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2009 DIGILAW 230 (GUJ)

Dhulabhai Manibhai Patel v. The State of Gujarat

2009-03-31

A.L.DAVE, J.C.UPADHYAYA

body2009
Judgment J.C. Upadhyaya, J.—The appellant, who was original accused in Sessions Case No. 117 of 2004, by preferring this appeal challenged the legality and validity of his conviction, recorded by the Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 2, Ahmedabad [Rural] on 27/5/2005 for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 376 and 506 [2] of the Indian Penal Code [IPC]. The Learned Trial Judge awarded sentence of rigorous imprisonment [RI] for 10 years and fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default of payment of fine, RI for 3 months for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC and RI for one year and fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, RI for one month for the offence punishable under Section 506 [2] of the IPC. Substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently and the benefit of set off was given. 2. The prosecution case, in nutshell, is that the appellant happens to be father-in-law of prosecutrix - Bhavna alias Bhavika. The prosecutrix married with Mahendra Dhulabhai, son of the appellant on 17/2/2003 and after her marriage, she went to reside with her husband at her matrimonial home situated at village Ognaj of District Ahmedabad. The family of her husband, at the time of the incident, consisted of her father-in-law [appellant], her mother-in-law Hiraben and minor girl Anchal, aged about 3 years, who was daughter of her husband’s elder brother. 2.1. The incident occurred at about 11.00 a m on 10/3/2004. At the time of the incident, her husband had left the house to attend his job and her mother-in-law Hiraben had gone to Gandhinagar where her husband’s elder brother was residing. Thus, at the time of the incident, the prosecutrix, her father-in-law [the appellant] and Anchal, aged about 3 years, were only there in the house. The prosecutrix was doing routinal household work in the ground floor portion of the house. It is alleged that at that time, the appellant shut the main door of the house from inside and came near the prosecutrix and he caught hold of her hands and forcibly took her to a room which was situated in the upstairs of the house. The appellant then closed the prosecutrix into the room by closing the door of the room from outside and the appellant returned back in the room with Anchal. The appellant then closed the prosecutrix into the room by closing the door of the room from outside and the appellant returned back in the room with Anchal. Anchal was made to sit on a bicycle and the appellant gave her ice-cream and threatened the prosecutrix that if she will speak anything or will shout, she would be done to death. Then the prosecutrix was undressed by the appellant and was compelled to lie-down on a cot and the prosecutrix was raped without her will or consent by the appellant. It is alleged that Anchal opened a window of the room and thereupon the appellant carrying his clothes in his hands, left the room and went to the ground floor of the house. The prosecutrix thereafter put on her clothes and went to the ground floor. The appellant then told the prosecutrix to accompany Anchal and to leave Anchal to the Nursery School. The prosecutrix then along with Anchal, went to the Nursery School, left Anchal there and instead of returning back to her matrimonial home, she went to her mother’s house which was situated in the City of Ahmedabad, but the house was locked. She, therefore, went to the High Court as her mother was serving in the canteen of the High Court, but in the compound of the High Court, she saw scooter of her husband and, therefore, she did not go inside the canteen to meet her mother, but she returned back to her mother’s house and waited outside the house till her mother returned from her service. It is alleged that after Kailasben Bhikhabhai, mother of the prosecutrix returned to her home, the prosecutrix narrated the incident about the rape to her mother. On the next day, her mother informed about the incident to her aunt and other relatives and they went to Gandhinagar where the elder brother of the husband of the prosecutrix was residing and informed him about the mis-deed committed by his father, but no response was given by the elder brother of her husband. It is alleged that the police was not immediately informed with a view to save their reputation. Subsequently, Kailasben, mother of the prosecutrix informed about the incident to advocate Mr. PB Goswami, who was knowing Kailasben and thereafter on 15/3/2004 the prosecutrix lodged FIR in Ghatlodia Police Station, Ahmedabad. It is alleged that the police was not immediately informed with a view to save their reputation. Subsequently, Kailasben, mother of the prosecutrix informed about the incident to advocate Mr. PB Goswami, who was knowing Kailasben and thereafter on 15/3/2004 the prosecutrix lodged FIR in Ghatlodia Police Station, Ahmedabad. The FIR came to be registered and the police investigation was commenced. 2.2. During the course of investigation, police recorded statements of material witnesses. The prosecutrix was sent for medical examination. Certain Muddamal articles like clothes, bed sheets, etc., were recovered by drawing panchnamas in presence of Panchas. After collecting required material for the purpose of lodgment of charge-sheet, charge-sheet came to be filed in the Court of the Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ahmedabad [Rural]. As the offence was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the Learned Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Ahmedabad [Rural], which came to be registered as Sessions Case No. 117 of 2004. 3. The Learned Trial Judge framed charge against the appellant at Exhibit 4 for the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 506 [2] of the IPC, to which the appellant did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried. Thereupon, the prosecution adduced oral and documentary evidence. After the prosecution completed its oral evidence, the Learned Trial Judge recorded further statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C., and the appellant in his further statement denied generally all the allegations levelled against him by the prosecution. The Learned Trial Judge, after appreciating the evidence on record and considering submissions made on behalf of both the sides, came to the conclusion that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond any reasonable doubt against the appellant and recorded the conviction of the appellant for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 376 and 506[2] of the IPC and awarded the sentence as hereinabove referred to in this judgment. 4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order recording his conviction, the appellant accused preferred this appeal. 5. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. PM Thakkar for M/s. Thakkar Associates, for the appellant accused submitted that the trial Court has committed serious error in convicting the appellant, despite the fact that there was no cogent and trustworthy evidence on record to establish the nexus between the incident in question and the appellant accused. 5. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. PM Thakkar for M/s. Thakkar Associates, for the appellant accused submitted that the trial Court has committed serious error in convicting the appellant, despite the fact that there was no cogent and trustworthy evidence on record to establish the nexus between the incident in question and the appellant accused. The alleged incident happened on 10/3/2004, whereas the FIR came to be lodged on 15/3/2004. The prosecutrix, who lodged the FIR, not satisfactorily explained the delay in lodgment of the FIR either in the FIR or in her evidence. On the contrary, the evidence adduced by the prosecution itself is suggestive of the fact that the delayed FIR was lodged with oblique and ulterior motive to falsely implicate the appellant with the crime. 5.1. Mr. Thakkar submitted that the Sessions Court, while recording the conviction, solely relied upon the evidence of the prosecutrix recorded at Exhibit 5 [PW 1]. During the course of her evidence, a letter written by the prosecutrix to her husband Mahendrabhai was produced at Exhibit 9. Considering the letter Exhibit 9, it is apparent that the prosecutrix was exchanging the love letters of teenage boys and girls residing in the area where she was staying. However, the appellant being the head of his family, objected to such activity of the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix did not like it. By keeping a grudge in her mind, she filed a false FIR implicating the appellant with such serious crime. That the bare perusal of the letter Exhibit 9 would reveal the malafide intention on the part of the prosecutrix and that the prosecutrix can go to any extent and considering such mentality of the prosecutrix, it cannot be believed for a moment that she could have been threatened by the appellant and that the prosecutrix would succumb to the alleged threat administered to her by aged and infirm appellant. That in letter Exhibit 9 addressed to her husband, the prosecutrix did not at all refer the alleged incident of rape having been committed on her by her father-in-law, the appellant. If at all such serious thing had happened, she would have definitely mentioned in her letter about rape and would have definitely informed her husband about it. That in letter Exhibit 9 addressed to her husband, the prosecutrix did not at all refer the alleged incident of rape having been committed on her by her father-in-law, the appellant. If at all such serious thing had happened, she would have definitely mentioned in her letter about rape and would have definitely informed her husband about it. That thus the bare perusal of the letter Exhibit 9 would make the entire version of the prosecutrix, not only untrustworthy and doubtful, but would reveal the fact that a false and malicious FIR was lodged by the prosecutrix with oblique and ulterior motive. 5.2. It is submitted that the version of the prosecutrix does not at all get support from the medical evidence. In the so called history before a Medical Officer, the incident is alleged to have taken place on 9/3/2004 and not on 10/3/2004. It is submitted that as a matter of fact, the prosecutrix was caught red-handed by exchanging love letters of teenage boys and girls on 9/3/2004 and the appellant had expressed his displeasure about it and on 9/3/2004 the prosecutrix had left her matrimonial home. That, therefore, there was no question of the incident of rape having taken place on 10/3/2004, as by then the prosecutrix had already left her matrimonial home. However, as she was exposed doing her activity of exchanging love letters and the appellant being the head of his family, objected to such activity and, therefore, with a view to teach lesson to the appellant, he came to be falsely implicated in connection with this offence by the prosecutrix. 5.3. The evidence of the prosecutrix is suffering from material improvements and contradictions and is quite unnatural. As averred by her, after dragging her to upstairs and when the appellant left the room to call Anchal, who was in the ground floor, the prosecutrix could have bolted the door of the room from the inside and could have shouted for help. She is young lady and the appellant was at the relevant time 60 years’ old, infirm man and she could have overpowered him. Even after the so called incident was over and the appellant asked her to accompany Anchal to leave Anchal at her Nursery School, the prosecutrix readily agreed to it. She accompanied Anchal and left her at her school and according to her version, she went to her mother’s house. Even after the so called incident was over and the appellant asked her to accompany Anchal to leave Anchal at her Nursery School, the prosecutrix readily agreed to it. She accompanied Anchal and left her at her school and according to her version, she went to her mother’s house. While going to her mother’s house, she did not inform about such incident to anybody, including her neighbours. When she found that her mother was not at home and it was locked, she went to the High Court where her mother was serving in the canteen. She saw her husband’s scooter parked in the compound of the High Court and she immediately returned from there without meeting her mother and again went to her mother’s house which was already locked. It is submitted that such unnatural conduct on the part of the prosecutrix makes the entire prosecution case highly doubtful. If at all she was ravished and raped by her father-in-law, her natural conduct would have been to immediately inform her husband, who was already available in the High Court canteen with her mother. She did not inform about the incident either to her husband or to her mother when they both were available in the canteen. 5.4. It is submitted that the police machinery was not moved immediately and the prosecutrix and her mother sat silent and according to their evidence, they went to inform about the incident to the elder brother of husband of the prosecutrix [elder son of the appellant] who was residing at Gandhinagar, but according to them, no response was given by her husband’s elder brother. The prosecutrix and her mother never tried to meet the appellant, either to rebuke him or with a view to get some explanation from him about the alleged misdeed. Then, only after consulting advocate Mr. Goswami and upon his advice, false FIR was lodged. 5.5. Therefore, it is submitted that the evidence about the conduct of the prosecutrix is highly unnatural and artificial. The evidence of the prosecutrix is not cogent, convincing and trustworthy so that the Court can rely upon it and record conviction. Therefore, it is submitted that it is not in the interest of justice to record conviction relying upon the bare words of the prosecutrix. 5.6. The evidence of the prosecutrix is not cogent, convincing and trustworthy so that the Court can rely upon it and record conviction. Therefore, it is submitted that it is not in the interest of justice to record conviction relying upon the bare words of the prosecutrix. 5.6. It is submitted that the evidence of the mother of the prosecutrix is full of material improvements than what prosecutrix deposed in her evidence. The prosecutrix Bhavnaben in her evidence does not state that when the appellant went down stairs to call Anchal, at that time the appellant had bolted the door of the room from the outside, whereas the mother of the prosecutrix, Kailasben states that the door of the room was bolted by the appellant from the outside. Mother of the prosecutrix attempted to explain and justify the delay in lodgement of FIR, but she has failed in her attempt. 5.7. Considering the evidence of advocate Mr. Goswami Exhibit 40, it is submitted that Mr. Goswami in his evidence tried to convey that he has not taken any interest in the matter, but as a matter of fact, considering the evidence of the prosecutrix Bhavna and her mother Kailasben, it is apparently clear that not only at the stage of lodgement of FIR, but even in the hospital where the prosecutrix was examined and even during the course of evidence recorded before the trial Court, Mr. Goswami has taken interest in the matter. 5.8. It is submitted that the prosecutrix in her evidence stated that the appellant gave ice-cream to Anchal at the time of commission of rape. She further states that the ice-cream was kept in refrigerator. However, considering the evidence of I.O., he clearly admits that in the house he did not see the refrigerator. In the Panchnama of the scene of offence, there is no reference of any refrigerator available in the house. 5.9. Assailing the FSL Report, on behalf of the appellant, it was submitted that the prosecution relies upon the evidence to the effect that in the vaginal swab, the semen of group “B” of the appellant was detected. In the Panchnama of the scene of offence, there is no reference of any refrigerator available in the house. 5.9. Assailing the FSL Report, on behalf of the appellant, it was submitted that the prosecution relies upon the evidence to the effect that in the vaginal swab, the semen of group “B” of the appellant was detected. However, the appellant at the time when his further statement came to be recorded by the trial Court, has produced a copy of the driving licence of his son Mahendra Dhulabhai [the husband of the prosecutrix], wherein even the blood group of the husband of the prosecutrix is shown to be of group “B”. Therefore, the version of the prosecutrix cannot be said to have been duly corroborated by any circumstantial evidence. 5.10. Ultimately it is submitted that the appeal may be allowed. 6. Learned APP Mr. Patel for the State vehemently opposed this appeal. It is submitted that considering the nature of offence, hardly there will be any eye witness to the occurrence and, therefore, the evidence of the prosecutrix carries great importance. Considering the evidence of the prosecutrix, she elaborately narrated the incident of rape and there is no material contradiction between her FIR and her evidence. The involvement of the appellant in the incident is duly proved by the prosecutrix. No corroboration of the evidence of the prosecutrix is required, but in the instant case, her evidence is duly corroborated by the evidence of her mother Kailasben and the medical evidence on record. 6.1. Learned APP Mr. Patel submitted that the defence relies upon the letter Exhibit 9 written by the prosecutrix addressed to her husband. However, the said letter came to be produced by the defence during the course of cross-examination of the prosecutrix. There is nothing on record to come to the conclusion that the prosecutrix had sent said letter after the date of the incident. On the contrary, the prosecutrix in her evidence states that the letter was written by her, addressed to her husband, before about 6 months from the date of the incident. There is no reason to doubt the version of the prosecutrix. Admittedly the author of the letter is the best person to say when it was written and under what circumstances it was written. Therefore, the letter Exhibit 9 does not help the appellant. 6.2. There is no reason to doubt the version of the prosecutrix. Admittedly the author of the letter is the best person to say when it was written and under what circumstances it was written. Therefore, the letter Exhibit 9 does not help the appellant. 6.2. It is submitted that merely in the Panchnama of the scene of occurrence, there is no reference of refrigerator, it cannot be believed that there was no refrigerator in the house. Even otherwise, this is minor discrepancy and not going to the root of the prosecution case. There are no material contradictions between the evidence of the prosecutrix and her mother Kailasben. It is submitted that considering the FSL evidence, on the underwear of the victim and even in her vaginal swab, the semen of the group of the appellant is found. It is submitted that the incident occurred on 10/3/2004 and soon after the incident, she left her matrimonial home. Therefore, there was no cohabitation between the prosecutrix and her husband after the incident. Therefore, mere fact that the blood group of husband of the prosecutrix is also group “B”, shall not create any doubt about the FSL evidence. 6.3. Therefore, it is submitted that the appeal may be dismissed. 7. We have examined the record and proceedings of the trial Court in context with the submissions made on behalf of both the sides. 8. There is no dispute about the relationship between the prosecutrix and the appellant. The appellant is father-in-law of the prosecutrix. There is also no dispute that the family consisted of the prosecutrix herself, her husband Mahendrabhai, her father-in-law [the appellant] and her mother-in-law Hiraben. Minor girl aged about 3 years named Anchal, the daughter of her husband’s elder brother was also residing in the house at the time of the incident. 9. The prosecutrix Bhavnaben in her evidence Exhibit 5 about the incident, stated that on 7/3/2004 there was a Dhuleti festival and her mother-in-law had gone to the house of her husband’s elder brother at Gandhinagar. The incident occurred on 10/3/2004 at about 11.30 a.m. At that time in the house she was doing her routinal household work and the appellant as well as Anchal were there in the house. Her husband had left the house at about 8.00 a.m., to attend his duty and her mother-in-law was at Gandhinagar. The incident occurred on 10/3/2004 at about 11.30 a.m. At that time in the house she was doing her routinal household work and the appellant as well as Anchal were there in the house. Her husband had left the house at about 8.00 a.m., to attend his duty and her mother-in-law was at Gandhinagar. The appellant was on the ground floor of the house and she was doing her household work and the appellant came near her and he caught hold of her hand and took her to the upstair room. Anchal was also in the room. She was made to lie-down on the cot by the appellant and she was raped by the appellant. She stated that she was threatened by the appellant that if she will speak anything, she would be done to death. She stated that before she was raped by the appellant, the appellant gave ice-cream to Anchal. She stated that Anchal opened the window of the room and thereafter, the appellant left the room and went down-stairs carrying his clothes. About the incident, considering her cross-examination she stated that initially when the appellant had caught hold of her hand and carried her to the upstair room, there was nobody in the room and she herself and the appellant were there in the room. That thereafter, the appellant went to the down-stairs and came to the room along with Anchal and Anchal was made to sit on a cycle and the appellant gave her ice-cream which he had kept in the refrigerator. She further stated that she was threatened by the appellant when she was inside the room. In her evidence, the prosecutrix further stated that after the incident she came down-stairs in the house and the appellant thereafter asked her to accompany Anchal and leave her at her Nursery school. She deposed that she left the house along with Anchal at about 12.00 noon. After leaving Anchal in the school, she went to the house of her mother, but she found that her mother’s house was locked. Her mother was working in a canteen in the High Court and, therefore, she went to the canteen. However, before she entered the canteen, she saw scooter of her husband in a parking and, therefore, she was afraid of going into the canteen and she came back to the house of her mother. Her mother was working in a canteen in the High Court and, therefore, she went to the canteen. However, before she entered the canteen, she saw scooter of her husband in a parking and, therefore, she was afraid of going into the canteen and she came back to the house of her mother. One cot was lying outside the house and she lied down on the cot. At about 6.00 p.m., her mother came to the house and she narrated the incident to her mother. The prosecutrix further stated that on the next day, her mother met Yogita, the elder sister of the prosecutrix and mother-in-law of Yogita and other relatives and informed them about the incident. Thereafter, on the next day, they went to Gandhinagar to meet the elder brother of the husband of the prosecutrix [the elder son of the appellant], but no satisfactory response was given by him and he stated that they may do whatever they like. Thereafter, they met one Kantibhai, who was a middleman to arrange marriage between the prosecutrix and her husband and told him about the incident and Kantibhai had stated that if they want to initiate legal action, they may do so. Thereafter, she lodged the FIR before Ghatlodia Police Station. She stated that thereafter she was sent to hospital for medical examination. She was shown the Muddamal under-garment and she identified it to be of the appellant and she explained that as she was washing clothes of her family members, she can say that the under-garment belonged to the appellant. 9.1. The prosecutrix Bhavnaben was cross-examined at length by the defence. Considering her cross-examination, it transpires that at the time of offence, she did not shout for help. As per the case of the prosecution, she was doing household work in the ground floor of the house. The appellant came near her and caught hold of her hand and took her to the first floor room. Keeping her in the room, the appellant again came on the ground floor, took with him to the first floor room girl Anchal. Anchal was made to sit on cycle and gave her ice-cream and then, according to the prosecution case, raped the prosecutrix. Now in the cross-examination, she states that when the appellant went to the ground floor, she did not bolt the door of the room from inside. Anchal was made to sit on cycle and gave her ice-cream and then, according to the prosecution case, raped the prosecutrix. Now in the cross-examination, she states that when the appellant went to the ground floor, she did not bolt the door of the room from inside. She stated that the ice-cream was kept in a refrigerator. She admitted that at the time when the Panchnama of the scene of offence was drawn, she did not draw the attention of the concerned Police Officer to the refrigerator and she explains that at the time when the Panchnama of scene of offence was drawn, she was not permitted to remain present near the Police Officer. About the threat, she states that she was given threat by the appellant when they were in the ground floor. Thereafter, she stated that the threat was given to her in the room of the first floor. She further admitted that at the time when she was raped, Anchal was present in the room. However, she stated that she was aged about 3 years. She stated in her cross-examination that she was undressed by the appellant. However, none of her garments was torn. She further admitted that advocate Mr. Goswami used to attend the proceedings before the trial Court. However, during the course of her cross-examination on behalf of the defence, a letter was shown to her, which is produced at Exhibit 9 and she admitted that she had written the letter. However, she stated that she wrote the letter addressed to her husband before about 6 months from the date of the incident. 10. Now the major controversy between the parties is surrounding to the letter Exhibit 9. The sum and substance of letter Exhibit 9 appears to be that one Jalpa threw some chit in the courtyard and it seems that her mother-in-law found said chit and there was some verbal exchanges between herself and her mother-in-law. In the letter, it is further stated that during noon when she had gone to take rest, some indecent words were uttered by her father-in-law [the appellant]. That therefore, she came to her house. It further transpires that some allegations were made by her in-laws about her mother. She stated in the letter that she would never come back to her matrimonial home. She ventilated some grievance in the letter about her mother-in-law. That therefore, she came to her house. It further transpires that some allegations were made by her in-laws about her mother. She stated in the letter that she would never come back to her matrimonial home. She ventilated some grievance in the letter about her mother-in-law. She stated in the letter that if her husband desires to stay with her, she is prepared to stay with him provided if he resides separately. It is stated in the letter that within 2 days, she would see that Jalpa is beaten by somebody. 10.1. Now the controversy between the parties is as to when did the prosecutrix write the letter Exhibit 9. According to the say of the prosecutrix on oath in her deposition, it was written before about 6 months from the date of the incident. During the course of arguments, on behalf of the defence, it is stated that the letter was written after the incident. However, considering her entire cross-examination, no-where direct suggestion was put to her by the defence that the letter was written after the incident. However, it was suggested to her that the incident contained in the letter Exhibit 9 occurred on 9/3/2004. She outright denied the suggestion. She even outright denied the suggestion that some incident had taken place on 9/3/2004 and on the same day, she had left her matrimonial home. 10.2. Now the root cause of the controversy, as to when the letter Exhibit 9 was written by the prosecutrix is that in the letter no-where the date is mentioned. Even no-where it is mentioned that the incident about throwing a chit by Jalpa in her courtyard and find of the chit by her mother-in-law occurred on 9/3/2004. It is alleged by the defence that the incident narrated in the letter occurred on 9/3/2004. Except the bare suggestion that the incident contained in the letter occurred on 9/3/2004 put to the prosecutrix during her cross-examination, which she outright denied, there is no evidence whatsoever to come to the conclusion that the incident narrated in the letter occurred on 9/3/2004. The prosecutrix, in Para. 7 of her cross-examination, stated that once during her matrimonial life of one year prior to the incident, she had felt offended and she had come to reside with her mother and at that time her sister Yogitaben had come to leave her at her house. The prosecutrix, in Para. 7 of her cross-examination, stated that once during her matrimonial life of one year prior to the incident, she had felt offended and she had come to reside with her mother and at that time her sister Yogitaben had come to leave her at her house. She further stated that thereafter, this is the second incident that she left her matrimonial home, feeling offended, on the day of the incident. She admitted that after she was raped, she had decided that she would now never go back to her matrimonial home. 10.3. Under such circumstances, on behalf of the defence, it was submitted that the tenor and texture of the letter Exhibit 9 is suggestive that it must have been written after the incident. However, as stated above, she deposed that during one year of her married life, only once she had felt offended and had left her matrimonial home and at that time Yogitaben had accompanied her to her house. Thereafter, after that incident, this is the second time that she felt offended and left her matrimonial home. Merely because the name of Yogitaben appears in the letter Exhibit 9 and the fact that she left her matrimonial home as stated in the letter, it cannot be inferred that the letter was written after the incident. Further more, if the letter was written after the incident, she would have definitely narrated the incident of rape in her letter. It is further pertinent to note that the defence has only tendered the documentary evidence in form of the letter during the course of cross-examination of the prosecutrix. There is nothing on record to show that whether letter was sent by the prosecutrix to her husband by post or by hand delivery and how it was sent. Nothing on this line was asked by the defence during the course of the cross-examination to the prosecutrix. It is true that according to her evidence, before the incident, once she felt offended and she had left her matrimonial home. However, there is nothing on record to come to the conclusion that thereby during one year of her matrimonial life before the incident only once she had left the house of her husband. It has come during her cross-examination that even on the occasion of marriage of one relative, she had attended said marriage. However, there is nothing on record to come to the conclusion that thereby during one year of her matrimonial life before the incident only once she had left the house of her husband. It has come during her cross-examination that even on the occasion of marriage of one relative, she had attended said marriage. In other words, there may be many occasions where she could have written letters to her husband prior to the date of incident when she was away from her house. It is not her allegation that she was never permitted to come to her mother’s house during said one year. 10.4. Putting reliance upon the letter Exhibit 9, it was submitted that the letter exposes the mentality of the prosecutrix that she can go to any extent and she has threatened in the letter that within a day or two, she would see that Jalpa is beaten by somebody. Therefore, it was submitted that even she can file false and frivolous complaint containing any grave allegations. However, as stated above, there is nothing on record to come to the conclusion that the letter was written after the date of the incident. Even there is nothing to suggest that the incident narrated in the letter, occurred on 9/3/2004 and that on 9/3/2004 she left her matrimonial home. It has come in her evidence that after the incident when she went to the canteen to meet her mother, she saw her husband’s scooter parked in a parking and, therefore, she did not meet her mother there in the canteen. When such is the situation that after the incident, she was not prepared to meet her husband, there was no reason whatsoever for her to write the letter like the one Exhibit 9 to her husband after the incident. Secondly, the bare reading of the letter does not create an impression about her that she is a woman of revengeful nature. There is nothing to show that Jalpa was actually beaten. 10.5. When such is the situation, the say of the defence that the letter Exhibit 9 contains the incident which occurred on 9/3/2004, cannot be accepted. Therefore, the say of the defence that the incident occurred on 9/3/2004 narrated in the letter and on the same day she left her matrimonial home cannot be accepted. 10.5. When such is the situation, the say of the defence that the letter Exhibit 9 contains the incident which occurred on 9/3/2004, cannot be accepted. Therefore, the say of the defence that the incident occurred on 9/3/2004 narrated in the letter and on the same day she left her matrimonial home cannot be accepted. The incident of rape took place on 10/3/2004 and, therefore, taking recourse to the letter Exhibit 9, the appellant seems to have raised a defence before the trial Court that the prosecutrix had already left her matrimonial home on 9/3/2004 and, therefore, there was no question of she having been ravished and raped on 10/3/2004 as alleged by the prosecution. However, considering the overall evidence adduced by the prosecutrix, there is nothing to come to the conclusion that she had left her matrimonial home on 9/3/2004. 11. On behalf of the appellant, it was submitted that the conduct of the prosecutrix at the time of the alleged incident was unnatural. It was submitted that when a woman is to be raped or is raped, the natural conduct would be to shout for help. In the instant case, even when the appellant went to the ground floor, she could have bolted the door of the room from inside. It is true that she did not shout for help or she did not bolt the door of the room from inside when the appellant went down-stairs. However, while evaluating her conduct, it is required to be considered that the appellant was not a stranger outsider, who somehow entered the house of the prosecutrix and raped her. The appellant is her father-in-law staying in the same house. Therefore, considering that background, because she did not shout for help or did not take any prior precaution to avert the rape, her entire evidence cannot be thrown over-board criticizing her conduct as unnatural conduct. It is required to be considered that for appellant, she was a daughter like daughter-in-law and she was subjected to sexual attack by none other than her father like father-in-law. Therefore, if her conduct at the time of the incident is considered in light of the aforesaid background, it would not render her evidence untrustworthy or doubtful. 12. It is required to be considered that for appellant, she was a daughter like daughter-in-law and she was subjected to sexual attack by none other than her father like father-in-law. Therefore, if her conduct at the time of the incident is considered in light of the aforesaid background, it would not render her evidence untrustworthy or doubtful. 12. On behalf of the appellant, it was submitted that the alleged incident happened on 10/3/2004, whereas the FIR came to be lodged on 15/3/2004 and, therefore, not only it is delayed FIR but it is a concocted one. It is true that the FIR came to be lodged on 15/3/2004 regarding the incident which occurred on 10/3/2004. The prosecutrix in her evidence states that the incident occurred at about 11.30 a.m., on 10/3/2004. She met her mother only at about 6.00 p.m., and she narrated the incident to her mother. Thereafter, on the next day, her mother and other relatives went to the house of elder brother of husband of the prosecutrix at Gandhinagar, but no response was given by brother of her husband. Thereafter, they met Kantibhai, at whose instance, the prosecutrix and her husband married. Even considering the evidence of Kailasben Bhikhabhai Exhibit 39, the mother of the prosecutrix, she stated that on 10/3/2004 when she came to her house she found her daughter Bhavna waiting for her and Bhavna narrated the incident to her. She told Bhavna that her in-laws would be rebuked and if they are not convinced that something wrong is done to Bhavna, then only legal action will be taken. Then she stated that on the next day, they went to meet Kanubhai, the elder brother of husband of Bhavna, but no good response was given. They met Kantibhai and again no response was given. They contacted advocate Mr. PB Goswami and thereafter Bhavna lodged the FIR. In her cross-examination, she denied the suggestion that the FIR came to be lodged at the instance of advocate Mr. Goswami. 12.1. Prosecution examined advocate Mr. Goswami at Exhibit 40. Considering his evidence, he stated that Kailasben had engaged him as an advocate in one civil suit. Said civil suit was adjourned on 15/3/2004. Therefore, he met Kailasben alias Naynaben, the mother of the prosecutrix and the prosecutrix on 15/3/2004 at about 5.00 p.m., when they had come in the Court in connection with said civil suit. Considering his evidence, he stated that Kailasben had engaged him as an advocate in one civil suit. Said civil suit was adjourned on 15/3/2004. Therefore, he met Kailasben alias Naynaben, the mother of the prosecutrix and the prosecutrix on 15/3/2004 at about 5.00 p.m., when they had come in the Court in connection with said civil suit. He stated that at that time Bhavna told him about the incident of rape. Advocate Mr. Goswami further stated that both the ladies told him that they wanted to lodge police case and he [Mr. Goswami] was requested to accompany them to the police station. Thereupon, as deposed by Mr. Goswami, he told both the ladies that they should consult their relatives and thereafter they may lodge FIR. Thereafter, they departed and he want to his house. Then at about 9.30 p.m., mother of the prosecutrix telephoned him and therefore, he went to Ghatlodia Police Station. When he reached Ghatlodia Police Station, at that time Bhavna was narrating the incident to police. He denied the suggestion that the false FIR came to be lodged at his instance. 12.2. Thus, considering the evidence of the prosecutrix, her mother and advocate Mr. Goswami, it clearly transpires that soon after the incident the FIR was not lodged, but the time was spent to see that her in-laws are rebuked and if her in-laws do not realize that something wrong was done to Bhavna, then only legal action would be taken. After the incident and before the lodgement of FIR, both the ladies met Yogitaben and her mother-in-law. They also met elder brother of Bhavna’s husband as well as Kantibhai. However, defence examined Kantibhai Patel as defence witness at Exhibit 62 and he stated that he does not know Bhavna and her husband Mahesh. He was not consulted either by Bhavna or her mother in connection with any dispute. However, the fact remains that before the lodgement of FIR and after the incident, both Bhavna and her mother tried to convince in-laws of Bhavna that something wrong was done to Bhavna, but they failed in their attempt. It is further pertinent to note that the FIR came to be filed on 15/3/2004 at about 9.30 p.m., during late evening. On 15/3/2004 both Bhavna and her mother had gone to Court in connection with the civil suit wherein they had engaged advocate Mr. It is further pertinent to note that the FIR came to be filed on 15/3/2004 at about 9.30 p.m., during late evening. On 15/3/2004 both Bhavna and her mother had gone to Court in connection with the civil suit wherein they had engaged advocate Mr. Goswami and at about 5.00 p.m., in the evening they met advocate Mr. Goswami and Bhavna narrated the incident of rape to advocate Mr. Goswami and requested his help. The reply given by advocate Mr. Goswami is required to be considered. As deposed by Mr. Goswami, he told both the ladies that they should consult their relatives first and then to decide about filing of the FIR. Thereafter, they departed. It is not his say that immediately he expressed his readiness and took both the ladies to police station. At about 9.00 to 9.30 p.m., he received telephone call of mother of the prosecutrix and went to Ghatlodia Police Station and at that time, both the ladies were there in the police station. It is further pertinent to note that Bhavna was not raped by any stranger but her father-in-law. Therefore, she refrained from immediately filing a police complaint. She and her mother attempted their best before the lodgement of FIR to see that at-least in-laws of Bhavna should realize that something wrong was done to Bhavna. However, no response was given to Bhavna. It is further pertinent to note that irrespective of the final outcome of the criminal case, once a daughter-in-law files complaint before police alleging rape having been committed by her father-in-law, the matrimonial life of that wife is ultimately going to be ruined. If at all Bhavna wanted to falsely implicate her father-in-law in an offence of rape and if at all she was ill-advised by advocate Mr. Goswami, then soon after the incident she would have immediately filed the FIR. Under such circumstances, merely because the FIR came to be filed after about 5 days from the date of the incident, it cannot be said that the delay is suspicious and doubtful one going to the root of the prosecution case. 13. Considering the evidence of Kailasben alias Naynaben Bhikhabhai, mother of the prosecutrix, during the course of her cross-examination, questions were asked on behalf of the defence regarding her income and expenditure. 13. Considering the evidence of Kailasben alias Naynaben Bhikhabhai, mother of the prosecutrix, during the course of her cross-examination, questions were asked on behalf of the defence regarding her income and expenditure. However, we are of the opinion that the income of Kailasben and the expenditure part cannot be said to be relevant so far as this case is concerned. However, a suggestion was put to her that her daughter Bhavna had left her matrimonial home and had come to her house on 9/3/2004 and she denied said suggestion. She denied the suggestion that on 9/3/2004 Bhavna was exchanging love letters of teenagers and she was rebuked by her father-in-law and mother-in-law and, therefore, she had come to her house. Under such circumstances, without referring the letter Exhibit 9, it appears that the defence tried to develop its defence during the course of cross-examination of Kailasben, but she outright denied those suggestions. It is pertinent to note that even during the course of cross-examination of advocate Mr. Goswami, suggestion was put by the defence that Bhavna had left her matrimonial home on 9/3/2004 and, therefore, at his instance false FIR came to be lodged, which was denied by him. Under such circumstances, even considering the evidence of Kailasben and advocate Mr. Goswami, nothing emerges that Bhavna had left her matrimonial home on 9/3/2004 as alleged by the defence. 14. After the lodgement of FIR, Bhavna was examined by Dr. Sharma, whose evidence is recorded at Exhibit 11 and who produced certificate at Exhibit 12. She was also examined by Dr. Leuva, examined at Exhibit 24 and Dr. Shah examined at Exhibit 37. During the course of their evidence, Police Yadi Exhibit 25 and case papers Exhibit 26 and certificates Exhibit 27 and Exhibit 39 came to be produced. Considering the evidence of Dr. Sharma Exhibit 11, it transpires that he is the first Medical Officer who examined Bhavna on 16/3/2004. After her examination, he issued certificate produced at Exhibit 12. In his evidence and in his certificate about the history, it is stated that Bhavna said about intercourse done by her father-in-law on 10/3/2004 at about 11.00 a.m., at home. Thus, not only after the incident prosecutrix Bhavna narrated the incident to her mother and to other relatives as well as advocate Mr. Goswami, but even in her history before Dr. Sharma she said about the incident. Dr. Thus, not only after the incident prosecutrix Bhavna narrated the incident to her mother and to other relatives as well as advocate Mr. Goswami, but even in her history before Dr. Sharma she said about the incident. Dr. Sharma opined that Bhavna was habitual of intercourse. But it is pertinent to note that she is a married woman. At the time of the incident, her marriage span was about one year. Doctor opined that there was no recent intercourse. However, the incident of rape occurred on 10/3/2004 and she was examined on 16/3/2004 by Dr. Sharma. According to Dr. Sharma, on 24/3/2004 he had examined the appellant. The medical certificate of the accused is produced at Exhibit 13. In the history, he stated to the doctor that he had not enjoyed sexual intercourse since last many years. In his cross-examination, he stated that after about one hour, the appellant was able to provide sample of his semen. 14.1. Prosecutrix Bhavna was thereafter referred to Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad. There she was examined by Dr. Leuva and Dr. Shah. Dr. Shah examined prosecutrix on 16/3/2004. History was given by the prosecutrix to Dr. Shah. Considering the evidence of Dr. Shah, Exhibit 37 about the history and the certificate Exhibit 38, it transpires that detailed history was given by the prosecutrix. According to her, she is residing at Vav Valo Vas, Ognaj at her in-laws’ house. Her parents stay at Sarvoday-I, Bhuyangdev. She is married since one year. She and her husband stay with his mother and father and his brother’s children. Since last 6 months her father-in-law was harassing her by touching her intimately when her husband was not at home. She had not complained about this to anyone at their home. On 9/3/2004 when she was alone at her house with her father-in-law and her husband’s brother’s two and half years old daughter, her father-in-law raped her. He gaged her and threatened her to death if she did not comply his wishes. That same morning he had held her hand forcibly, but she managed to escape. After being raped, she managed to escape to her parents’ place and right now she is staying there. When she called up and informed her husband of what had happened and demanded to live separately from her mother-in-law and father-in-law, he told her that he was not ready to stay away from his parents. After being raped, she managed to escape to her parents’ place and right now she is staying there. When she called up and informed her husband of what had happened and demanded to live separately from her mother-in-law and father-in-law, he told her that he was not ready to stay away from his parents. She had to stay with them if she wished to return. 14.2. The above detailed history was recorded by Dr. Shah on 16/3/2004 at about 3.30 p.m., when the prosecutrix was brought before him. The history supports the version of the prosecutrix. However, on the basis of this history, it was submitted that the alleged incident of rape is said to have occurred on 9/3/2004, whereas as per the prosecution case, the incident took place on 10/3/2004. It is true that in the history, the date of incident is shown to be 9/3/2004 and not 10/3/2004. However, the question is would the prosecutrix gain anything by saying that the offence took place on 9/3/2004? It may be noted that on the same day i.e., 16/3/2004 initially the prosecutrix was medically examined by Dr. Sharma in Sarkhej P.H.C., at 2.30 p.m. Now in the history given by the prosecutrix before Dr. Sharma, the date of incident is stated to be 10/3/2004. Therefore, by saying that the incident occurred on 9/3/2004 before Dr. Shah, the prosecutrix was not going to gain any advantage. Even the prosecutrix before her mother and other relatives as well as in the FIR, stated the incident having taken place on 10/3/2004. Under such circumstances, mere reference in the history recorded by Dr. Shah about the incident having taken place on 9/3/2004 cannot be said to be such discrepancy which may go to the root of the prosecution case. 14.3. Considering the evidence adduced by Dr. Leuva and Dr. Shah, it is true that there is no specific finding about rape having been committed in recent past. In micro-biology test, presence of semen was not found. No external marks of injury were found. Old hymen tear was present. Sample of her vaginal swab was taken. Considering the FSL evidence and especially the serological analysis report attached with FSL report Exhibit 54, it transpires that the blood and semen group of the appellant is “B”. The stains of semen found on the under-garment of the prosecutrix are of group “B”. Old hymen tear was present. Sample of her vaginal swab was taken. Considering the FSL evidence and especially the serological analysis report attached with FSL report Exhibit 54, it transpires that the blood and semen group of the appellant is “B”. The stains of semen found on the under-garment of the prosecutrix are of group “B”. The vaginal swab contained semen of group “B”. However, by producing the copy of driving licence of husband of the prosecutrix, Mahendrabhai, it is the defence of the appellant that the blood group of Mahendrabhai is “B”. There is no dispute that the prosecutrix married Mahendrabhai before about one year from the date of the incident. It has come in evidence that on 10/3/2004 at about 8.00 a.m., Mahendrabhai left his house to attend his job. The incident of rape took place at about 11.30 a.m., on 10/3/2004. It has also come in evidence that soon after the incident, the prosecutrix left her matrimonial home and there is nothing in evidence that after 10/3/2004 till 16/3/2004 when the prosecutrix was medically examined and required samples were taken by the doctor, there was any cohabitation between herself and her husband Mahendrabhai. Viewing the FSL evidence from this angle, it can safely be said that the evidence of the prosecutrix gets corroboration by medical evidence and FSL evidence. 15. Further more, considering the history recorded by Dr. Shah, it further transpires that since last 6 months from the date of the incident, her father-in-law [the appellant] was harassing her by touching her intimately when her husband was not at home. Thus, the appellant was teasing the prosecutrix since last 6 months. It may be noted that in the letter Exhibit 9 the prosecutrix has stated about indecent behaviour of the appellant with her. The prosecutrix in her evidence stated that the letter Exhibit 9 was written by her before about 6 months from the date of the incident. The history recorded by Dr. Shah corroborates the version of the prosecutrix that the letter Exhibit 9 was written before about 6 months from the date of the incident. In the history, the prosecutrix has stated that since last 6 months the appellant was harassing her by touching her intimately. 15.1. It has been well settled that even slightest penetration is sufficient to make out an offence of rape. Even depth of penetration is immaterial. In the history, the prosecutrix has stated that since last 6 months the appellant was harassing her by touching her intimately. 15.1. It has been well settled that even slightest penetration is sufficient to make out an offence of rape. Even depth of penetration is immaterial. The sine-qua-non of the offence of rape is penetration and not ejaculation. Slightest penetration with or without any emission of semen would be quite enough for the purpose of Sections 375 and 376 of the IPC. In the instant case, the prosecutrix happens to be a married woman. However, despite this, as discussed above in this judgment, the medical evidence and FSL evidence corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix. However, whether any corroboration is required to the evidence of victim of rape will be discussed hereinafter in this judgment. But even if the medical evidence and FSL evidence is considered in the light of the fact that the prosecutrix was a married woman and upto and before about 3 hours from the time of the incident, she had stayed with her husband, then also considering the medical evidence and FSL evidence, it does not appear that the evidence destroys or demolishes the oral version of the prosecutrix. The medical evidence and FSL evidence is not in direct contrast to the oral evidence of the prosecutrix. The evidence does not negative the say of the prosecutrix. There is no specific medical evidence to the effect that there was no intercourse. However, in the instant case, the medical evidence and FSL evidence supports the version of the prosecutrix, but even if said evidence is considered in the light of the fact that the prosecutrix is a married woman, yet in the light of the above discussion, the medical evidence and FSL evidence does not make the evidence of the prosecutrix a doubtful one. 16. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Thakkar for the appellant relied upon Para. 6 of the judgment rendered by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Radhu vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2008) 2 SCC [Cri.] 207. It reads as under:— “6. It is now well settled that a finding of guilt in a case of rape, can be based on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix. The very nature of offence makes it difficult to get direct corroborating evidence. It reads as under:— “6. It is now well settled that a finding of guilt in a case of rape, can be based on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix. The very nature of offence makes it difficult to get direct corroborating evidence. The evidence of the prosecutrix should not be rejected on the basis of minor discrepancies and contradictions. If the victim of rape states on oath that she was forcibly subjected to sexual intercourse, her statement will normally be accepted, even if it is uncorroborated, unless the material on record requires drawing of an inference that there was consent or that the entire incident was improbable or imaginary. Even if there is consent, the act will still be a “rape”, if the girl is under 16 years of age. It is also well settled that absence of injuries on the private parts of the victim will not by itself falsify the case of rape, nor construed as evidence of consent. Similarly, the opinion of a doctor that there was no evidence of any sexual intercourse or rape, may not be sufficient to disbelieve the accusation of rape by the victim. Bruises, abrasions and scratches on the victim especially on the forearms, wrists, face, breast, thighs and back are indicative of struggle and will support the allegation of sexual assault. The Courts should, at the same time, bear in mind that false charges of rape are not uncommon. There have also been rare instances where a parent has persuaded a gullible or obedient daughter to make a false charge of a rape either to take revenge or extort money or to get rid of financial liability. Whether there was rape or not would depend ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case.” 16.1. Thus, it is now well settled that the finding of guilt in a case of rape, can be based on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix is not an accomplice that her evidence would invariably be required to be corroborated. Corroboration is not a rule of law, but is a rule of prudence. Victim of rape is in the better position than an injured eye witness. The prosecutrix is not an accomplice that her evidence would invariably be required to be corroborated. Corroboration is not a rule of law, but is a rule of prudence. Victim of rape is in the better position than an injured eye witness. It has been further propounded by Hon’ble the Apex Court that even the opinion of a doctor that there was no evidence of any sexual intercourse or rape, may not be sufficient to disbelieve the accusation of rape by the victim. However, Hon’ble the Apex Court in the said judgment observed that the Court should at the same time, bear in mind that false charges of rape are not uncommon. There have also been rare instances where a parent has persuaded a gullible or obedient daughter to make a false charge of a rape either to take revenge or extort money or to get rid of financial liability. However, it has been further observed that whether there was a rape or not would depend ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case. 17. Now in the instant case, scanning the entire oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, nothing emerges that the prosecutrix lodged false, frivolous and malicious FIR containing false allegations of rape. As stated earlier in this judgment, the appellant is not a stranger person, but the father-in-law of the prosecutrix. He is the head of the family and resides in the same house along with his family members. The incident occurred within the four walls of the house. In a way, it can be described as a domestic violence. On behalf of the appellant, the delay in lodgement of FIR was highly criticized. However, as discussed earlier in this judgment, irrespective of the final outcome of the case, whether the case ends in conviction or acquittal of the father-in-law of the prosecutrix, mere lodgement of FIR against her father-in-law about the offence of rape, the matrimonial life of the prosecutrix was going to be ruined. Therefore, before lodgment of FIR, some sincere attempts were made to meet elder brother of the husband of the prosecutrix, but no response was given. The evidence reveals that instead of giving consolation to the prosecutrix and her mother, they were condemned. Therefore, before lodgment of FIR, some sincere attempts were made to meet elder brother of the husband of the prosecutrix, but no response was given. The evidence reveals that instead of giving consolation to the prosecutrix and her mother, they were condemned. It has come in evidence that on 17/3/2004 the prosecutrix had to file a report before the police regarding threat given to the prosecutrix by her father-in-law and her husband’s elder brother. Thus, whatever delay was caused in lodgement of FIR was result of inner conflict of the prosecutrix between saving her and her in-laws’ honour, dignity and reputation on one hand and cry for justice on other. 17.1. If the prosecutrix wanted to lodge a false FIR after obtaining ill-advice from an advocate, then the event of delay in lodgement of FIR would not have arisen. Immediately she would have lodged the FIR. If the prosecutrix was getting continuous assistance of an advocate as it is alleged by the appellant, then in the history recorded by Dr. Shah, the mistake of referring date of incident as 9/3/2004 would not have occurred. On behalf of the appellant, it is submitted that as per the version of the prosecutrix, she stated that at the time of the incident, the appellant gave ice-cream to Anchal taking it out from a refrigerator, but in the scene of offence Panchnama and in the evidence of I O, there is no reference of having refrigerator in the house. If the prosecutrix was getting continuous assistance from an advocate, in the Panchnama of scene of offence, the existence of refrigerator in the house could have been incorporated. In other words, all such minor discrepancies and minor contradictions in the evidence could have been averted. The very fact that such minor and insignificant discrepancies emerge from the evidence on record suggest the fact that the criminal action was not initiated by the prosecutrix on the basis of some ill-advice given to her either by advocate or by her mother or her relatives. Though the minor discrepancies shall pale into insignificance, but the overall picture which emerges from the evidence of the prosecutrix is suggestive of ring of truth in her version. Though the minor discrepancies shall pale into insignificance, but the overall picture which emerges from the evidence of the prosecutrix is suggestive of ring of truth in her version. Thus, considering the background of the case, it cannot be said that the delay in lodgement of FIR is undue or unexplained one or it was deliberate with a view to falsely implicate the appellant. 17.2. Perusing the impugned judgment of the trial Court, it transpires that before the trial Court, the contention was raised regarding the consent of the prosecutrix. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the overall evidence on record, the trial Court rightly ruled out the defence of consent. Similarly, it transpires that during the course of trial and especially when the prosecutrix was cross-examined on behalf of the appellant, the allegation levelled by the prosecutrix about threat was criticized by putting various suggestions. Whether the threat was given when the prosecutrix was in the first floor room or in the ground floor, appears to be the issue which was much highlighted during the course of the cross-examination of the prosecutrix. However, the prosecutrix stated that in the FIR it has been clearly mentioned by her that the threat was administered to her in the room on the first floor before the rape was committed by the appellant. As stated above, the overall evidence of the prosecutrix is required to be considered. The overall evidence of the prosecutrix is cogent, consistent, trustworthy and inspires confidence of the Court. Therefore, there is nothing to come to the conclusion that the prosecutrix levelled false charges of rape against the appellant. 18. In the result, in light of the entire above discussion, the trial Court rightly arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution proved its case beyond any reasonable doubt against the appellant. The trial Court rightly recorded the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 376 and 506(2) of the IPC. Considering the nature of the offence and the evidence regarding the manner and method in which the offence was committed by the appellant and the relationship between the appellant and the prosecutrix as that of father-in-law and daughter-in-law, the trial Court rightly exercised its discretionary powers while fixing the quantum of sentence. The appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 19. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal stands dismissed. P P P P P