JUDGMENT Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—The Allahabad Development Authority, hereinafter referred to as the A.D.A., invited tenders for running a swimming pool in Bharadwaj Ashram Park, which is owned and managed by the Allahabad Development Authority. The petitioner submitted his tender, which was accepted by the authority, and an agreement dated 5.6.2005 was executed for a period of 5 years. Under the terms of the agreement, the petitioner was required to pay a monthly rent of Rs. 21,881/- and the respondents were obliged to provide electricity and water to the petitioner for running the swimming pool. 2. It is alleged that pursuant to a Public Interest Litigation filed in the High Court, an order dated 25.4.2006 was passed, whereby all the parks, located in the city of Allahabad, was directed to be handed over for its maintenance to the Nagar Nigam Allahabad, pursuant to which, Bharadwaj Ashram Park was handed over to the Nagar Nigam, Allahabad. It is alleged that the water for the swimming pool, which was being provided by the Allahabad Development Authority from a tubewell, was located in the Bharadwaj Park but, on account of the park being handed over to the Nagar Nigam, the tubewell was also handed over to the Nagar Nigam. This resulted in the non-supply of the water to the petitioner. Since the Allahabad Development Authority started neglecting to supply the electricity and water to the petitioner, the petitioner represented and eventually a meeting dated 24.3.2007 was held between the authorities of the Nagar Nigam and the Allahabad Development Authority, in which the petitioner was also invited. It is alleged, that the two authorities resolved that the Nagar Nigam would supply the water to the petitioner from its tubewell. The cost, however, was to be borne by the Allahabad Development Authority. It is alleged that pursuant to the said resolution, the Allahabad Development Authority started harassing the petitioner and compelled him to give its acceptance to pay the electricity and water charges. When the petitioner refused to do so, a notice dated 17.4.2007 was issued directing the petitioner to give his written consent for payment of the electricity and water charges, within three days failing which, the agreement would be cancelled. When the petitioner refused to do so, a notice dated 17.4.2007 was issued directing the petitioner to give his written consent for payment of the electricity and water charges, within three days failing which, the agreement would be cancelled. The petitioner, apprehending that adverse steps would be taken by the authority, filed a suit for permanent injunction, on 9.4.2007, praying that defendants be restrained from rescinding the contract and from interfering in the right of the petitioner to operate the swimming pool, till 4.6.2010, i.e., till the date of the validity of the agreement. An application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the C.P.C. for an interim relief was also filed. The trial Court, on this application, for grant of a temporary injunction, issued notice to the opposite party, pursuant to which, the defendant, Allahabad Development Authority appeared and sought time to file objections, which was granted. The Court, eventually by an order dated 25.4.2007, after hearing the parties, granted a temporary injunction, directing the parties to maintain status-quo on the spot pursuant to the agreement entered between the parties. It is alleged that, inspite of the injunction being granted and which was in the knowledge of the defendant, the defendants took the law into their own hands and locked the premises in the evening of 25.4.2007, as a result of which, the petitioner was forcibly ousted from the premises and was unable to run the swimming pool as per the agreement. An application under Order 39 Rule 2A of the C.P.C. was also filed which is pending consideration. On 5.5.2007, the defendants filed their objections, and subsequently, the trial Court, after considering the matter, rejected the application for grant of a temporary injunction. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the said order, filed an appeal, which was also dismissed. Consequently, the present writ petition. 3. Heard Sri M.A. Qadir, the learned senior counsel, assisted by Sri Mustaqeem Ahmad Siddiqui, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri B.B. Paul, the learned counsel for the Allahabad Development Authority. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner not only had a prima facie case in his favour but balance of convenience and irreparable loss was also in his favour and that the Court below in spite of giving a finding that the defendants had violated the temporary injunction, committed an error in refusing to grant an injunction. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner not only had a prima facie case in his favour but balance of convenience and irreparable loss was also in his favour and that the Court below in spite of giving a finding that the defendants had violated the temporary injunction, committed an error in refusing to grant an injunction. The learned counsel submitted that a clear finding has been given that the respondents took the law into their own hands and violated the injunction granted by the trial Court with impunity and therefore, the Court should exercise its inherent power in restoring the possession and permit the petitioner to run the swimming pool till the duration of the agreement. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the authority submitted that the petitioner violated the terms and conditions of the agreement which was modified in the minutes dated 24.3.2007 and that the petitioner failed to pay the water and electricity charges. Not only this, the petitioner had also failed to pay the monthly rent and that the petitioner had illegally installed a submersible pump and was drawing electricity from the pole without an electricity meter and without seeking previous permission from the authority. The learned counsel submitted that a notice was given to the petitioner and, inspite of the receipt of the notice, the defendants did not give his consent and consequently, the authority rescinded the contract on 24.4.2007. The learned counsel submitted that in view of the cancellation of the contract, the question of granting an injunction did not arise. The learned counsel further submitted that there was no violation of the injunction order of the trial Court inasmuch as the authority were unaware of the order of the trial Court. 5. The petitioner in rejoinder submitted that there was a gross violation of the order passed by the trial Court and that the petitioner had deposited the lease rent and that, in any case, the only allegation in the impugned notice was with regard to giving consent for payment of electricity and water charges which was against the terms and conditions of the agreement. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a decision of the Patna High Court in State of Bihar v. Usha Devi and another, 1996 ALR 455 (Pat), in which it was held that if the Court comes to a conclusion that an order passed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 had been disobeyed and by a contravention of that order, the other party in the suit had done something for its own advantage to the prejudice of the other party, it would be open to a Court under its inherent jurisdiction to bring back the party to its original position where he ordinarily stood. The learned counsel also placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in Uma Shanker v. Smt. Angoori Devi and others, 1987 ALJ 1071, in which it was held that the Court had ample power to restore the possession to the plaintiff where it was found that the injunction order was violated by the other party and where the plaintiff was dispossessed forcibly. 6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on a decision in State of Karnataka v. State of A.P. and others, 2000(9) SCC 572 ; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Sriman Narain, 2002 ACJ 1396; Rame Gowda (Dead) By LRs. v. M.Varadappa Naidu (Dead) By LRs. and others, 2004 ACJ 632; BSES Ltd. v. Tata Power Co. Ltd. and others, 2004 (1) SCC 195 and Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.) Faridkot v. Baldev Dass, 2004(8) SCC 488 , on the proposition, that a mandatory injunction could not be granted where an interim relief granted would amount to a final relief and that it was not necessary that an injunction should be granted when the defendant could be compensated, in the event the suit was decreed. 7. In the light of the aforesaid submissions and, upon a perusal of the record, it is clear, that the trial Court passed an injunction directing the parties to maintain status-quo on 25.4.2007. This order was passed in the presence of the counsel for both the parties by the trial Court. Inspite of this order, the defendants took the law into their own hands and placed their lock in the premises in question in the same evening of 25.4.2009, and forcefully evicted the plaintiff from the premises in question. This order was passed in the presence of the counsel for both the parties by the trial Court. Inspite of this order, the defendants took the law into their own hands and placed their lock in the premises in question in the same evening of 25.4.2009, and forcefully evicted the plaintiff from the premises in question. This action has been considered by the trial Court as well as by the lower appellate Court and both the Courts have found that the defendants had prima facie violated the injunction order, the impact of which would be considered subsequently. In so far as the grant of injunction was concerned, the Court below found that the contract had been rescinded on 24.4.2007 and consequently held, that the petitioner was not entitled for grant of an injunction and could not be put back in possession. An attempt has been made to indicate that the order rescinding the contract was ante dated and was done deliberately in order to escape the contempt proceedings that had been drawn against the defendant. It has also urged on behalf of the defendant that the plaintiff did not respond to the notice and did not give their consent for payment of electricity and water charges and consequently the defendant terminated the contract. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that payment of electricity and water charges was to be paid by the ADA and that the petitioner could not be compelled to pay these charges which was in violation of the agreement. 8. Having perused the record and the submissions made by the parties, the Court finds that the question as to whether the defendant violated the orders of the trial Court deliberately and malafidely, is a question which has to be adjudicated by the trial Court in the pending application under Order 39 Rule 2A of the C.P.C. The question, whether the plaintiff violated the terms of the agreement and was liable to pay the water and electricity charges as per the minutes dated 24.3.2007 and whether the said minutes of 24.3.2007 would over ride the terms of the agreement are all such questions which are required to be decided by the trial Court. The trial Court will also consider as to whether the contract which was rescinded by an order dated 24.4.2007 was ante dated or not. The trial Court will also consider as to whether the contract which was rescinded by an order dated 24.4.2007 was ante dated or not. These questions will be adjudicated and the suit would be decided accordingly. But, at this stage, the Court finds that even though the respondents prima facie had violated the interim injunction, the Court is not inclined to grant an injunction in favour of the plaintiff because the three essential ingredients for grant of an injunction are missing. Even though the petitioner may have made out a prima facie case in his favour but, at this moment, the balance of convenience and irreparable injury is not in his favour. It has come on record and, which is admitted, that the contract has been rescinded by the authority. The Court at the moment is not concerned as to whether the contract was rescinded illegally, malafidely or genuinely. The Court is only concerned, that a contract has been rescinded. If the contract had wrongly been rescinded, the petitioner would get adequate damages/compensation for wrongful recession of the contract but by a grant of injunction, the Court could not bring the clock back and allow the petitioner to complete the duration of the contract period. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is distinguishable, inasmuch as, the said decision relates to giving back the possession of the property which was forcefully taken in violation of the injunction. In the present case, there is a distinction, namely, that even though the respondents may have violated the terms of the injunction, but a new fact had also come into existence, namely, that the contract had been rescinded prior to the date of the grant of an injunction. Consequently, at this stage, when the Court gets knowledge of the recession of the contract, it would not be a proper exercise of discretion to grant an injunction and permit the plaintiff to run the contract for the remaining period. The damages/compensation can be awarded in the event the suit is decreed. 9. In view of the aforesaid, an essential element, namely, irreparable loss is not in favour of the plaintiff. The law is well settled that if any one of the ingredients for grant of an injunction is missing, no injunction could be granted. The damages/compensation can be awarded in the event the suit is decreed. 9. In view of the aforesaid, an essential element, namely, irreparable loss is not in favour of the plaintiff. The law is well settled that if any one of the ingredients for grant of an injunction is missing, no injunction could be granted. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion, that the order of the Court below refusing to grant an injunction does not suffer from any error of law. The writ petition fails and is dismissed. 10. Considering the facts and circumstances that has been brought on the record, I direct the trial Court to decide the application under Order 39 Rule 2A of the C.P.C. within four months from the date of the production of a certified copy of this order and further decide the suit within one year from the date of the production of a certified copy of this order. ————