JUDGMENT Hon’ble Shri Narayan Shukla, J.—Heard Mr. Prashant Chandra, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Jaspreet Singh, learned counsel for petitioner No. 1 and Mr. Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. R.K.S. Suryavanshi, learned counsel for petitioner No. 2 and Mr. R.B. Singhal, learned counsel for opposite party No. 6. 2. The writ petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 23.3.1979 passed by learned Additional District Judge-II, Lucknow in rent revision No. 150 of 1978 allowing the revision of opposite party by setting aside the orders of allotment made in favour of petitioners by A.D.M.(CS)/R.C.& E.O., Lucknow. 3. The facts narrated by the petitioners are briefly stated as under : The description of premises in question is “Sangeet”, 509/151 Rai Bihari Lal Road, New Haidrabad, Lucknow. 4. Under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (here-in-after referred to as the Act) the premises was inspected for the purpose of declaration of the vacancy by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer and it was found vacant. Therefore, he issued a notice on 1.10.1977 inviting objections regarding the declaration of vacancy. This proceeding was initiated on the basis of application for allotment moved by Dr. Suresh Chandra Yadav. Mr. Pran Nath Seth-opposite party No. 3 filed objection through which he admitted that previously it was occupied by one police officer and late Dr. C.P. Tandon had got it released for his own use and occupation. Ultimately proceeding for allotment initiated by Dr. Suresh Chandra Yadav was dropped. Thereafter, respondent No. 5-Syed Kalim Uddin occupied the entire premises as a tenant with the consent and permission of the landlord. On 28.8.1978, he vacated the entire premises. On 28.8.1978, the petitioner No. 1 applied for allotment of entire house upon which, respondent No. 2, Additional District Magistrate obtained the report of the Rent Control Inspector, who reported that the first floor of the house in question was vacant. The respondent No. 2 issued notice on 15.9.1978 inviting objections for declaration of vacancy. Respondent No. 5-Syed Kalim Uddin put in appearance on behalf of Smt. Asha Tandon-opposite party No. 4 by filing his Vakalatnama. He also filed objection stating therein that the house in question was never let out to any police officer by late Dr. The respondent No. 2 issued notice on 15.9.1978 inviting objections for declaration of vacancy. Respondent No. 5-Syed Kalim Uddin put in appearance on behalf of Smt. Asha Tandon-opposite party No. 4 by filing his Vakalatnama. He also filed objection stating therein that the house in question was never let out to any police officer by late Dr. C.P. Tandon, which was contrary to the statement of Shri Pran Nath Seth made through his objection dated 10.10.1977. The petitioner No. 1 filed reply of objections denying the capacity of respondent No. 5 to live in the premises as family member of Smt. Asha Tandon. By means of order dated 9.10.1978, respondent No. 2 fixed the next date i.e. 23.10.1978 for evidence. However, no evidence was filed on that date on behalf of respondent No. 4. On 23.10.1978, the respondent No. 2 declared the vacancy of the first floor as well as the ground floor of the premises. 5. One fact has also been brought out that on 8.11.1976, respondent No. 3-Pran Nath Seth sought one month’s time to obtain instructions from respondent No. 4 by appearing as counsel of opposite party No. 4 through the application, which was not supported with Vakalatnama of respondent No. 4. That application was rejected and ground floor of the premises was allotted to petitioner No. 1. The application for allotment of premises was also made by petitioner No. 2 and the first floor of the said premises was allotted to him on 10.11.1978. Thereafter, the petitioners took place the possession of the ground floor as well as first floor of the premises in question on 14.11.1978. 6. The respondent No. 5 challenged the said order through rent revision No. 139 of 1978 denying the vacancy of the house in question. The respondents No. 3, 4 and 5 also challenged the said order through different revisions. 7. Revision No. 139 of 1978 filed by opposite party No. 5 was dismissed as withdrawn on 17.3.1979 and other two revisions i.e. 143 of 1978 and 150 of 1978 were heard altogether by respondent No. 1 and allowed by means of an order dated 23.3.1979, which is under challenge in the present petition. 8. 7. Revision No. 139 of 1978 filed by opposite party No. 5 was dismissed as withdrawn on 17.3.1979 and other two revisions i.e. 143 of 1978 and 150 of 1978 were heard altogether by respondent No. 1 and allowed by means of an order dated 23.3.1979, which is under challenge in the present petition. 8. The petitioners have challenged the order impugned inter alia on the ground that the revisions filed by the respondents No. 3 and 4 were not maintainable in view of provisions of Rule 7(i) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 as the respondent No. 3 was not competent person to file the revision as also that the revisions filed by the respondents No. 3 and 4 were not maintainable as respondent No. 3 was neither agent nor the landlord of the premises. Further grounds have been taken that due to limited jurisdiction conferred upon the revisional authority under Section 18 of the Act, the respondent could not have interfered with the finding of fact recorded by respondent No. 2. 9. The Additional District Magistrate, (R.C.) pasted a notice on 1.10.1977 on the notice board called as ‘vacancy notice’ regarding the house in question, copy of which was also sent to Mr. Pran Nath Seth-respondent No. 3 for his information, who filed the objection against notice on 14.10.1977. He also filed objection against the application of petitioner No. 1 for allotment denying the vacancy, which was replied by the petitioner No. 1. On 23.10.1978, the Rent Control Authority notified the vacancy of the ground floor as well as first floor of the house in question and fix the date for objection i.e. 8.11.1978. Respondent No. 3 filed an application seeking one month’s more time to file objection on the ground that although he has conveyed the information to his daughter, Smt. Asha Tandon yet he could not receive the instructions for filing objection. The Rent Control Authority refused to grant him further time on the ground that the landlady had already filed objection and vakalatnama signed by her and passed an order on that date itself. Considering the need of petitioner No. 1 for one portion as genuine, he allotted ground floor of the house to petitioner No. 1 and issued direction to issue allotment order accordingly on 10.11.1978. Considering the need of petitioner No. 1 for one portion as genuine, he allotted ground floor of the house to petitioner No. 1 and issued direction to issue allotment order accordingly on 10.11.1978. On the application of petitioner No. 2, he allotted first floor of the house in question to him. 10. Mr. Syed Kalim Uddin, learned Advocate filed revision against the order of allotment dated 8.11.1978 passed by Rent Control Authority in favour of petitioner No. 1. However, he withdrew the same subsequently. Thus, the revisions bearing No. 143 of 1978 and 150 of 1978 filed by Prem Nath Seth-respondent No. 3 as well as Smt. Asha Tandon-opposite party No. 4 remained on board for adjudication. 11. Through rent revision No. 143 of 1978 filed by opposite parties 3 and 4 against the order of allotment in favour of petitioner No. 1, they took the ground that the building in dispute has never fallen vacant either physically or legally nor could it be deemed to have fallen vacant to entitle the respondent No. 2 to make any allotment. It was further submitted that Dr. C.P. Tandon, the owner of the premises had been in possession of the said premises during his life time and after his death, his son Dr. K.K. Tandon became owner, who also died in England. Only because his wife and other family member could not return to the country for some time, no vacancy could be said to be created in the premises in question. They challenged the finding of Rent Control Authority as he erred in considering the objection filed by the revisionist and passed the order without application of mind. It was further submitted that there was no evidence of the fact that Smt. Asha Tandon intended to sell the property. They further submitted that the report of the Inspector itself was bad due to non-compliance of Rule 8 and 9 and other Rules and further the date of allotment was never fixed as provided under law. They claimed that order of allotment was without jurisdiction. They also challenged the order on the ground of violation of principle of natural justice. They further submitted that opposite party No. 2 completely ignored the fact that Dr. They claimed that order of allotment was without jurisdiction. They also challenged the order on the ground of violation of principle of natural justice. They further submitted that opposite party No. 2 completely ignored the fact that Dr. C.P. Tandon had been in possession of said premises during his life time and all his belongings continued to be kept in the said building and the mere fact, that his son Dr. K.K. Tandon, who become exclusive owner being sole heir died in England could not give the chance to deem vacancy in the premises. The Rent Control Authority committed manifest error in interpreting Section 12 of the Act. They further claimed that rent control authority i.e. the Additional District Magistrate, (Rent Control) passed the order of allotment in violation of provisions of Rule 10(9) of the Rules as well as Section 16(9) of the Act. They also submitted that the premises in question was never let out to any person as whole or in part. It was further pointed out that after death of Dr. C.P. Tandon (Retired Inspector General of Prisons) on 24.8.1977, one Dr. Suresh Chandra Yadav applied for allotment of the said house but application was consigned to record office on the ground that there was no vacancy on 16.1.1978. 12. The question was also raised on the maintainability of the revision by the opposite parties (petitioners) on the ground that Rule 7 of Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (in short Rules) provides that every revision under the Act shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant and his counsel, if any, whereas in the instant revision, the landlady Smt. Asha Tandon has not signed either of the two rent revisions because admittedly she was in England and both the revisions had been signed by Mr. Pran Nath Seth, Advocate, who is the father of the landlady. To substantiate the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the opposite parties placed reliance upon a decision rendered in the case of Smt. Vidyawati v. Smt. Chhawli Devi and another, 1978 All LJ 974. 13. Pran Nath Seth, Advocate, who is the father of the landlady. To substantiate the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the opposite parties placed reliance upon a decision rendered in the case of Smt. Vidyawati v. Smt. Chhawli Devi and another, 1978 All LJ 974. 13. In the light of Section 3(j) of the Act, which defines the terms ‘landlord’ in which the agent is included, the revisional Court held that respondent No. 3-Pran Nath Seth was treated as agent of the landlady by the ADM (CS) as is established from the record itself. The notices were also issued to the landlady by the Rent Control Authority at the address of Mr. Pran Nath Seth and were served on him. The revisional Court held the respondent No. 3 as agent and counsel of the landlady, was competent to sign and maintain the revisions. Accordingly, the revisional Court held that both the revisions were legally maintainable. The petitioners raised the objection on the maintainability of the revision on another ground also that the determination of vacancy is a finding of fact and once the Rent Controlling Authority has determined the vacancy, it cannot be interfered by the revisional Court. Dealing with this question, the revisional Court held that jurisdiction to allot the house in question is a jurisdiction of fact if by erroneous decision, on the point of vacancy, the Rent Control Authority has committed error, the said findings can be challenged in revision. The revisional Court further held that in both the rent revisions, the main contention of the respondent was that the A.D.M.(CS) had no jurisdiction to allot the premises because it was neither actually vacant nor could have been deemed to be vacant. Therefore, both the revisions were maintainable. 14. On merit, the revisional Court proceeded to decide some questions, which are discussed hereinunder : (1) Whether any portion of the house in question was vacant and available for allotment? After discussion, the revisional Court held that it is evident from the record of lower Court that ground floor of the house in question has always been in possession of the landlady and was never vacated by the landlady nor was any body permitted to occupy this portion by the landlady. After discussion, the revisional Court held that it is evident from the record of lower Court that ground floor of the house in question has always been in possession of the landlady and was never vacated by the landlady nor was any body permitted to occupy this portion by the landlady. In the report of Inspector itself it was stated that he found one Chaukidar Balbir in the house in question at the time of inspection, who told him that the ground floor of the house in question was already in possession of the landlady. The household effects and belongings of the landlady were still in the said portion as is evident from the record. The Inspector in his report had not recommended for notifying the vacancy of the ground floor. He did not find any evidence that the landlady had removed her personal goods and belonging from the house in question. The onus was on the applicant for allotment to establish that the landlady had removed her goods and belongings from the house completely. There was no evidence on record to show that the landlady had removed her goods and belongings from the house in question. The observation of the learned A.D.M. (City) that the landlady had permanently settled in England is without any evidence on record. Mr. Rama Shankar Singh had taken the possession of the part of the ground floor from the Chaukidar Balbir as stated by him in his application to A.D.M. (C.S.), Lucknow. From the aforesaid facts, the revisional Court found that the ground floor was neither actually vacant nor could be deemed vacant at the time when it was allotted to Sri Ram Shankar Singh, opposite party No. 1 of the rent revision No. 143 of 1978. The mere absence of the landlady from the country in connection with the treatment of her husband, who ultimately died, would not mean that she had vacated the house in question. Therefore, for the aforesaid reason, the revisional Court held that the ground floor of the house in question was not vacant and the impugned order of allotment in favour of Sri R.S. Singh, Advocate was without jurisdiction and is unsustainable. (2) The next question is whether the first floor of the house in question was vacant. Therefore, for the aforesaid reason, the revisional Court held that the ground floor of the house in question was not vacant and the impugned order of allotment in favour of Sri R.S. Singh, Advocate was without jurisdiction and is unsustainable. (2) The next question is whether the first floor of the house in question was vacant. The revisional Court considered the report of the inspector, which shows that at the time of inspection, Sri Syed Kaleemuddin, Advocate was in possession of a portion of the first floor for about three months. 15. The capacity of Mr. Syed Kaleemuddin to occupy the first floor of the house in question was shown as junior of Mr. Pran Nath Seth who occupied the same as caretaker. The revisional Court held that Mr. Syed Kaleemuddin was occupying the said portion under the permission of respondent No. 3-(Pran Nath Seth), as a caretaker. 16. One question also arose regarding letting out the first floor to one D.I.G. (Prisons), Lucknow in reply of which, it was submitted by the revisionist that he was one of the friends of late Dr. C.P. Tandon and was accommodated to stay therein till his accommodation was ready. However, for the purpose of determination of vacancy of first floor of the house in question, the revisional Court held that since Mr. Syed Kaleemuddin was in occupation as caretaker, no vacancy of first floor could be deemed. It was submitted by the opposite parties that the revisionist’s house was let out to several persons in the past and in this connection, he showed the telephone directory of 1976 to show that telephone number was given in the name of Synthetic & Chemicals Sangeet Rai Behari Lal Marg-1, which was not taken as a piece of evidence. In this manner, the revisional Court held that there was neither actual vacancy nor deemed vacancy on the first floor. Therefore, the allotment order in favour of Sri Shri Raj Singh was also without jurisdiction. 17. The revisional Court also discussed the claim of the revisionist for breach of Rule 8(2) of the Rules and held that there was a breach of Rule 8(2) of the Rules and on this ground also, he declared the allotment order invalid. Therefore, the allotment order in favour of Sri Shri Raj Singh was also without jurisdiction. 17. The revisional Court also discussed the claim of the revisionist for breach of Rule 8(2) of the Rules and held that there was a breach of Rule 8(2) of the Rules and on this ground also, he declared the allotment order invalid. Breach of Rule 9 was also claimed with the submission that Rent Control Authority did not intimate the date to the revisionist when the allotment was to be made. The revisional Court also found the breach of said Rule. In the aforesaid background, the revisional Court set aside the orders of allotment dated 13.11.1978 as well as the order dated 10.11.1978 passed in favour of the petitioners of the present writ petition. 18. The petitioners have filed the present writ petition challenging the order of the revisional Court. This Court by means of an order dated 29.1.1997 allowed the writ petition and set aside the order impugned dated 23.3.1979 and remanded the matter to the revisional Court for decision in accordance with law as the revisional Court has not considered the pleas taken by the respondents in the revisions filed by them. This Court held that contesting respondent or the other respondents should have filed writ petition against the order declaring vacancy. Since they failed to challenge that order, it had become final. The revisional Court was in error in setting aside the allotment orders on the ground that no vacancy existed for allotment to the petitioners. It appears that in the meantime, the respondent No. 6 Smt. Achal Misra intervened in the matter in the capacity of purchaser of the house and being aggrieved with the order passed by this Court, she filed an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was registered as civil appeal No. 3322 of 1998. The Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal. 19. In the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the matter was referred to the larger bench on the question whether the order notifying the vacancy which leads to the final order of allotment, could be challenged in a proceeding taken to challenge the final order as being an order, which is a preliminary step in the process of decision making in passing the final order. The larger bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court after discussing the various points ultimately held that in a revision against the final order of allotment, which is provided for by the Act, the order notifying the vacancy could be challenged and set aside the order of the High Court and remanded the writ petition for a fresh hearing and disposal in accordance with law, operative portion of which is as under : “We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was in error in allowing the writ petition solely on the ground that the landlord had not challenged the original order notifying the vacancies then and there. The decision of the High Court in the writ petition, therefore, required to be set aside and the writ petition remanded to that Court for a fresh hearing and disposal in accordance with law, including the question whether the order notifying the vacancy was proper. It would also be necessary for the High Court to consider the effect of the cancellation of the order in favour of Respondent No. 2 considering the nature of the allotment made in his favour, even assuming that the High Court does not find any reason to interfere with the order notifying the vacancy or with the order making the allotment. The appeal is hence allowed. The judgment of the High Court in the Writ Petition filed by the allottees is set aside and the Writ Petition is remanded to the High Court for a fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. The High Court, it is hoped, will expeditiously dispose of the Writ Petition afresh pursuant to this order of remand, in the circumstances of the case preferably within a period of six months of the receipt of a copy of the judgment.” 20. As no presumptive rent was fixed by the Rent Control Authority, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also fixed the rent for payment and issued direction to the respondent to pay the same as per direction of Hon’ble Supreme Court itself. Thus, the writ petition is before this Court for a fresh disposal. 21. As no presumptive rent was fixed by the Rent Control Authority, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also fixed the rent for payment and issued direction to the respondent to pay the same as per direction of Hon’ble Supreme Court itself. Thus, the writ petition is before this Court for a fresh disposal. 21. Before dealing with the factual pleas raised in the case and findings given by the Court, I feel it appropriate to reproduce some relevant provisions of the Act for consideration of the case which are as under : Section 3 of the Act contains definition clause under different sub-sections. Sub-Section (j) defines “landlord”, which reads as under : “(j) "landlord”, in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building were let, would be, payable and includes, except in clause (g), the agent or attorney, or such person;” Section 12. “12. Deemed vacancy of building in certain cases.—(1) A landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if— (a) he has substantially removed his effects therefrom, or (b) he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family, or (c) in the case of a residential building, he as well as members of his family have taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere. (2) In the case of non-residential building, where a tenant carrying on business in the building admits a person who is not a member of his family as a partner or a new partner, as the case may be, the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. (2) In the case of non-residential building, where a tenant carrying on business in the building admits a person who is not a member of his family as a partner or a new partner, as the case may be, the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. (3) In the case of a residential building, if the tenant or any member of his family builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant state or gets vacated a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area in which the building under tenancy is situate, he shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy : Provided that if the tenant or any member of his family had built any such residential building before the date of commencement of this Act, then such tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy upon the expiration of a period of one year from the said date. [Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section— (a) a person shall be deemed to have otherwise acquired a building, if he is occupying a public building for residential purposes as a tenant, allottee or licensee. (b) the expression “any member of family”, in relation to a tenant, shall not include a person who has neither been normally residing with nor is wholly dependent on such tenant.] [(3-A) If the tenant of a residential building holding a transferable post under any Government or local authority or a public sector corporation or under any other employer has been transferred to some other city, municipality, notified area or town area, then such tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy such building with effect from the thirtieth day of June following the date of such transfer or from the date of allotment to him of any residential accommodation (whether any accommodation be allotted under this Act or any official accommodation is provided by the employer) in the city, municipality, notified area or town area to which he has been so transferred whichever is later. (3-B) If the tenant of a residential building is engaged on any profession, trade, calling or employment in any city, municipality.......area or town area in which the said building is situate, and such engagement ceases for any reason whatsoever, and he is landlord of any other building in any other city, municipality, notified area or town area, then such tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the first mentioned building with effect from the date on which he obtains vacant possession of the last mentioned building whether as a result of proceedings under Section 21 or otherwise.] (4) Any building or part which a landlord or tenant has ceased to occupy within the meaning of sub-section (1), or sub-section (2), or [sub-section (3), sub-section (3-A) or sub-section (3-B)], shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, deemed to be vacant. [(5) A tenant or, as the case may be, a member of his family, referred to in sub-section (3) shall, have a right, as landlord of any residential building referrred to in the said sub-section which may have been let out by him before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976 to apply under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 for the eviction of his tenant from such building, notwithstanding that such building is one to which the remaining provisions of this Act do not apply.] Section 11. “11. Prohibition of letting without allotment order.—Save as hereinafter provided, no person shall let any buildings except in pursuance of an allotment order issued under Section 16. Section 16. “16. “11. Prohibition of letting without allotment order.—Save as hereinafter provided, no person shall let any buildings except in pursuance of an allotment order issued under Section 16. Section 16. “16. Allotment and release of vacant building.—(1) Subject to the provisions of the Act, the District Magistrate may by order— (a) require the landlord to let any building which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant, or a part of such building but not appurtenant land alone, to any person specified in the order (to be called an allotment order); or (b) release the whole or any part of such building, or any land appurtenant thereto, in favour of the landlord (to be called a release order) : Provided that in the case of a vacancy referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 12, the District Magistrate shall give an opportunity to the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, of showing that the said section is not attracted to his case, before making an order under clause (a)]” “16(4). Where the allottee or the landlord has not been able to obtain possession of the building, allotted to him or as the case may be, released in his favour, or any part thereof, the District Magistrate, on an application of the allottee or the landlord, as the case may be, may by order evict or cause to be evicted any person named in the order as well as every other person claiming under him or found in occupation, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary and put or cause to be put the allottee or the landlord in possession of the building or part.” “16(7) Every order under this section, [subject to any order made under Section 18] be final.” “16(9) The District Magistrate shall, while making an order under clause (a) of sub-section (1), also require the allottee to pay to the landlord an advance, equivalent to,— (a) Where the building is situated in a hill municipality, one half of the yearly presumptive rent; and (b) in any other case, one month’s presumptive rent, and on his failure to make or offer the payment within a week thereof, rescind the allotment order.” Explanation.—In this sub-section, the expression “presumptive rent” means an amount of rent which the District Magistrate prima facie considers reasonable having regard to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 9, provided that such amount shall not be less than the amount of rent which was payable by the last tenant, if any. Section 18. “18. Appeal against order of allotment or release.—(1) No appeal shall lie from any order under Section 16 or Section 19, whether made before or after the commencement of this section, but any person aggrieved by a final order under any of the said sections may, within fifteen days from the date of such order, prefer a revision to the District Judge on any one or more of the following grounds, namely : (a) that the District Magistrate has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law; (b) that the District Magistrate has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law; (c) that the District Magistrate acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. (2) The revising authority may confirm or rescind the final order made under sub-section (1) or may remand the case to the District Magistrate for rehearing, and pending the revision, may stay the operation of such order on such terms, if any, as it thinks fit. Explanation.—The power to rescind the final order under this sub-section shall not include the power to pass an allotment order or to direct the passing of an allotment order in favour of a person different from the allottee mentioned in the order under revision. (3) Where an order under Section 16 or Section 19 is rescinded, the District Magistrate shall, on an application being made to him on that behalf, place the parties back in the position which they would have occupied but for such order or such part thereof as has been rescinded, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary. Relevant Rules of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 reads as under : Rule 7. “7. Appeal. [Sections 10, 18 and 22].—(1) Every appeal or revision under the Act shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant or revisionist or applicant, as the case may be, and his counsel, if any, and presented either in person or through counsel, to the District Judge or to the Munsarim of his Court. (2) Every such memorandum shall be accompanied by a copy of the order sought to be appealed or revised and shall set forth concisely and under distinct heads, the grounds of objection and such grounds shall be numbered consecutively. (3) The memorandum shall also be accompanied by sufficient number of copies thereof alongwith copies of notice of the appeal or revision for service on the respondents or be accompanied by [a written] acknowledgment of receipt thereof, by the respondents or their counsel. (3) The memorandum shall also be accompanied by sufficient number of copies thereof alongwith copies of notice of the appeal or revision for service on the respondents or be accompanied by [a written] acknowledgment of receipt thereof, by the respondents or their counsel. (4) Copy of the order to be filed under this rule shall ordinarily be a certified copy and where it is not reasonably practicable or convenient to file such a copy, the appellant or applicant shall give reasons for not being able to file a certified copy and shall also file an affidavit verifying the contents of the order under appeal or revision or of its operative part.] (5) The memorandum of appeal or revision shall bear the requisite fee as mentioned in Rules 35 and 36. (6) Notice of appeal or revision or other process may be served on the counsel who may have represented any party in the original proceedings before the District Magistrate or the prescribed authority. A copy of the notice of appeal or revision or other process may also be posted registered acknowledgment due, to the address of that party as recorded in the original proceedings. The notice shall be deemed to be served on the earliest of the dates on which service in various modes, if any, adopted is effected. (8) As far as possible, a revision under Section 18 shall be decided within one month, an appeal or revision under Section 10 shall be decided within two months, and an appeal under Section 22 shall be decided within six months from the date of its presentation. Rule 8. “8. Ascertainment of vacancy [Section 12, 16 and 34(8)].—The District Magistrate, shall, before making any order of allotment or release in respect of any building which is alleged to be vacant under Section 12 or to be otherwise vacant or to be likely to fall vacant, get the same inspected [by a gazetted officer]. (2) The inspection of the building, so far possible, shall be made in the presence of the landlord and the tenant or any other occupant. (2) The inspection of the building, so far possible, shall be made in the presence of the landlord and the tenant or any other occupant. The facts mentioned in the report should wherever practicable, be elicited from at least two respectable persons in the locality and the conclusion of the inspection report shall be pasted on the notice board of the office of the District Magistrate for the information of the general public, and an order of allotment may be passed not before the expiration of three days from the date of such posting, and if in the meantime any objection is received, not before the disposal of such objection. (3) Any objection under sub-rule (2) shall be decided after consideration of any evidence that the objector or any other person concerned may adduce. Rule 9. “9. Notice of vacancy [Section 15].—(1) Every notice to the District Magistrate under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 15 shall contain the following particulars : (a) The number, if any, allotted by the local authority to the building and the street, ward or division in which the building is situated. (b) The name and address of the landlord. (c) Whether the building is residential or non-residential. (d) Details of accommodation available together with the appurtenant land, garden, garage, out-houses, etc. (e) In case the building falling vacant is part of a bigger building, the names of occupants of the other parts. (f) The actual or expected date of vacancy. (g) The name of the person vacating the building. (h) The year of construction of the building. (i) Whether the building was ever let out. (j) Other information, if any. (2) The notice shall be signed and dated by the information and shall be presented in person at any time during office hours on any working day or shall be sent by registered post acknowledgment due. (3) Immediately after the receipt of intimation of vacancy of any building in the office of the District Magistrate, the vacancy shall be entered in a register which shall be maintained in that behalf and be notified for the information of the general public by pasting a copy of the list of the vacant buildings on the notice board of that office, specifying therein the date on which the question of allotment will be considered. He shall also issue a notice to the landlord intimating him the date so fixed. On the date so fixed the District Magistrate shall consider the cases of all applicants registered in the register mentioned in Rule 10 and shall pass an order under Section 16 in accordance with Rules 10 and 11. Rule 10. “10. Allotment procedure [Section 16(1)(a) and 34(8)].—(1)(a) An application for allotment of a building shall be made in Form A. (b) The District Magistrate shall maintain a register of application for allotment of buildings. (c) The application shall be classified according to the priority categories specified in Rule 11 and shall be registered in order of receipt of application. (d) For each priority category, there shall be a separate register and the applicant shall be given a serial number showing the number and date of his registration and the priority category in which he has been registered. (e) Each such register shall be open to inspection by any member of the public on application being made in that behalf. 10(9) In the case of a building which was never let out before, the District Magistrate shall serve on the landlord a notice asking him within a month of service thereof whether he is willing to throw the building open for letting and if so, to nominate a person in whose favour the allotment may be made, and thereupon— (a) if the landlord intimates the District Magistrate within the said period that he does not want to let out the building, it shall not be allotted; (b) if he intimates the District Magistrate within the said period his consent to letting and nominates a person in that behalf, the allotment shall be made in favour of that nominee. (c) if the landlord fails to send any such intimation within the said time, it shall be open to the District Magistrate to allot the building to any person. Rule 14. “Enforcement of order of allotment or release. (c) if the landlord fails to send any such intimation within the said time, it shall be open to the District Magistrate to allot the building to any person. Rule 14. “Enforcement of order of allotment or release. [Section 16(4)].—Where any building about to fall vacant is allotted or released under Section 16(1), proceedings for putting the allottee or the landlord, as the case may be, in possession shall be taken by the District Magistrate only after the building has actually fallen vacant or is held by him through an inquiry conducted in that behalf to have fallen vacant, and an order in Form C shall be served upon the person or persons found in unauthorised occupation of the building directing him or them to vacate the same and deliver vacant possession thereof to the person named in the order within such period as may be specified in the order, which shall in no case be less than a week from the date of service of the order upon him, and on his failure to comply with the order within the time allowed, the District Magistrate shall issue an order to the officer-in-charge of the Police Station in Form D directing him to get the building vacated and to put the allottee or the landlord in possession of the building.” Rule 19. “19. Notice to unauthorised occupant before eviction [Section 16 and 34(8)].— Where an allotment or release of a building or part thereof is ordered under Section 16(1) on the ground or deemed vacancy within the meaning of Section 12 or on the ground of unauthorised occupation within the meaning of Section 13, no such order shall be executed until after the expiration of fifteen days from the service upon the occupant of a notice to vacate that building or part.” 22. The petitioners have challenged the order impugned on several grounds. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order of allotment is appealable/revisable under Section 18 of Act on the grounds mentioned therein. Since none of the grounds was available to the petitioners to challenge the order of allotment, the revision before the District Magistrate under Section 18 of the Act was not maintainable. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order of allotment is appealable/revisable under Section 18 of Act on the grounds mentioned therein. Since none of the grounds was available to the petitioners to challenge the order of allotment, the revision before the District Magistrate under Section 18 of the Act was not maintainable. The next ground is that revision preferred before the District Judge was not by the competent person, therefore, it was not maintainable as Rule 7 of the Rules requires filing of appeal or revision in the form of memorandum signed by the appellant or revisionist or applicant, as the case may be and his counsel, if any, and presented either in person or through counsel to the District Judge. In the present case on the memorandum of the appeal presented by Mr. Pran Nath Seth, there was no signature of landlady Mrs. Asha Tandon nor was there any Vakalatnama authorising Mr. Seth to file the revision. There was only the revision filed by Mr. Syed Kalim Uddin on the authority of her Vakalatnama but he withdrew the same and accordingly, they further submitted that Mr. Seth committed fraud on the Court and the order passed on fraud is nullity. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioners also pointed out towards the incomplete and incorrect address of the landlady furnished by Mr. Pran Nath Seth and further on the point of misrepresentation made by Mr. Pran Nath Seth claiming himself authorised to file the revision. Learned counsel for the petitioners have also raised the question on the maintainability of the revision with the averments that the revisionist concealed the material facts regarding tenancy of Mr. D.P. Saha, which established the vacancy of the house. Accordingly, they have submitted that Mr. Seth committed fraud on the Court and the order passed on fraud is nullity. They also raised question on the locus of Mrs. Achal Misra-opposite party No. 5, who is the subsequent purchaser of the house in question claiming that the transaction during the course of litigation, is unlawful. They submitted that the landlady Smt. Asha Tandon had settled permanently in London and thereat she had movable and immovable property as she had never been shown to be resided in the house in question rather some time Mr. Syed Kalim Uddin and sometime other persons have been shown to have resided in the house in question. They submitted that the landlady Smt. Asha Tandon had settled permanently in London and thereat she had movable and immovable property as she had never been shown to be resided in the house in question rather some time Mr. Syed Kalim Uddin and sometime other persons have been shown to have resided in the house in question. Therefore, under Section 12 of the Act, there was a clear vacancy in the house in question. 25. In the aforesaid background, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the revisional authority proceeded to decide the case without authority and accordingly he transgressed his power. Thus, the order impugned is without jurisdiction. 26. In support of the contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on some decisions of this Court as well as of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which are reproduced as under : (1) Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and another, 2006 (1) SCC 75 . (2) Azizuddin v. Ist A.D.J. Agra and others, 1979 ARC 280. (3) Hari Swarup v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, 1982 ARC 809 (DB). (4) Dharm Narain Agarwal v. Vth Additional District & Sessions Judge Meerut and others, 1983 (2) ARC 167. (5) Ganpat Roy and others v. Additional District Magistrate and others, 1985 (2) SCC 307 . (6) Shyam Dass v. Delegatee District Magistrate, Bijnor and others, 1988(1) ARC 391. (7) Yogendra Tewari v. District Judge, Gorakhpur and others, 1984 (10) ALR 285. (8) Rajendra Singh and others v. District Judge, Kanpur and others, 1986(1) ARC 116. (9) Lachhman Prasad Richaria v. IVth A.D.J. Hamirpur, 1990 (1) ARC 497. (10) Keshav Ram v. IIIrd A.D.J. Dehradun and others, 1988(2) ARC 321. (11) Roshan Lal Agrawal v. M/s Gupta Ayurvedic Pharmacy, 1979 ARC 457. 27. On the point of signing of memorandum of appeal/revision and Vakalatnama, he referred a case i.e. Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and another, 2006 (1) SCC 75 . (10) Keshav Ram v. IIIrd A.D.J. Dehradun and others, 1988(2) ARC 321. (11) Roshan Lal Agrawal v. M/s Gupta Ayurvedic Pharmacy, 1979 ARC 457. 27. On the point of signing of memorandum of appeal/revision and Vakalatnama, he referred a case i.e. Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and another, 2006 (1) SCC 75 . Relevant para of which reads as under : “It is, thus, now well settled that any defect in signing the memorandum of appeal or any defect in the authority of the person signing the memorandum of appeal, or the omission to file the vakalatnama executed by the appellant, alongwith the appeal, will not invalidate the memorandum of appeal, if such omission or defect is not deliberate and the signing of the memorandum of appeal or the presentation thereof before the appellate Court was with the knowledge and authority of the appellant. Such omission or defect being one relatable to procedure, can subsequently be corrected. It is the duty of the office to verify whether the memorandum of appeal was signed by the appellant or his authorised agent or pleader holding appropriate vakalatnama. If the office does not point out such defect and the appeal is accepted and proceeded with, it cannot be rejected at the hearing of the appeal merely by reason of such defect, without giving an opportunity to the appellant to rectify it. The requirement that the appeal should be signed by the appellant or his pleader (duly authorised by a vakalatnama executed by the appellant) is, no doubt, mandatory. But it does not mean that non-compliance should result in automatic rejection of the appeal without giving an opportunity to the appellant to rectify the defect. If and when the defect is noticed or pointed out, the Court should, either on an application by the appellant or suo moto, permit the appellant to rectify the defect by either signing the memorandum of appeal or by furnishing the vakalatnama. If and when the defect is noticed or pointed out, the Court should, either on an application by the appellant or suo moto, permit the appellant to rectify the defect by either signing the memorandum of appeal or by furnishing the vakalatnama. It should also be kept in view that if the pleader signing the memorandum of appeal has appeared for the party in the trial Court, then he need not present a fresh vakalatnama alongwith the memorandum of appeal, as the vakalatnama in his favour filed in the trial Court will be sufficient authority to sign and present the memorandum of appeal having regard to Rule 4(2) of Order 3, CPC, read with Explanation (c) thereto. In such an event, a mere memo referring to the authority given to him in the trial Court may be sufficient. However, filing a fresh vakalatnama with the memo of appeal will always be convenient to facilitate the processing of the appeal by the office.” 28. In the case of Azizuddin v. Ist A.D.J. Agra and others (supra) in which the jurisdiction of Additional Commissioner to interfere with the finding recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was under consideration, this Court held that “Section 18 is analogous to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The revisional Court’s power is, therefore, limited and can be used only when there is either exercise or refusal to exercise jurisdiction. It can also be exercised if the Court below has acted illegally and with material irregularity in adopting the procedure for deciding a case.” 29. In the light of the decision given in Hari Swarup v. Rent Control & Eviction Officer Alld. (supra) as well as in the case of Dharm Narain Agarwal v. Vth Additional District & Sessions Judge, Meerut and others (supra), learned counsel for the petitioner submits that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Act, it was not open to the District Judge to reverse the finding recorded by the Rent Control Authority. 30. (supra) as well as in the case of Dharm Narain Agarwal v. Vth Additional District & Sessions Judge, Meerut and others (supra), learned counsel for the petitioner submits that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Act, it was not open to the District Judge to reverse the finding recorded by the Rent Control Authority. 30. Further, he submitted that in the case of Ganpat Roy and others v. Additional District Magistrate and others (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that while in an appeal, findings of fact can also be challenged on the ground that the evidence was not properly appreciated, in revision the only question would be whether the District Magistrate had exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or had failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him by law or had acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The scope of revision under Section 18 is, therefore, much narrower than in the case of an appeal. 31. On the question of non-compliance of Rule 9(3) of the Rules, he placed reliance upon a judgment rendered in the case of Shyam Dass v. Delegatee District Magistrate, Bijnor and others (supra) and submitted that this rule becomes applicable in a case where a notice about the vacancy of an accommodation is given either by the landlord or tenant as provided in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 15 and under the clause of deemed vacancy, it has no application. 32. On the point of notice/opportunity to the landlord before determination of vacancy, learned counsel for the petitioner cited a case i.e. Rajendra Singh and others v. District Judge, Kanpur and others (supra) in which, this Court held that "Even if the petitioner did not have any notice before the vacancy was notified, he was given opportunity by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The petitioner filed his written statement saying that sub-section (3) of Section 12 did not apply and also asserted that the sale deed was benami. Thereafter, an order of allotment was made. As a result of non-service of notice under Rule 8, no injury was caused to the petitioner. Therefore, non-compliance of Rule 8 in the circumstances of the present case was of no consequence". 33. He further cited another case i.e. Lachhman Prasad Richaria v. IVth A.D.J. Hamirpur (supra). Thereafter, an order of allotment was made. As a result of non-service of notice under Rule 8, no injury was caused to the petitioner. Therefore, non-compliance of Rule 8 in the circumstances of the present case was of no consequence". 33. He further cited another case i.e. Lachhman Prasad Richaria v. IVth A.D.J. Hamirpur (supra). In the light of the aforesaid judgment, he submits that since on behalf of landlady one Mr. Syed Kalim Uddin had already filed the objection before the Rent Control Authority, it cannot be said that it is a case of no notice to the landlady. 34. On the point of compliance of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that in the case of Keshav Ram v. IIIrd A.D.J. Dehradun and others (supra), this Court has held that “I find from the report that the Inspector recommended at the end that the report be considered after giving notice to the parties. That was done in this case in pursuance of which the petitioner filed an objection. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer took evidence of the parties and held that vacancy existed. Consequently any technical non-compliance of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 was of no consequence on the facts of this case. It has been complied with.” 35. In the light of the aforesaid order, he submitted that if technically there is any non-compliance of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 in determination of vacancy in the present case that has no consequence in the matter. He further submitted that non-compliance of Rule 8 has also been considered by this Court in the case of Roshan Lal Agrawal v. M/s Gupta Ayurvedic Pharmacy (supra) in which this Court held that in a case where both the persons in occupation as well as the landlord know about the fact that a report has been submitted by the Inspector and thereafter objections were filed to contest the said report the ultimate action could not be declared as invalid merely because of certain irregularity in conduct of the inspection by the inspector. 36. They also drew the attention of this Court towards the order-sheet of the Court of A.D.M. (R.C.), Lucknow, who in the order dated 9.9.1978 recorded that “the applicant and counsel of Smt. Asha Tandon are present. Let the record be placed for objection on 9.10.1978”. 36. They also drew the attention of this Court towards the order-sheet of the Court of A.D.M. (R.C.), Lucknow, who in the order dated 9.9.1978 recorded that “the applicant and counsel of Smt. Asha Tandon are present. Let the record be placed for objection on 9.10.1978”. On 9.10.1978, he further recorded that “counsels of both the parties are present. Counsel of landlady filed his objection. Placed the record for evidence on 23.10.1978”. They submitted that the order sheet proves that the objection filed by landlady was on record, thus, no defence can be pleaded that it is a case of violation of principle of natural justice. 37. In support of his submission on the point of fraudulent action of the opposite party Mr. Pran Nath Seth also, he cited some cases which are as under : (1) S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, AIR 1994 SC 853 . (2) Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, 2003(8) SCC 319 . (3) State of Andhra Pradesh v. T. Surya Chandra Rao, AIR 2005 SC 3110 . (4) A.V. Papayya Sastry and others v. Govt. of A.P. and others, 2007 (4) SCC 221 . (5) Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2005 (7) SCC 605 . 38. In the case of Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v. State of Maharashtra and others (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has already considered the cases, which are as under : (1) S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, AIR 1994 SC 853 . (2) Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, 2003(8) SCC 319 . (3) State of Andhra Pradesh v. T. Surya Chandra Rao, AIR 2005 SC 3110 . 39. Therefore, there is no need to repeat all those cases here on the point of discussion. 40. In the case of Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v. State of Maharashtra and others (supra), the grant of benefits to phantoms masquerading to the freedom fighters was under challenge as large number of persons had been granted pensionary benefits under the Freedom Fighters’ Pension Scheme on the misrepresentation of fact. The petitioners had come with a case that some of the persons who are so called freedom fighters had succeeded to get the benefit fraudulently by concealment of fact. The petitioners had come with a case that some of the persons who are so called freedom fighters had succeeded to get the benefit fraudulently by concealment of fact. The Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the question as to what is the fraud in the light of several cases decided earlier and held that the suppression of material document would also amount to fraud on the Court; fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter; negligence is not fraud but it can be evidence on fraud and no judgment of a Court can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud; fraud unravels everything. Fraud vitiates all transactions known to the law of however high a degree of solemnity. 41. In the case of A.V. Papayya Sastry and others v. Govt. of A.P. and others, 2007 (4) SCC 221 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that ‘fraud’ may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilised as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants. 42. In the aforesaid background, learned counsels for the petitioners submitted that although the revision itself was not maintainable before the District Judge yet he entertained the same and transgressed his power of revision in deciding the case on merit relying upon the misstatement of facts submitted by the respondent (revisionist). 43. Thus, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order impugned is unsustainable. 44. Mr. R.B. Singhal, learned Advocate appeared and argued the case on behalf of respondent No. 6. His submissions are noted hereinunder : 45. 43. Thus, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order impugned is unsustainable. 44. Mr. R.B. Singhal, learned Advocate appeared and argued the case on behalf of respondent No. 6. His submissions are noted hereinunder : 45. He submitted that notice of vacancy dated 1.10.1977 (Annexure 1) issued by the Additional District Magistrate proposed the vacancy of first floor of the house named as “Sangeet”, 509/151 Rae Behari Lal Road, New Hyderabad vacated by one police officer. In the said notice, the name of the house owner was indicated as Shri Krishna Kumar through Mr. Pran Nath Seth, 14/61 Sewa Sadan, Civil Lines, Kanpur. 46. It was not a case of intimating the vacancy to District Magistrate by the landlord under Section 15 of the Act. Therefore, the rent control authority proceeded to exercise power under Section 16 of the Act under the clause of deeming vacancy of building as is provided under Section 12(4) of the Act. The District Magistrate in the case of vacancy referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Act, is under statutory obligation to give an opportunity to the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, of showing that the said section is not attracted to his case before making an order under clause (a). Under Section 3(j) ‘landlord’ includes the agent or attorney or such person also. Therefore, treating agent to Mr. Pran Nath Seth, the authority issued notice to him at his address. Mr. Seth filed objection of the said notice on 14.10.1977 and tried to establish that first floor of the house in question could not be deemed to be vacant under Section 12(1) of the Act in the light of several facts submitted therein. Considering the reply of Mr. Seth, the said proceeding was dropped and case was consigned to record room on 16.1.1978. 47. He substantiated his submissions with the report of the Inspector concerned which is Annexure 3 to the writ petition, who reported that Mr. Pran Nath Seth, Advocate, resident of 14/61, Sewa Sadan, Civil Lines, Kanpur is the father of Smt. Asha Tandon, who is the widow of late Shri Krishna Kumar Tandon, as also the house owner and the house in question is under the supervision of Mr. Seth. He also reported that for allotment of first floor, one case on the application of Dr. Seth. He also reported that for allotment of first floor, one case on the application of Dr. Suresh Chandra Yadav was pending, which was consigned with record room by means of an order dated 16.1.1978 passed by learned Additional District Magistrate (Rent Control). Though he reported the vacancy under Section 12 of the Act, but submitted that parties be heard and earlier record be connected with the present proceeding and appropriate order be passed. Thus, the vacancy of only first floor was reported by Inspector concerned. Once earlier the proceeding was consigned with record room, the authority was under obligation to connect with the said very record with the present proceeding and he should have provided the opportunity of hearing to the parties before passing any order. He further submitted that Mr. Talak Mahmood, Advocate was shown to have been residing therein for 3, 4 months with the consent of Mr. Pran Nath Seth. One Mr. Balbir, who is said to be chowkidar of his house also told the occupancy of Mr. Tandon. He admitted the occupancy of one police officer on the first floor of the house in question but after his transfer, the occupancy of the house has been shown by Mr. Tandon. So far as ground floor of the house in question is concerned, no such notice was issued either to the landlord-Smt. Asha Tandon or to her agent Mr. Pran Nath Seth. Therefore, the proceeding for declaration of vacancy of ground floor of the house in question is in contravention of proviso of Section 16(1) of the Act. 48. Mr. Seth also submitted the reply of the applications moved by the petitioners for allotment of house with the submission that after the death of Dr. C.P. Tandon, the house in question was never let out but the servant of Dr. C.P. Tandon was kept in the house as Chowkidar/caretaker to look after the house furniture and other household goods lying in the house. Smt. Asha Tandon was interested to live in the house in question and start her private practice after disposal of the house and belongings of the deceased in England. Therefore, he did not want to let out the house in question to any person. He further submits that likewise objections were raised on the application moved by one Mr. Smt. Asha Tandon was interested to live in the house in question and start her private practice after disposal of the house and belongings of the deceased in England. Therefore, he did not want to let out the house in question to any person. He further submits that likewise objections were raised on the application moved by one Mr. Suresh Chandra Yadav, who applied for declaration of vacancy and allotment of house but after hearing the objections, the rent control authority consigned the case with the record room. He also raised question on merit that the first floor of the house cannot be separated from the ground floor. He also submitted that she and her family members do not own any other house in Lucknow to live therein. He also showed the reason for filing the objection on her behalf that his daughter Smt. Krishna Kumari was in England and there was no personal service of the summons on her as such he filed objections on her behalf. He further submitted that Mr. Seth was issued notice as agent. He filed objection in the said capacity and, therefore, after order passed by the Rent Control Authority, he had right to file revision challenging the said order. He also raised objection on the point of rent as no presumptive rent was fixed by the authority concerned. 49. The answering respondents also denied from any notice of allotment application moved by the petitioner No. 2 to the opposite parties with the submission that Mr. Seth came to know in regard to allotment order passed in favour of petitioner No. 2 only after the same was received by him on behalf of opposite party No. 4. He has also denied the occupancy of house by Mr. Syed Kalim Uddin, Advocate. Through the counter affidavit, it has further been submitted that the rent control inspector never verified the facts either from him or from two respectable persons of the locality and he did not call him for inquiry before submitting his report, thus, he claimed violation of Rule 8 of Rules 1972. He also claimed the violation of Section 16(9) of the Act, which require the allottee to pay the presumptive rent to the landlord as the same was lacking in the order. 50. He also claimed the violation of Section 16(9) of the Act, which require the allottee to pay the presumptive rent to the landlord as the same was lacking in the order. 50. Learned counsel for the respondents drew the attention of this Court towards Annexure 4 of counter affidavit i.e. the order dated 23.10.1978 passed by the Rent Control Authority and submitted that since regarding the first floor of the house, the proceeding had already been closed and the file was consigned with record room but subsequently treating the vacancy of first floor of the house in question, the authority notified the vacancy of first floor as also of the ground floor and fixed the date for objection i.e. 8.11.1978. On that date, Mr. Pran Nath Seth submitted an application before the authority concerned seeking one month’s time to file objection after getting instructions from landlady Smt. Asha Tandon but the same was refused by following order : “I find there is no justification for giving any such time. The landlady has already filed objections and Vakalatnama signed by her has also been submitted.” 51. Smt. Asha Tandon neither appeared nor filed any objection or signed Vakalatnama. On the same very date, the Rent Control Authority proceeded to pass order in favour of petitioner No. 1 and thereby he allotted ground floor portion of the house in question in his favour. On 10.11.1978, he passed another order in favour of petitioner No. 2 and allotted the first floor of the building in his favour. He further submitted that the Rent Control Authority has given finding that since Shri Pran Nath Seth has filed objection and Vakalatnama of his client, there was no justification for giving any further time to file objection on her behalf and as such his application was rejected whereas after notification of the vacancy at the stage of allotment, no objection was filed either by Mr. Pran Nath Seth himself or on behalf of landlady. 52. Disputing the aforesaid order of the Rent Control Authority, though learned counsel for the opposite parties admitted the filing of Vakalatnama of an Advocate on behalf of landlady but he submitted that the order dated 9.10.1978 passed by the Revisional Court is wrong as the objection filed on behalf of landlady was not on record. It was only the objection filed on behalf of opposite party No. 3-Mr. It was only the objection filed on behalf of opposite party No. 3-Mr. Pran Nath Seth before the Rent Control Authority for consideration. The Rent Control Authority has also not taken the notice of the said objection and has not discussed the same in the order. The petitioners have failed to bring on record the objection filed by the landlady. 53. He has also submitted that pursuant to the aforesaid order when the petitioners forcibly took over the possession of the house in question, the chowkidar of the house, Balbir lodged the first information report in police station of P.S. Mahanagar, district Lucknow, which was registered as case crime No. 957 under Section 343, 448, 498, 323, I.P.C. He has brought on record the same as Annexure 8 to the counter affidavit. Mr. Balbir (chowkidar) also submitted an affidavit to the same effect before the revisional Court on 7.3.1979. The tenancy of Mr. Syed Kalim Uddin has also been denied on the ground that under Section 3(a), ‘tenant’ means a person by whom its rent is payable and the petitioners have failed to establish any rent paid by Mr. Kamaluddin. 54. Mr. Singhal has brought out some new facts that petitioner No. 1 has purchased the house in the name of his wife Smt. Prabha Singh vide registered sale deed. Therefore, in view of Section 12(1)(c), it is deemed to have been seized to occupy the building under tenancy. Keeping in view the aforesaid provision, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-I (RCED), Lucknow on 23.10.2006 passed the order declaring the vacancy on 23.10.2006 and released the same in favour of respondent No. 6 by means of an order dated 27.11.2006. So far as first floor is concerned, the petitioner No. 2, Shri Raj Singh had been transferred from Lucknow to Deoria. Therefore, vacancy was created under Section 12(3)(a) of the Act. The A.D.M. (RC & EO) Lucknow passed an order declaring the vacancy on 4.5.1994 and the same has been released in favour of respondent No. 6, who is the purchaser of the house by means of order dated 14.2.2008 passed by A.C.M. (R.C. & E.O.), Lucknow. 55. He has further reported that in the first floor of the house, one Shri Mata Prasad, an unauthorised tenant is residing continuously with his family member and petitioner No. 2 is not in occupation of the said floor. 55. He has further reported that in the first floor of the house, one Shri Mata Prasad, an unauthorised tenant is residing continuously with his family member and petitioner No. 2 is not in occupation of the said floor. The valuation report of the Income Tax Department Team has also reported so on the basis of inspection made on 12.4.2007. 56. To substantiate his submissions, learned counsel for the opposite parties placed reliance on some decisions of this Court as well as of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which are reproduced as under : (1) The Roman Catholic Diocese of Agra Ltd. v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Agra and others, 1991(18) ARC 591 (2) Ganpat Roy and others v. Additional District Magistrate and others, 1985(2) SCC 307 . (3) Mahendra Singh Chaudhary v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mathura, 2008(2) ARC 595 . (4) Adhyaksha Zila Bhartiya Janta Party, Bareilly and another v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Bareilly and others, 1996 (1) ARC 378. (5) Nitin Kumar Jain and others v. District Judge, Mainpuri and others, 2000 (39) ALR 171. (6) Km. Asha Raina v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Dehradun and another, 2000 (1) A.W.C. 462 . (7) Yogendra Tiwari v. District Judge, Gorakhpur and others, 1984 (10) ALR 285. (8) Smt. Maddi Devi and another v. Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others, 1981 ARC 167. (9) Suresh Chandra Agarwal v. Ist Addl. District Judge and others, 1979 (UP) RCC 315. (10) Smt. Shashi Govil v. District Judge, Meerut and others, 1989 (1) ARC 108 (11) Shri Krishan Lal Mehra v. District Magistrate, Kanpur and others, 1957 ALJ 830. (12) Vasudha Srivastava v. Kamla Chauhan, 1992 (1) SCC 645 . (13) Maharaj Kumari Vimla Devi v. Rent Control & Eviction Officer, Mussorie and another, 1983 (2) ARC 225. (14) Durga Devi v. District and Sessions Judge, 1976 (UP) RCC 208 and Dr. S. N. Ghosh v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1975 ALR 594. (15) Satish Prasad v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad and others, 1992(1) ARC 215 (16) Yogendra Tewari v. District Judge, Gorakhpur and others, 1984(2) ARC 7. (17) Gopal Krishna Mittal v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mussoorie, Dehradun and others, 1985(2) ARC 537 (18) Madan Mohan v. City Magistrate/R.C. & E.O. Etawah and others, 1998(33) ALR 357. (15) Satish Prasad v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad and others, 1992(1) ARC 215 (16) Yogendra Tewari v. District Judge, Gorakhpur and others, 1984(2) ARC 7. (17) Gopal Krishna Mittal v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mussoorie, Dehradun and others, 1985(2) ARC 537 (18) Madan Mohan v. City Magistrate/R.C. & E.O. Etawah and others, 1998(33) ALR 357. (19) Sarva Daman Shah v. Rent Control & Eviction Officer I, Allahabad/A.D.M. Civil Supplies, Allahabad and another, 1994(1) ARC 297. (20) Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, 1978(1) SCC 405 . (21) U.P. State Electricity Board v. Pooran Chandra Pandey and others, 2007(11) SCC 92 . (22) Surya Prakash Ojha v. District Magistrate, Ballia and others, 2001 (3) A.W.C. 1877. 57. Learned counsel for the opposite party submitted that this Court in the case of The Roman Catholic Diocese of Agra Ltd. v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Agra and others (supra) held that the entire proceedings for declaration of vacancy and for allotment of premises due to non-compliance of Rule 8(2) and 9(3) of the Rules are vitiated. 58. He further submitted that in Ganpat Roy and others v. Additional District Magistrate and others (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has declared Rule 8 as mandatory. 59. On the fixation of presumptive rent, he submitted that in the case of Mahendra Singh Chaudhary v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mathura (supra), this Court has held that by virtue of Section 16(9) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, it was utmost essential to mention the rent in the allotment order and direct the tenant to pay the same within a week. Moreover, according to the Section 105 of T.P. Act, there cannot be any tenancy without rent. 60. Moreover, according to the Section 105 of T.P. Act, there cannot be any tenancy without rent. 60. In regard to the compliance of Rule 14 of Rules, he cited a case i.e. Adhyaksha Zila Bhartiya Janta Party, Bareilly and another v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Bareilly and others (supra) in which this Court has held that an allottee is entitled to take possession of the accommodation allotted to him only in accordance with Rule 14 of the Rules framed under the Act which provides that an order in Form C shall be served upon the persons or person found in unauthorised occupation of the building directing him to vacate the same and deliver vacant possession thereof to the person named in the order within such period as may be specified in the order which shall in no case be less than a week from the date of service of order upon him and on his failure to comply with the order within the time allowed, the District Magistrate shall issue an order to the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station in Form D directing him to get the building vacated and put the allottee or the landlord in possession of the building. 61. In the said case also, no notice in Form C was served upon the landlord-respondent No. 2. The possession was taken within two days from the date of allotment order. This Court held that no person is entitled howsoever he may be high in status to obtain possession forcibly in violation of Rule 14 and in case the possession is obtained in violation of Rule 14 of the Rules framed under the Act, that amounts to house grabbing. 62. On the strength of the aforesaid case, he submits that in the present case also, the petitioner took over the possession in violation of Rule 14, which is unsustainable as has been held in the aforesaid case. 63. 62. On the strength of the aforesaid case, he submits that in the present case also, the petitioner took over the possession in violation of Rule 14, which is unsustainable as has been held in the aforesaid case. 63. He further cited a case i.e. Nitin Kumar Jain and others v. District Judge, Mainpuri and others (supra) in which this Court has held that in regard to the delivery of possession, after the allotment order was passed, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have issued Form C before Form D was issued, as prescribed under the Rules framed as the allottee can take possession only in accordance with Rule 14, which provides that an order in Form C shall be served upon the person found in the unauthorised occupation of the building directing him to vacate the same. 64. He further submitted that the Rent Control Inspector made an inspection without notice to the answering respondents, which is no inspection in the eye of law as has been held by this Court in the case of Km. Asha Raina v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Dehradun and another (supra). In this case, this Court has held that the Rent Control Inspector should have first given notice to the petitioner and only thereafter he should have inspected the premises. The inspection without notice to the petitioner was invalid and on the basis of said report, the vacancy could not have been declared. 65. He also relied upon the case of Yogendra Tiwari v. District Judge, Gorakhpur and others (supra) and submitted that in the like matter, the principle of audi alteram partem would clearly be applicable as the District Magistrate in making an order of allotment under clause (a) or an order of release under clause (b) of Section 16(1) clearly exercises a quasi-judicial function and therefore, he has the duty to hear. There must be an impartial objective assessment of all the pros and cons of the case after due hearing of the parties concerned. 66. He submitted that the effects were not removed and there is no finding on this aspect by the Rent Control Authority. Therefore, the order is bad in law on this ground also. 67. There must be an impartial objective assessment of all the pros and cons of the case after due hearing of the parties concerned. 66. He submitted that the effects were not removed and there is no finding on this aspect by the Rent Control Authority. Therefore, the order is bad in law on this ground also. 67. To substantiate his argument, he placed reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Smt. Maddi Devi and another v. Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others (supra) in which it has been held that the property can only be deemed to be vacant if the landlord has ‘substantially removed his effects therefrom’. In the absence of a specific finding that the landlord has specifically removed his effects therefrom the property cannot be deemed to be vacant under the provisions of this section. He further submitted that it is not in dispute that Chowkidar of the landlord was there and effects were lying in the house. Relying upon the case of Suresh Chandra Agarwal v. Ist Addl. District Judge and others (supra), he further submits that in this case, this Court has held that “for applying clause (a) of the Section 12(1) it is necessary that the effects of the house must have been removed. The word ‘effects’ means ‘goods’ property belongings ‘chattels’”. When the learned Additional District Magistrate himself found that the furniture was lying in the house, he could not possibly hold that the effects had been removed. 68. On the point that petitioner No. 2, who is the judicial officer holding transferable post, on transfer the accommodation is deemed to fall vacant under the provision of sub-section (3-A) of Section 12 of the Act, he cited a case i.e. Smt. Shashi Govil v. District Judge, Meerut and others (supra) in which this Court has held that once under Section 12(3-A) of the Act, the tenant has ceased to occupy the building under tenancy, he could not re-occupy the same on re-transfer after many years without an allotment order having been passed in his favour. In the present case, since petitioner No. 2 had been transferred from Lucknow to Deoria, he could not claim his occupation without a fresh allotment made in his favour. 69. In the present case, since petitioner No. 2 had been transferred from Lucknow to Deoria, he could not claim his occupation without a fresh allotment made in his favour. 69. He further submitted that the situation of the house is such as the separate vacancy in part cannot be created as the staircase was riding to first floor through inner side of the house and without creating disturbance to the occupants of ground floor, nobody could enter in the first floor accordingly, he submitted that where there is no possibility of division of a single unit into different tenancy, it cannot be allotted separately. He cited another judgment rendered in the case of Shri Krishan Lal Mehra v. District Magistrate, Kanpur and others (supra) in which it has been held that the District Magistrate cannot force upon the landlord for the division of an accommodation. 71. In regard to the capacity and authority of Mr. Pran Nath Seth, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that he is not a stranger of the proceeding as Section 3(j) of the Act includes the agent in the definition of ‘landlord’. The expression of the definition clause is not limited to denote the owner of the house but it has to be for the purposes of the Act, understood in the wide sense to include a person to whom the rent is payable including the agent as has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vasudha Srivastava v. Kamla Chauhan, 1992 (1) SCC 645 . 72. Since some persons have been named to have been residing in the building, learned counsel for the opposite parties submitted that so far as the possession of Mr. Balbir, who was taking care of the house in question being Chowkidar and other persons, namely, Mr. D.P. Shaha and Mr. R.S. Gupta, who have been shown to have been residing temporarily for sometime in absence of any expressed or implied consent on the part of landlord, which has not been proved by the petitioner, cannot give any benefit for deeming vacancy as has been held in the case of Maharaj Kumari Vimla Devi v. Rent Control & Eviction Officer, Mussorie and another (supra). In this case, this Court held that the possession of a care-taker of a building or any part thereof cannot mean his occupation of the building. In this case, this Court held that the possession of a care-taker of a building or any part thereof cannot mean his occupation of the building. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act is not attracted to such a case. The similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of Durga Devi v. District and Sessions Judge, 1976 (UP) RCC 208 and Dr. S.N. Ghosh v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1975 ALR 594. Learned counsel for the opposite parties have also raised finger on the proceeding taken by the Rent Control Officer with the submission that he has not recorded any finding of the parties. More so, without discussing the submission filed by opposite parties, he has proceeded to declare the vacancy, which is not permissible in the eye of law as has been held in the case of Satish Prasad v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad and others (supra). 73. On the question of jurisdiction of revisional Court, he submitted that the question of vacancy is a jurisdictional fact, which has to be ascertained on the basis of procedure laid down in the Rules and if the rent control authority has committed error in ascertaining the vacancy, the revision under Section 18 of the Act is well maintainable. The procedure of determination of vacancy as well as the notification and allotment thereof has been discussed in paragraph 5 in the case of Yogendra Tewari v. District Judge, Gorakhpur and others (supra), which is reproduced hereinunder : “It is needless to stress that the making of an order of allotment by the District Magistrate under Section 16(1)(a) of the Act consists of two stages. The first stage is actual vacancy of a building or a part thereof in consequence of an intimation given by the landlord or the tenant under Section 15, or a declaration of deemed vacancy of such building or part thereof under Section 12(4). It is clear from the terms of the proviso to Section 16(1) that in the case of a deemed vacancy under Section 12(4) of the Act, the District Magistrate is required to give an opportunity to the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, of showing that no declaration of deemed vacancy under Section 12(4) could at all be made in his case before making an order of allotment under Section 16(1)(a). The use of the word ‘shall’ in the proviso to Section 16(1)(a) makes the requirement mandatory. The District Magistrate therefore, cannot make an order of allotment under Section 16(1)(a) on the strength of deemed vacancy under Section 12(4) until the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, has an opportunity of being heard in the matter. The District Magistrate is required in terms of Rule 8(2) to give an opportunity to the landlord to file his objection or make his submission, if any, to the making of an order of allotment under Section 16(1)(a). In the case of deemed vacancy referred to in Section 12(4), he is entitled to show that none of the clauses (a) to (c) of Section 12(1) comes into play. The second stage is reached when there is a deemed vacancy under Section 12(4) or actual vacancy in consequence of an intimation under Section 15. Under Rule 9(3) the District Magistrate is required to serve a notice on the landlord intimating of the date on which the question of allotment will be considered. The landlord may, in response to the notice issued to him under Rule 9(3), make out a case for release of the building or a part thereof, or any land appurtenant thereto, for occupation by himself or any member of his family or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade, calling, etc. The landlord has clearly a right to have an order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 16(1)(b) for the release of the building or a part thereof for any of the purposes set out in Section 16(2). The District Magistrate may release the building or part thereof or any land appurtenant thereto under Section 16(1)(b) where any of the aforesaid conditions are proved to exist to his satisfaction. If the landlord fails to satisfy the District Magistrate on any of these aspects, the District Magistrate would reject his application for release and proceed to make an order of allotment under Section 16(1)(a). The proviso to Section 16(1) has been introduced to meet with the requirements of principles of natural justice. If the landlord fails to satisfy the District Magistrate on any of these aspects, the District Magistrate would reject his application for release and proceed to make an order of allotment under Section 16(1)(a). The proviso to Section 16(1) has been introduced to meet with the requirements of principles of natural justice. As vacancy, actual, expected or deemed, is a jurisdictional fact for the making of an order of allotment under Section 16(1)(a) or for an order of release under clause (b) thereof, the District Magistrate must follow the procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. 74. On the point of deemed vacancy, he submitted that the order without recording finding that landlord/tenant had removed his effects is not sustainable. He cited following decisions : Gopal Krishna Mittal v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mussoorie, Dehradun and others (supra), relevant portion of which reads as under : “Although learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to demonstrate that the order of allotment was passed without following proper procedure inasmuch as no notice was given to the petitioner or to his mother under Rule 8 which has been held to be mandatory by this Court but it is not necessary to go into this aspect at this stage as from the order of Rent Control and Eviction Officer and revising authority, it does not appear that they had properly applied Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. It has nowhere been found that the widow was found to have been residing in the premises in dispute after death of Chhotey Lal had substantially removed her effects within the meaning of sub-clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act. The revising authority was persuaded to take the view against petitioner only because an affidavit had been filed by Singh alleging that the accommodation was lying vacant for the last two years and the petitioner was a Junior Engineer and was employed outside Mussoorie. The revising authority further inferred that the old mother was not expected to live alone at Mussoorie. In recording this finding he obviously committed an error of law. Even the construction of Section 12(1)(a) by this Court is not that the tenant must all the time live in the accommodation in dispute. The revising authority further inferred that the old mother was not expected to live alone at Mussoorie. In recording this finding he obviously committed an error of law. Even the construction of Section 12(1)(a) by this Court is not that the tenant must all the time live in the accommodation in dispute. The finding which should have been recorded by the revising authority was if the mother of petitioner had removed her effects substantially and not if he was living with her son or because of her being old in age she was not expected to live alone at Mussoorie. Even the finding that she could not live there in winter season was not very material, the order of the revising authority, therefore, being based on irrelevant consideration cannot be maintained." Madan Mohan v. City Magistrate/R.C. & E.O. Etawah and others (supra) relevant para of which reads as under : “13. A bare perusal of clauses (a), (b) of Section 12(1) and Section 12(2) would indicate that the tenanted accommodation in certain circumstances is to be deemed vacant by legal fiction. The effect of a legal fiction by a deeming clause is well known. Legislature can introduce a statutory fiction and Courts have to proceed on the assumption that such a state of affairs exist on the relevant date. Under the Act, vacancy cannot be deemed unless it has been specifically established by evidence on record that the circumstances stated in one of the clauses (a), (b) and ( c) of Section 12(1) or in Section 12(2) of the Act exist. The use of the expression “he has substantially removed his effects” occurring in clause (a), or “he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family” occurring in clause (b) or the expression “admits a person who is not a member of his family as a partner or a new partner” in sub-section (2) of Section 12 show the legislative intent that the legal fiction would arise only if these circumstances have occurred after the enforcement of the Act.” 75. The Court further held that before declaring the building in question vacant under Section 12(4) of the Act, it was incumbent upon him to have recorded clear and specific findings which were essential to attract the deeming provisions contained in the aforesaid provisions. The Court further held that before declaring the building in question vacant under Section 12(4) of the Act, it was incumbent upon him to have recorded clear and specific findings which were essential to attract the deeming provisions contained in the aforesaid provisions. Since no finding has been recorded in respect of ingredients of sub-section (2) of Section 12, it was held that in absence of any such finding, no vacancy could be deemed under the provisions of Section 12(4) of the Act. 76. Since Mr. Raj Singh-petitioner No. 2 a judicial officer holding transferable post, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that on transfer, the accommodation is deemed to fall vacant under the provisions of sub-section (3-A) of Section 12. 77. In regard to the capacity and authority of Mr. Pran Nath Seth, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that he was not a stranger of the proceeding as Section 3(j) of the Act includes the agent in the definition of landlord. The expression of the definition clause is not limited to denote the owner of the house but it has to be for the purposes of the Act understood in the wide sense to include a person to whom the rent is payable as also his agent as has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vasudha Srivastava v. Kamla Chauhan, 1992 (1) SCC 645 . 78. So far as authority of Balbir, who was to take care of the house in question as Chowkidar is concerned, he relied upon a decision of this Court given in the case of Maharaj Kumari Vimla Devi v. Rent Control & Eviction Officer, Mussorie and another, 1983 (2) ARC 225 in which this Court held that even assuming to be so, in law, the permission of the Chaukidar cannot enure to the benefit of any person occupying the premises in the absence of an express or implied consent having been proved on the part of the landlord. The Court further held that the possession of a care-taker of a building or any part thereof cannot mean his occupation of the building. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act is not attracted to such a case. The similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of Durga Devi v. District and Sessions Judge, 1976 (UP) RCC 208 and Dr. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act is not attracted to such a case. The similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of Durga Devi v. District and Sessions Judge, 1976 (UP) RCC 208 and Dr. S.N. Ghosh v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1975 ALR 594. 79. On the question of deemed vacancy, Mr. Singhal cited a judgment rendered in the case of Sarva Daman Shah v. Rent Control & Eviction Officer I, Allahabad/A.D.M. Civil Supplies, Allahabad and another, 1994(1) ARC 297 in which this Court held that going for a short period for treatment or for any other purpose does not mean that the person ceased to occupy and vacated the premises. 80. Mr. Singhal also raised the finger in the proceeding taken by the Rent Control Officer with the submission that he has neither taken any evidence of the parties nor has recorded any finding. More so, without discussing the averments of the affidavit filed by the opposite parties, he has proceeded to declare the vacancy, which is not permissible in the eye of law as has been held in the case of Satish Prasad v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad and others (supra) in which this Court held as under : “It will not be out of place to mention here that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer disposed of the matter by a very sketchy and short order. It cannot be disputed that respondent No. 1 was deciding I question affecting very valuable rights of the parties. The respondent No. 1 has only mentioned the various affidavits filed by the parties in his order without disclosing the averments made therein. Such a course cannot be approved. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer ought to have discussed the evidence of the parties, if not in detail like a Civil Court, at least in such a manner which may show that he applied his mind to the contents of the various affidavits filed by the parties and the contentions advanced. The telephone number and length of possession could be relevant facts but these two facts could not be conclusive to draw an inference that Shri Gautam Mathur was residing as tenant of the petitioner. There is no material on record to show that Shri Gautam Mathur paid any rent to the petitioner.” 81. The telephone number and length of possession could be relevant facts but these two facts could not be conclusive to draw an inference that Shri Gautam Mathur was residing as tenant of the petitioner. There is no material on record to show that Shri Gautam Mathur paid any rent to the petitioner.” 81. He further submitted that the order passed by the revisional authority can be tested only by the reasons mentioned in the order and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others (supra). Para 8 of which reads as under : “The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out." 82. He further submitted that several facts have been brought out before this Court and argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner before this Court, which were not before the revisional authority as such there was no occasion for the revisional authority to give finding on those facts, which were not before him. He cited a judgment rendered in the case of U.P. State Electricity Board v. Pooran Chandra Pandey and others (supra) in which, it has been held that a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. 83. He further cited a judgment rendered in the case of Surya Prakash Ojha v. District Magistrate, Ballia and others (supra) in which it has been held that it is well settled that this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution would not quash an order even though illegal, if the result of the same is to restore an other illegal order. 84. 84. In the light of the aforesaid decision, he submits that even if this Court arrives at conclusion that the order passed by the authority concerned requires interference on any point, it may not interfere in the same as if the order passed by the revisional Court is quashed, the order of allotment in favour of petitioners, which are illegal being in violation of the provisions of the Act will revive. 85. After considering the submissions of learned counsels for the parties as well as in the background of the facts of the case, as I gathered, I find that following questions are to be determined by this Court. (i) Whether against the order passed by the Rent Control Authority, revision was maintainable ? (ii) Whether the revisional Court has transgressed his power in deciding the revision ? (iii) Whether Mr. Pran Nath Seth held the status of agent of the ‘landlord? (iv) Whether the revision filed by Mr. Pran Nath Seth without having any authority of the landlord was maintainable. (v) Whether before the Rent Control Authority, the question for determination of vacancy was only for one part of the house or for the whole house ? (vi) Whether in determination of vacancy, Rent Control Authority has followed the relevant Rules ? (vii) Whether the house in question was liable to be deemed vacant under Section 12 of the Act ? (viii) Whether Mr. Pran Nath Seth has committed fraud by way of misrepresentation of facts or in any manner ? Question No. (i) 86. Section 18 of the Act extends the power of revision to the District Judge on the ground that the District Magistrate has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or/and that (ii) the District Magistrate has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law and/or (iii) that the District Magistrate acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. 87. In the case of Yogendra Tiwari v. District Judge, Gorakhpur and others, 1984 (10) ALR 285 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “As a vacancy, actual, expected or deemed, is a jurisdictional fact for the making of an order of allotment under Section 16(1)(a) or for an order of release under clause (b) thereof, the District Magistrate must follow the procedure prescribed under this Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Therefore, for determination as to whether the District Magistrate has committed any jurisdictional error in determination of vacancy, the revision lies before the District Judge under Section 18 of the Act. Accordingly, I am of the view that the revision was maintainable." Question No. (ii) 88. The District Magistrate set out the main question for determination whether any portion of the house in question was vacant and available for allotment and for determining the said question, he has dealt with the power in respect of determination of vacancy as to whether he has exercised it legally. The revisional Court has discussed regarding the vacancy of two parts of the house i.e. ground floor as well as first floor separately and has also discussed regarding the deemed vacancy under Section 12 of the Act, which is well within the jurisdiction provided under Section 18 of the Act. 89. Therefore, I am of the view that he has exercised his power within the jurisdiction provided under Section 18 of the Act. Question No. (iii) 90. Section 3(j) of the Act defines the term ‘landlord’ as a person to whom its rent is or if the building were let, would be payable and includes, except in clause (g), the agent or attorney, or such person : 91. Notice dated 1-10-1997 Annexure 1, indicates that it was published on the notice board and a copy thereof was sent to Mr. Pran Nath Seth for information. There is no other notice which can establish that notice was sent to the landlord. Landlord of the house was either Mr. Krishna Kumar Tandon or his wife Smt. Asha Tandon. In the notice, the name of the owner and address was indicted as Shri Krishna Kumar through Shri Pran Nath Seth, 14/61 Sawa Sadan, Civil Lines, Kanpur. 92. The petitioner’s case is that the landlord was living in England but the notice does not indicate that it was sent to landlord in England. Thus, it is established that by the Rent Control Authority, Mr. Pran Nath Seth was accepted as the person covered under the definition of ‘landlord’ as provided under Section 3(j) of the Act and it is answered accordingly. Question No. (iv) 93. Thus, it is established that by the Rent Control Authority, Mr. Pran Nath Seth was accepted as the person covered under the definition of ‘landlord’ as provided under Section 3(j) of the Act and it is answered accordingly. Question No. (iv) 93. Rule 7 of the Rules, 1972 provides that every appeal or revision under the Act shall be preferred in the form of memorandum signed by the appellant or revisionist or applicant, as the case may be, and his counsel if any, and presented either in person or through counsel, to the District Judge or to the Munsarim of his Court. 94. Since except Mr. Pran Nath Seth, nobody was asked to participate in the proceeding of determination of vacancy, after passing the order in the proceeding definitely, he had right to challenge the same, therefore, he had rightly preferred the revision in his own capacity. Once the revision filed by him was maintainable, it does not make difference as to whether he was having authority on behalf of Smt. Asha Tandon to file the same or not. Therefore, the revision filed by him was well maintainable. Question No. (v) 95. From the report of the Rent Control Inspector dated 11.9.1978, Annexure A-2 to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of opposite parties 3 and 4, it is evident that he submitted the report only regarding the vacancy of first floor as has been observed by the Inspector that the first floor can be deemed vacant under Section 12 of the Act and proceeding of allotment can be initiated after providing opportunity of hearing to the parties. Thereafter, on 23.10.1978, in contrary to report of his Inspector, the Rent Control Authority observed as under : “I have perused the objection of Mr. Pran Nath Seth whereby it is very clear that there is no doubt about the vacancy. Hence, vacancy of ground floor as well as of the first floor be notified. Next date for objection dated 8.11.1978." 96. From the notice dated 1.10.1977, it is evident that the notice was published to notify the vacancy of the first floor of the house in question vacated by one police officer and except this, no other notice has been brought on record. Next date for objection dated 8.11.1978." 96. From the notice dated 1.10.1977, it is evident that the notice was published to notify the vacancy of the first floor of the house in question vacated by one police officer and except this, no other notice has been brought on record. Therefore, it is evident that only the vacancy of the first floor of the house in question was for determination before the Rent Control Authority but through the order dated 23.10.1978 passed by the Rent Control Authority (Annexure A-4 to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of opposite parties 3 and 4) it is obvious that he took up the matter for declaration of vacancy of ground floor also and fixed the next date i.e. 8.11.1978 for objection. 97. On 8.11.1978, Mr. Pran Nath Seth moved an application for allowing him one month’s time for filing objection after getting instructions from her daughter, Smt. Asha Tandon, which was rejected by the order that ‘there was no justification for giving any such time’ and proceeded to pass the final order of allotment on the same date i.e. on 8.11.1978. Upon perusal of the order dated 8.11.1978 passed by the Additional District Magistrate, Lucknow, I do not find any discussion on the objection filed by the landlady as had been observed by the Additional District Magistrate in rejecting the request of Mr. Pran Nath Seth for giving him time rather he took notice of the objection filed by Mr. Pran Nath Seth in the following manner : “On 8.11.1978, Mr. Pran Nath Seth has moved an application requiring one month’s time from getting instructions from her client. Since Mr. Pran Nath Seth has already filed objection and Vakalatnama of his client, as such, there is no justification for giving such time and thus, the application is rejected. On 8.11.1978, the Rent Control Authority i.e. Additional District Magistrate, Lucknow passed the following order : “I have gone through the papers available on the file and perused the inspector’s report. From the report, it is clear that Ist floor is occupied by an Advocate and the ground floor is lying vacant. No person of the landlady is living in the house in question. It has been let out to one after other person from time to time without any allotment order from this Court. From the report, it is clear that Ist floor is occupied by an Advocate and the ground floor is lying vacant. No person of the landlady is living in the house in question. It has been let out to one after other person from time to time without any allotment order from this Court. On the basis of the Inspector’s report and after perusing the objections filed on behalf of landlady, the vacancy of the ground floor as well as first floor portions were ordered to be notified by me on 23.10.1978.” 98. In the light of the aforesaid observation, he allotted the ground floor portion of the house in question to Shri Rama Shanker Singh, petitioner No. 1. The report of the Inspector indicates that he submitted the report for proceeding of allotment only for first floor of the house as was deemed vacant but the Additional District Magistrate exceeded his jurisdiction and allotted the ground floor to petitioner No. 1. Simultaneously, he also allotted the first floor of the house to petitioner No. 2 being a government servant. 99. Therefore, I am of the view that only first floor of the house in question was before the authority concerned for determination of vacancy and he committed error in passing the order of vacancy of the whole house. Question No. (vi) 100. Rule 8 provides the provision for ascertainment of vacancy, which requires inspection by Gazetted Officer before making an order of allotment by the District Magistrate in the presence of the landlord and the tenant or any other occupant, in presence of two respectable persons in the locality. It further requires the pasting of conclusion of inspection report on the notice board of the office of the District Magistrate for the information of the general public. The report of the inspector, which has been brought on record, does not indicate that he inspected the house in question in presence of either landlord or tenant or in presence of any other persons of the locality. More so, it is also not established that the conclusion of inspection was pasted on the notice board rather it has been indicated in the notice that at the time of inspection, one, Balbir alias Birbal, who disclosed him as Chowkidar of Mr. Tandon was present, who told the inspector that the building was in occupation of late Shri C.P. Tandon. Tandon was present, who told the inspector that the building was in occupation of late Shri C.P. Tandon. In Ganpat Roy’s case (supra), Rule 8 has been declared mandatory. Thus, there has been a clear violation of the provision of Rule 8 of the Act also. 101. Rule 9 of the Rules speaks for notice of vacancy and sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 provides that immediately after the receipt of intimation of vacancy of any building in the office of the District Magistrate, the vacancy shall be entered in a register which shall be maintained in that behalf and be notified for the information of the general public by pasting a copy of the list of the vacant buildings on the notice board of that office specifying therein the date on which the question of allotment will be considered. He shall also issue a notice to the landlord intimating him the date so fixed. On that date, so fixed, the District Magistrate shall consider the cases of all applicants registered in the register mentioned in Rule 10 and shall pass an order under Section 16 in accordance with Rules 10 and 11. From the notice itself, it is evident that the provisions of Rule 9 have not been followed. 102. There is also violation of Rule 14 which provides the provision for enforcement of order of allotment or release. Under the aforesaid Rule, it is the District Magistrate, who has been entrusted the power to put the allottee in possession through the manner provided in Rule but in the present case, the possession has been taken forcibly as is established from the facts of first information report lodged by Mr. Balbir. In the case of Adhyaksha Zila Bhartiya Janta Party, Bareilly and another v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Bareilly and others, 1996 (1) ARC 378 this Court has held that the possession taken in violation of Rule 14 amounts to house grabbing and is unsustainable. 103. There is also violation of Section 16(9) of the Act as the District Magistrate has failed to fix the presumptive rent while making an order. In the case of Mahendra Singh Chaudhary v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mathura (supra), this Court has held that there cannot be any tenancy without rent. 104. 103. There is also violation of Section 16(9) of the Act as the District Magistrate has failed to fix the presumptive rent while making an order. In the case of Mahendra Singh Chaudhary v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mathura (supra), this Court has held that there cannot be any tenancy without rent. 104. There is also laches on the part of the Inspector, who did not give notice to the landlord before making inspection of the premises. This Court in the case of Km. Asha Raina v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Dehradun and another (supra), this Court has held that the inspection without notice was invalid and on the basis of said report, the vacancy could not have been declared. 105. Section 16 of the Act provides the provision of allotment and release of building in question. Sub-section (9) of which speaks that the District Magistrate shall, while making an order under clause (a) of sub-section (1), also require the allottee to pay to the landlord an advance the presumptive rent as is provided therein but in the case on hand the order passed by the Additional District Magistrate does not disclose that any such direction was issued to the allottee to pay the presumptive rent, therefore, there is also a violation of provision of Section 16(9). 106. Section 16(4) provides that where the allottee or the landlord has not been able to obtain the possession of the building, allotted to him or, as the case may be, released in his favour, or any part thereof, the District Magistrate, on an application of the allottee or the landlord, as the case may be, may by order evict or cause to be evicted any person named in the order as well as every other person claiming under him or found in occupation, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary and put or cause to be put the allottee or the landlord in possession of the building or part whereas in the present case the first information report lodged by Mr. Balbir, Chowkidar shows that the petitioners have tried to take over the possession forcibly in violation of the provisions of Section 16(4) of the Act. Question No. (vii) 107. Balbir, Chowkidar shows that the petitioners have tried to take over the possession forcibly in violation of the provisions of Section 16(4) of the Act. Question No. (vii) 107. Section 12 of the Act contains the provision of deeming vacancy of building in certain cases and provides that a landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if (a) he has substantially removed his effects therefrom, or (b) he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family, or (c) in the case of a residential building, he as well as members of his family have taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere. 108. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since it has been admitted by opposite parties themselves that Mr. Krishna Kumar Tandon and Smt. Asha Tandon was occupying the residence in London and had shown her willingness to dispose of the same and further Smt. Asha Tandon had allowed the house in question, to be occupied by other person, who was not a member of his family, the Rent Control Authority has rightly deemed the vacancy of the house in question. 109. On the other side, learned counsel for the opposite parties has submitted that the inspection report itself shows that one Mr. Balbir, chowkidar of Mrs. Tandon was found residing in the building on behalf of Mrs. Tandon and further no effects of Mrs. Tandon was removed substantially, therefore, there was no reason to deem vacancy of the house in question. Through the order passed by the Revisional authority, it has been observed that some person was residing with the permission of the owner of the house or agent, therefore, there was neither actual vacancy nor deemed vacancy in the house in question. Whether there was a vacancy in the house in question or not, for determination of this facts, there is a well prescribed procedure under the Act as has been discussed hereinabove and I find that for determination of the vacancy, the procedure prescribed by the Rules has not been followed. Therefore, even if it is assumed that there was a deemed vacancy in the house in question, that could be notified and allotted only in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act and Rules framed thereunder. Therefore, even if it is assumed that there was a deemed vacancy in the house in question, that could be notified and allotted only in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act and Rules framed thereunder. In the case in hand, upon perusal of the record, I find that the procedure prescribed for determination of vacancy has not been followed. Therefore, I arrive at conclusion that there has been a clear procedural irregularity in determination of vacancy. Question No. (viii) 110. Claim and counter claim has been made by both the parties on the alleged fraudulent action of Mr. Seth as to whether his action in filing revision was fraudulent or bona fide. According to learned counsel for the petitioner he misrepresented the fact before the revisional Court as he has shown wrong address. He has also wrongly shown his authority to file the revision. One fact has also come in light that one Mr. Syed Kalimuddin claimed as junior of Mr. Pran Nath Seth contested the matter supported with the authority of landlady but once this fact has been brought to the knowledge of this Court that he withdrew the revision filed by him, the contest by him on behalf of landlady lost its significance as his action cannot be said to be bonafide. 111. It is not in dispute that the rent revision No. 150 of 1976 has been shown to have been preferred by two petitioners, one Mr. Pran Nath Seth and second Smt. Asha Tandon. 112. Learned counsel for the petitioners, to establish the fraud on the part of Mr. Pran Nath Seth, drew the attention of this Court towards the note mentioned in the revision, which indicates that Mr. Seth has signed on the memorandum of revision in absence of Smt. Asha Tandon. Note No. 2 also indicates that the allotment order was intimated to Mr. Seth, which was received by him on 17.11.1978. Since here-in-above, Mr. Pran Nath Seth has been declared landlord as has been defined under Section 3(j) of the Act. Even if the revision be not treated the revision on behalf of Smt. Asha Tandon but it was well maintainable on behalf of Mr. Seth. Therefore, I do not find any such illegality as it renders the order passed by the revisional Court in nullity. Even if the revision be not treated the revision on behalf of Smt. Asha Tandon but it was well maintainable on behalf of Mr. Seth. Therefore, I do not find any such illegality as it renders the order passed by the revisional Court in nullity. Therefore, I am of the view that the factors of fraud on the part of Mr. Seth are not established. 113. Two additional facts, which developed subsequently, have also been brought to the notice of the Court that the petitioner has purchased his house in the name of his wife Smt. Prabha Singh by registered sale deed dated 21.6.2003. Further in 2006, due to vacancy of ground floor of the house in question had been created by means of an order dated 23.10.2007 by A.C.M. V (R.C.& E.O.) and an order of release in favour of respondent No. 6 was passed on 27.11.2006. 114. So far as petitioner No. 2 is concerned, he being a government servant, was transferred from Lucknow to Deoria in 1980. Therefore, after his transfer, order was passed by A.D.M. (R.C. & E.O.) on 4.5.1994 and A.C.M. V (R.C. & E.O.) on 14.2.2008 passed the order of release in favour of respondent No. 6. 115. Thus, both the portions of the house in question have been released by the Rent Control Authority in favour of opposite party No. 6. 116. In view of the discussions made here-in-above, I do not find error in the judgment and order dated 23.3.1979 passed by the learned Additional District Judge-II, Lucknow in rent revision No. 150 of 1978. The writ petition is dismissed. ————