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2009 DIGILAW 23 (GAU)

State of Arunachal Pradesh v. P. K. Baruah

2009-01-13

P.K.MUSAHARY

body2009
JUDGMENT P.K. Musahary, J. 1. The alleged perpetrators here are seemingly posing.... 'Look we are going astray, far of from the justice...don't chase and make futile attempt to reach us with your incurable intrinsic default in not obtaining the prosecution sanction, by preferring a misconceived revision petition against an order of discharge in place of a statutory appeal, and that too, time barred, without an application for condoning the delay, which you cannot repair the damage by preferring yet another ill-advised appeal against the obvious dismissal order, before this Court.' 2. This is an appeal presented as an application under Section 26 of the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulations, 1945 (hereinafter referred to as Regulation only) read with Section 378A(1) and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, by the State of Arunachal Pradesh, against the order dated 18.5.2006, passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner, Lower Subansiri District, Ziro (hereinafter referred to as Deputy Commissioner in short) in criminal revision No. 03/05 corresponding to Ziro P.S. Case No. 48/2001 under Sections. 120B/408/420/409 of IPC. 3. The facts of the case which are in narrow campus, are enumerated as follows: (i) The respondent No. 1, Sri P.K. Baruah, was the Branch Manager of Arunachal Pradesh State Co-operative Apex Bank Ltd. ('APSCABL'), Hapoli Branch ('the Bank only'), a State Government Public Sector undertaking. Having received a written FIR complaining misappropriation of a huge amount to the tune of Rs. 1,89,79,337, the police registered a crime being Ziro P.S. case No. 42/2001, corresponding to G.R. Case No. 69/2001 under Sections 120B/408/420/409 of IPC, against him. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was laid by the police, charges were framed against the 4 accused persons including the present respondents who stood the trial before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ziro. The said Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ziro, vide order dated 12.7.2005, discharged all the accused persons on the ground that it is purely a case of civil nature and no sanction was obtained by the prosecution as required under Section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (ii) The State Government filed a Revision Petition being Civil Revision Petition No. 03/2005 before the Deputy Commissioner, Ziro, under Section 28of the Regulation read with Sections 399 and 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for setting aside and reviewing the Magistrate's order dated 12.7.2005, aforesaid. (ii) The State Government filed a Revision Petition being Civil Revision Petition No. 03/2005 before the Deputy Commissioner, Ziro, under Section 28of the Regulation read with Sections 399 and 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for setting aside and reviewing the Magistrate's order dated 12.7.2005, aforesaid. The learned Deputy Commissioner after hearing the parties came to a conclusion that prosecution sanction is not required in this case as the act of misappropriation of public money is not one of the duties of the government servant. However, the learned Deputy Commissioner dismissed the Revision Petition vide order dated 18.5.2006 as barred by limitation, for which, no application was filed by the State for condonation of the delay. (iii) The State being aggrieved by the aforesaid order is now before this Court by filing this appeal under Section 26 of the Regulation read with Sections 378(1) and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for setting aside the aforesaid order dated 18.5.2006 passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner, Ziro. 4. This matter was heard earlier by a learned Single Bench of this Court and vide order dated 17.5.2007, granted leave for entertaining the instant appeal holding that the matter may be heard as to whether the impugned Judgment and Order dated 18.5.2006 passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner, Ziro, can be sustained on the basis of findings recorded therein and as to the application of Section 3 read with Article 131 in the Schedule to the Limitation Act to the matters covered by Regulation 28 of the Regulation. The question framed by the aforesaid learned Single Bench is whether Article 131 in the Schedule to the Limitation Act applies to the revision filed under Regulation 28 of the Regulation or Article 137 of the Limitation Act be applicable in the context of the provisions of Regulation. Accordingly, it was directed that the present appeal filed by the State be entertained as an appeal and heard on merit particularly in answering the question as to whether the impugned Judgment and Order dated 18.5.2006 could be sustained in law. 5. Heard Mr. Pritam Taffo, learned Public Prosecutor for the State of Arunachal Pradesh. Also heard Mr. H.L. Maurya, Learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 as well as Mr. T. Michi, Learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 6. Mr. 5. Heard Mr. Pritam Taffo, learned Public Prosecutor for the State of Arunachal Pradesh. Also heard Mr. H.L. Maurya, Learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 as well as Mr. T. Michi, Learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 6. Mr. Taffo, learned P.P., for the State of Arunachal Pradesh, submits that there was no delay in filing the Revision Petition before the learned Deputy Commissioner, Ziro, because the matter was brought to the knowledge of the State Government only on 12.7.2005 and the Revision Petition was filed on 25.10.2005 and if the limitation is counted from the date of knowledge, there is no delay and the question of filing any petition for condonation of delay does not arise. Alternatively, he submits that even if the limitation is counted from the date of passing of the impugned order on 12.7.2005, the delay is only 13 days, which is not a substantial delay. Such delay, according to Mr. Taffo, cannot stand on the way of the court exercising revisional jurisdiction. He also relies on the decision of the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Girdharilal Sapuru AIR 1981 SC 1169 wherein it has been held that if the order of discharge passed by the learned trial court is found illegal, the High Court must exercise suo motu the revisional power even if the limitation period is over and no condonation for delay has been filed. This, according to the Learned Counsel, is for the sole purpose of discouraging perpetuity of illegality. Further Mr. Taffo, Learned Counsel, cites the case of State of U.P. v. Sunder Singh AIR 2000 SC 3602 wherein the Apex Court allowed the Special Leave Petition (SLP) condoning the inordinate delay in filing the petition due to lapse on the part of a Government Advocate. Founded on those cases, it has been submitted that the alleged delay, which is not at all substantial ought to have been condoned by the learned trial court to avoid public justice to suffer. 7. Moreover, it is submitted by Mr. Taffo, learned P.P., for the State that Regulation 28 of the Regulation does not provide limitation period for filing the Revision Petition and Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides that any application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere, the limitation period is treated as 3 years. 7. Moreover, it is submitted by Mr. Taffo, learned P.P., for the State that Regulation 28 of the Regulation does not provide limitation period for filing the Revision Petition and Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides that any application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere, the limitation period is treated as 3 years. There being no inordinate delay and the delay is not substantial in nature, he submits that the impugned order dated 18.5.2006, is liable to be set aside and the matter remanded back to the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ziro, for fresh trial of all the accused persons. 8. Per contra, Mr. Maruya, Learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1, taking me through the provisions under Chapter III of the Regulation, which deals with criminal proceedings, submits that the order dated 12.7.2005, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ziro, is an original decision within the meaning of Regulation 18 against which an appeal lies before the learned Deputy Commissioner under Regulation 25 of the Regulation and such appeal is to be preferred within the period of limitation prescribed under Regulation 27, i.e., 30 days from the date of order but the State instead, filed a Revision Petition under regulation 28 of the Regulation read with Sections 399 and397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which is not provided and maintainable under the said Regulation. It is submitted by Mr. Maurya, Learned Counsel, that whenever there is provision of an appeal in the statute itself, no revision would lie and,, hence, in that view of the matter, the Revision Petition was liable to be dismissed being hit by regulation 25 of the Regulation. According to the Learned Counsel, the Revision Petition as filed before the learned. Deputy Commissioner is misconceived inasmuch as power of revision as provided under Regulation 28 of the Regulation is available for reduction, enhancement or cancellation of sentence or remand of the case for trial and no provision is provided against an order of discharge passed by the learned trial court. 9. Further, according to Mr. Deputy Commissioner is misconceived inasmuch as power of revision as provided under Regulation 28 of the Regulation is available for reduction, enhancement or cancellation of sentence or remand of the case for trial and no provision is provided against an order of discharge passed by the learned trial court. 9. Further, according to Mr. Maurya, Learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1, the present appeal under Regulation 26 of the Regulation read with Sections 378(1) and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, against the impugned order dated 12.7.2005, passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner in the above revision petition is also misconceived inasmuch as, such appeal lies against an order of acquittal only and there being no trial and order of acquittal by the court below, no appeal would lie and as such, the instant appeal is liable to be dismissed. It is also submitted that Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is not applicable to this appeal as there is no abuse in the process of any Court and that apart, provision of Section 482 cannot be applied along with Section 378(1) of the said Code or Regulation 26 of the Regulation. 10. On the question of limitation, Mr. Maurya, Learned Counsel, submits that Article 131 of the Limitation Act prescribes 90 days for filing the revision petition from the date of decree or order or sentence and the revision petition filed beyond the prescribed limitation period without being accompanied by an petition for condoning the delay, is liable to be rejected, which was rightly done so by the learned Deputy Commissioner-cum-Sessions Judge without going into the question of maintainability of a revision petition or an appeal which is specifically provided under Regulation 25 of the Regulation. 11. On the question as to whether the Article 131 in the Schedule to the Limitation Act would be applicable to revision filed under Regulation 28 of the Regulation, it is submitted by Mr. Maurya, Learned Counsel, that although the period of limitation is not prescribed in the Regulation, provision under Regulation 32 specifically provides that the High Court, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner, shall be guided in regard to the procedure by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, with certain exceptions mentioned therein. Maurya, Learned Counsel, that although the period of limitation is not prescribed in the Regulation, provision under Regulation 32 specifically provides that the High Court, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner, shall be guided in regard to the procedure by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, with certain exceptions mentioned therein. The said exceptions, according to the Learned Counsel, are not applicable to the present case inasmuch as the Regulation itself provides that the word Revision mentioned in Regulation 28 denotes revision within the meaning of Sections397, 399 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and, therefore, the period prescribed for preferring the revision is 90 days from the date of order as prescribed under Regulation 3 read with Article 131 of the Limitation Act. The further submission of Mr. Maurya is that in the Revision Petition itself, so preferred before the learned Deputy Commissioner, provisions of Regulation 28 of the Regulation has been invoked by the revision petitioner along with Sections 399 and 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and thus, it has become an admitted position that the revision petitioner filed the revision petition under Regulation 28 of the Regulation read with the revisional provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and in that view of the matter, the period prescribed for revision is 90 days as mandated by Article 131 of the Limitation Act. It is also submitted that although the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, does not prescribe any stipulated period for filing revision petition, the revisional provision under the said Code are guided by Article 131 of the Limitation Act and since the Regulation carries the aforesaid Code with it insofar as they are applicable, the revision under Regulation is to be construed as revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 12. As regards the question of applicability of the Article 137 of the Limitation Act, it is submitted by Mr. Maurya, Learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1, that the Article 137 is applicable to 'any other application' and the words 'any other application' are not provided or prescribed in the Regulation and as such, the same can be applied only to the cases wherein the type of application is not understood or is not particularly prescribed. According to the Learned Counsel, in the instant case. According to the Learned Counsel, in the instant case. Regulation 28 of the Regulation has well prescribed the type of application, i.e., revision application and when the type or class of application is well known, well understood, well denoted and well prescribed in the statute book, the words 'any other application' cannot be considered or interpreted with the Revision. Furthermore, since Regulation 28 of the Regulation clearly prescribes the powers of revision, the application preferred for exercising the powers of revision cannot be termed as 'any other application' and in that view of the matter, Article 137 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable. The other aspect of the matter according to the Learned Counsel is that Article 137 of the said Act is applicable in civil court only in civil proceedings and there is no application of Article 137 in criminal proceedings. In this respect, he relies on Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhalaiyumm AIR 1977 SC 282 , wherein it has been held that Article 137of the Limitation Act applies to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court. The Learned Counsel further refers to Tamok Komut v. State of Arunachal Pradesh (2008) 2 GLT 313 to bring home his submissions that revisional power under Section 397 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, can be exercised by this Court in the matters pertaining to the State of Arunachal Pradesh. 13. I have also heard Mr. T. Michi, Learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2 and 3. It is submitted that these two respondents were not named as accused persons in the FIR and they have been wrongly impleaded in the case although there is no allegation against them in the FIR. Both the respondents are employees of the Bank and they being government servants, according to the Learned Counsel, the prosecution has to obtain sanction from the Government as required under Section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Learned Counsel adopts all the submissions made by Mr. Maurya, Learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1, which I do not feel necessary to repeat. 14. Under Regulation 18 of the said Regulation, the Assistant Commissioner, is vested with power to exercise the powers of a Magistrate of the First Class, as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Learned Counsel adopts all the submissions made by Mr. Maurya, Learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1, which I do not feel necessary to repeat. 14. Under Regulation 18 of the said Regulation, the Assistant Commissioner, is vested with power to exercise the powers of a Magistrate of the First Class, as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The order dated 12.7.2005, discharging the respondents/accused persons is an original decision against which appeal lies to the Deputy Commissioner under Regulation 25 of the said Regulation. For better appreciation, Regulation 25 is quoted below: 25. An appeal shall lie from an original decision of an Assistant Commissioner to the Deputy Commissioner. The admitted position is that the State appellant, instead of filing appeal, tiled a Revision Petition under Regulation 28. A revision under Regulation 28 may be made for reduction, enhancement or cancellation of any sentence passed or remand of the case for retrial. For better appreciation, Regulation 28 is quoted herein below: 28. The High Court or Deputy Commissioner may call for the proceedings of any officer subordinate to it and reduce, enhance or cancel any sentence passed, or remand the case for retrial, but no offence shall be punished by a sentence exceeding that warranted by law. As a last resort, the State filed the present appeal against the aforesaid impugned order dated 18.5.2006 basically under Regulation 26 of the Regulation, which is also quoted below: 26. An appeal shall lie to the. High Court against sentences of three years imprisonment and upward, and sentences of death or transportation. In other cases, there shall be no right of appeal, but the High Court may entertain an appeal by special leave. 15. This appeal is not against any sentence or transportation. Regulation 26 does not provide appeal to the High Court in other cases except by way of special leave of the High Court. Once the special leave has been granted by this Court, it is imperative to examine the validity or otherwise of the impugned order passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner. 16. It is by now clear enough that the State misdirected itself by filing the Revision Petition before the Deputy Commissioner as well as the instant appeal before this Court, may be due to wrong legal advice from the Public Prosecutor or misreading of relevant provision of law. 16. It is by now clear enough that the State misdirected itself by filing the Revision Petition before the Deputy Commissioner as well as the instant appeal before this Court, may be due to wrong legal advice from the Public Prosecutor or misreading of relevant provision of law. The point of law called upon to decide by way of special leave, in my considered view, has a least relevance and there is nothing to decide on the face of the indisputable factual position that the State by its fault filed a revision petition in place of an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner. The disturbing aspect is that although it was registered and admitted as a revision petition, the learned Deputy Commissioner considered and disposed of the same as an appeal. The impugned order dated 18.5.2006 begins, to quote from paragraph 1, with the words -"...This is an appeal filed against the order dated 12.07.2005 passed by the JMFC, Ziro..." and ends with the words - "...the findings of the JMFC Ziro, are upheld. The appeal is disposed off...". The learned Deputy Commissioner is lacking clarity in his mind whether he should exercise power of revision or appeal under Regulation 25 of the said Regulation. For this, the learned Deputy Commissioner, is not to blame because he is not an Officer from the judiciary adequately instructed in legal provisions. The present case is to be considered, taking into view the prevailing legal system or functioning of the Deputy Commissioner in the State of Arunachal Pradesh way back from the British Rule in India. 17. The North East Frontier Tract comprised of Sadiya, Balipara and Lakhimpur Tracts, were earlier known as a backward Tract. They were later included in the "Excluded Areas" under the Government of India (Excluded and Partial Areas) Order, 1936. The Excluded Areas were to be administered by the Governor himself in his discretion. The North East Frontier Tracts are inhabited by Tribes in an early stage of development. The Code of Criminal Procedure and Code of Civil Procedure, were not applicable to these areas though the officials were expected to be guided by the spirit of these laws. These areas were kept outside the operation of all the General Act and the Regulations, particularly, the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the Indian Penal Code was always made applicable to these areas. These areas were kept outside the operation of all the General Act and the Regulations, particularly, the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the Indian Penal Code was always made applicable to these areas. At the time of framing the Constitution of India, it was recommended to retain the same position in regard to application of Code of Criminal Procedure and Code of Civil Procedure. The reasons are not far too seek. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the architect of the Constitution of India, while participating in the debate for granting Regional and District Council, by way of incorporating the provisions of 6th Schedule, commented, thus: ...In other words, the position of the tribals of Assam, whatever may be the reason for it, is somewhat analogous to the position of the Red Indians in the United States as against the white emigrants there. Now, what did the United States do with regard to the Red Indians ? So far as I am aware, what they did was to create what are called Reservations or Boundaries within which the Red Indians lived. They are a republic by themselves. No doubt, by the law of the United States they are citizens of the United States. But that is only a nominal allegiance to the Constitution of the United States. Factually they are a separate, independent people. It was felt by the United States that their laws and modes of living, their habits and manners of life were so distinct that it would be dangerous to bring them at one shot, so to say, within the range of the laws made by the white people for white persons and for the purpose of the white civilization.... 18. The Sixth Schedule was incorporated in the Constitution of India for administration of Tribal areas, i.e., the Hill Districts of Assam, which included the Districts of Khasi and Jaintia and Garo Hills of present State of Meghalaya, and later on, extended, by subsequent amendments to some portion of the States of Tripura, Mizoram and some plain districts of Assam. The provision of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India is not extended to the State of Arunachal Pradesh but for the purpose of administration of justice, the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945, were framed. Similar Regulations have also been framed in other Tribal States like Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya, providing procedures for administration of criminal justice. The provision of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India is not extended to the State of Arunachal Pradesh but for the purpose of administration of justice, the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945, were framed. Similar Regulations have also been framed in other Tribal States like Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya, providing procedures for administration of criminal justice. These Rules/Regulations have been framed with an eye to peculiar sociocultural conditions of the tribal people of this part of India who are not really aware of and accustomed with the technicalities of complex procedures under the Code of Civil Procedure, and Code of Criminal Procedure. This position, was elaborately discussed by a Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in the case of State of Nagaland v. Ratan Singh AIR 1967 SC 212 , wherein it was held that 'these backward tracts are not found suitable for the application of Code of Criminal Procedure, in all its rigour and technicality and to say that they shall be governed not by the technicality Rules of the Code but by substance of such Rules is not to discriminate these areas against the rest of India.' To put in the words of Hon'ble Justice Hidayatullah, who was speaking for the Bench...'in a backward tract, the accused is not in a position to defend himself meticulously according to complex Code' and 'it is, therefore, necessary to leave the Judge free so that he may mould his proceedings to suit the situation and may be able to apply essential Rules on which our administration of justice is based untrammelled by any technical rule unless that rule is essential to further the cause of criminal justice.' It is apposite to quote paragraph 30 of the Judgment rendered in the aforesaid case: 30. Laws of this kind are made with an eye to simplicity. People in backward tracts cannot be expected to make themselves aware of the technicalities of a complex Code. What is important is that they should be able to present their defence effectively unhampered by the technicalities of complex laws. Throughout the past century, the Criminal Procedure Code has been excluded from this area because it would be too difficult for the local people to understand it. Instead the spirit of the Criminal Procedure Code has been asked to be applied so that justice may not fail because of some technicality. Throughout the past century, the Criminal Procedure Code has been excluded from this area because it would be too difficult for the local people to understand it. Instead the spirit of the Criminal Procedure Code has been asked to be applied so that justice may not fail because of some technicality. The argument that this is no law is not correct. Written law is nothing more than a control of discretion. The more there is of law the less there is of discretion. In this area, it is considered necessary that discretion should have greater play than technical rules and the provision that the spirit of the Code should apply is a law conceived in the best interest of the people. The discretion of the Presiding Officer is not subjected to rigid control because of the unsatisfactory state of defences which would be offered and which might fail if they did not comply with some technical rule. The removal of technicalities, in our opinion, leads to the advancement of the cause of justice in these backward tracts. On the other hand, the imposition of the Code of Criminal Procedure would retard justice, as indeed the Governors-General, the Governor and the other heads of local Government have always thought. We think, therefore, that Article 21 does not render the Rules of 1987 ineffective. 19. The distinctive feature of the Regulation, particularly, Chapter III, is that the criminal administration in the State of Arunachal Pradesh is not to be administered by the Sessions Judge and Judicial Magistrate appointed under the Criminal Procedure Code. It is. made clear in Regulation 15 of the Regulation that the criminal justice shall be administered by the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner and the Village authorities. The Assistant Commissioner appointed under Regulation 16 of the Regulation shall exercise all or any of the powers of the Deputy Commissioner, who are competent under Regulation 17 to pass any sentence warranted by law. The Deputy Commissioner is invested with powers of a Sessions Judge in the matters of criminal justice administration. The Assistant Commissioners under Regulation 18 of the said Regulation are likewise invested with power of a Magistrate of the First Class as defined under the Criminal Procedure Code. The Deputy Commissioner is invested with powers of a Sessions Judge in the matters of criminal justice administration. The Assistant Commissioners under Regulation 18 of the said Regulation are likewise invested with power of a Magistrate of the First Class as defined under the Criminal Procedure Code. This is a clear departure from the criminal justice administration under the Criminal Procedure Code which is permitted under the existing constitutional provision and the law made by the Supreme Court as discussed before. 20. Looking back at the objective sought to be achieved by allowing such exemption, in respect of tribal States in the North East, it would be illogical to insist on strict application of technical rules in the matters of disposal of appeal and/or revision, presented under the Regulation. The appeal and/or revision should not be understood strictly in terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure. One may file an application cause-titled as an appeal wrongly in a case where statutory revision lies and a revision in place of appeal vice-versa under the Regulation. Such appeal and/or revision, in my considered view, is not liable to be thrown away or rejected applying the strict technicality or procedure under the Code of Criminal Procedure inasmuch as the principal aim of the Regulation is to deliver justice to the simple living tribal people in simple procedure and manner. This would be equally applicable to an appeal and/or revision barred by limitation. Under such scheme of criminal administration of justice, the provisions of Articles 131 and/or 137 of the Limitation Act, can have no role to play. Discretion is given to the Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner to mould the criminal proceeding to suit any peculiar situation, as mandated by the Apex Court in Ratan Lal Singh's case (supra) wherein it is also held that under the criminal administration of justice, the technical rules are not to prevail over the substance of the matter. The learned Deputy Commissioner failed to exercise his judicial discretion in moulding the proceeding by way of asking the appellant to file a petition for condonation of delay in presenting the appeal and/or revision filed by the State before him and disposing the same not on merit but on ground of limitation as has been done by him vide impugned order dated 18.5.2006. This Court may also be failing in discharging its duties if it fails to interfere with the impugned order so as to help achieving the objective of the Regulation. 21. The learned Deputy Commissioner, as noted earlier, disposed of the State's revision petition vide his order dated 18.5.2006, as an appeal upholding the order of the Magistrate and thereby the accused respondents stood discharged from the criminal charges just on a technical ground namely, limitation by strictly applying the provisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Limitation Act. The foregoing discussions, has already resulted into a conclusion that the disposal of State's appeal/revision by the learned Deputy Commissioner, is not in conformity with the objective sought to be achieved by the framers of the Regulation. The objective of the Regulation is to be read with the object and function of criminal law. Providing security to persons and property is the prime function of the State. Here, in this case, the respondents have allegedly misappropriated a huge sum of public money to the tune of Rs. 1,89,79,337 meant particularly for economic development of the tribal people. The State would be failing in protecting the said public property if the perpetrators are allowed to move at large without being tried for some defects in following the trivial procedure or technicality. It is to be noted that with the passing of time, apart from ordinary crimes, more serious/heinous crimes including economic crimes are taking place in this peaceful State predominantly inhabited by simple living tribal people and the State is now being confronted with new challenges in the domain of administration of criminal justice. The Apex Court has always been reminding us that the contagion of lawlessness should not be allowed to undermine social order and lay it in ruins. I would, in this regard, refer only to one, amongst other cases, viz., the case of Madhya Pradesh v. Babbu Barkare (2005) 5 SCC 413. 22. The money allegedly misappropriated by the accused respondents is public money and as such, a great amount of public interest is involved in the present case. If the guilts involved are left untried and unpunished due to technical defect, it would amount to ignoring of public interest. 22. The money allegedly misappropriated by the accused respondents is public money and as such, a great amount of public interest is involved in the present case. If the guilts involved are left untried and unpunished due to technical defect, it would amount to ignoring of public interest. The Apex Court had already mandated that public interest in the proper administration of justice must be given much importance if not more, as the interest of the individual accused. In this, the courts have a vital role to play and court should not leave the fate of the proceeding entirely in the hands of the parties inasmuch as the crime is a public wrong in breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community. I am referring to what has been said so in Zahira Habihullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat (2006) 3 SCC 374 . 23. For the above discussions and reasons, I come to the conclusion that strict procedure under the Criminal Procedure Code for disposal of an appeal and/or revision is not contemplated under the existing provision of the Regulation. So also, the provision of Limitation Act in the disposal of an appeal and/or revision, in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, should not be applied strictly. The learned Deputy Commissioner dismissed/rejected the appeal and/or revision filed by the State of Arunachal Pradesh strictly by applying the provision of Limitation Act which, in my considered view, is not in conformity with the laws laid down by the Apex Court and the objective sought to be achieved by the aforesaid Regulation. In view of the above, the impugned order dated 18.5.2006, passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner, Ziro, in Criminal Revision No. 03/2005, is liable to be quashed and the same is accordingly quashed. The matter is remanded back to the learned Deputy Commissioner, Ziro, to dispose of the aforesaid criminal revision treating the same as an appeal in accordance with law, if necessary, by requiring the State of Arunachal Pradesh to file an appropriate petition for condonation of delay. 24. The appeal stands allowed. 25. It is made clear that the learned Deputy Commissioner, Ziro shall dispose of the appeal, without being influenced by whatever opinion has been expressed in this Judgment, exercising his discretion and power given under the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945. 24. The appeal stands allowed. 25. It is made clear that the learned Deputy Commissioner, Ziro shall dispose of the appeal, without being influenced by whatever opinion has been expressed in this Judgment, exercising his discretion and power given under the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945. The question of prosecution sanction is also left open to the learned Deputy Commissioner. Appeal allowed