Judgment Mohit S. Shah, J.—This appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment and order dated 6th November 1984 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing First Appeal No. 222 of 1984 and confirming the judgment and decree dated 30th December 1983 of the learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Bhuj, District Kutch, dismissing Special Civil Suit No. 9 of 1977. 2. The appellant herein had filed the above numbered suit for the following substantive reliefs : “[1] That the orders made by the Collector and the Mamlatdar, Bhuj respectively on14.06.1973 and 27.02.1974 calling upon plaintiff to handover the possession of Chadva Rakhal are illegal, ultra vires, void and inoperative. [2] That the Constitution (Twenty-Sixty Amendment) Act, 1971, be declared beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament, ultra vires, void and inoperative. [3] That a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from enforcing the order dated June 14, 1973 and 27.02.1974 issued by the fifth and sixth defendants and recovering possession of the Chadva Rakhal property from the plaintiff and/or interfering with the possession and enjoyment of plaintiff of Chadva Rakhal property be issued.” 3. The undisputed facts leading to filing the suit may be stated in the following terms: 1. The then Ruler of the State of Kutch - Maharao of Kutch (father of the appellant herein) entered into an agreement of merger with the Dominion of India on 04.05.1948. 2. As per provisions of the Merger Agreement, signed by Maharao of Kutch, the private property of Maharao was settled by the Government of India in consultation with representatives of Government of Kutch and Maharao. The list of private property of Maharao as accepted by Government of India did not include the suit property i.e. the property known as Chadva Rakhal. Subsequently, the Maharao of Kutch represented to the Government of India that he had gifted away Chadva Rakhal to Yuvraj (the appellant) on 5.4.1948 in accordance with the tradition of his family and that it had not been done in anticipation of the merger and requested for recognition of the said property as his private property. 3. Subsequently, the Maharao of Kutch represented to the Government of India that he had gifted away Chadva Rakhal to Yuvraj (the appellant) on 5.4.1948 in accordance with the tradition of his family and that it had not been done in anticipation of the merger and requested for recognition of the said property as his private property. 3. The matter was further examined and it was decided by the Government of India after discussion with Chief Commissioner, Kutch and Maharao of Kutch that the Chadva Rakhal should be allowed to be retained by Yuvraj (the appellant) on the following terms : “[1] The Government of India agree that Chadva Rakhal (as described in the schedule) shall be retained by the Yuvaraj Saheb of Kutch until such time as it reverts to the Government of India as provided in Clause 3. [2] The Government of India agree that so long as the Yuvaraj of Kutch remains in possession of Chadva Rakhal his title shall be that of a free holder exempt from payment of tax, charge or levy of any kind. [3] The Yuvaraj of Kutch will remain in possession of Chadva Rakhal including the tank, farm and small structures as also the “Jakhai well” at Samatra together with power plant and pipe line, until such time as he either succeeds to the Gadi of Kutch or otherwise ceases to be Yuvaraj. [4] When Chadva Rakhal shall revert to the Government of India on the occurrence of either of the event provided for in clause 3, the tank, farm and small structures as also the Jakhai well with power plant and pipe line shall not pass to the Government alongwith the remainder of Chadva Rakhal, but shall vest in the said Yuvaraj if he be alive for the enjoyment of himself, his heirs and successors, or in the alternative, should he die before succeeding to the Gadi of Kutch, the tank, farm and small structures as also the Jakhai well with power plant and pipe line shall vest in his natural heirs and successors.” (emphasis supplied) 4. That the Maharao of Kutch Shri Mandalsinhji confirmed the above mentioned decision to the Chief Commissioner of Kutch vide his letter dated 21.4.1952 (Exhibit ibit 59) with one variation that the Chadva Rakhal property shall remain in possession of the Yuvraj until such time as he succeeded to the Gadi of Kutch or “God forbid departed from this world”. The Chief Commissioner of Kutch by his letter dated 7th August, 1952 (Exhibit ibit 60) replied that the Government of India had decided that the property shall remain in possession of the appellant until such time as he either succeeds to the “Gaddi” or otherwise ceased to be Yuvraj. 5. The Rulers of former native States ceased to be the rulers and privy purses stood abolished and all the rights, obligations and liabilities thereof were extinguished with the coming into operation of the Constitution (26th Amendment) Act, 1971 with effect from 28.12.1971. Consequently, the appellant ceased to be recognised as successor to the ruler of Kutch in respect of Chadva Rakhal. 6. The Collector, Kutch thereafter issued order dated 22-23.11.1973 calling upon the Mamlatdar to take over possession of the property known as “Chadva Rakhal” from the appellant and to hand over the same to the Divisional Forest Officer, Bhuj, except the properties referred to in Para 1 of the order. 7. The appellant made a representation dated 15.01.1974 to the Government to the effect that Chadva Rakhal property can revert to the Government of India or to the Government of Gujarat, as the case may be, on the occurrence of the either of the two eventualities viz., appellant’s ascendance to the Gadi or his demise; that none of the two eventualities contemplated by the terms of the settlement had taken place and therefore, the appellant was entitled to continue in possession and enjoyment of the said property despite coming into force of the Constitution (Twenty-Sixth Amendment) Act. 8. Subsequently, an order dated 27.02.1974 (Exhibit ibit 65) came to be passed by the Collector, Kutch, wherein it was observed that the stay granted by the Government against taking over possession of the disputed Chadva Rakhal pursuant to order dated 22/23.11.1973 has been vacated. Therefore, as per the order dated 22/23.11.1973, the Mamlatdar, Bhuj shall inform Shri Prithvirajsinh (the appellant herein) that in view of the Twenty-Sixth Constitutional Amendment, he no longer remains Yuvraj. Therefore, as per the order dated 22/23.11.1973, the Mamlatdar, Bhuj shall inform Shri Prithvirajsinh (the appellant herein) that in view of the Twenty-Sixth Constitutional Amendment, he no longer remains Yuvraj. Hence, as per paragraph “1” of the order dated 22/23.11.1973, except for the properties referred to therein, the lands of Chadva Rakhal revert back to the Government, accordingly, possession of the Rakhal be taken over on 11.3.1974 and immediately be handed over to the Divisional Forest Officer, Kutch-Bhuj. 4. Being aggrieved by the above order of the Collector, the petitioner filed Special Civil Application No. 285 of 1974 before this Court. The said petition came to be withdrawn as per the following order dated 12th October 1976: “Mr. Shah seeks permission to withdraw the application with liberty to file a suit in the competent Civil Court provided the learned Assistant Government Pleader assures on behalf of the Government that status quo will be maintained up to 31.01.1977 so that the petitioner may issue a notice as required under Section 80 C.P.C. Mr. J.R. Nanavati, learned Assistant Government Pleader submits that the impugned order of the Collector will not be enforced till 31.01.1977 so as to enable the petitioner, if he is so advised to file a civil suit against the respondents in view of what has been represented by both sides. Leave is granted to Mr. Shah to withdraw this Special Civil Application. Rule discharged. No costs.” 5. The appellant accordingly gave notice dated 12.11.1976 to the Government of India, the State Government, the Collector of Kutch and the Mamlatdar, Bhuj, and filed the suit, giving rise to the present proceedings. The appellant prayed for the reliefs indicated hereinabove taking the same stand which was adopted in the appellant’s representation dated 15.01.1974 as referred to in paragraph No. 3.7 hereinabove. 6. On behalf of the Government of India, written statement Exhibit 16 came to be filed on 30.06.1977. After referring to the facts already narrated hereinabove, it was pleaded in the written statement, inter alia, that the Government of India did not recognise the grant of suit property made by Maharao of Kutch to the appellant plaintiff. On the other hand, the suit property was given to the appellant by the Government as a special privilege on stipulated conditions. On the other hand, the suit property was given to the appellant by the Government as a special privilege on stipulated conditions. The special privilege given to rulers and members of their family had been withdrawn after coming into force of the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971. As by the said amendment, the concept of rulership stood terminated, there was no question of any succession to the Gaddi as such. The appellant ceased to be recognized as successor to the ruler of Kutch in respect of Chadva Rakhal and as such, the special concession given to the Yuvaraj of Kutch in respect of Chadva Rakhal property has been withdrawn from the appellant. It was denied that Chadva Rakhal property held by the appellant was, his private, personal and individual capacity. So, the appellant was not entitled to hold the suit property after the privileges of the rulers and the rulers and the members of their families had been withdrawn. It was contended that the appellant was at no time given full and absolute ownership of the suit property. Hence, the Government of India and State Government were entitled to claim possession of the suit land from the appellant-plaintiff. It was also contended that the Government of India is entitled to claim possession as the reversionary rights of Government of India within the native State of Kutch is an asset of that Government acquired by way of an Act of State and held by it for the governance of the ex-State of Kutch and not held by it for the Union purpose and that right passed on to successor State of Bombay under Section 95 of the State Reorganization Act, 1956. The said right now vests in the State of Gujarat as it has passed to the State under Section 47 of the Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960. 7. After considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned Civil Judge (S.D.) accepted the submissions made on behalf of respondent-defendants and dismissed the suit. It may be noted that, in the above suit, an attempt was made on behalf of the appellant plaintiff to explain the settlement agreement dated 04.03.1952, minutes of the meeting held on 21.04.1952 and the letter dated 07.08.1952 of the Commissioner. It may be noted that, in the above suit, an attempt was made on behalf of the appellant plaintiff to explain the settlement agreement dated 04.03.1952, minutes of the meeting held on 21.04.1952 and the letter dated 07.08.1952 of the Commissioner. The gist of the settlement which took place on 04.03.1952 was reflected in the letter dated 21.04.1952 (Exhibit ibit 59) written by Maharao of Kutch and the Government gave reply to Maharao of Kutch on 07.08.1952, stating that the Government had recognized the suit property remaining with Yuvaraj of Kutch on the terms and conditions which are already set out in Para 3.3 of this judgment. On behalf of the appellant plaintiff, an attempt was made to explain the contents of the letter dated 07.08.1952 (Exhibit ibit 60) by a subsequent letter dated 22.03.1979 (Exhibit ibit 97) written by Shri S.A.Ghatge, the then Commissioner of Gujarat to Maharao of Kutch. This letter was written by Mr. Ghatge after he retired from service on 31.10.1956. In the said letter, Mr. Ghatge tried to convey that the expression - “otherwise ceased to be Yuvraj” was only to improve the language of the agreement with the Government of India to make secular and free from sentiment and merely to convey that the expression meant till the demise of the appellant. The Trial Court, however, held that the so-called explanation given after 27 years and that too, after the retirement of Mr. Ghatge on 31.12.1956, was of no value, more particularly when Mr. Ghatge had not stepped in the witness box. 8. Aggrieved by the above judgment and decree of the Trial Court dismissing the suit, the appellant challenged the same before the learned Single Judge of this Court by filing First Appeal No. 222 of 1984. The learned Single Judge agreed with the reasoning and conclusion of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgement and order dated 6th November 1984. Hence, this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 9. At the outset, we must note that, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Kamla Devi vs. Khushal Kanwar, AIR 2007 SC 663 , this Letters Patent Appeal filed long prior to coming into force of the Amendment made by the Code of Civil Procedure to Section 100-A w.e.f. 01.07.2002 continues to be maintainable. 9. At the outset, we must note that, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Kamla Devi vs. Khushal Kanwar, AIR 2007 SC 663 , this Letters Patent Appeal filed long prior to coming into force of the Amendment made by the Code of Civil Procedure to Section 100-A w.e.f. 01.07.2002 continues to be maintainable. The Apex Court has held in the above decision that Section 100-A of the CPC (as substituted by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 2002) will not have retrospective effect so as to bring within its fold even appeals preferred prior to coming into force of said Amendment Act (2002) i.e. with effect from 01.07.2002. Thus, a Letters Patent Appeal, which was filed prior to 01.07.2002 would be maintainable. 10. At the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Dhaval Dave, learned Counsel for the appellant has raised the following contentions: (a) The Trial Court as well as the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the appellant had not acquired any ownership rights over the property known as “Chadva Rakhal”. As per the document executed by the Maharao of Kutch in favour of the appellant on15.04.1948, the property called Chadva Rakhal came to be vested in the appellant alongwith all the superstructures, power plant, pipelines and the Jakhai well. The property thus became the private property of the appellant. (b) As per the agreement arrived at on 21.04.1952, the appellant is entitled to possess and enjoy the entire area admeasuring 12,792 acres of land for his life-time and only after his death, the land would revert back to the Government except the superstructures, power plant, Jakhai well, pipelines and other structures which would vest in the legal heirs of the appellant. (c) In the alternative, even if the land called Chadva Rakhal was to revert back to Government of India upon coming into force of the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment Act) 1971, the superstructures, the power plant, tank, pipeline and other superstructures etc. continue to be of the ownership of the appellant and after death of the appellant also, all these superstructures would vest in the legal heirs of the appellant and would not revert back to the Government of India or the Government of Gujarat under any circumstances. continue to be of the ownership of the appellant and after death of the appellant also, all these superstructures would vest in the legal heirs of the appellant and would not revert back to the Government of India or the Government of Gujarat under any circumstances. (d) Article 362 covered only those covenants or agreements which were referred to in Article 291 and therefore, even after deletion of Article 362, though the former rulers of Indian States and their family members have lost such rights under the agreements / covenants with respect to the privy purse, but no right to any property has been lost even after deletion of Article 362. If at all the protection is lost with respect to any rights of the property, the same is only with respect to any rights under any agreement or covenant between the Ruler of an Indian State and the Domain of India entered into prior to the commencement of the Constitution. However, the settlement arrived at on 21.04.1952 was after the date of coming into force of the Constitution and therefore, the rights available under the said settlement have not been lost even after coming into force of the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971. 11. On the other hand, Mr. Umesh Trivedi, learned Additional Government Pleader has opposed the appeal and submitted that the appellant is claiming rights under the settlement dated 21.04.1952 read with letter dated 07.08.1952 of the Commissioner. The said settlement / letter were referable to the agreement of merger dated 04.05.1948 which was entered into between the Ruler of Kutch and the Dominion of India prior to coming into force of the Constitution. Article 362 of the Constitution requiring that, in the exercise of power of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State to make laws or in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State, due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given under any such covenant or agreement with respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State, came to be deleted by the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act 1971 and, therefore, the terms of the agreement / settlement dated 21.04.1952 / 07.08.1952 are no longer binding on the Government of India or the Government of Gujarat. Upon coming into force of the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act 1971, the appellant ceased to be the Yuvaraj and therefore, the rights of the appellant over the property called Chadva Rakhal came to an end. The Collector was, therefore, justified in issuing the impugned order/notice dated 14.06.1973, 21/23-11-1973 and 27-02-1974 for taking over possession of the property from the appellant. 12. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we have given anxious consideration to the rival submissions. Before proceeding further, we note that the constitutional validity of the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 has been upheld by the Apex Court in Shri Raghunath Ganpatrao vs. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1267 = 1994 Supp (1) SCC 191. 13. As regards the first contention of the appellant that the entire property called Chadva Rakhal came to be vested in the appellant as per the document executed by the Maharao of Kutch in favour of the appellant on 15.04.1948, the same cannot be accepted because the Maharao of Kutch i.e. father of the appellant himself thereafter entered into an arrangement with the Union of India that the entire property called Chadva Rakhal shall not vest in the Yuvraj (appellant herein), but the Chadva Rakhal shall remain with the appellant till such time as he either succeeds to the gadi of Kutch or otherwise ceases to be Yuvraj. The occasion for the appellant to succeed to the gadi of Kutch did not arise because the Maharao of Kutch (the appellant’s father) was still alive when the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 came into force. Upon abolition of the Gaddi of Kutch, there was no question of the appellant succeeding to the gadi of Kutch. As far as the other contingency is concerned (otherwise ceases to be Yuvraj), the contention of the appellant is that the expression conferred rights upon the appellant to possess and enjoy the entire Chadva Rakhal estate for his life time. However, that view was not accepted by the Commissioner of Kutch, as was expressly indicated in the letter dated 07.08.1952, by which the words “God forbid depart from his life” were not accepted and instead the expression used was “otherwise ceases to be Yuvraj”. Hence, the appellant was entitled to remain in possession of Chadva Rakhal only till he continued to be Yuvraj. Hence, the appellant was entitled to remain in possession of Chadva Rakhal only till he continued to be Yuvraj. Upon coming into force of the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971, which came into force on 29.12.1971, the appellant ceased to be Yuvraj and therefore, upon occurrence of this contingency, the appellant was no longer entitled to remain in possession of Chadva Rakhal. We, therefore, find no infirmity in the reasoning of the Trial Court and the learned Single Judge who have taken the view that the appellant ceased to be Yuvraj and therefore, was no longer entitled to remain in possession of Chadva Rakhal upon coming into force of the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 on 29.12.1971. 14. Now we take up the contention of Mr. Dave for the appellant that the expression “otherwise ceases to be Yuvraj” was sought to be explained by the Chief Commissioner in his letter dated 22.03.1979 at Exhibit 97. It was sought to be explained in the said letter that the words “otherwise ceases to be Yuvraj” were intended to convey the same meaning as contingency of death of Yuvraj. It is not possible to accept this contention because the rights of the parties have to be decided on the basis of the documents executed at the relevant time. The contents of such documents cannot be explained away by subsequent letters written after more than 25 years. Even the author of the letter was not examined as a witness. In fact, even if he were to be examined as a witness, it would make no difference to the interpretation of the phrase “otherwise ceases to be Yuvraj”. 15. Coming to the alternative contention of Mr. Dave for the appellant, we do find considerable substance in the contention that even though Chadva Rakhal reverted to the Government of India on the occurrence of one of the two contingencies i.e. the appellant ceased to be Yuvraj upon coming into force of the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971, “the tank, farm and small structures, as also the jakhai well with power plant and pipelines” did not pass to the Government alongwith the remainder of Chadva Rakhal, but vested in the appellant. In view of Clause (4) of the Minutes of the Meeting as finalized by the Chief Commissioner of Kutch and accepted by the Government of India and as quoted in the written statement filed on behalf of Union of India, it is clear that since the appellant was very much alive on the date of coming into force the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 and is also alive today, “the tank, farm and small structures, as also the jakhai well with power plant and pipelines” vested in the appellant for the enjoyment of himself, his heirs and successors. The same view is also reflected in the Collector’s order dated 22/23.11.1973 by which the Collector directed the Mamlatdar, Bhuj to take over possession of the Chadva Rakhal, excepting the tank, farm and small structures, the jakhai well with power plant and pipeline. Thus, it was not even the case of the Collector, Kutch or any other authority that the tank, farm and small structures, the jakhai well with power plant and pipeline did not vest in the appellant. 16. We cannot overlook the fact that it was the appellant herein who filed Special Civil Suit No. 9 of 1977 for challenging the communication dated 14.06.1973 to the appellant (Exhibit ibit 61) and the order dated 27.02.1974 of the Collector, Kutch (Exhibit ibit 64), directing the Mamlatdar, Bhuj to take over possession of the Chadva Rakhal, except the properties mentioned in paragraph 1 of the Collector’s order dated 22/23.11.1973. Since the said order dated 22/23.11.1973 was not on the record of the suit, at the hearing of this appeal, we called upon the learned Additional Government Pleader to produce the same so that the scope of the entire controversy in the suit could be properly appreciated and the real dispute between the parties can be effectively adjudicated. Upon perusal of the said order dated 22/23.11.1973, it is clear that even upon dismissal of the appellant’s suit, the appellant’s position cannot be worse off than what it was when the Collector issued the orders impugned in the suit. That is, the parties rights were and are as reflected in the Collector’s order dated 22/23.11.1973 which position was also reiterated in the impugned communication dated 27.02.1974 at Exhibit 64. 17. That is, the parties rights were and are as reflected in the Collector’s order dated 22/23.11.1973 which position was also reiterated in the impugned communication dated 27.02.1974 at Exhibit 64. 17. In view of the above discussion, it is declared that while the appellant ceased to be Yuvraj upon coming into force of the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 with effect from 29.12.1971 and thereupon the Chadva Rakhal reverted to the Government of India, but “the tank, farm and small structures, as also the jakhai well with power plant and pipeline” in the said estate did not pass to the Government alongwith remainder of the Chadva Rakhal, but vested in the appellant for enjoyment of himself, his heirs and successors. 18. Subject to the above clarification, the appeal is dismissed.