Judgment :- (1) The petitioners in this writ petition dated September 5, 2008 are questioning the order of the hearing officer of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation dated July 8, 2008 at p. 122 fixing the annual value of the property in question. (2) The Corporation is the owner of the property, a plot of land measuring 5.59 acres. It is recorded in the Corporations assessment records as Premises No. 8, J.B.S. Halden Avenue, Kolkata-700 046. The Corporation wanted to lease it out, and at the public auction concerned the first petitioner participated and emerged as the highest bidder. It was leased to the first petitioner under an agreement dated August 19, 2007, The first petitioner paid the Corporation Rs. 155,45,79,000 bid money. The land was leased for 99 years for setting up of a hotel. When the first petitioner was making arrangements for setting up of the hotel, the Corporation issued a hearing notice dated October 12, 2007 under subsections (3) and (4) of Section 184 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 stating that the premises had been assessed by it at an annual value of Rs. 10,88,20,530 with effect from 3/2007-08. (3) The first petitioner was given an opportunity to file its objection, if any, to the valuation. In view of the provisions of Section 186 of the Kolkata Municipai Corporation Act, 1980 the first petitioner, as the person liable to pay tax, was entitled to submit its objection to the annual valuation proposed by the Corporation under Section 174 of the Act. The first petitioner submitted a petition to the Municipal Commissioner on October 12, 2007 praying for adjournment of hearing. The matter was to go to the hearing officer after objection in terms of the provisions of Section 186 was filed by the first petitioner. But the matter was taken up by the hearing officer on October 13, 2007 and considering the first petitioners adjournment application dated October 12, 2007 he adjourned hearing until December 7, 2007, this is apparent from the order of the hearing officer dated October 13, 2007 at p. 104. But the matter was taken up by the hearing officer on October 13, 2007 and considering the first petitioners adjournment application dated October 12, 2007 he adjourned hearing until December 7, 2007, this is apparent from the order of the hearing officer dated October 13, 2007 at p. 104. (4) The case of the petitioners is that in exercise of its right available under the Right to Information Act, 2005 the first petitioner submitted requisite application to the Corporation seeking relevant information that it intended to use as evidence in support of its case before the hearing officer; that the information officer of the Corporation having not supplied the wanted information, it was compelled to submit its objection dated March 4, 2008 at p. 90 and further objection dated April 8, 2008 at p.96 to the annual valuation proposed by the Corporation in the hearing notice dated October 12, 2007. It appears from the order of the hearing officer dated April 8, 2008 at p. 105 that the first petitioners objection dated March 4, 2008 was entertained by him and kept in the records of the case. In the order the hearing officer also observed that many legal issues requiring careful examination were involved in the case. (5) Thereafter, the matter was taken up for consideration by the hearing officer on May 20, 2008 when he adjourned hearing stating that the valued opinion he sought from the law cell of the Corporation was not made available. He also mentioned in the order that in view of the unprecedented situation arising before him, it was necessary for him to obtain views of the highest authority of the Corporation as to what should be the basis for determining the annual valuation of the land. In the order he mentioned that an adjacent property known as ITC SONAR was valued only at the rate of Rs.6 per square foot when the proposed annual valuation of the land in question was at the rate of Rs.41.37 per square foot. The hearing officer also mentioned that the first petitioner was awaiting response to its application filed under the Right to Information Act, 2005. It appears from the order that the hearing officer was not ready to proceed with the final hearing of the assessment case. The hearing officer also mentioned that the first petitioner was awaiting response to its application filed under the Right to Information Act, 2005. It appears from the order that the hearing officer was not ready to proceed with the final hearing of the assessment case. On June 24, 2008 the matter was again taken up by the hearing officer and hearing was adjourned once again on the ground that views of the highest authority of the Corporation were not made available. (6) Then the matter was taken up on July 8, 2008 and the hearing officer made the final order, which is as follows:- "The file has been received by me to-day A.P. is present. He submitted a written objection on date. Perused the objection filed dated 08.07.08 by the A.P. which is enclosed with the docket. The points raised by the A.P. in the aforesaid representation do not come under the purview of consideration by the H.O. Appropriate authority of the Assessment Collection Deptt, K.M.C., may take such action as considered necessary. The moot point of consideration by the H.O. is to assess the A.V. in respect of the instant Assessee vis-a-vis the proposed A.V. The instant matter has been dragging on since 13.10.07 and it came up for hearing before me first on 04.03.08. Thereafter, this matter has been deferred as many as four times. In this connection attention is drawn to my orders dated 20.05.08 which is self-contained. Since the valued views, sought for were awaiting from appropriate authority, K.M.C., no decision could be arrived at on subsequent hearing dated 24.06.08. Now it is observed from the file that the K.M.C. has not furnished the requisite information as sought for in my orders dated 20.05.08 and 24.06.08. Since the K.M.C. authority could not enlighten me the basis of arriving at the market value of the instant vacant land, it is felt that they have stuck to their stand of proposing the A.V. on the basis of highest bid price as the estimated market value of the instant land. Considering on all points including my previous orders as well as representation dated 08.04.08 by the A.P. I am of the view that the proposed A.V. of Rs.10,88,20,530/-only is reasonable. Considering on all points including my previous orders as well as representation dated 08.04.08 by the A.P. I am of the view that the proposed A.V. of Rs.10,88,20,530/-only is reasonable. Accordingly, the proposed A.V. of Rs.10,88,20,530/-only is hereby confirmed in respect of the instant Assessee in presence of DAC(S) and AAC(S) of the concerned division." (7) In view of the provisions of Section 189 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 the petitioners were entitled to appeal against the final order of the hearing officer dated July 8, 2008 to the Municipal Assessment Tribunal. They, however, chose to approach the writ Court. Their principal contention, as will appear from para.24, is that the hearing officer made the final order in the assessment case without considering their objections. In para. 12 they have stated that against the proposed annual valuation they submitted their objection dated March 4, 2008. In para. 15 they have stated that they were compelled to file their further objection dated April 8, 2008, since the hearing officer was not inclined to adjourn hearing giving them further opportunity to obtain information for which they had submitted requisite application to the Corporation. (8) Mr. Mukherjee, Counsel for the petitioners, has argued that the hearing officer has made the final order in the assessment case in patent violation of the principles of natural justice in that the objection dated March 4, 2008 and the supplementary objection dated April 8, 2008 submitted by. the petitioners were not considered by him at all. According to Mr. Mukherjee, since the objections were not considered and nothing was said regarding the merits of the grounds stated in the objections, the petitioners were not in a position to appeal to the Tribunal. Mr. Mukherjee has said that since natural justice was violated at the first stage, the right of appeal could not be a true right of appeal, and for this he has relied on Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna and Ors., 1986 (4) SCC 537 . (9) According to Mr. Chakraborty, counsel for the Corporation, the objection that the hearing officer was under an obligation to consider was only the one submitted by the first petitioner on October 12, 2007, referred to in the order of the hearing officer dated October 13, 2007. (9) According to Mr. Chakraborty, counsel for the Corporation, the objection that the hearing officer was under an obligation to consider was only the one submitted by the first petitioner on October 12, 2007, referred to in the order of the hearing officer dated October 13, 2007. His argument is that in view of the provisions of Section 186, the first petitioner, if it wanted, was required to submit its objection to the proposed annual valuation to the Municipal Commissioner, and it could file objection only once. His submission is that the application dated October 12, 2007 submitted to the commissioner was to be considered the only objection to the proposed valuation for all purposes and in the absence of any statutory right to file further objection and supplementary objection the first petitioner was not entitled to submit the objection dated March 4, 2008 and the supplementary objection dated April 8, 2008. According to him, the hearing officer was under no obligation to consider these objection and supplementary objection for any purpose at all. (10) His further submission is that when the provisions of Section 174(2) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 have clearly provided how annual valuation of a vacant piece of land is to be determined and when there is no dispute about the quantum of the bid money paid by the first petitioner for the lease, there is no reason to say that the hearing officer has not considered the first petitioners objections to the proposed annual valuation, especially when the hearing officer, as will appear from his final order, has given some reason in support of his order. For this he has relied on Tarapada Ghorai v. State of West Bengal and Ors., 2001 (1) CHN 318 . Lastly, he has contended that in view of the alternative remedy that was available before the Tribunal, the petitioners were not entitled to approach the writ Court. He has said that he did not get a reasonable opportunity to take the point at the earliest available opportunity. (11) In reply, Mr. Mukherjee has relied on Jharoo Mal v. Puran Chand Pandey and Ors., AIR 1970 SC 306 , in support of his argument that even after expiration of the period mentioned in Section 186, the hearing officer was empowered to entertain the first petitioners objection and supplementary objection to the proposed annual valuation. (11) In reply, Mr. Mukherjee has relied on Jharoo Mal v. Puran Chand Pandey and Ors., AIR 1970 SC 306 , in support of his argument that even after expiration of the period mentioned in Section 186, the hearing officer was empowered to entertain the first petitioners objection and supplementary objection to the proposed annual valuation. (12) I do not find any reason to permit Mr. Chakraborty to raise the question of availability of the alternative remedy at this stage. I am unable to accept his submission that he did not get a reasonable opportunity to take the plea at the earliest available opportunity. The question of availability of alternative remedy is to be raised at the earliest available opportunity, and a party aggrieved by an order turning down the point is entitled to appeal to the higher Court. In the instant case, the respondents did not appeal against the order admitting the writ petition. Today it has come up for final hearing after the parties have exchanged affidavits. An interim order was made and it is in force. (13) There is no reason to say that the petitioners have bypassed the tribunal so as to avoid the liability to pay the prescribed part of the tax payable according to the determined annual valuation for maintaining an appeal against the order of the hearing officer, because the admitted position is that with a view to avoiding all complications they have paid the tax that was payable on the basis of the annual valuation determined by the hearing officer. They have approached the writ Court taking a specific plea that the hearing officer made the final order without considering their objections. I have no doubt that on this ground they were entitled to approach the writ Court, even when they had an alternative remedy available before the Tribunal. According to them, they could not appeal to the Tribunal, since the hearing officer by not dealing with their objections made a totally unreasoned order. (14) The principal question therefore is whether the hearing officer has considered the first petitioners objections to the proposed valuation. Mr. Chakraborty is absolutely wrong in saying that the petition dated October 12, 2007 submitted by the first petitioner was to be considered its only objection to the proposed valuation. (14) The principal question therefore is whether the hearing officer has considered the first petitioners objections to the proposed valuation. Mr. Chakraborty is absolutely wrong in saying that the petition dated October 12, 2007 submitted by the first petitioner was to be considered its only objection to the proposed valuation. From the order of the hearing officer dated October 13, 2007 it is apparent that the application dated October 12, 2007 was only an application for adjournment, and nothing else. The hearing officer adjourned hearing considering the application. (15) In para. 12 of the writ petition it has been categorically asserted that the objection dated March 4, 2008 was the one submitted against the proposed annual valuation. In para.7 of the opposition para. 12 of the writ petition has been dealt with, and the respondents have not contended that in view of the provisions of Section 186 the objection dated March 4, 2008 could not be entertained by the hearing officer. In para. 15 of the writ petition the petitioners have stated the circumstances under which the further objection dated April 8, 2008 was submitted. Their case in para. 15 has been dealt with in para.8 of the opposition. Again, the respondents have not contended that in view of the provisions of Section 186 the further objection dated April 8, 2008 was not entertainable. (16) In the absence of any prohibition against submitting a supplementary objection, I find no reason to accept the argument that a person entitled to submit an objection under Section 186 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 is not entitled to supplement his principal objection by filing a further objection. (17) It is the admitted position that when the hearing notice dated October 12, 2007 was issued and served on October 12, 2007, the hearing officer took up the matter on October 13, 2007. Hence there is no reason to say that objection to the proposed annual valuation could not be submitted by the first petitioner before the hearing officer. (17) It is the admitted position that when the hearing notice dated October 12, 2007 was issued and served on October 12, 2007, the hearing officer took up the matter on October 13, 2007. Hence there is no reason to say that objection to the proposed annual valuation could not be submitted by the first petitioner before the hearing officer. When the assessment case was initiated by the Corporation before the hearing officer even before the objection was filed by the first petitioner that was within time, I do not see how it can be said that the first petitioner, having filed the adjournment petition to the commissioner to whom the objection under Section 186 was to be filed within the stipulated time, was no longer entitled to submit its objection to the proposed valuation before the hearing officer. (18) The objection dated March 4, 2008 was submitted and it was unconditionally entertained by the hearing officer, as will appear from his order dated April 8, 2008. The further objection dated April 8, 2008 was also entertained unconditionally, and this is apparent from the final order. The case now argued at the bar was never the case of the Corporation before the hearing officer, nor has, it stated such a case in its opposition. I am unable to accept the argument that the objection dated March 4, 2008 and the supplementary objection dated April 8, 2008 were not objections within the meaning of Section 186, and that hence the hearing officer was under no obligation to consider them. In my opinion, they were objection and supplementary objection validly submitted by the first petitioner, and the hearing officer was under an unqualified statutory obligation to consider them. (19) The ultimate question therefore is whether the objections dated March 4, 2008 and April 8, 2008 were considered by the hearing officer. If they were considered, and the hearing officer gave some reasons or other rejecting them, then perhaps Mr. Chakraborty can justifiably rely on the decision in Tara Pada Garai. Validity of an order of a quasi judicial or statutory authority is not dependent on sufficiency of reasons stated in support of the order, but on relevant reasons. (20) It is apparent from the final order of the hearing officer that nothing stated by the petitioners in their objection and supplementary objection was considered by the hearing officer. Validity of an order of a quasi judicial or statutory authority is not dependent on sufficiency of reasons stated in support of the order, but on relevant reasons. (20) It is apparent from the final order of the hearing officer that nothing stated by the petitioners in their objection and supplementary objection was considered by the hearing officer. The hearing officer made the order on the ground that since the Corporation did not disclose the basis on which it proposed the annual valuation, the bid money paid by the first petitioner should be considered the market value of the land in question. The arguments made by Mr. Chakraborty regarding the nature of the provisions of Section 174(2) and the amount of the bid money are some reasons sought to be supplied by him in support of the order. He is not empowered or entitled to supply reasons which the hearing officer did not state in his order. It was for the hearing officer to state reasons why objections of the petitioners were meritless. (21) Under the circumstances, in my opinion, the petitioners are fully justified in saying that the irrelevant reason recorded by the hearing officer cannot be taken into consideration for saying that the order is a reasoned one. The order would have been a reasoned one, had the hearing officer dealt with the grounds stated in the objection and the supplementary objection and accepted or turned them down recording reasons. (22) Besides, from the orders dated May 20, 2008 and June 24, 2008 of the hearing officer it is apparent that the case was nowhere near the stage of final hearing. The positions creating the situation for which it was not possible to take up the case for final hearing, stated in those orders, were existing also on July 8, 2008 when abruptly the final order was made in the case. It is not that since the problems were not likely to be resolved, the hearing officer was of the view that the case should be taken up for final hearing, and that he, accordingly, took it up for such hearing. The order does not show that he actually heard the petitioners on their grounds of objection. He ought to have heard the parties or fixed the hearing for some other day. Instead, he abruptly made the final order in the case. The order does not show that he actually heard the petitioners on their grounds of objection. He ought to have heard the parties or fixed the hearing for some other day. Instead, he abruptly made the final order in the case. It is therefore evident that the petitioners were also deprived of a reasonable opportunity of pressing their grounds of objection. (23) I am therefore of the view that the petitioners are entitled to say that by making an unreasoned order and not hearing them properly, the hearing officer has deprived them of their valuable statutory right to appeal to the tribunal on merits. The hearing officer has followed an unfair procedure. Hence the defect incurably vitiating his order could not be cured by the tribunal by following a fair procedure. This proposition is supported by the authority Mr. Mukherjee has relied on. In my opinion, the matter should be heard by the hearing officer again. (24) For these reasons, I allow the writ petition and order as follows. The impugned order of the hearing officer dated July 8, 2008 is hereby set aside. He is directed to hear the assessment case again. He shall make the final order after giving the parties reasonable opportunity of adducing both oral and documentary evidence, and also of hearing. He shall make a reasoned order dealing with all the points raised by the parties before him. The tax paid by the petitioners according to the order dated July 8, 2008 shall abide by the result of the fresh order that will be made by the hearing officer. There shall be no order for costs.