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2009 DIGILAW 2385 (ALL)

ROOP RAM v. STATE OF U. P.

2009-06-08

SUDHIR AGARWAL

body2009
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Learned counsel for the revisionist at the out set submitted that he may be permitted to delete the opposite parties No. 2 and 3 from the array of parties and to make necessary corrections in the memo of revision. The request is allowed. The necessary corrections be made during the course of the day. 2. Heard Sri Jai Shanker Audichya, learned counsel for the revisionist and Sri Mehrotra, learned A.G.A. for the State and as agreed by the said learned counsel, this revision is being decided finally. 3. The revision has been preferred aggrieved by the order dated 13th February, 2009 passed by the Special Judge (D.A.A.) Farrukhabad in Misc. Case No. 04/12/08 (Roop Ram v. Sonu and another) rejecting the application of the revisionist preferred under Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’) seeking a direction to the police to make investigation in respect to his complaint constituting commission of a cognizable offence after registering a first information report (hereinafter referred to as the "F.I.R."). 4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the revisionist that the Court below has rejected the application observing that a Magistrate is not bound to accept an application under Section 156 (3) of the Code and it is his discretion. Further, it is also said by the Court below that the dispute prima facie appears to be of a civil dispute, the Police reached the spot took, appropriate action under Sections 107 and 116 of the Code apprehending breach of peace, the allegations of the revisionist have not been believed by the Police and it is open to the revisionist to file a complaint case. Learned counsel for the revisionist submitted that the Court below has erred in law in failing to consider as to whether the allegations or the information of the revisionist amounts to occurrence of cognizable offence or not and if that be so, the Court below ought to have directed for investigation in the matter instead of entering into the correctness of the complaint. It was beyond its jurisdiction at this stage to look into the truth of the allegations. It is also contended that discretion exercised under Section 156 (3) of the Code is not arbitrary, but has to be exercised in a lawful manner and in accordance with law. It was beyond its jurisdiction at this stage to look into the truth of the allegations. It is also contended that discretion exercised under Section 156 (3) of the Code is not arbitrary, but has to be exercised in a lawful manner and in accordance with law. In support of his submissions reliance has been placed upon Har Prasad v. State of U.P., 2007 (1) JIC 204 (All) and Ram Pal Singh v. State of U.P., 2007 (1) JIC 205 (All). 5. Sri Mehrotra, learned A.G.A. having gone through the order of the Court below could not justify the aforesaid order as also could not dispute the proposition advanced on behalf of the revisionist. 6. I have heard the matter at length and perused the record as well as the authorities cited at the Bar. 7. This matter ex-facie appears to be plain and simple involving the correctness of an order of the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) of the Code refusing to direct the Police to make investigation into complaint of the applicant about the occurrence of a cognizable offence but judicial cognizance can be taken of the fact that a large number of such cases are being filed under Section 156 (3) of the Code before the Magistrate concerned and consequential proceedings have also been carried to this Court. 8. Section 154 (1) of the Code provides that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally or in writing to an Officer-in-charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, shall be signed by the person giving it and the substance thereof shall be entered into a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe. A copy of such information free of cost is supposed to be given to the informant as provided under Section 154 (2) of the Code. 9. A copy of such information free of cost is supposed to be given to the informant as provided under Section 154 (2) of the Code. 9. The law has also perceived a situation where the Officer-in-Charge of a police station may refuse to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) and in such a case the informant can approach the Superintendent of Police concerned by giving him in writing and by post the above information and if the Superintendent of Police is satisfied that the information disclosed commission of a cognizable offence, he shall either investigate the case himself or direct investigation by any police officer subordinate to him in the manner provided in the Code. The entire Section 154 of the Code, therefore, makes it obligatory on the part of the Officer-in-Charge of the police station as well as the Superintendent of Police, as the case may be, to record information and to make investigation provided the information relates to commission of a cognizable offence. The only scope of enquiry at the stage of Section 154 of the Code is about the fact that the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence. 10. In State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, the Apex Court had the occasion to consider Section 154 of the Code and it was held that the recording of report under Section 154 (1) of the Code, known as registration of a criminal case, is a legal mandate. The concerned police officer cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the information given is reliable and genuine or not and on the contrary, subject to only scrutiny as to whether the information discloses a cognizable offence, the Officer-in-Charge of a police station is under an obligation to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation. The refusal on the part of an Officer-in-Charge of a police station to register a report amounts to violation of a statutory duty cast upon him, if in-spite of the fact that the information discloses a cognizable offence yet it is not registered by him. 11. The refusal on the part of an Officer-in-Charge of a police station to register a report amounts to violation of a statutory duty cast upon him, if in-spite of the fact that the information discloses a cognizable offence yet it is not registered by him. 11. Further, in case of such a refusal, the informant has remedy to apprise the Superintendent of Police about the commission of a cognizable offence and if the information discloses such an offence, the Superintendent of Police is also under a statutory obligation to make or to direct for investigation either by himself or by an officer subordinate to him. The Apex Court very categorically has held in Bhajan Lal (supra) that the police officer should not refuse to record an information relating to commission of a cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. The credibility or reasonableness of the information in fact is not a condition precedent for registration of a case. It would be useful to reproduce the following extract from the above judgment : "30. The legal mandate enshrined in Section 154 (1) is that every information relating to the commission of a "cognizable offence" (as defined under Section 2 (c) of the Code) if given orally (in which case it is to be reduced into writing) or in writing to "an officer in charge of a police station" (within the meaning of Section 2 (o) of the Code) and signed by the informant should be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe which form is commonly called as "First Information Report" and which act of entering the information in the said form is known as registration of a crime or a case. 31. At the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate of Section 154 (1) of the Code, the concerned police officer cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the information, laid by the informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, the officer in charge of a police station is statutorily obliged to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate, subject to the proviso to Section 157 (As we have proposed to make a detailed discussion about the power of a police officer in the field of investigation of a cognizable offence within the ambit of Sections 156 and 157 of the Code in the ensuing part of this judgment, we do not propose to deal with those sections in extenso in the present context.) In case, an officer in charge of a police station refuses to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him and to register a case on the information of a cognizable offence reported and thereby violates the statutory duty cast upon him, the person aggrieved by such refusal can send the substance of the information in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police concerned who if satisfied that the information forwarded to him discloses a cognizable offence, should either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him in the manner provided by sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the Code. 32. Be it noted that in Section 154(1) of the Code, the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully and cautiously used the expression "information" without qualifying the same as in Section 41 (1)(a) or (g) of the Code wherein the expressions, "reasonable complaint" and "credible information" are used. Evidently, the non-qualification of the word "information" in Section 154 (1) unlike in Section 41 (1)(a) and (g) of the Code may be for the reason that the police officer should not refuse to record an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other words ‘reasonableness’ or ‘credibility’ of the said information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the earlier Codes will indicate that the legislature had purposely thought it fit to employ only the word "information" without qualifying the said word. In other words ‘reasonableness’ or ‘credibility’ of the said information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the earlier Codes will indicate that the legislature had purposely thought it fit to employ only the word "information" without qualifying the said word. Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act 25 of 1861) passed by the Legislative Council of India read that ‘every complaint or information’ preferred to an officer in charge of a police station should be reduced into writing which provision was subsequently modified by Section 112 of the Code of 1872 (Act 10 of 1872) which thereafter read that ‘every complaint’ preferred to an officer in charge of a police station shall be reduced in writing. The word ‘complaint’ which occurred in previous two Codes of 1861 and 1872 was deleted and in that place the word ‘information’ was used in the Codes of 1882 and 1898 which word is now used in Sections 154, 155, 157 and 190 (c) of the present Code of 1973 (Act 2 of the 1974). An overall reading of all the Codes makes it clear that the condition which is sine qua non for recording a first information report is that there must be an information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence. 33. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer in charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154 (1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information." (emphasis added) 12. The Apex Court has further gone into the question as to whether mere registration of the criminal case under Section 154 (1) of the Code ipso facto warrants the setting in motion of an investigation under Chapter XII of the Code and said that the police officer if, has reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence, may proceed to investigate the matter without the order of the Magistrate but if he finds that the offence is not of a serious nature or that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the same but in case a decision taken for not investigation, he has to submit his report to the Magistrate along with the reasons and shall notify the same to the informant that he will not investigate the same or cause it to be investigated. 13. In fact, in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR (32) 1945 PC 18, it was held that receipt and recording of information is not a condition precedent to the setting in motion of a criminal investigation. If the police is in possession through their own knowledge or by means of a credible though informal intelligence, which genuinely leads them to believe that a cognizable offence has been committed, should on their own motion undertake an investigation into the truth of the matter alleged. The provisions pertaining to recording of an information that is registration of F.I.R. are enacted for other reasons. Its object is to obtain early information of alleged criminal activity, to record the circumstances before there is time for them to be forgotten or embellished. Further, the report can also be put in evidence when the informant is examined, if it is desired to do so. The Privy Council on page 22 said : "In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case........" 14. In State of Punjab and another v. Gurdial Singh and others, 1980 (2) SCC 471 , it has been observed that obligation to register a case is not to be confused with the remedy, if the same is not registered. The obligation of registering F.I.R. may be excused if the Officer-in-Charge of the police station finds that the information does not discloses a cognizable offence or that the dispute is pure and simple of civil nature from the bare narration of the facts without going into its truthfulness or that ex-facie the information appears to be fictitious. 15. It may also be mentioned at this stage that no particular procedure of drafting of information which has to be registered, that is F.I.R., is prescribed in the Code. In Superintendent of Police, CBI and others v. Tapan Kumar Singh, 2003 SCC (Cri) 1305, in Para 20, the Apex Court said : 20. "It is well settled that a first information report is not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. An informant may lodged a report about the commission of an offence though he may not known the name of the victim or his assailant. He may not even know how the occurrence took place. A first informant need not necessarily be an eye-witness so as to be able to disclose in great detail all aspects of the offence committed. What is of significance is that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the information so lodged must provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage it is enough if the police officer on the basis of the information given suspects the commission of a cognizable offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has been committed. At this stage it is enough if the police officer on the basis of the information given suspects the commission of a cognizable offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has been committed. If he has reasons to suspect, on the basis of information received, that a cognizable offence may have been committed, he is bound to record the information and conduct an investigation. At this stage it is also not necessary for him to satisfy himself about the truthfulness of the information. It is only after a complete investigation that he may be able to report on the truthfulness or otherwise of the information. Similarly, even if the information does not furnish all the details he must find out those details in the course of investigation and collect all the necessary evidence. The information given disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence only sets in motion the investigative machinery, with a view to collect all necessary evidence, and thereafter to take action in accordance with law. The true test is whether the information furnished provides a reason to suspect the commission of an offence, which the police officer concerned is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record the information and proceed to investigate the case either himself or depute any other competent officer to conduct the investigation. The question as to whether the report is true, whether it discloses full details regarding the manner of occurrence, whether the accused is named, and whether there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations are all matters which are alien to the consideration of the question whether the report discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Even if the information does not give full details regarding these matters, the investigating officer is not absolved of his duty to investigate the case and discover the true facts, if he can." 16. Even if the information does not give full details regarding these matters, the investigating officer is not absolved of his duty to investigate the case and discover the true facts, if he can." 16. A cumulative reading of Sections 154 to 157 of the Code shows that so far as the registration of an information about commission of a cognizable offence is concerned, the only thing which is to be seen is whether the information constitute a cognizable offence and then it has to be registered but so far as the investigation part is concerned, there is some scope of discretion vested with the Police Officer-in-Charge of the concerned police station but that is also subject to scrutiny by the Magistrate having jurisdiction in such matter and since he has also to record reasons for not making investigation and to inform the informant, the informant can also have the remedy of challenging the same before the appropriate forum. It is in this way, the Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (supra) has dealt with the aforesaid provisions in para 36 to 40. 17. In the case, this Court is not concerned about the decision of the police authorities to investigate the matter but the basic question is about the registration of an information regarding commission of a cognizable offence and the scope of discretion of Magistrate in directing for investigation. 18. It is no doubt true that it has been held that the power under Section 156 (3) of the Code is a discretionary one vested in the Magistrate but at the same time, it is also a well settled proposition of law that a discretion vested in a judicial authority has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. This Court in Ram Pal Singh (supra) has said that : "At the stage of Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. which is a pre-cognizance stage, once cognizable offence is disclosed through that application it was the duty of the concerned Court to order for registration and investigation of the offence as crime detection and crime prevention are the foremost duty of the police and not of the Court." 19. The Apex Court also in S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. and others, JT 2008 (2) SC 8 said that when the Magistrate applies his mind for taking action i.e. ordering investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence, meaning thereby, the stage is earlier. There, since the stage of directing for investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code is a pre-cognizance stage, the truth or correctness of the allegation/information is not supposed to be undergone by the Magistrate. 20. Registration of an F.I.R. in a case like present one involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of cognizable offence in a book kept by Officer-in-Charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. It is for this reason that the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) of the Code is not required to examine the complainant on oath since he has not taken cognizance of any offence therein. The investigation in a matter of a crime is the prime responsibility of the police, the Magistrate therefore, instead of wasting his time can order investigation by the Police and for the said purposes the F.I.R. has to be registered by the Police. 21. In Mohammad Yusuf v. Smt. Afaq Jahan and another, JT 2006 (1) SC 10 it was held that for the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation, it is open for the Magistrate to direct the Police to register F.I.R. and there is no illegality therein even though Magistrate does not say in so many words by directing investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code that an F.I.R. should be registered. It is the duty of the Officer-in-Charge of the police station to register F.I.R. regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complainant and that police officer should take further steps contemplated under Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter. It also held that Section 156 (3) is wide enough to include all such powers in a Magistrate which are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation and it includes the power for order of registration of an F.I.R. and of ordering a proper investigation, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the proper investigation has not been done or not being done by the police. 22. 22. Sometimes in a given case, application containing information of a cognizable offence when presented before the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) of the Code, from a bare reading of the allegations may show an improbability or falsity in the allegations or lack of genuinity or exaggerated facts. In such circumstances, though the Magistrate, may not be required to go into the truth of the information but what appears to it from a bare reading of the complaint, improbability or falsity in the allegations may justify an order of refusal but such cases would be rare and exceptional. Normally when an information in an application discloses commission of a cognizable offence, instead of going into the veracity of the matter, the Magistrate should direct the police to investigate into the matter for which the police would be under an obligation, thereafter, to register a report and proceed for investigation. However, this would not deprive the Magistrate his power to treat an application or information as a complaint under Section 190 of the Code, even though there may not be any prayer seeking trial and to proceed accordingly. This is the procedure and the course which can be adopted by the Magistrate as held by a Full Bench of this Court in Ram Babu Gupta and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2001 (3) Cr.L.J. 3363. 23. It is thus clear that power of the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) of the Code for directing investigation may be discretionary, but the same is to be exercised judiciously. The discretion, therefore, has to be exercised by the Magistrate on his own, from the facts stated in the complaint and not upon the view of the police and that too, not arbitrarily. So far as the police is concerned, it is under a statutory mandate of registering report under Section 154 of the Code as when the information is given regarding commission of a cognizable offence and dereliction of police officer in discharge of the above statutory duty cannot be taken lightly but deserves to be taken in a more stricter manner. 24. 24. In the case in hand, the Magistrate though has held that a civil dispute between the parties, was pending in the Court of Civil Judge, Farrukhabad but simultaneously he has permitted the revisionist to file a complaint, meaning thereby, he has not found that the information is incorrect or appears to be false or that the information does not constitute a cognizable offence but impressed with the fact that the police does not believe the information of the revisionist, and that it has taken proceedings under Sections 107 and 116 of the Code, he has rejected the application though has made it open to the applicant to file complaint. In view of Ram Babu Gupta (supra) he could have treated the application as complaint under Section 190 of the Code and proceeded accordingly. 25. I therefore, while having no doubt on the exposition of law that power of Magistrate under Section 156 (3) of the Code is discretionary but is clearly of the view that it has not been correctly exercised by the Court below in the case in hand and the order impugned is erroneous and is liable to be set-aside. 26. However, this matter does not end here. It is true that for an orderly society, the importance of an effective and efficient police force dedicated to the public service is of utmost importance and is the necessity of the time. It is a matter of common knowledge that the people run from pillar to post after occurrence of a serious crime for mere registration of the report but the concerned police authorities failed to realise trauma and harassment of such people and simply ignore the observance of their statutory duty despite of the same being declared mandatory and is the law of the land settled by the Apex Court. Crime detection and adjudication are two separate though inseparable wings of justice delivery system. The former is the basic obligation of the police and latter is in the hands of judiciary. Crime detection and adjudication are two separate though inseparable wings of justice delivery system. The former is the basic obligation of the police and latter is in the hands of judiciary. Though the Code provides for an alternative remedy of approaching the Superintendent of Police and thereafter to the Magistrate concerned under Section 156 (3) but such remedy instead of providing any solace and relief to the harried lot, on the contrary is adding to their sufferance due to persistent lacklustre attitude of Police compelling a common man to run from one authority to another for a simple cause of registration of an information constituting commission of a cognizable offence, so that the police may make investigation according to the procedure prescribed in the Code. 27. The Subordinate Courts are already heavily burdened with the huge number of such cases where the people having approached the Police authorities in vain, then had approached the Magistrate concerned under Section 156 (3). Even this Court is now being burdened for the only reason that the information has not been registered by the Police under Section 154 of the Code. What normally ought to have been an exception has turned out to be a routine exercise. A very large number of applications are being filed under Section 156 (3) of the Code before the Magistrates concerned and consequential proceedings are coming frequently to this Court also. Huge time is consumed only in such matters though it could have been utilized for other matters of substance and that too only for the reason that the police has shown blatant slackness in observance of its statutory obligations. It appears that the police is conveniently omitting to remind itself that its fundamental and basic duty is to prevent occurrence of any crime and if it has already occurred, to investigate and detect the crime so as to bring the accused to justice. The first step in this regard is as soon as the information of a cognizable offence is received, it must register the same and thereafter to proceed to investigate the matter in accordance with law. 28. The first step in this regard is as soon as the information of a cognizable offence is received, it must register the same and thereafter to proceed to investigate the matter in accordance with law. 28. This Court also take judicial notice of the fact that the tendency developed with the police authorities in refusing to register F.I.R. is not for any valid reason, as said above, but perhaps for administrative reasons namely to show to the higher authorities improvement of law and order in the area within their jurisdiction on the ground that number of F.I.R. registration has got down drastically comparing to the corresponding past or in respect to the period when some other police officers were posted thereat. It appears that the State Government and the higher authorities of the police department, while assessing the performance of a police Officer-in-Charge of a police station, take into consideration whether FIR’s have reduced comparing to the predecessor in office as a major factor to judge the position of law and order. The basic data taken into account by the State Government or the higher authorities of the police department is the number of F.I.R. of cognizable offence registered in the concerned police station. Probably this has led the tendency in the concerned police authorities to refuse recording of F.I.R. and thereby creating artificially good record showing reduction in crime rate due to lesser recording of F.I.R. It totally ignores the fact that due to none registration of F.I.R. in a large number of cases, pertaining to cognizable offence, the people are compelled to approach the Magistrate by filing applications under Section 156 (3) of the Code. This demonstrates that the declaration of law by the Apex Court as well as this Court that police is under a statutory obligation to register F.I.R. has gone down on blind eyes with the police authorities as well as the Government. The situation has not shown any improvement in the method of functioning of the police authorities in such matters despite of repeated observations by the Court. 29. The Court cannot overlook the fact that criminal justice system in the State is already over burdened. A large number of vacancies of judicial officers in subordinate Courts are lying for one or the other reason. 29. The Court cannot overlook the fact that criminal justice system in the State is already over burdened. A large number of vacancies of judicial officers in subordinate Courts are lying for one or the other reason. Mere inaction on the part of police authorities in observance of their statutory duty and/or faulty system of investigation is adding further to the already over burdened justice system. This has gone to an extent that the people who are arrested in the early younger age are still awaiting for their trial etc. though have attained advanced old age. In many of the matters, large number of accused have died but the Court proceedings could not have been completed and even not commenced in some of the cases. In many others the trial etc. suffers due to death of material witnesses due to prolonged time taken in the Courts. At this stage, it would be prudent to notice some of the observations/directions of the Apex Court in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2008 (7) SCC 164 . Paras 4 and 5 the Apex Court held : "4. It is a matter of experience of one of us (B.N. Agrawal, J.) while acting as Judge of the Patna High Court, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court and Judge of this Court that inspite of law laid down by this Court, the police authorities concerned do not register FIRs unless some direction is given by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the High Court or this Court. Further, experience shows that even after orders are passed by the Courts concerned for registration of the case, the police does not take the necessary steps and when matters are brought to the notice of the inspecting Judges of the High Court during the course of inspection of the Courts and Superintendents of Police are taken to task, then only FIRs are registered. In a large number of cases investigations do not commence even after registration of FIRs and in a case like the present one, steps are not taken for recovery of the kidnapped person or apprehending the accused person with reasonable dispatch. In a large number of cases investigations do not commence even after registration of FIRs and in a case like the present one, steps are not taken for recovery of the kidnapped person or apprehending the accused person with reasonable dispatch. At times it has been found that when harsh orders are passed by the members of the judiciary in a State, the police becomes hostile to them, for instance, in Bihar when a bail petition filed by a police personnel, who was the accused was rejected by a member of the Bihar Superior Judicial service, he was assaulted in the Courtroom for which contempt proceeding was initiated by the Patna High Court and the erring police officials were convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment. 5. On the other hand, there are innumerable cases that where the complainant is a practical person, FIRs are registered immediately, copies thereof are made over to the complainant on the same day, investigation proceeds with supersonic jet speed, immediate steps are taken for apprehending the accused and recovery of the kidnapped persons and the properties which were the subject-matter of theft or dacoity. In the case before us allegations have been made that the Station House Officer of the police station concerned is pressurising the complainant to withdraw the complaint, which, if true, is a very disturbing state of affairs. We do not know, there may be innumerable such instances." 30. It is high time now that this Court must endeavour to find out some ways to make the police authority adhere to their statutory duties. The time perhaps has ripened when this Court in exercise of its inherent power must look into this disease in a more serious manner and find out ways by issuing appropriate directions to the concerned authorities, which may result in compelling the police authorities either to observe their statutory duties faithfully or to face consequences. 31. In the above facts and circumstances, this revision is allowed. The impugned order dated 13.2.2009 passed by Special Judge (D.A.A.) Farrukhabad in Misc. Case No. 4/12/08 (Roop Ram v. Sonu and another) is hereby set-aside. The matter is remanded back to the Special Judge (D.A.A.) Farrukhabad to re-consider the application of the revisionist and pass a fresh order in accordance with law. 32. The impugned order dated 13.2.2009 passed by Special Judge (D.A.A.) Farrukhabad in Misc. Case No. 4/12/08 (Roop Ram v. Sonu and another) is hereby set-aside. The matter is remanded back to the Special Judge (D.A.A.) Farrukhabad to re-consider the application of the revisionist and pass a fresh order in accordance with law. 32. Considering the above observations this Court gives further the following directions : (i) When a Police Officer-in-Charge of the police station or any other police Officer, acting under the directions of the Officer-in-Charge of police station refuses to register an information disclosing a cognizable offence, the informant may either approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154 (3) or the Magistrate concerned under Section 156 (3) of the Code. (ii) If the informant approaches the Superintendent of Police, who finds that the refusal of registration of F.I.R. by the police Officer-in-Charge of the police station was unjust or for reasons other than valid, and where he directs for investigation, he shall initiate disciplinary proceedings against the Officer-in-Charge of the police station for such non-observance of statutory obligation treating the same to be a serious misconduct justifying a major penalty and complete the proceedings within three months from the date he passes an order for investigation into the matter. (iii) Where, the informant approaches the Magistrate concerned under Section 156 (3) of the Code and the Magistrate ultimately finds that information discloses a cognizable offence and direct the police to proceed for investigation, he shall cause a copy of the order sent to Superintendent of Police/Senior Superintendent of Police (hereinafter referred to as the S.P./S.S.P.) of the concerned district and such S.P./S.S.P. shall cause a disciplinary inquiry into the matter to find out the person guilty of such dereliction of duty i.e. failure to discharge statutory obligation i.e. registration of an information disclosing cognizable offence treating the said failure as a serious misconduct justifying major penalty and shall complete the disciplinary proceedings within three months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order from the concerned Magistrate. After completing the disciplinary proceedings, the S.P./S.S.P. concerned shall inform about the action taken against the concerned police Officer-in-Charge of the police station to the Magistrate concerned within 15 days from the date of action taken by him but not later than four months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order from the Magistrate concerned. (iv) The Magistrate concerned shall review the cases in which the copy of the orders passed under Section 156 (3) of the Code has been sent to concerned S.P./S.S.P. quarterly and when it is found that the concerned S.P./S.S.P. has also failed to comply with the above directions of this Court, he shall sent a copy of his order along with the information about non-compliance of this Court’s order/direction by the concerned S.P./S.S.P. to the Director General of Police, U.P., Lucknow and the Principal Secretary (Home), U.P., Lucknow who shall look into the matter and take appropriate action as directed above against the police Officer-in-Charge of the police station concerned as well as the S.P./S.S.P. concerned for his inaction also into the matter within three months and communicate about the action within next one month to the Magistrate concerned. The Principal Secretary (Home), U.P., Lucknow and the Director General of Police, U.P. Lucknow shall also submit a report regarding number of the cases informed by the concerned Magistrate in a calendar year and also the action taken, by them as directed above by the end of February of every year to the Registrar General of this Court. (v) Besides above, non-compliance of the above directions of this Court shall also be treated to be a deliberate defiance by the concerned authorities above mentioned constituting contempt of this Court and may be taken up before the Court concerned having jurisdiction in the matter, whenever it is brought to the notice of this Court. The Registrar General of this Court is directed to send a copy of this order forthwith to the Principal Secretary (Home), U.P. Lucknow, the Director General of Police, U.P. Lucknow so that they may issue necessary instructions in respect of the compliance of the various directions contained in the judgment to the concerned S.P./S.S.P. of the concerned districts of the State of U.P. and also to the various Police Officers-in-Charge of the concerned police stations apprising them about the directions of this Court and for compliance thereof. ————