Judgment : DEBASISH KAR GUPTA, J. (1) This appeal is directed against an order dated December 22, 1999 passed in an application under article 226 of the constitution of India being C.O. No. 13728(W) of 1992. By the aforesaid impugned order the learned Single Judge held that the writ petitioner/respondent no.1 was entitled to his pensionary benefits taking into account that the petitioner was entitled to non-practicing allowance @ Rs.150/- per month, post graduate allowance @ Rs.50 per month and five years additional qualifying service. (2) The writ petitioner/respondent no.1 was a retired Medical Officer of the appellant no.3, namely, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, District Purba Midnapore. He retired from the above services on attaining the age of retirement on superannuation on January 31, above writ application being C.O. No.13728(W) of 1992 for a direction upon the respondent authorities to take into account (i) non-practicing allowance @ Rs.950 per month, (ii) Post Graduate Allowance @ Rs.50/-per month and (iii) five years additional qualifying service for calculating his pensionary benefits. The above writ application was allowed on December 22, 1998 holding that the respondent no.1 was entitled to aforesaid three benefits. The appellants filed this appeal challenging the above judgment and order. (3) According to the appellants, non-practicing allowance @ Rs.900/-per month was given to the respondent no.1 in terms of notification dated December 18, 1987 issued by the Government of India. Subsequently, the above non-practicing allowance was revised. Accordingly, the board of governors of the appellant no.3 adopted a resolution in its 113th meeting held on October 31, 1991 approving payment of revised non-practicing allowance to the Medical Officers subject to the confirmation of the date of implementation by the Ministry of Human Resource and Development, Government of India. In terms of the above resolution the appellant no.3 sought for an approval from the Ministry of Human Resources and Development. But no reply was received in this regard. (4) Drawing the attention of this court towards Clause (b) of statute 18B of the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur statutes (hereinafter referred to as the said statutes), it is submitted on behalf of the appellants that save as otherwise provided in the statute in all other respects, the provisions as contained in Schedule F to the above statutes should be applicable for the purpose of General Provident Fund-cum-Pension-cum-Gratuity Scheme framed under statute 18B of the said statutes. The attention of this court is further drawn towards the provisions of Clause (xvii) of Schedule F to the said statutes to submit that under the aforesaid scheme "A", pay defined as amount drawn monthly by an employee as pay including dearness pay, special pay and personal pay. Clause (xviii) provided that the term "personal pay" defined the additional pay granted to an employee. Clause (xxii) defined "special pay" meaning thereby an addition of the nature of pay to emoluments of a post or of an employee granted in consideration of the especially arduous nature of his duties or of a specific addition to his working or responsibility on the basis allowance was not included in "special pay". Therefore, the same could not be included in pay of the respondent no.1 for calculating the benefits of the respondent no.1 under the General Provident Fund-cum-Pension-cum-Gratuity scheme. (5) With regard to the question of taking into account the post graduate allowance, it is submitted on behalf of the appellants that the same could not be added to the pay of the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of the said statutes. (6) Regarding counting of additional qualifying service of five years for the purpose of calculating the pensionary benefit of the respondent no.1, it is submitted on behalf of the appellants that statute 11 of the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur statutes classified the members of the stuff of the appellant no.3 into different categories. Clause (a) of statute 11 prescribed the members of the stuff of Institute who were included in the category of "academic". (7) It is further submitted on behalf of the appellants that the respondent no.1 did not produce the relevant certificate from his erstwhile employer. Therefore, he was not entitled to get such benefit. No supporting document was available to the appellate authority to count the past service of the respondent no.1 in Tripura. So, the additional qualifying service for that period was not added to his service. (8) On the other hand it is submitted on behalf of the respondent no.1 that the appellant take a new stand at the time of argument before us. Such new argument is contrary to the stand taken by the appellants at the time of adjudication of the issues by the Learned Single Judge. (8) On the other hand it is submitted on behalf of the respondent no.1 that the appellant take a new stand at the time of argument before us. Such new argument is contrary to the stand taken by the appellants at the time of adjudication of the issues by the Learned Single Judge. According to the respondent no.1 recourse to the provisions of the said statutes were not taken even at the time of filing the memorandum of appeal incorporating those grounds in the appeal. According to the respondents such contrary stands were required to be included in the pleading before the learned Single Judge which was not done. Therefore, it is not open to take recourse to the provisions of the said statutes at the time of advancing argument before us. Our attention is drawn towards the provisions of Rule 30 of C.C.S (Pensionary Rules, 1972) Rule 9(21) (A1) (iii) of fundamental Rules, to submit that the claim of the respondent no.1 was always considered in accordance with the aforesaid rules. (9) Trikumlal Mills Ltd. reported in AIR 1958 SC 512 and Union of Indis Vs. Jai Prakash Singh and Anr. reported in AIR 2007 SC 1363 , it is submitted on behalf of the respondent no.1 that travelling beyond the pleading is not permissible. (10) Having heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties and taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case we find that admittedly the learned Single Judge, after considering the materials on record, came to the conclusion that initially the appellants paid non-practicing allowance to the respondent no.1 @ Rs.900/- per month and thereafter a balance of Rs.800/-was approved to the respondent no.1 towards non-practicing allowance for the period from October 1987 to January 1989. By an order issued under memo dated January 13, 1999 on the basis of the above materials which was available on record. The learned Single Judge came to conclusion that the appellant was entitled to get non-practicing allowance @ Rs.950/-per month by virtue of an order dated January 13, 1999, passed by the appellant authority. Regarding the question of additional qualifying service of five years, the learned Single Judge observed that the appellants did not disclose the reasons on the basis of which the additional qualifying services were not counted for calculating the benefit of the respondent no.1 under the General Provident Fund-cum-Pension-cum-Gratuity Scheme. Regarding the question of additional qualifying service of five years, the learned Single Judge observed that the appellants did not disclose the reasons on the basis of which the additional qualifying services were not counted for calculating the benefit of the respondent no.1 under the General Provident Fund-cum-Pension-cum-Gratuity Scheme. While deciding the issue of adding post graduate allowance to the pay of the respondent no.1, the learned Single Judge took into consideration the office order no.185/87 dated May 25, 1987 passed by the appellant no.1 for granting such post graduate allowance to the respondent no.1 taking into consideration the provisions of fundamental Rule 9 (21). (11) After considering the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the appellants in the writ application, the memorandum of appeal of the present appeal we find that the appellants never took the plea of calculating the benefit under the General Provident Fund-cum- Pension-cum-Gratuity Scheme in respect of the respondent no.1 on the basis of provisions of the said statutes. Rather we find from the office order No.185/87 dated May 25, 1987 passed by the appellant no.1 that the appellants took recourse to the provisions of the fundamental rules to calculate the post graduate allowance of the respondent no.1. Therefore, we have no hesitation to say that the their own pleading before the learned Single Judge. It is well settled principles of law that a new point of law can be argued at any stage but with regard to the questions of facts the appellants cannot be allowed to advance argument on the basis of contrary sets of facts without incorporating those facts in the pleading neither before the learned Single Judge in their affidavit- in-opposition nor including such pleading in the memorandum of appeal before us. In other wards the appellants neither pleaded in the affidavit-in-opposition nor in the memorandum of appeal that the claims of the respondent no.1 for payment of non-practicing allowance @ Rs.950/-per month, post graduate allowance @ Rs.50/-per month and five years qualifying service were considered by the appellants in accordance with the said statutes. In this regard the settled principles of law as decided in the relevant portion of the decision of Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel(supra) are quoted below:- "10. There is one more point which must be considered. In this regard the settled principles of law as decided in the relevant portion of the decision of Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel(supra) are quoted below:- "10. There is one more point which must be considered. It was strongly urged before us by the appellants that, in the trial court, no plea had been taken by therespondent that the agreement for the extension of time was vague and uncertain.No such plea appears to have been taken even in the grounds of appeal preferred by the respondent in the High Court at Bombay; but apparently the plea was allowed to be raised in the High Court and the appellants took no objection to it atthat stage. It cannot be said that it was not open to the High Court to allow sucha plea to be raised even for the first time in appeal. After all, the plea raised is aplea of law based solely upon the constructions of the letter which is the basis ofthe case for the extension of time for the performance of the contract and so it was competent to the appeal court to allow such a plea to be raised under O.41, R.2,Civil P.C. If, on a fair construction, the condition mentioned in the document is held to be vague or uncertain, no evidence can be admitted to remove the saidvagueness or uncertainty. The provisions of S.93, Evidence Act are clear on this point. It is the language of the document alone that will decide the question. It would not be open to the parties or to the court to attempt to remove the defect ofvagueness or uncertainty by relying upon any extrinsic evidence. Such an attempt would really mean the making of a new contract between the parties. That is whywe do not think that the appellants can now effectively raise the point that theplea of vagueness should not have been entertained in the High Court." (Emphasis supplied) (12) In view of the discussions and observations made hereinabove, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed accordingly. (13) In view of the order dated December 6, 2000 passed in this appeal, the respondent No.1/writ petitioner will be entitled to get interest at the prevailing rate of Bank on the amount due and payable towards his terminal benefits. (14) There will be, however, no order as to costs. (13) In view of the order dated December 6, 2000 passed in this appeal, the respondent No.1/writ petitioner will be entitled to get interest at the prevailing rate of Bank on the amount due and payable towards his terminal benefits. (14) There will be, however, no order as to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties, as expeditiously as possible, upon compliance with the necessary formalities in this regard. I agree.