Judgment : Animadverting upon the judgment dated 33. 2006 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vellore, in Crl.A.No.91 of 2005 confirming the judgment dated 26. 2005 passed by the Judicial Magistrate No.III, Thiruppathur, Vellore District, in C.C.No.96 of 2004 this criminal revision case is focussed. 2. The long and short, and the epitome of the relevant facts, which are absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this criminal revision case, would run thus: .(a) The police laid the police report in terms of Section 173 of Cr.P.C. as against the accused for the offence under Sections 279, 338 and 304(A) of I.P.C. Since the accused pleaded not guilty, trial was conducted. .(b) During trial, on the side of the prosecution as many as twelve witnesses were examined as P.W.1 to P.W.12 and Exs.P1 to P8 were marked. On the accuseds side no oral or documentary evidence was adduced. .(c) Ultimately, the trial Court recorded the conviction and imposed the following sentences: Table 3. Challenging and impugning the judgments of both the Courts below, this revision is focussed on various grounds, the warp and woof of them would run thus: Both the Courts below failed to consider objectively the evidence of P.W.2. On seeing P.W.2 and his father, suddenly the driver applied the break of the vehicle and because of that, the said minidoor lorry capsized and as such, the driver of it was not at fault. However, the sentence imposed on the accused is on the higher side. 4. The point for consideration is as to whether there is any perversity or non-application of law on the part of both the Courts below in recording the conviction and imposing the sentence. 5. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner, reiterating the grounds of revision would develop his argument to the effect that the very sketch drawn by the I.O. is far from satisfactory and it does not reflect the reality and in fact it is quite antithetical to the version given by P.W.2, who along with his father, all of a sudden, attempted to stop the minidoor lorry, so as to go to the town area, as there was no bus facility, and in that process, they came across the minidoor lorry and thereby they only invited the accident on themselves. 6. 6. A bare perusal of the records including the judgements of both the Courts below would exemplify and demonstrate that P.W.2 is an injured by himself and he cogently and convincingly narrated the incident as to how it happened. According to him, the driver of the minidoor lorry drove the said offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and made that vehicle to fall on them. He would also specifically narrate and detail that they were standing only in the place where the buses were normally to be stopped and he described it as bus stop only. Wherefore it could rightly be understood and inferred that the driver of the offending vehicle was rash and negligent in driving it, as at the bus stop area he ought not to have driven the vehicle in such a manner, so as to get capsized the very vehicle itself and make it to fall on the by-standers, namely, P.W.2 and his father. Hence, I could see no infirmity or illegality, impropriety or perversity in the findings given by both the Courts below. 7. At this juncture, my mind his reminiscent and redolent of the following decisions of the Honourable Apex Court: (i) 2002 Supreme court cases (crl) 1448 -Bindeshwari Prasad Singh alias B.P.Singh and Others vs. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) and another; an excerpt from it would run thus: "13. The instant case is not one where any such illegality was committed by the trial court. In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not reappreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted. 14. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction at the instance of the informant. It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from that of the trial court. 14. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction at the instance of the informant. It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from that of the trial court. But that by itself is no justification for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a judgment of acquittal. We cannot say that the judgment of the trial court in the instant case was perverse. No defect of procedure has been pointed out. There was also no improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial vitiating the trial itself. (ii) 2005 Supreme Court Cases (cri) 276 – Sathyajit Banerjee and Others vs. State of W.B.and others, an excerpt from it would run thus: "22. The cases cited by the learned counsel show the settled legal position that the revisional jurisdiction, at the instance of the complainant, has to be exercised by the High Court only in very exceptional cases where the High Court finds defect of procedure or manifest error of law resulting in flagrant miscarriage of justice." 8. A bare perusal of those decisions would exemplify and demonstrate that the High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction is not expected to interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by both the Courts below simply because one other view is possible or a different view could be taken. 9. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would implore and entreat that awarding of three months Rigourous Imprisonment, together with fine, is a harsh punishment and that sentence of imprisonment may be replaced by heavy fine. 10. At this stage, I call up and recollect the following decision of the Honourable Apex Court: (I) 2002(2) Supreme 500 – State of Karnataka Vs. Sharanappa Basnagouda Aregoudar, an excerpt from it would run thus: "6. We are of the view that having regard to the serious nature of the accident, which resulted in the death of four persons, the learned Single Judge should not have interfered with the sentence imposed by the Court below. Sharanappa Basnagouda Aregoudar, an excerpt from it would run thus: "6. We are of the view that having regard to the serious nature of the accident, which resulted in the death of four persons, the learned Single Judge should not have interfered with the sentence imposed by the Court below. It may create and set an unhealthy precedent and send wrong signals to the subordinate courts which have to deal with several such accident cases. If the accused are found guilty of rash and negligent driving, courts have to be on guard to ensure that they do not escape the clutches of law very lightly. The sentence imposed by the courts should have deterrent effect on potential wrong-doers and it should commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. Of course, the Courts are given discretion in the matter of sentence to take stock of the wide and varying range of facts that might be relevant for fixing the quantum of sentence, but the discretion shall be exercised with due regard to larger interest of the society and it is needless to add that passing of sentence on the offender is probably the most public face of the criminal justice system." 11. A bare perusal of those decisions would clearly exemplify that at least imprisonment of three months should be imposed and that alone the Courts below adhered to. In my opinion, there is no mitigating circumstance also, in view of the discussion supra. However, the rigourous imprisonment of three months imposed for the offence under Section 304-A IPC can be converted into simple imprisonment and accordingly, it is converted. In respect of other portion of the sentence, as well as the findings, no interference is warranted. The criminal revision case is ordered accordingly.