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Gauhati High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 218 (GAU)

Tata Motors Ltd. v. Dandeswar Das

2009-03-27

I.A.ANSARI

body2009
JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. Both these criminal petitions, made under Section 482, Cr.PC, are directed against the order, dated 28.2.2008, passed, in CR Case No. 784/2007, by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jorhat, whereby cognizance of offences under Sections 379, 406 and 506, IPC read with Section 34, IPC, has been taken and summons have been directed to be issued against the accused-petitioners. 2. As both these criminal petitions have arisen out of the one and same order, which stands impugned, both these petitions have been heard, on the request made by the learned Counsel for the parties, together. 3. I have heard Mr. J. Roy, learned Counsel for the accused-petitioners, and Mr. T.J. Mahanta, learned Counsel for the complainant-opposite party. 4. The material facts, which have given rise to the present petitions, may, in brief, be set out as under: The complainant-opposite party herein lodged, on 11.9.2007, a complaint, which came to be registered as CR Case No. 784/2007, the case of the complainant being, briefly stated, thus. On the persuasion of Sri Mukesh Agarwalla, who is accused No. 3, the complainant obtained, on 15.3.2004, one vehicle with financial arrangement made by the company, whom the accused persons, named in the complaint, represent. Though the complainant had paid 18 installments, he failed to make payment of the remaining installments due to his ill-health. On the failure of the complainant to make payment of the installments, accused No. 4, namely, Sri Huda, came to the complainant's residence and forcibly took away the said vehicle. On .10.9.2007, the complainant went to the office of the accused No. 3, namely, Mukesh Agarwalla, but he was rebuked by the said accused and told not to come to their office again or else, he would face dire consequences. In the face of what accused have done, it is clear that the accused Nos. 3 and 4, namely, Sri Mukesh Agarwalla and Sri Huda, and the company respectively have committed offences punishable under Sections 403/420/426/491/387/506/120B, IPC and that the remaining accused Nos. 1 and 2, namely, Managing Director, Tata Motors, and Sri Robi Himmat Singhka respectively, are vicariously liable for what the accused Nos. 3 and 4 have done. 5. From the allegations made in the complaint, it becomes clear that the accuse Nos. 1 and 2, namely, Managing Director, Tata Motors, and Sri Robi Himmat Singhka respectively, are vicariously liable for what the accused Nos. 3 and 4 have done. 5. From the allegations made in the complaint, it becomes clear that the accuse Nos. 1 and 2 had been made accused in the complaint on the ground that they were vicariously liable for the acts done by their agents and servants, namely, accused Nos. 3 and 4. It is, in fact, not in dispute that the only allegation made against the accused Nos. 1 and 2, namely, Managing Director, Tata Motors and Sri Robi Himmat Singhka respectively, is to the effect that they are vicariously liable for what the accused Nos. 3 and 4 have done. 6. The question, therefore, which falls for determination is as to whether the accused No. 1, being the Managing Director of the Company concerned, and the accused No. 2, who is one of the functionaries of the said company, can be held to be vicariously liable for what the accused Nos. 3 and 4 have allegedly done. 7. It needs to be borne in mind that the Indian Penal Code does not contain any provisions, whereby vicarious liability can be attributed to a person on the ground that the person is Managing Director or a Director of a company, which has committed the offence. It is not in dispute that the loan was advanced to the complainant by a company, which has the business of financing. Law does not make, in the absence of anything else, a Managing Director or a Director responsible vicariously for the offences, which may have been committed by his company, nor does the law make a Managing Director or Director vicariously liable for offences, if any, which may have been committed by any of the employees or agents of the company unless the employee's or servant's acts or omissions, which constitute the offence, can be said to have been abetted by the Managing Director or the Director, as the case may be. If, however, the Managing Director or Director commits an offence for, and/or on behalf, of the company, he may be held personally liable along with the company. See S.K. Alagh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2008) 5 SCC 662 Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat and Ors. (2008) 5 SCC 668 . 8. If, however, the Managing Director or Director commits an offence for, and/or on behalf, of the company, he may be held personally liable along with the company. See S.K. Alagh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2008) 5 SCC 662 Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat and Ors. (2008) 5 SCC 668 . 8. To a pointed query made by this Court, nothing could be submitted, on behalf of the complainant-opposite party, to show as to how the present petitioners, who are Managing Director and a functionary of the company, in question, can be held vicariously liable for the offence, if any, which has been, as alleged by the complainant, committed by the accused Nos. 3 and 4. 9. In fact, the learned court below ought to have determined as to whether the allegations made in the complaint, even if assumed to be true, would lead to the conclusion that the present petitioners, as Managing Direction or Director of the company, in question, were personally liable for the offences, which have been committed by the accused Nos. 3 and 4. The learned court below, thus, completely failed to note that in the face of the allegations made in the complaint, no case has been made out against the present petitioners. 10. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, the impugned order, dated 28.2.2008 is, to the extent that the same directs issuance of summons against the present accused-petitioners, hereby set aside and quashed. 11. With the above observations and directions, both these criminal petitions stand disposed of.