Judgment K.Kannan, J. 1. By the impugned award of the Labour Court dated 9.11.1996 three workmen working in the Bata India had been terminated from service. The award was a confirmation of the decision of the Management to terminate the service on alleged proof of misconduct following a domestic enquiry. The charge against the workmen was that they had stopped a Vehicle going towards the factory, dragged out of the vehicle two of the fellow workmen with a view to prevent them from going into the factory and when they resisted, they were severely assaulted with lathi causing head injuries. 2. When the Management had, after obtaining a finding of proof of misconduct by the workmen, decided to dismiss the workmen form service, the workmen had sought for a reference to the Labour Court, which held that the enquiry had been conducted in a fair and proper manner and while adverting to the evidence let in before the Court held that the workmen were not entitled to any favourable consideration and affirmed the decision taken by the Management. The case also had an earlier history viz., when the Management had taken a decision to terminate their services and applied to the Labour Court for permission under Section 33(2) (b) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in view of the pendency of some dispute in relation of the workmen, originally the permission had been refused by the Labour Court. This was challenged by the Management through a writ petition. Among the objections that had been taken by the workmen were, inter alia that the person who framed the charge sheet was not empowered to do so, he being not the competent authority himself. The Labour Court found that there was not proof for such a contention and also held that the order of dismissal had been passed only by the competent authority and no prejudice had been shown even if it were to be extended that the charge sheet had been framed by a person who was not the authority. The decision of the High Court was also affirmed in S.L.P. before the Honble Supreme Court. 3. The decision of the High Court was also affirmed in S.L.P. before the Honble Supreme Court. 3. The Validity of the award and the validity of the decision of the Management to terminate the service have been challenged on the following grounds : i) the charge sheet had not been framed by person who was competent to do so and therefore the entire proceeding before the enquiry officer was vitiated. ii) At the initial stage when the alleged incident was reported to the police the names of some other workmen had not been set out in the F.I.R. and even the criminal case that was prosecuted on the basis of the F.I.R. narrating the alleged incident resulted in acquittal. The contention was therefore that the case had not been made out; iii) The misconduct attributed to the workman was a incident outside the factory and the Housing colony of persons working with the Company and therefore it could not be taken as falling within enumerated misconduct in the standing orders; iv) the Labour Court had not exercised the powers under Section 11-A of the industrial Disputes Act and the punishment of the dismissal was grossly disproportionate to the incident; iv) The workmen had also not been granted monetary benefits which were entitled to. 4. Since the reference was on the punishment meted out to the workman after a domestic enquiry, the first point that fell for consideration before the Labour Court was whether the enquiry had been fair and proper. It had held that the workmen had been granted sufficient opportunity to defend themselves. The Labour Court upheld the fairness of the enquiry vide order dated 25.1.1995 and thereafter the parties were given opportunity to lead their evidence on other issues. The Management had examined a witness to introduce the enquiry report into the evidence and all the three workmen had examined themselves. No procedural irregularly relating to the fairness of the enquiry was made out and nothing is shown before me from out of the enquiry officers report to doubt the fairness of property of the enquiry. The labour Court therefore examined the finding of the enquiry officer within the parameters of what the Labour Court could do relating to the examination of evidence of the witness under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. The labour Court therefore examined the finding of the enquiry officer within the parameters of what the Labour Court could do relating to the examination of evidence of the witness under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. On the first contention that the charge sheet had been issued by a person who was not competent to issue the same, the contention was that the charge sheet could be levied only by personnel Welfare officer but had been issued by some other officer who was not competent to do so. The copy of the standing order which had been produced refers to an amended clause Section 23-C which set out the procedure that if any workman was charged with the offence under the rules, except the case lateness and absenteeism, shall receive a copy of the charge and in all cases will receive an opportunity of offering his explanation. Learned counsel refers to a decision in Palghat B.P.L. & PSP Thozhilali Union v. B.P.L. India Ltd. and another, 1995 (6) S.L.R. 22, to contend that if the standing order had provided for a particular officer to levy a charge sheet, a person below the rank of such a person was not competent to issue the charge sheet. It does not specify any particular officer as alone competent to issue charge sheet. I have referred to the fact that the standing orders as mentioned does not prescribe any one particular officer as the person competent to issue the charge sheet. If there was no specific officer who has been empowered under the standing orders, unless a prejudice is shown for a particular officer who issued the charge sheet, the workmen cannot contend the entire proceeding was vitiated by the fact that the appointing authority did not issue the charge sheet. As a matter of fact, the issue of prejudice was considered even at the time when in the earlier round of litigation this Honble Court rejected the plea of the workman that the charge sheet had not been framed by a competent person. It examined this issue from the point of view of whether there existed any prejudice to the workmen and ultimately held that no prejudice was established. It examined this issue from the point of view of whether there existed any prejudice to the workmen and ultimately held that no prejudice was established. Though it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the finding of this Honble Court in the writ petition relating to the validity of the charge sheet would constitute res judicata against the petitioner, I find that there is no specific finding relating to the validity of the charge sheet. However, I reject the contention of the petitioner on a fresh consideration that there is no one single authority named under the standing orders for issuing the charge sheet and also on account of the fact that there existed no prejudice against the workmen. 6. On the issue that the workmens names were not found in the F.I.R. and that the criminal Court judgment acquitted them, it must be pointed out that the judgment of a criminal court in relation to an incident is irrelevant unless the charge sheet itself makes the criminal court judgment as the basis for action. It is too well established a principle that the criminal proceedings and domestic enquiry operate in different fields and the judgment of a criminal court is irrelevant for any purpose except to the extent that in relation to the very same incident there was also a criminal case. The result of the criminal court judgment therefore acquitting the petitioners will be no consequence and cannot impair a objective decision that a domestic enquiry officer is competent to take and the decision making powers of the Labour court, cannot be influenced by any finding of a criminal Court. 7. The major thrust of the argument by the learned counsel for the petitioner was only that the incident had taken place outside the factory and it did not amount to misconduct as delineated in the standing orders. Referring to misconduct as defined in the standing order learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that clause 23-A (X) the misconduct that could result in the punishment as under; "Alone or in combination with others, anywhere within the factory and/or colonies or threatening to cause mental and/or physical pain or injury to other employees and/or workmen." 8. Referring to misconduct as defined in the standing order learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that clause 23-A (X) the misconduct that could result in the punishment as under; "Alone or in combination with others, anywhere within the factory and/or colonies or threatening to cause mental and/or physical pain or injury to other employees and/or workmen." 8. The contention was even the charge sheet referred to the incident as having taken place at in the following issues :- "It is reported that on 28.1.1978 at about 7.15 a.m. you in combination with Messrs Karan Singh C. No. 1501, Ram Kishore C. No. 01626, Ganpat Ram C. No. 00844 and Milap Chand C. No. 00182 with some other persons forced the Land rover vehicle in which Messrs Beli Ram C. No. 00543 and Mahabir Singh C. No. 01432 (both workman of the factory) along with some other persons were coming to the factory, to stop near South Western corner of Bate `A Colony of Udyog Marg, dragged Messrs Beli Ram and Mahabir singh out of the land rover and shouted at them not to proceed to factory for duty." 9. According to him, the south west of Bata `A Colony did not mean within the colony but it was outside the colony Learned counsel also refers to evidence elicited in the cross examination of a management witness that the incident took place in a thoroughfare where all public had right of access which was not under the control of the company. According to the learned counsel this meant that the accident was not within the factory nor within the colonly both of which were under the control of the company. 10. In support of the contention that the misconduct outside the factory in a private feud between the workmen outside the factory cannot afford the basis for punishment, learned counsel for the petitioner refers to a decision of the Honble Supreme Court in M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding officer, Labour Court, Meerut and others, reported in AIR 1984 S.C. 505, that held that a misconduct must have causal connection within the place of work and duty hours and the employer shall have no locus standi under the standing orders to complain of misconduct for accident that took place outside the factory it expanded in the following words. :- "Numerous acts of misconduct such as drunkenness, fighting indecent or disorderly be behaviour, use of abusive language, wrongfully interfering with the work of other employees etc. are not per se misconduct. Each one of them have correlation. Such acts of misconduct would be misconduct punishable only if committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity there of. What constitutes establishment or its vicinity would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To enable an employer to peaceful carry on his industrial activity the Act confers powers on him to prescribe conditions of service including anumerating acts of misconduct when committed within the premises of the establishment. The employers has hardly any extra territorial jurisdiction. He is not the coustodian of general law and order situation nor the Guru or mentor of his workmen for there well regulated cultural advancement. If the power to regulate the behaviour of the workmen out side the duty hours and at any place wherever they may be was conferred upon the employer, contract of service may be reduce to contract slavery." 11. Learned counsel appearing for the Management would contend that the incident relating to the misconduct did not take place within the factory or the colony was nowhere urged in the pleadings or in the evidence. Even the written argument submitted before the Labour court did not make a specific reference to the incident as having taken place outside the colony to be disregarded for proof of misconduct. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, even if it were assumed that it was outside the factory if the incident had taken place when the victims of the petitioner-assailants misconduct were proceeding towards the factory and when the petitioners attempted to stop them form going to the factory, this incident had immediate casual connection to industrial disputes and the definition of misconduct in their standing order must be so read as to include that even an act done immediately outside the factory had a bearing to the industrial discipline at the factory and hence actionable. He relied on a decision in Mulchandani Electrical and Radio Industries Ltd. v. The workmen reported in (1975) 4 S.C.C. 731. He relied on a decision in Mulchandani Electrical and Radio Industries Ltd. v. The workmen reported in (1975) 4 S.C.C. 731. Learned counsel referred to similar provisions that was dealt with in the decision in the following words :- " The following acts and omissions on the part of a workman shall amount to misconduct. (1) Commission of any act subversive of discipline or good behaviour within the premises or precincts of the establishment. XX XX XX XX In our opinion, on a plain reading of the clause, the words within the premises or precincts of the establishment refer not to the place where the act which is subversive of discipline or good behaviour is committed but where the consequence of such an act manifests itself. In other words, an act, wherever committed, if it has the effect of subverting discipline or good behaviour within the premises or precincts of the establishment, will amount of misconduct under Standing order 24(1) We are unable to agree that Standing Order 24(1) leaves out of its scope an act committed outside though it may result in subversion of discipline or good behaviour within the premises or precincts of the establishment in question. Such a construction in our view would be quite unreasonable." 12. The decision was affirmed subsequently also in Lalla Ram v. DCM Chemical Works Limited and another, reported in 1978 3 S.C.C. 1. The judgment said though it is true that private quarrel between an employee and a stranger with which the employer is not concerned falls outside the categories of misconduct. It cannot be reasonably disputed that acts which are subversive of discipline amongst employees or misconduct or misbehavior by an employee which is directed against another employee of the concern may in certain circumstances constitute misconduct so as to form the basis of an order of dismissal or discharge. It cannot also be disputed that the extent of jurisdiction exercisable by an approving authority under Section 33-2 (b) of the Act is very limited as has been clearly and succinctly pointed out. 13. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court has also held in C. Narayanan v. BPL Systems and Projects Ltd., Reported in 1994 Lab. It cannot also be disputed that the extent of jurisdiction exercisable by an approving authority under Section 33-2 (b) of the Act is very limited as has been clearly and succinctly pointed out. 13. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court has also held in C. Narayanan v. BPL Systems and Projects Ltd., Reported in 1994 Lab. I.C. 1345, that striking workers assaulting the managerial staff on who were leading the non- striking workers into the factory outside the factory premises ought to know that the act had definite linkage employment and dismissal by punishment was when such misconduct was proved proper. 14. The attempt of the petitioner stating that the incident did not take place within the precincts of the factory or colony seems to be really an after thought for there are no sufficient pleadings of evidence to lead to such an inference. Even the statement of a management witness that the incident took place where the management did not have control cannot be taken out of context. It should be only understood as a statement by witness that it was not in the factory premises. In any event it cannot be denied that the Management was entitled to except of their workmen and if any event it cannot be denied that the incident had a direct linkage to the industrial discipline that the Management was entitled to except of their workmen and if any of the co-workers had been assaulted while proceeding towards the factory and to prevent them from going to the factory, it was definitely a misconduct as explained in several decision of the Supreme Court and other High Courts. In my view the act constitutes a misconduct within the definition of the standing orders. 15. The contention of the learned counsel that the enquiry officer had not taken into consideration Section 11-A in awarding punishment is equally untenable. The Labour has not stated in so many words that it was rejecting the prayer for reinstatement by consideration of the powers under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 . However, I find that it was application of the principles laid down under Section 11-A that governed the decision making of the Labour Court. The Labour has not stated in so many words that it was rejecting the prayer for reinstatement by consideration of the powers under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 . However, I find that it was application of the principles laid down under Section 11-A that governed the decision making of the Labour Court. It has been also laid down in Mahendra Nissan Allwyns Ltd. v. M.P. Siddappa and another, reported in 2000(2) S.C.T. 207 : 1999 Supreme Court (L&S) 1067 BU, that conduct of a workman threatening and abusing the officer in filthy language was a serious misconduct and punishment of removal from service was not disproportionate of the proved charge. The misconduct was serious enough to justify the minor punishment of dismissal from service. 16. The last plea on behalf of the workmen was that they had not paid some benefits which had accrued as such as unpaid salary and leave encashment. There are no details available in the writ petition and it is not possible to accommodate such pleas on mere vague contentions. If ever there is any amount which is still remaining and payable to the workmen the Management shall not drive the workmen to any independent action. If a representation is made with definite details of salary and allowances that had accrued and which amount had not been release any payments if they are justifiably due. However, I give no specific directions in that regard in the absence of details. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.