JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.P. Mehrotra, J.—The present Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner, interalia, praying for quashing the judgment and order dated 9.8.2005 (Annexure 6 to the Writ Petition) passed by the Controlling Authority/Commissioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi-respondent No.1 in Revision No. 74 of 2001 under Section 15-A of the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958 (hereinafter also referred to as “the Act”). 2. The dispute relates to a house being House No. 95-B, Mohalla Alamganj, Jaunpur City. The said house is situated on plot Nos. 17/-21,18/-26, 19/-9, 20/-8, 21/-15, 22/-12, 23/-04, 24/05 and 26/14 (hereinafter referred as “the plots in question"). 3. Pleadings have been exchanged between the parties. The Writ Petition is being disposed of finally at this stage with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. 4. From a perusal of the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner, Counter Affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 4 to 7, Rejoinder Affidavit filed by the petitioner, Supplementary Counter Affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 and the Supplementary Affidavit filed by the petitioner, the following facts emerge. 5. The respondent Nos. 4 to 7 claim title over the plots in question on the basis of two Registered Sale Deeds. One Sale Deed dated 12.2.1981 and registered on 19.2.1981 was executed in favour of Smt. Kamla Devi (wife of Ghanshyam Das) (respondent No. 4) by Smt. Sameeunnissa Begum and Nazim Hussain, and the other Sale Deed dated 17.2.1981 and registered on 19.2.1981 was executed in favour of Ghanshyam Das—predecessor-in-interest of the respondent Nos. 4 to 7—by Smt. Sameeunnissa Begum, widow of Sayed Shah Ahmad Hashmi and D/o Maulvi Abdul Rahman, and Deva Mani Pathak Mukhtaram of Raja Yadvendra Dutta Debey. Photostat copies of the said two Sale Deeds have been filed as Annexures-C.A.7 and C.A.8 to the Counter Affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 4 to 7. 6. It appears that the said Ghanshyam Das submitted a map for sanction on 17.1.2000. The said map was sanctioned by the Prescribed Authority on 25.1.2000. 7. Subsequently, Objections dated 22.6.2000 were filed on behalf of the petitioner, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure 1 to the Writ Petition. 8. 4 to 7. 6. It appears that the said Ghanshyam Das submitted a map for sanction on 17.1.2000. The said map was sanctioned by the Prescribed Authority on 25.1.2000. 7. Subsequently, Objections dated 22.6.2000 were filed on behalf of the petitioner, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure 1 to the Writ Petition. 8. It is, inter alia, stated in the said Objections that Nawab Mohammad Yusuf executed a Waqfnama dated 5.4.1956 in regard to the plots in question and other property; and that the plots in question were the property of the Waqf, and the matter had been finalised up to the Supreme Court; and that the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 after getting their names mutated in the official records in forged and illegal manner, were making illegal construction over the plots in question. 9. Reply dated 28.7.2000 was filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 against the said Objections filed on behalf of the petitioner. It is, inter alia, stated in the said Reply that no waqfnama dated 5.4.1956 was executed by Nawab Yusuf in accordance with law; and that no waqf was created, nor were the plots in question property of the waqf; and that Smt. Sameeunnissa Begum was the tenant of the Zamindar Rana Yadvendra Dutt Dubey in respect of plot Nos. 18, 19 and 20; and that the said Smt. Sameeunnissa Begum was also the tenant of the Zamindar Nazim Hussain in respect of plot Nos. 17, 22, 21, 23, 24 and 26; and that the said plots were purchased by Ghanshyam Das and Smt. Kamla Devi by two sale-deeds in February, 1981; and that after the said Sale Deeds, the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 incurred huge expenditure and constructed building, shops, Mandir and garden etc. over the said plots; and that the names of the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 were recorded in the Assessment Register of the Nagar Palika. Copy of the said Reply has been filed as Annexure 2 to the Writ Petition. 10. By the order dated 16.3.2001 (Annexure 3 to the Writ Petition) passed under Section 7-A of the Act, the Prescribed Authority, Regulated Area, Jaunpur, inter alia, cancelled the order dated 25.1.2000 whereby sanction had been granted in respect of the map. Copy of the said Reply has been filed as Annexure 2 to the Writ Petition. 10. By the order dated 16.3.2001 (Annexure 3 to the Writ Petition) passed under Section 7-A of the Act, the Prescribed Authority, Regulated Area, Jaunpur, inter alia, cancelled the order dated 25.1.2000 whereby sanction had been granted in respect of the map. The Prescribed Authority, inter alia, held on the basis of the material on record that it was established that the plots in question were the waqf property, and the sanction granted in respect of the map was not in accordance with the Rules. 11. The respondent Nos. 4 to 7 filed an Appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act. 12. By its order dated 26.3.2002 (Annexure 4 to the Writ Petition), the Appellate Authority dismissed the said Appeal filed by the respondent Nos. 4 to 7. 13. Thereupon, the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 filed Revision under Section 15-A of the Act. 14. By the order dated 9.8.2005 (Annexure 6 to the Writ Petition), the Controlling Authority/Commissioner, Varanasi Mandal, Varanasi (respondent No. 1) allowed the said Revision filed by the respondent Nos. 4 to 7, and set-aside the order dated 16.3.2001 passed by the Prescribed Authority and the order dated 26.3.2002 passed by the Appellate Authority. On a detailed consideration of the material on record, the respondent No. 1 concluded that the plots in question were not proved to be the waqf property or part of the waqf property. 15. Thereupon, the petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition seeking the reliefs as mentioned above. 16. I have heard Sri Ikram Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri G.K. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 to 7, and have perused the record. 17. It is submitted by Sri Ikram Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioner that the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority rightly held the plots in question to be part of the waqf property, and the validity of the waqf had been upheld up-to the Supreme Court, and the respondent No. 1 acted illegally in passing the impugned order dated 9.8.2005 allowing the Revision filed by the respondent Nos. 4 to 7. 18. In reply, Sri G.K. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 to 7. 18. In reply, Sri G.K. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 has made the following submissions : (1) It is submitted that in regard to the same cause of action and for the same reliefs, the petitioner had also filed a suit being Suit No. 723 of 2000 in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Jaunpur. He refers to a copy of the plaint of the said Suit filed as Annexure SCA-1 to the Supplementary Counter Affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 4 to 7. It is further submitted by Sri Singh that the said Suit was dismissed in default on 30th April, 2007. He has produced a certified copy of the said order dated 30th April, 2007. Let the same be taken on record. It is further submitted by Sri Singh that in view of the fact that the petitioner was pursuing an alternative remedy in regard to the same subject-matter, the present Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on the said ground. It is further submitted that even though the said Suit was dismissed in default on 30th April, 2007 but the same would not be relevant for the present Writ Petition, and the present Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground that the petitioner has already availed of an alternative remedy. It is further submitted that even though alongwith the Supplementary Affidavit, the petitioner has filed copy of an application dated 21.3.2001, filed on behalf of the petitioner in the said Suit, wherein prayer has been made, inter alia, for withdrawal of the said Suit, namely, Suit No. 723 of 2000. The said application was never allowed, and the said Suit was dismissed in default on 30th April, 2007. In any case, the submission proceeds, even after the withdrawal of the said Suit, the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner would be liable to be dismissed. Sri G.K.Singh, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 has placed reliance on the following decisions : (1) Sheo Nath Dubey v. District Inspector of Schools, Mainpuri and others, 1985 UPLBEC 1374 (D.B.). (2) M/s. Akay Organics Private Limited v. Oil & Natural Gas Commission and others, 1992 AWC 792 (DB). Sri G.K.Singh, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 has placed reliance on the following decisions : (1) Sheo Nath Dubey v. District Inspector of Schools, Mainpuri and others, 1985 UPLBEC 1374 (D.B.). (2) M/s. Akay Organics Private Limited v. Oil & Natural Gas Commission and others, 1992 AWC 792 (DB). (2) Even otherwise, as is evident from a perusal of the Objections filed by the petitioner and the Reply thereto given by the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 before the Prescribed Authority, the present case involves question of title, namely, as to whether the plots in question were the waqf property or not. The said question of title could not be made the subject-matter of the proceedings initiated under the Act, and the proper course for the petitioner was to file a Suit before the Civil Court. He has placed reliance on the following decisions : (1) Jai Ram Lal Srivastava v. State of U.P., AIR 1982 All 290 . (2) Shyam Sunder Agarwal and others v. District Magistrate/Vice Chairman, Banda Development Authority, Banda and others, 1991 (Suppl.) RD 27 (DB). 19. In rejoinder, Sri Ikram Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Objections before the Prescribed Authority were filed on behalf of the petitioner on 22.6.2000 while the said Suit No. 723 of 2000 was filed subsequently. As the said Objections filed on behalf of the petitioner were accepted by the Prescribed Authority by its order dated 16.3.2001, the petitioner filed the Withdrawal Application dated 21.3.2001 in the said Suit, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure S.A.1 to the Supplementary Affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner. 20. It is submitted by Sri Ikram Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioner that as the said Withdrawal Application dated 21.3.2001 had been filed on behalf of the petitioner, the petitioner had not been pursuing the said Suit which appears to have been dismissed in default on 30th April, 2007. It is not disputed by Sri Ikram Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no order on record of the said Suit allowing the said Withdrawal Application filed on behalf of the petitioner. 21. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 22. Let us first take-up the objection raised by Sri G.K. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 21. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 22. Let us first take-up the objection raised by Sri G.K. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 regarding the maintainability of the present Writ Petition. 23. A perusal of the plaint of the said Suit No. 723 of 2000 shows that the said Suit was filed in respect of the land in question as detailed in the plaint of the said Suit, inter alia, praying for restraining Smt. Kamla Devi and Ghanshyam Das (defendants in the said Suit) from raising construction over the plots in question. The main ground for filing the said Suit was that the land in question was the property of the waqf. 24. In the proceedings taken on behalf of the petitioner under Section 7-A of the Act by filing Objections dated 22.6.2000 (Annexure 1 to the Writ Petition), the petitioner, inter alia, prayed that the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 be restrained from making illegal construction over the plots in question. The main ground for filing the said Objections was that the plots in question were the property of the waqf. 25. It is, thus, evident that the controversy involved in the said Suit was the same as was involved in the said proceedings under the Act, and the reliefs sought in the said Suit were substantially the same as were sought in the said proceedings under the Act. 26. The present Writ Petition, as noted above, has been filed against the order dated 9.8.2005 passed by the respondent No.1 whereby the Revision filed by the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 was allowed, and the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority were set-aside, and it was concluded on the basis of the material on record that the plots in question were not proved to be the waqf property or part of the waqf property. 27. The present Writ Petition was filed on 2.9.2005. 28. As is evident from a perusal of the Withdrawal Application dated 21.3.2001, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure S.A.1 to the Supplementary Affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner, the petitioner prayed for withdrawal of the said Suit No. 723 of 2000. 27. The present Writ Petition was filed on 2.9.2005. 28. As is evident from a perusal of the Withdrawal Application dated 21.3.2001, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure S.A.1 to the Supplementary Affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner, the petitioner prayed for withdrawal of the said Suit No. 723 of 2000. However, it is not disputed by Sri Ikram Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioner that no order was passed on the said application permitting withdrawal of the said Suit. On the other hand, it is evident from a perusal of the certified copy of the order dated 30.4.2007 produced by Sri G.K. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 that the said Suit No. 723 of 2000 was dismissed in default on 30.4.2007. 29. It will thus be noticed that the present Writ Petition was filed in the year 2005, that is, prior to the dismissal of the said Suit in default on 30th April, 2007. 30. Question arises as to whether in view of the aforesaid circumstances, this Court may decline to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 31. In order to decide the above question, it is necessary to refer to the relevant statutory provisions and judicial decisions. 32. Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides : “9. Decree against plaintiff by default bars fresh Suit. 1. Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed under Rule 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. But he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. 2. No Order shall be made under this rule unless notice of the application has been served on the opposite party.” 33. This provision, thus, lays down that where a Suit is dismissed in default under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, no fresh Suit in respect of the same cause of action may be filed by the plaintiff. This provision, thus, lays down that where a Suit is dismissed in default under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, no fresh Suit in respect of the same cause of action may be filed by the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff may file an application praying for an order to set aside the dismissal order. 34. In Sheo Nath Dubey case (supra), this Court has laid down as under (Paragraph 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the said UPLBEC) : “11. In the rejoinder affidavit, the petitioner has come out with an excuse for not disclosing the fact of dismissal of the suit in the writ petition which appears to us to be a lame one. His explanation is that as he was not getting leave from the College for pursuing the suit, he had no alternative but to leave the same. It was his duty to have disclosed the said fact in the writ petition. Be that as it may, from the order it appears that on the date when the suit was taken up, the defendant was present in the Court and the order indicates that the petitioner had since failed to show cause for which he had been granted time, it was dismissed for want of prosecution. To the filing of the writ petition, the principle of Order IX, Rule 9 applied. In the view of the applicability of the principle, the present writ petition was barred. It is true that Order IX, Rule 9 applies to a civil suit in terms but, as stated above Order IX, Rule 9, being behind the idea that no body should be harassed unnecessarily by fresh proceedings one after the other, would apply to the maintainability of the writ petition also. 12. In that suit the controversy was relating to the seniority of the petitioner which he is claiming in this writ petition. It has been held in Shanker Ramachandra Abhvankar v. Krishnali Dattatraya Bapat, AIR 1970 SC 1 that : “If there were two modes of invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court and one of those modes has been chosen and exhausted, it would not be a proper and sound exercise of discretion to grant relief in the other set of proceedings in respect of the same order of the subordinate Court. The refusal to grant relief in such circumstances would be in consonance with the anxiety of the Court to prevent abuse of process as also to respect and accord finality to its own decisions.” 13. In Premier Automobiles Limited v. Kamlakur Shanaram Wedke and others, AIR 1975 SC 2238 , it was observed : “But where the industrial dispute is for the purpose of enforcing a right, obligation or liability under the general law or the common law and not a right, obligation or liability created under the Act, then alternative forums are there giving an election to the suitor to choose his remedy of either moving the machinery under the Act or to approach the civil Court. It is plain that he cannot have both. He has to choose the one or the other”. 14. Independently of the doctrine of election, the question of the sound exercise of judicial discretion is that having chosen the remedy of filing a suit, the petitioner had the benefit of a meaningful hearing of the lis therein. He cannot be permitted to harass a party by changing the forum of Court from one to another. Judicial discretion requires the rejection of the writ petition on the ground.” (Emphasis supplied) 35. In M/s. Akay Organics Private Limited (supra), this Court has laid down as under (Paragraph 5 and 7 of the AWC) : “5. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Premier Automobiles Limited v. Kamlakur Shanaram Wedke, AIR 1975 SC 2238 , wherein the Supreme Court laid down as follows : “But where the industrial dispute is for the purpose of enforcing a right, obligation or liability under the general law or the common law and not a right, obligation or liability created under the Act, then alternative forums are there giving an election to the suitor to choose his remedy of either moving the machinery under the Act or to approach the civil Court. It is plain that he cannot have both. He has to choose the one or the other”. In Sheo Nath Dubey v. District Inspector of Schools and others,Writ Petition No. 10524 of 1978, decided on 28-9-1985, a Division Bench of this Court had to consider some what similar controversy. It is plain that he cannot have both. He has to choose the one or the other”. In Sheo Nath Dubey v. District Inspector of Schools and others,Writ Petition No. 10524 of 1978, decided on 28-9-1985, a Division Bench of this Court had to consider some what similar controversy. In that case the suit of the petitioner therein was dismissed for want of prosecution and thereafter writ petition was filed for the same relief, which was claimed in the suit. This Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground of the principles contained in Order IX Rule 9 of the CPC. This Court laid down as under : “To the filing of the writ petition, the principle of Order IX Rule 9 applied. In the view of the applicability of the principle, the present writ petition was barred. It is true that Order IX Rule 9 applies to a civil suit in terms but, as stated above Order IX Rule 9, being behind the idea that no body should be harassed unnecessarily by fresh proceedings one after the other, would apply to the maintainability of the writ petition also.” The other ground on which the writ petition of Sheo Nath Dubey (supra) was dismissed, was the doctrine of election and public policy, i.e. a person having elected to seek redress of his grievances in a civil Court cannot be permitted to give it up and then to file a writ petition of this Court is quoted below : “Independently of the doctrine of election, the question of the sound exercise of judicial discretion is that having chosen the remedy of filing a suit, the petitioner had the benefit of a meaningful hearing of the lis therein. He cannot be permitted to harass a party by changing the forum of Court from one to another. Judicial discretion requires the rejection of the writ petition on that ground.” 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner in the end has however, argued that the petitioner has withdrawn the suit because it was not possible to pursue it in view of the strike of the Advocates of District Courts and on account of this reason this writ petition has been filed. It is not possible to agree with the learned counsel. Learned counsel for the petitioner in the end has however, argued that the petitioner has withdrawn the suit because it was not possible to pursue it in view of the strike of the Advocates of District Courts and on account of this reason this writ petition has been filed. It is not possible to agree with the learned counsel. From the perusal of the application for withdrawing the suit, the contents of which have been quoted here-in-before, the reason given for withdrawing the suit was delay caused in the hearing of the injunction matter. The interim injunction application was filed by the petitioner before the Civil Judge on 21-2-1992 and on that very day the Civil Judge passed an order holding that it is not a fit case for granting the exparte interim injunction without hearing the other side and on that basis merely issued notice on the said application. The strike by the Advocates of the District Courts was not the reason for delay in the hearing of the injunction application and was also not the reason for withdrawing the suit. That apart, the strike of the Advocates was only for few days, as is clear from the order sheet, which has been placed before us by the learned counsel for the parties. It may also be restated, as mentioned above, that the petitioner has already presented the writ petition before the Oath Commissioner of this Court on 29-2-1992 and filed it before the Stamp Reporter on 3-3-1992. It appears that as the Civil Judge was not inclined to grant ex parte interim injunction, the writ petition was prepared and filed and apprehending that the party cannot pursue two parallel remedies for the same relief, application for withdrawing the suit was filed before the Civil Judge on 3-3-1992 without seeking any permission for filing a fresh civil suit or for pursuing any other remedy. When the civil suit is withdrawn without permission to file the fresh suit, filing of the new suit is prohibited in view of Order XXIII Rule 1 of the CPC. Petitioner, in our opinion, has given-up the remedy of civil suit, which was already availed of by him, without any justification. To entertain his writ petition, in these circumstances, would be against the public policy. The petitioner cannot be permitted to harass the party by changing the forum from one Court to another. Petitioner, in our opinion, has given-up the remedy of civil suit, which was already availed of by him, without any justification. To entertain his writ petition, in these circumstances, would be against the public policy. The petitioner cannot be permitted to harass the party by changing the forum from one Court to another. As laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sheo Nath Dubey (supra), the sound exercise of judicial discretion is that the writ petition should not be entertained and should be rejected.” (Emphasis supplied) 36. From the above decisions, it follows that even though the provision contained in Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as such is not applicable to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but the principle underlying the said provision may be applied to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 37. Hence, applying the principle underlying the provision of Order IX, Rule 9, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which provides that once a Suit is dismissed in default, it is not open to the plaintiff to file a fresh Suit on the same cause of action, it follows that once a Suit is dismissed in default, the plaintiff cannot file a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in respect of the same cause of action, as otherwise, the plaintiff will be able to achieve something which is prohibited by the provision contained in Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 38. In such a situation, the Court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 39. However, the question arises as to whether the above principles are applicable in the present case, that is, as to whether the present Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed in view of the said principles. 40. While, it is true that the reliefs sought by the petitioner in the said Suit No. 723 of 2000 were substantially the same, as were sought in the proceedings under the Act but the present Writ Petition has been filed against the Order dated 9.8.2005 passed by the respondent No. 1 whereby the Revision filed by the respondent Nos. 40. While, it is true that the reliefs sought by the petitioner in the said Suit No. 723 of 2000 were substantially the same, as were sought in the proceedings under the Act but the present Writ Petition has been filed against the Order dated 9.8.2005 passed by the respondent No. 1 whereby the Revision filed by the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 under Section 15-A of the Act was allowed, and the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority were set-aside. Thus, the present Writ Petition has been filed by the petitioner, inter alia, seeking quashing of the said order dated 9.8.2005. Thus the cause of action of the present Writ Petition and the relief sought in the present Writ Petition are not the same as in the said Suit No. 723 of 2000, therefore, the principles noticed above regarding non-entertainment of a Writ Petition in respect of the same cause of action as was involved in the Suit dismissed in default or withdrawn, is not applicable to the present case. 41. The present Writ Petition cannot, therefore, be dismissed on the ground of filing of the said Suit No. 723 of 2000 or its dismissal in default on 30.4.2007. 42. The submission made by Sri G.K. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 in this regard cannot be accepted. 43. Let us now consider the question regarding the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority that the plots in question were the Waqf property, and the Revisional Authority (respondent No. 1) setting aside the said finding. While Sri Ikram Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority on the question was correct and the Revisional Authority (respondent No. 1) acted illegally in setting aside the said finding, the submission of Sri G.K. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 is that the question as to whether the plots in question were Waqf property, is a question of title, and the said question cannot be decided in the proceedings under the Act. 44. Therefore, the question arises as to whether the question of title in regard to the plots in question may be made the subject-matter of the proceedings under the Act. 44. Therefore, the question arises as to whether the question of title in regard to the plots in question may be made the subject-matter of the proceedings under the Act. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to the decisions relied upon by Sri G.K. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 to 7. 45. In Jai Ram Lal Srivastava case (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court was dealing with the question of validity of the order passed by the Controlling Authority rejecting the petitioner’s application for compounding the offence under the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958, if any, committed by him and directing that certain constructions set-up by the petitioner be demolished. The learned Single Judge noticed various provisions of the Act, and held as under (Paragraph 16 of the said AIR) : “16. I may at this stage point out that the Act nowhere enables the authorities under the Act to investigate any dispute between private parties with regard to the land over which the constructions stand or are to be sanctioned or permitted. Any application moved for seeking permission for setting up of construction in a regulated area has to be dealt with under Section 7 of the Act. Sub-section (2-A) of Section 7 lists as many as seven grounds (enumerated as (a) to (g)) on which alone the Prescribed Authority can refuse permission for erection or re-erection of a building whereas clause (d) of sub-section (2-A) lays down that erection of proposed building shall not be sanctioned if its construction would result in encroachment upon any public premises as defied in U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972, it nowhere lays down that any such application is to be rejected for the reason that such construction would result in encroachment upon land belonging to some private person. It may be that in view of the provisions contained in clause (d) of sub-section (2-A) of Section 7 of the Act the concerned authority can enquire into and adjudicate on the question whether the objectionable construction stands on nazul land, but then it has not been enabled to decide or adjudicate upon private disputes with regard to title in respect of the land on which the objectionable construction stands. A fortiori the authorities constituted under the Act will also not be able to direct demolition of petitioner’s constructions merely for the reason that they stand on land belonging to some other private individual." (Emphasis supplied) 46. This decision, thus, lays down that the Act nowhere enables the authorities under the Act to investigate any dispute between private parties with regard to the land over which the constructions stand or are to be sanctioned or permitted. The authorities constituted under the Act have not been enabled to decide or adjudicate upon private disputes with regard to title in respect of the land on which the objectionable construction stands. A fortiori the authorities constituted under the Act will also not be able to direct demolition of the petitioner’s constructions merely for the reason that they stand on the land belonging to some other private individual. 47. In Shyam Sunder Agarwal case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with the validity of an order passed by the District Magistrate/Vice Chairman, Banda Development Authority, Banda, whereby he had stayed the operation of a sanction granted by him in favour of the petitioners for construction of a building upon an application filed by the contesting respondents. 48. A notice issued by the District Magistrate/Vice Chairman calling upon the petitioners to appear on a date fixed before him for disposing of the application filed by the contesting respondents with regard to the grant of the sanction to the petitioner, was also challenged. 49. The Division Bench allowed the Writ Petition in part, and quashed the said order as well as the said notice. It was held as under (Paragraph 4, 5 and 6 of the said R.D.): “4. Coming back to the proceedings which were initiated by the contesting respondents by way of an objection against the sanction granted by the District Magistrate to the petitioners, the position is that the sole ground on which the sanction was challenged was based on the allegation that the disputed property belongs to a temple of which the respondents were priests and worshippers and that the petitioners have no right, title or interest in the disputed land. It is apparent that the objection of the respondents involves an adjudication of a dispute pertaining to the title to the land in question. It is apparent that the objection of the respondents involves an adjudication of a dispute pertaining to the title to the land in question. It has consistently been ruled by this Court right from the earliest time that disputes pertaining to the title to the property with respect to which sanction is sought cannot and ought not appropriately to be determined in such proceedings. Indeed there is a complete unanimity of opinion on this point, the view expressed being that such an issue is beyond the purview of the proceedings for sanction of the plan. [See 1945 Allahabad -393, 1982 Allahabad -290, 1980 Allahabad Weekly Cases 637 and finally 1991 A.C.J. 649]. 5. We are in respectful agreement with the opinion expressed by this Court in the above decisions. It is, however, unnecessary to dilate on this point further beyond stating that the contesting respondents have already instituted a suit raising the same controversy and asserting the same claim, namely, that the petitioners not being the owners of the property are liable to be evicted from the disputed land. A relief for demolition of the construction made by the petitioners pursuant to the sanction granted to them has also been claimed in the suit. Annexure RA-2 purports to be a true copy of the plaint. From the perusal of the plaint it is apparent that precisely same issue of title which was urged by the contesting respondents in their objections before the District Magistrate is sought to be canvassed in that civil suit. 6. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that it will not be proper for the District Magistrate to enter into and determine the above issue which is the very matter which has to be considered and decided in the regular civil suit instituted by the petitioner”. (Emphasis supplied) 50. This decision, thus, lays down that where the objection against the sanction granted by the concerned authority for construction of a building on the land in question involves adjudication of disputes pertaining to the title to the land in question, such disputes cannot and ought not to be determined in the proceedings before the authorities dealing with the sanction of plan for making construction. Such disputes are beyond the purview of the proceedings for sanction of the plan. Such disputes should be considered and decided in a regular civil suit. 51. Such disputes are beyond the purview of the proceedings for sanction of the plan. Such disputes should be considered and decided in a regular civil suit. 51. In view of the above decisions, it is evident that the authorities constituted under the Act, that is, the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958 cannot decide or adjudicate upon the question of title to the land over which the constructions are proposed to be raised or have been raised. In case, an application for sanction of plan for making constructions over a particular land is made before the concerned authority constituted under the Act, the concerned authority will prima-facie satisfy itself regarding the title of the person seeking sanction of plan in respect of the land in question. Once the concerned authority is satisfied that prima-facie such person has title to the land in question and grants sanction for the plan, such sanction will not be stayed/cancelled on the ground that any objection regarding the title of such person to the land in question is raised by another private person. 52. Intricate questions of title cannot be adjudicated upon and decided by the authorities constituted under the Act. Such questions of title to the land in question should be raised by filing regular Suit. 53. It must, however, be emphasized that before granting sanction of plan for making construction on the land in question, the concerned authority must prima-facie satisfy itself regarding the title of the person applying for sanction of plan in respect of such land. 54. In the present case, as noted earlier, one Sale-Deed dated 12.2.1981 and registered on 19.2.1981 was executed in favour of the said Smt. Kamla Devi (respondent No. 4). The other Sale-Deed dated 17.2.1981 and registered on 19.2.1981 was executed in favour of Ghanshyam Das, who was the father of the respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7 and the husband of Smt. Kamla Devi (respondent No. 4). On the basis of the said Sale-Deeds, the names of the said Vendees were recorded in the relevant official records. Thus, the title of the said Vendees, namely, Ghanshyam Das and Smt. Kamla Devi in respect of the plots in question was prima-facie established. The map submitted by the said Ghanshyam Das was sanctioned by the Prescribed Authority on 25.1.2000. On the basis of the said Sale-Deeds, the names of the said Vendees were recorded in the relevant official records. Thus, the title of the said Vendees, namely, Ghanshyam Das and Smt. Kamla Devi in respect of the plots in question was prima-facie established. The map submitted by the said Ghanshyam Das was sanctioned by the Prescribed Authority on 25.1.2000. Subsequently, on the Objections dated 22.6.2000 filed by the petitioner, the Prescribed Authority, by the order dated 16.3.2001, under Section 7-A of the Act, cancelled the said order dated 25.1.2000 whereby sanction had been granted in respect of the map. 55. It is pertinent to note that the main ground raised by the petitioner in the Objections dated 22.6.2000 against the sanction of map was that the plots in question were the property of the Waqf. The objection of the petitioner was upheld by the Prescribed Authority, who held that it was established that the plots in question were the Waqf property, and the sanction granted in respect of the map was not in accordance with Rules. The respondent Nos. 4 to 7 filed an Appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act which was dismissed by the Appellate Authority by the order dated 26.3.2002.Thereafter, the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 filed Revision under Section 15 -A of the Act which was allowed by the Controlling Authority/Commissioner, Varanasi Mandal, Varanasi (respondent No. 1) by the order dated 9.8.2005. The respondent No. 1 concluded that the plots in question were not proved to be the Waqf property or part of the Waqf property. 56. It will, thus, be noticed that the sanction of map granted in respect of the plots in question was objected to on the ground that the plots in question were the Waqf property. 57. Thus, the question involved before the Prescribed Authority and the other authorities was evidently, the question of title, namely, as to whether the plots in question were the Waqf property or not. 58. In view of the principles noted above, such question of title cannot be made the subject-matter of the proceedings initiated under the Act, and the proper course for the petitioner was to file a Suit before the Civil Court. 59. 58. In view of the principles noted above, such question of title cannot be made the subject-matter of the proceedings initiated under the Act, and the proper course for the petitioner was to file a Suit before the Civil Court. 59. The Objections dated 22.6.2000 filed by the petitioner on the ground of title in regard to the plots in question were evidently beyond the purview of the proceedings for sanction of the map before the authorities constituted under the Act. The Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority acted beyond jurisdiction in going into the question of title to the plots in question and in holding the plots in question to be the Waqf property. 60. As noted earlier, the respondent No. 1 by the order dated 9.8.2005 allowed the Revision filed by the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 and set-aside the orders of the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority. Further, the respondent No. 1 also went into the question of title and held that the plots in question were not proved to be the Waqf property or part of the Waqf property. It was not open to the respondent No. 1 to go into the said question. 61. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the order dated 9.8.2005 passed by the respondent No. 1 allowing the Revision under Section 15-A of the Act, and setting-aside the order dated 16.3.2001 passed by the Prescribed Authority and the order dated 26.3.2002 passed by the Appellate Authority, is correct and legal, but the said order dated 9.8.2005 to the extent, it went into the question of title to the plots in question, is not legal. 62. In fact, the order passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority were liable to be set-aside/quashed on the ground that the said orders decided the question of title to the plots in question which the said authorities had no jurisdiction to decide. As the order dated 9.8.2005 passed by the respondent No. 1 set-aside the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority, though for different reasons, the said order dated 9.8.2005 deserves to be upheld to the extent it set-aside the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority. In the circumstances, the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed. 63. In the circumstances, the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed. 63. The Writ Petition filed by the petitioner is accordingly, dismissed. However, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. 64. It is made clear that this order will not come in the way of the petitioner in seeking proper reliefs before the appropriate forum. ————