JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. 2. The petitioner has been transferred by Inspector General of Police, Meerut Region, Meerut vide order dated 24.5.2008 from Bulandshahr to Baghpat. By means of order dated 4.6.2009 he has been relieved by S.S.P., Bulandshahr to enable him to join at the place of transfer at Baghpat. The petitioner submits that the impugned order of transfer dated 24.5.2009 is being sought to be given effect to after more than a year and in the meantime, petitioner’s father has suffered brain haemorrhage and his children are also in the midst of session, as such, the impugned order cannot be given effect to. He placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Balvir Singh v. Director Animal Husbandary, Lucknow and others, 1996(1) UPLBEC 353 which is an interim order passed by this Court, staying the transfer order in the mid term, relying on Apex Court’s decision in Director of School Education Madras and others v. O. Karuppa Thevan and another, 1996(1) UPLBEC 347 . 3. Having considered the submission, however, I do not find force in any of the submissions. It is not the case of the petitioner that the impugned order of transfer is in violation of statutory provision or the authority had no jurisdiction or that the impugned order is mala fide. Transfer being exigency of service and the petitioner holding a transferable post, he can be transferred from one place to another. Which employee should be posted at which place, is the discretion of the employer concerned and no judicial review is permitted in such matter unless it can be shown that the impugned transfer is contrary to rules or is without jurisdiction or is bad on account of mala fide. 4. So far as the above interim order is concerned, an interim order is not binding precedence in deciding the matter. Moreover the Apex Court’s decision in Karuppa Thevan (supra) has been considered in a Division Bench decision later on by this Court in Gulzar Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (5) AWC 4755, wherein the proposition of law as advanced above was not found to be laid down in the said case. Moreover the Apex Court’s decision in Karuppa Thevan (supra) has been considered in a Division Bench decision later on by this Court in Gulzar Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (5) AWC 4755, wherein the proposition of law as advanced above was not found to be laid down in the said case. This Court, noticing Karuppa Thevan’s judgment, observed as under : “The case before the Hon’ble Apex Court pertains to education department and while granting indulgence clearly took into consideration the factum of absence of any urgent exigency of service in the case before it as is apparent from the following : “We are of the view that in effecting transfer, the fact that the children of an employee are studying should be given due weight, if the exigencies of the service are not urgent.” (Para-2) 5. Another Division Bench in Rajendra Prasad v. Union of India, 2005 (2) ESC 1224 has also considered by above authority of Karuppa Thevan (supra) and in para 11 of the judgment said as under : “11. In Director of School Education Madras and others v. O. Karuppa Thevan and another, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 666, the issue of transfer in mid academic session was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it was held that “the fact that children of the employee are studying should be given due weight, if the exigencies of the service are not urgent.” Therefore, it is for the employer to examine as to whether transfer of an employee can be deferred till the end of the current academic session. The Court has no means to assess as what is the real urgency of administrative exigency. Thus, the Court is not inclined to consider this submission at all.” 6. In an earlier judgment, another Division Bench of this Court presided over by Hon’ble M. Katju, J. (as his Lordship then was) in Dr. S.P. Jindal v. State of U.P., 2002 (1) AWC 306 after considering Karuppa Thevan (supra) said as under : "2. The petitioner has been transferred from Meerut to Ghaziabad. In an earlier judgment, another Division Bench of this Court presided over by Hon’ble M. Katju, J. (as his Lordship then was) in Dr. S.P. Jindal v. State of U.P., 2002 (1) AWC 306 after considering Karuppa Thevan (supra) said as under : "2. The petitioner has been transferred from Meerut to Ghaziabad. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Director of School Education, Madras and others v. O. Karuppa Thevan and another, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 666, and has urged that in view of this decision, the petitioner could not be transferred in the mid-term of his children studying in school. In our opinion, the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court does not lay down any principle of law that a Government employee, whose children are studying in school, cannot be transferred during the mid-term of his children studying in school. The aforesaid decision is mere a direction of the Supreme Court without laying any principle of law. Such direction without laying down any principle of law is not a precedent. A writ lies where there is any error of law apparent on the face of the record and not merely because there is some hardship to the petitioner. Most of the Government employees have children and if it is held that they cannot be transferred in mid-term of their children studying in school, there could hardly be any transfer. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court does not lay down any principle of law. Transfer is an exigency of service. Hence, we cannot interfere with the impugned transfer order dated 31.10.2001. However, the petitioner may make a representation to the higher authority who will decide the same preferably within a month thereafter in accordance with law. The petition is disposed of." 7. The same thing has been reiterated by another Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 52249 of 2000, Dr. Krishna Chandra Dubey v. Union of India, decided on 5.9.2005. 8. In the case in hand, the petitioner is member of a disciplined force, i.e., a police force. He was transferred on 24th May, 2008 by the D.I.G., Meerut Range, Meerut from Bulandshahar to Baghpat. Krishna Chandra Dubey v. Union of India, decided on 5.9.2005. 8. In the case in hand, the petitioner is member of a disciplined force, i.e., a police force. He was transferred on 24th May, 2008 by the D.I.G., Meerut Range, Meerut from Bulandshahar to Baghpat. The learned Standing Counsel informed that considering the petitioners hardship, the transfer order was not given effect at that time but the petitioner now having already completed six years in Bulandshahar cannot be allowed to continue thereat. The school certificates filed by the petitioner show that one of his daughter is student of Class 8th, another of Class 3rd and his son is studying in Class 4th. The session having just started, it cannot be said that the said students cannot be shifted and in any case, it is not for this Court to decide as to whether the exigencies of the services require immediate relieve of the petitioner or not but can be considered only by the concerned authorities of the department. The transfer order, impugned in this writ petition, cannot be said to be a mid term transfer. This aspect has also been addressed by this Court in Gulzar Singh (supra) and it has been held as under : “Even otherwise the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above case observed that the children of an employee are studying should be given due weight. This shows that the matter is to be examined by the employer as to whether the transfer of an employee can be deferred till the end of the current academic session or not and not by the Court. The Court has neither any means nor sufficient material to assess as to whether there is any rule or urgency of administrative exigencies for necessitating immediate transfer or that such transfer can be deferred in a particular case. Therefore, the Hon’ble Single Judge has rightly allowed liberty to the petitioner-appellant to raise this grievance before the authority concerned by making a representation, who will consider and pass a reasoned order thereupon.” 9. Therefore, the Hon’ble Single Judge has rightly allowed liberty to the petitioner-appellant to raise this grievance before the authority concerned by making a representation, who will consider and pass a reasoned order thereupon.” 9. The law is well settled that transfer being exigency of service can be effected by the employer concerned in accordance with its administrative exigency and in the interest of administration and public interest at any point of time and that cannot be monitored and guided by this Court unless it may be shown that transfer order is vitiated on account of being in contravention of the statute, or lacks jurisdiction or on account of mala fide. 10. So far as personal grievance of the petitioner is concerned, if he has any such problem, he can represent such matter before the authority concerned and if it is so, it is open to the authority concerned to consider and pass appropriate order. 11. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed. However, it will not preclude the petitioner from making appropriate representation explaining his personal problems and if any such representation is made, the same may be considered by the said authority in accordance with law. ———