Judgment :- A.S. Pachhapure, J. The appellants have challenged the dismissal of their W.P.No.26830 of 2002 (LR), praying to quash the order dated 28-6-2002 passed by the Land Tribunal, Nelamangala. 2. The facts relevant for the purpose of this appeal are as under: The appellants were the petitioners before the learned Single Judge and the claimants before the Land Tribunal, Nelamangala, for grant of occupancy rights of the land bearing Sy.No.125, measuring 1 acre 34 guntas of Nelamangala Village. It is the case of the appellants that the deceased N.C. Gangaraju and N.A. Ramaiah i.e., the predecessors of the appellants were cultivating the above said land as tenants prior to 1960. The land in dispute was an inam land attached to the Village Office of Talwar. The predecessors of respondents 3 to 10 herein were the inam holders. After the advent of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “KVOA Act” for short) with effect from 1-2-1963, the land stated above stood vested with the Government and the inam holders were given right to seek the very grant. During the pendency of the application in Form 7, filed by the deceased N.C. Gangaraju and N.A. Ramaiah i.e., the predecessors of the appellants in Form 7 in Case No. LRF (N)9 23/1975-76, the Tahsildar, Nelamangala, initiated the proceedings to evict the appellants from the land in question under Section 7(1) of the KVOA Act and passed an order dated 14-7-1999 in Case Nos.13/1978-79 and 195/1970-71 despite the fact that the claim of the appellants for grant of occupancy rights was pending before the Tribunal. The order of the Tahsildar was challenged by the appellants in W.P.No. 224746 of 1999 and this Court vide Order dated 18-1-2000 directed the Tahsildar to find out whether the appellants have filed an application in Form 7 before the Land Tribunal and if Form 7 was pending before the Tribunal, the Tahsildar was directed not to give effect to the order of eviction. In view of the abolition of the village offices, the holders of the, were entitled to regrant of the land and accordingly, the predecessor', the holders of the office submitted an application to the Tahsildar, Nelamangala in Case Nos. HOACR.13/78-79 and HOACR.195/70 and the applications were considered and the lands were regranted to the legal heirs of the office holders vide order dated 23-8-1985. HOACR.13/78-79 and HOACR.195/70 and the applications were considered and the lands were regranted to the legal heirs of the office holders vide order dated 23-8-1985. It is the claim of the appellants that their predecessors i.e., deceased N.C. Gangaraju and N.A. Ramaiah were cultivating the lands in dispute lawfully prior to 1960 and continued to be in occupation of the said lands as tenants as on 1-2-1963 i.e., after the abolition of the village office and therefore, claimed the occupancy rights before the Land Tribunal by submitting Form 7. The enquiry was held by the Land Tribunal and vide orders dated 28-6-2002 rejected Form 7 of the appellants and aggrieved by the said order, the appellants filed the writ petition before this Court and the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petition holding that the appellants were not lawful tenant as on 1-2-1963 and in the circumstances, dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved by the dismissal, the appellants have approached this Court in appeal. Respondents 3 to 10 have filed their objection statement and it is their specific allegation that the predecessors of the appellants were not the tenants of the disputed land and that they have created false and fictitious documents showing their names in the record of rights and that they are not the lawful tenants as on 1-2-1963. So far as the production of the record of rights from 1960-65 with an application before this Court, it is their contention that the said documents are fabricated and they are not challenged. They claimed that the appellants have no right to seek production of the documents for the first time in this appeal. It is also the contention that they are in continuous possession of the property as inamdars and that the land was regranted in their name and as the appellants are not the lawful tenants, they contend that the Tribunal and also the learned Single Judge of this Court have rightly rejected the request of the appellants for grant of occupancy rights as ordered by the Tribunal and confirmed in the writ petition. On these grounds, they have sought for dismissal of the appeal. 3. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellants, learned Additional Government Pleader for respondents 1 and 2 and the learned Counsel for the remaining respondents. 4. The points that arise for our consideration are: 1. On these grounds, they have sought for dismissal of the appeal. 3. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellants, learned Additional Government Pleader for respondents 1 and 2 and the learned Counsel for the remaining respondents. 4. The points that arise for our consideration are: 1. Whether the rejection of Form 7 by the Land Tribunal and the dismissal of the writ petition by the learned Single Judge is legal and valid? 2. Whether production of the documents has to be permitted? 5. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants that the land in dispute is an inam land attached to the office of Talwar of Nelamangala Village. One Chikkanna, S/o. Anjanappa and Thimmakka, W/o. Thimma Hanumaiah and Thirumalaiah, S/o. Dasappa are the legal heirs of the holders of the office of Talwar and that they had filed an application for regrant of the land and their application came to be allowed by the Tahsildar. It is his contention that the predecessors of the appellants were cultivating the land as tenants much prior to 1960 and that they were in lawful possession of the land all along and in the circumstances, they filed Form 7 after the amendment to the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "KLR Act” for short) which came into effect from 1-3-1974 and that their rights of tenancy have been saved under Section 8 of the KVOA Act and so also under Section 126 of the KLR Act and therefore, it is their contention that as the predecessors of the appellants were in occupation of the property as tenants as on 1-2-1963 were entitled to the grant of occupancy rights. The learned Counsel submits that the names of their predecessors and the appellants continued in the record of rights since from the year 1960 onwards and that there is a presumption under Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 with regard to the entries made in the record of rights and therefore, he submits that the Tribunal and also the learned Single Judge did not consider the said presumption and thereby passed the impugned orders erroneously, overlooking the presumption raised. It is also the contention of the learned Counsel that though the land was regranted to the legal heirs of the village office in the year 1985, the said order relates back to the date of their application and that during the pendency of the proceedings for regrant, the tenancy rights continued and in view of the fact that the order of regrant relates back to their application and the tenancy of the appellants was protected and therefore, he submits that in view of the provisions of Section 8 of the KVOA Act and Section 126 of the KLR Act the appellants were entitled to the occupancy rights. On these grounds, he has sought for setting aside the impugned orders. .6. Per contra, the learned Counsel for respondents 3 to 10 submits that the appellants have made a false claim of tenancy and have produced the fabricated documents and they cannot be relied upon to hold that they are the occupants of the property as tenants. It is also his contention that apart from the record of rights, no other documents have been produced to prove the lease or the tenancy and in the circumstances, he has sought for dismissal of the application for production of the documents and also the appeal. It is further contended by the learned Counsel that the Tribunal rightly considered the fact that the predecessors of the appellants were not the tenants as on 1-2-1963 after the KVOA Act and they were not lawful tenants and as the land was not regranted as on 1-3-1974, the appellants have no right to claim the grant of occupancy rights. 7. The learned Additional Government Pleader, supports the order of the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge. 8. We have scrutinised the claims and the documents produced s context of the submissions made by both the learned Counsel and learned Additional Government Advocate. As could be seen from the observations made by the Land Tribunal in its order, the appellants had produced the record_ of rights for the year 1960. 8. We have scrutinised the claims and the documents produced s context of the submissions made by both the learned Counsel and learned Additional Government Advocate. As could be seen from the observations made by the Land Tribunal in its order, the appellants had produced the record_ of rights for the year 1960. They did not produce any documents or the record of rights for the subsequent years and in the circumstances, the Tribunal was of the opinion that no material was placed before it by the claimants to prove that they are the tenants of the disputed lands as on 1-2-1963 and it also held that in view of the abolition of the village offices, the land vested with the Government and the tenants have no right to claim occupancy rights, which was vested with the Government much prior to coming into force of the amended KLR Act, which provided the grant of occupancy rights to the tenants. The order of the Tribunal was challenged before the Appellate Authority and there was an order of injunction during the pendency of the appeal and in view of abolition of the Appellate Authorities, the writ petition was filed before this Court. The perusal of the order of the learned Single Judge also reveals that the appellants have failed to prove the lawful tenancy as on 1-2-1963 and as the land vested with the Government from 1-2-1963 till 1985 and as the Government has the owner, it was held that the application for grant of occupancy rights under the KLR Act was untenable. The learned Single Judge was also of the opinion that if the regrant was made prior to the advent of the KLR (Amendment) Act, 1974, the claim for grant of occupancy rights could have been valid one for consideration under the KLR Act. It is solely on these grounds that the writ petition came to be rejected by the learned Single Judge. 9. It is solely on these grounds that the writ petition came to be rejected by the learned Single Judge. 9. Before considering the rival contentions of the parties, we think it is just and proper to refer to the provisions of Section 8 of the KVOA Act, which reads as under: "Application of tenancy law.—If any land granted or continued in respect of or annexed to a village office by the State has been lawfully leased and such lease is subsisting on the appointed date, the provisions of the tenancy law for the time being in force in the area in which the land is situate, shall apply to the said lease and the rights and liabilities of the person to whom such land is granted under Section 5, 6 or 7 and his tenant or tenants shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be governed by the provisions of the said tenancy law. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the expression "land” shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in the tenancy law referred to above”. The perusal of Section 8 of the above provision reveals that if any land granted or continued in respect of or annexed to a village office by the State has been lawfully leased and such lease was subsisting on the appointed date (1-2-1963), the provisions of the tenancy law for the time being in force in the area in which the land is situate, shall apply to the said lease. At this juncture, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 5 of the Mysore Village Offices Abolition Act, 1908 which did not prohibit the leases of service inam lands, when such lease was neither permanent nor for a long period and was not a `transfer' which is prohibited by Section 5 of the said Act. So, in view of the above said provision, if the appellants are successful in establishing that there was a lawful subsisting lease on the appointed date, the appellants are entitled to the grant of occupancy rights. So, in view of the above said provision, if the appellants are successful in establishing that there was a lawful subsisting lease on the appointed date, the appellants are entitled to the grant of occupancy rights. Furthermore, we feel it just and proper to refer to the provisions of Section 126 of the KLR Act, which reads as under: "Application of Act to inams.—For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the provisions of this Act insofar as they confer any rights and impose obligations on tenants and landlords shall be applicable to tenants holding lands in inam and other alienated villages or lands (including tenants referred to in Section 8 of the Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 but subject to the provisions of the said Act) and to landlords and inamdar holding in such villages or lands". By this provision, it was declared that the provisions of this Act insofar as they confer any rights and impose obligations on tenants and landlords shall be applicable to tenants holding lands in inam and other alienated villages or lands (including tenants referred to in Section 8 of the Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 but subject to the provisions of the said Act). The italicised portion in the above provision was inserted by Act No.1 of 1979, with effect from 1-1-1979, thereby even in respect of lands which fall within the category of Section 8 of the KVOA Act, the provisions of the KLR Act were also made applicable and thereby if the appellants are successful in proving that they are the occupants of the lands as lawful tenants are entitled to the grant of occupancy rights. 10. In view of the said provisions, now it is relevant for us to take into consideration the decisions referred to by the learned Counsel for respondents 3 to 10. In the decision in Shidramappa Bheemappa Asangi and Others v State of Karnataka and Others ILR 2001 Kar. 5072 (DB), the Division Bench of this Court taking into consideration the abolition of the village offices by the KVOA Act stated that the lands attached to Watan or Village Office which were always the property of the Government reverted back to the Government with effect from 1-2-1963 and the Watandars ceased to have any right or interest in them and have no authority to transfer any right or interest in Watan lands. Further the facts disclose that the Watandars executed a lease deed in favour of the tenants on 9-2-1970 and it was held that Watandars had no right, title and interest in Watan lands after they were resumed on 1-2-1963 and the tenant in possession of such lands could not claim occupancy rights in terms of Section 45 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act because he was not in lawful possession. The perusal of the facts reveal the creation of the tenancy after 1-2-1963 and it is in this context that this Court held that it was unlawful lease. As the Watandars had leased the right, title and interest in the lands after the resumption and their rights were under suspension till the regrant was made. As could be seen from the facts on hand, it is the claim of the appellants that they were tenants much prior to 1-2-1963 and in fact they produced record of rights for the year 1960 before the Land Tribunal and even for the period subsequent to 1965, which would go to show that the predecessors of the appellants were in occupation of the land much prior to the date of the abolition of the village offices. If once the entry of the name of the predecessors of the appellants is presumed to be genuine under Section 133 of the KLR Act and as there was no prohibition of a lease prior to 1-2-1963, it could be said that they were in lawful possession of the property as tenants and the principles laid down in the decision referred to supra do not apply to the facts on hand. The learned Counsel also relied upon the decision of this Court in Bore Gowda v Rama Naik (dead) by L.Rs 1973(1) Mys. The learned Counsel also relied upon the decision of this Court in Bore Gowda v Rama Naik (dead) by L.Rs 1973(1) Mys. L.J. 89 (DB), wherein this Court took into consideration the provisions of Section 8 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act and in a case where a lease is held by the holder of office to a tenancy which was subsisting on the date of resumption of the land by the Government, it was held that the case falls under the first part of Section 8 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act and the lease is governed by the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and the relationship of landlord and tenant created by the lease and the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto continue to remain subject to the provisions of the tenancy law till the land is regranted. This Court further held that the application filed under Section 42 and the statement filed under Section 14(1) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act by the landlord would be maintainable. It is necessary to observe here that the application was filed by the landlord for recovery of the rent pertaining to the tenanted land. The perusal of the principles laid down in fact very much support the appellants as this Court held that the tenancy continues despite the abolition of the village offices. So also, as could be seen from the decision of this Court in Mariyappa v Land Tribunal, Mandya and Others 1978(1) Kar. L.J. 418. Considering the provisions of Sections 141 and 126 of the KLR Act, it has been held that the persons in occupation of the land will have to get their rights worked out only under those Acts and not under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act and the tenants and inferior holders though cultivating inam lands covered by the aforesaid enactments, will be entitled to seek appropriate reliefs under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. It is further held: "The main object with which the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act was brought into force was to abolish hereditary rights to village offices and the emoluments appertaining to such offices. This Act, unlike other Inams Abolition Acts, does not provide for conferment of ownership or occupancy rights in favour of tenants and other inferior holders. It is further held: "The main object with which the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act was brought into force was to abolish hereditary rights to village offices and the emoluments appertaining to such offices. This Act, unlike other Inams Abolition Acts, does not provide for conferment of ownership or occupancy rights in favour of tenants and other inferior holders. On the other hand, that Act envisages the continuation of such leases, if any, existing on the date of vesting. The relationship between the regrantees and their tenants would be governed by the existing tenancy laws”. The fact that the relationship between regrantee and their tenants were governed by the existing tenancy laws would clearly support the version of the appellants as they have sought for occupancy rights under the KLR (Amendment) Act, 1974. So, as could be seen from the decision referred to above, they do not favour the respondent, in case if the appellants were able to prove the lawful tenancy prior to 1-2-1963 and continued as tenants of the said property as on 1-3-1974, the date when the KLR (Amendment) Act came into force, they are entitled to the occupancy rights and Form 7 is filed by them and at the most could be kept pending till the Order of regrant were made by the Tahsildar in the year 1985. It is further necessary to mention here that the year of regrant relates back to the date of the application of the legal representatives of the office holder and as the tenancy is created earlier to 1-2-1963, there is no bar for the appellants to claim the occupancy rights. 11. It is in this context, we have to look into the documents produced by the appellants, both before the Tribunal and also in this Court. The appellants have produced the records regarding the cultivation of the land for the year 1960 onwards but did not produce any material to show as the cultivation as on 1-2-1963. Furthermore, an application before this Court is filed and the record of rights for the years 1960-61 to 1964-65 reveal the names of the predecessors of the appellants in the column pertaining to the cultivation on lease basis. Furthermore, an application before this Court is filed and the record of rights for the years 1960-61 to 1964-65 reveal the names of the predecessors of the appellants in the column pertaining to the cultivation on lease basis. When the appellants had produced the record of rights for the year 1960-61, before the Land Tribunal and so also, for the year 1964-65, an inference could be drawn regarding continuation of their name in the record of rights unless the respondents had produced the record of rights to show that their names were there in the cultivator's column of the property register. But, it is relevant to note that the appellants have produced the records for the year 1960-61 and even thereafter their names appear in the cultivator's columns as on 1-3-1974 and in view of the fact that subsequently the land has been regranted to the legal representatives of the village office holders, if the provisions of Section 8 of the KVOA Act and Section 126 of the KLR Act is taken into consideration, the appellants in fact are entitled to the grant of occupancy rights and their application in Form 7 has to be considered. But, this effort has to be made by the Land Tribunal after taking into consideration the documents produced in this Court and by giving an opportunity to both the parties to lead the evidence and to take an appropriate decision in the matter, in accordance with law. In view of the fact that the appellants did not produce the record of rights from 1960 to 1965 in the writ petition before the learned Single Judge, a conclusion was arrived holding that no material has been placed on record to prove the lawful tenancy as on 1-2-1963 and therefore, dismissed the petition. In view of the fact that the appellants have produced the record of rights and also taking into consideration that the regrant order relates back to the date of the application, the Tribunal ought to have taken into consideration the grant of occupancy rights. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the order of the Tribunal and also that of the learned Single Judge are erroneous and liable to be quashed. Hence, we answer Point No.1 in negative and Point No.2 in affirmative and proceed to pass the following: Order The appeal is allowed. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the order of the Tribunal and also that of the learned Single Judge are erroneous and liable to be quashed. Hence, we answer Point No.1 in negative and Point No.2 in affirmative and proceed to pass the following: Order The appeal is allowed. The order of the Land Tribunal bearing No. LRF(N)9 23/1975-76, dated 28-6-2002 and that of the order of the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.26830 of 2002 (LR) are set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Land Tribunal to consider the grant of occupancy rights to the appellants in the context of the observations made above and the documents produced in the appeal and to dispose of the same in accordance with law.