the State by enacting the legislation and it is to be given effect to? 24. In Rameshwar Prasad and Others Vs. 23. Now the question does arise as to whether selection process is permissible without determining the number of vacancies, particularly, where the reservation policy is adopted by the State by enacting the legislation and it is to be given effect to? 24. In Rameshwar Prasad and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the validity of Section 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (as amended by U.P. Act 15 of 1976) and held that where a statute provides for reservation in favour of a particular community or society, it cannot be given effect to unless number of vacancies is fixed. The said amendment Act provided that there shall be no upper limit to the number of permits to be issued for stage carriages. It was found to be in contravention of the other statutory provisions of the central legislation as grant of permit had to be in conformity with regard to matters referred to in various other clauses of Section 47(1) of the Act. The Apex Court observed as under: Preferences and reservations have value only when there is a limit on the number of permits to be issued and in the context of the Act there should necessarily be a limit on the issue of permits to operate motor vehicles in respect of any route or area.... We are clearly of the view that the State Government has transgressed the provisions contained in Sub-section (1) and Sub-sections (1-A) to (1-H) of Section 47. It has failed to comply with the duty imposed on it by those provisions. (Emphasis added). 25. In the instant case, admittedly the provisions of Orissa Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1975 are applicable. Therefore, certain vacancies had to be filled up and unless the number of vacancies is determined, the question of filling up of the vacancies does not arise. Therefore, we are of the humble opinion that entire selection process was void and no appointment could have been made on the basis of the said advertisement. 26. The submission made by Mr. Panda that this Court is bound by the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench, even if the earlier cases have not been decided correctly, undoubtedly has some substance. Therefore, we are of the humble opinion that entire selection process was void and no appointment could have been made on the basis of the said advertisement. 26. The submission made by Mr. Panda that this Court is bound by the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench, even if the earlier cases have not been decided correctly, undoubtedly has some substance. The earlier judgment of the Court is binding on the Co-ordinate Bench and it is so required by Judicial Propriety and Judicial Discipline. (Vide Uttar PradeshGram Panchayat Adhikari Sangh and Others Vs. Daya Ram Saroj and Others, ; Sanjay Singh and Another Vs. U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad and Another, ; Maharashtra University of Health Sciences represented by Deputy Registrar Vs. Paryani Mukesh Jawaharlal and Others, ; and Official Liquidator Vs. Dayanand and Others, .) The use of precedent is an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application in individual case. The doctrine of 'precedent' provides a basis for orderly development of legal rules. However, the decision on question not argued cannot be recognised as a precedent and the judgment is to be read and considered in the light of the questions which were before the Court. (Vide Gopabandhu Biswal Vs. Krishna Chandra Mohanty and Others, ; Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Gurnam Kaur, ; Goodyear India Ltd., Gedore (India) Pvt. Ltd., Kelvinator of India Ltd. and the Food Corporation of India and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Another, and Mehboob Dawood Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra, .) 27. Admittedly statutory provisions had not been complied with while making the advertisement and the issue agitated in these petitions had not been raised in earlier cases. In such a fact-situation, the doctrine of per incuriam becomes applicable. 28. The concept of "per incuriam" are those decisions given in ignorance or for getfulness of some inconsistent statutory provisions or of some authority binding on the Court concerned i.e. previous decisions of the Court i.e. its own Court or by a Court of co-ordinate or higher jurisdiction or in ignorance of a term of a statute or by a rule having the force of law. "Incuria", literally means "carelessness". In practice, per incuriam is taken to mean per ignoratium. (Vide Mamleshwar Prasad and Another Vs. Kanhaiya Lal (Dead) through L. Rs., ; A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak and Another, ; State of U.P. and Another Vs. "Incuria", literally means "carelessness". In practice, per incuriam is taken to mean per ignoratium. (Vide Mamleshwar Prasad and Another Vs. Kanhaiya Lal (Dead) through L. Rs., ; A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak and Another, ; State of U.P. and Another Vs. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and Another, ; B. Shama Rao Vs. The Union Territory of Pondicherry, ; Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Gurnam Kaur, ; Ram Gopal Baheti v. Girdharilal Soni and Ors., (1999) 3 SCC 112 ; Sarnam Singh and Another Vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation and Others, ; Government of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Satyanarayana Rao, (dead) by L.Rs, and Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1729 ; M/s. Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. Vs. Jindal Exports Ltd. Suganthi Suresh Kumar Vs. Jagdeeshan, ; State of Bihar Vs. Kalika Kuer @ Kalika Singh and Others, ; Director of Settlements, Andhra Pradesh and Others Vs. M.R. Apparao and Another, ; Manda Jaganath Vs. K.S. Rathnam and Others, ; Sunita Devi Vs. State of Bihar and Another, ; and Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, ). 29. The Courts are not to perpetuate an illegality, rather it is the duty of the Courts to rectify the mistakes. While dealing with a similar issue the Apex Court in Hotel Balaji and others, Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, etc. etc., observed as under: To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of judicial conscience. In this, we derive comfort and strength from the wise and inspiring words of Justice Bronson in Pierce v. Delameter (A.M.Y. at page 18: 'a Judge ought to be wise enough to know that he is fallible and, therefore, ever ready to learn great and honest enough to discard all mere pride of opinion and follow truth wherever it may lead and courageous enough to acknowledge his errors' (Emphasis added). 30. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that as the above referred to matters have been decided without taking note of the mandatory statutory provisions, thus the same remain per incuriam and have no binding effect. The writ petitions lack merit and are accordingly dismissed. B.N. Mahapatra, J. 31. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed