Judgment :- Animadverting upon the judgment passed in C.A.No.195 of 2006 by the Additional District & Sessions Judge, FTC No.II, Coimbatore dated 112. 2006 confirming the judgment made in C.C.No.147 of 2002 by the Judicial Magistrate No.1, Pollachi dated 10.04.2006, this criminal revision is focussed. 2. Pithily and precisely, compendiously and concisely the relevant facts which are absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this revision would run thus: .(a) The police laid the police report in terms of Section 173 of Cr.P.C. as against the accused for the offence under Sections 279, 337 (4 counts), 304(a) (3 counts) and 338IPC. .(b) Inasmuch as the accused pleaded not guilty, the trial was conducted. During trial, on the prosecution side, P.Ws.1 to 18 were examined and Exs.P1 to P16 were marked. No oral or documentary evidence was adduced on the side of the defendant. .(c) Ultimately, the trial Court acquitted the accused and recorded the conviction and imposed the sentence. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the conviction recorded and the sentence imposed by the trial Court, the appeal was filed on various grounds for nothing but to be dismissed confirming the judgment of the lower Court. .3. Impugning and challenging the relevant facts and the sentence imposed by both the Courts below, this revision is focussed on various grounds, the gist and kernel of them would run thus: .Both the Courts below failed to take into account the fact that the left side front wheel of the jeep got separated from the vehicle and that alone caused the accident and that there was no rash and negligent driving on the part of the accused at all. The alleged eye witnesses on the prosecution side did not speak anything about the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by P.W.1. As such, the judgments of both the Courts below have to be set aside. 4. The point for consideration is as to whether there is any perversity or non-application of law in recording the conviction as against the accused. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner placing reliance on the grounds of revision would develop his argument to the effect that the left side wheel of the jeep got separated from the vehicle and that alone resulted in the accident and none of the witnesses spoke about the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner placing reliance on the grounds of revision would develop his argument to the effect that the left side wheel of the jeep got separated from the vehicle and that alone resulted in the accident and none of the witnesses spoke about the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle. Whereas, the learned Government Advocate (crl.side) by detailing and delineating the accident and inviting the attention of this Court to the deposition of the eye witness, would develop his argument to the effect that the witnesses who travelled in the offended jeep cogently and coherently without any embellishment highlighted that despite they having instructed the driver not to be rash and negligent in driving the jeep, he did choose to drive it so and caused the accident. .5. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would submit that it is an admitted fact that the driver himself is a neighbour of those witnesses and in order to help the aged lady who sustained already some fracture, he was taking her along with other relatives in that jeep and in that process alone, the axil got broken and the accident occurred. However, the eye witnesses would coherently state that it is because of the rash and negligent driving of the jeep only, he was constrained to apply the brake suddenly which made the jeep to go helter-skelter to the left side of the road and thereby, it dashed as against a palm tree and because of that alone the left side wheel got dislocated. The Motor Vehicles Inspector, P.W.8, with reference to Ex.P2 would state that only after the accident the wheel got dislocated and it is not as though the wheel got separated from the vehicle even before the accident. 6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would submit that in the F.I.R. it is found stated as though the driver drove the vehicle without seeing the vehicle coming in the opposite direction, that he applied the brake and that in that process alone the accident occurred, but P.W.1, the very same FIR complainant in his deposition during cross examination would state that no vehicle came in the opposite direction. 7. 7. At this juncture, I would like to point out that the expression used in the FIR would reveal that the driver of the vehicle, namely the accused, was rash and negligent in driving the vehicle, without concentrating on the traffic and the on coming vehicles coming in the opposite direction and in the FIR he never stated that a particular vehicle was coming just in front of the vehicle. 8. At this juncture, my mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Honble Apex Court: (i) 2002(6) SCC 650 - Bindeshwari Prasad Singh alias B.P.Singh and Others vs. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) and another; an excerpt from it would run thus: "13. The instant case is not one where any such illegality was committed by the trial court. In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not reappreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted. 14. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction at the instance of the informant. It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from that of the trial court. But that by itself is no justification for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a judgment of acquittal. We cannot say that the judgment of the trial court in the instant case was perverse. No defect of procedure has been pointed out. There was also no improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial vitiating the trial itself. (ii) 2005 Supreme Court Cases (cri) 276 – Sathyajit Banerjee and Others vs. State of W.B.and others, an excerpt from it would run thus: "22. There was also no improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial vitiating the trial itself. (ii) 2005 Supreme Court Cases (cri) 276 – Sathyajit Banerjee and Others vs. State of W.B.and others, an excerpt from it would run thus: "22. The cases cited by the learned counsel show the settled legal position that the revisional jurisdiction, at the instance of the complainant, has to be exercised by the High Court only in very exceptional cases where the High Court finds defect of procedure or manifest error of law resulting in flagrant miscarriage of justice." A bare perusal of the said decisions would demonstrate that the revisional court is not expected to interfere with the finding given by both the courts below and if there is no perversity or non-application of law on the part of both the courts below, the question of revisional court interfering with the findings would arise. 9. Both the Courts below understanding the evidence correctly arrived at a factual finding warranting no interference by this Court. As such, I could see no infirmity in the finding of fact by the Courts below relating to the offence committed by the accused. Relating to sentence is concerned, altogether the accused is made to undergo only six months imprisonment. 10. At this juncture, my mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decision of the Honble Apex Court: 2002(2) SUPREME 500 – STATE OF KARNATAKA VS. SHARANAPPA BASNAGOUDA AREGOUDAR, an excerpt from it would run thus: "6. We are of the view that having regard to the serious nature of the accident, which resulted in the death of four persons, the learned Single Judge should not have interfered with the sentence imposed by the Court below. It may create and set an unhealthy precedent and send wrong signals to the subordinate courts which have to deal with several such accident cases. If the accused are found guilty of rash and negligent driving, courts have to be on guard to ensure that they do not escape the clutches of law very lightly. The sentence imposed by the courts should have deterrent effect on potential wrong-doers and it should commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. If the accused are found guilty of rash and negligent driving, courts have to be on guard to ensure that they do not escape the clutches of law very lightly. The sentence imposed by the courts should have deterrent effect on potential wrong-doers and it should commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. Of course, the Courts are given discretion in the matter of sentence to take stock of the wide and varying range of facts that might be relevant for fixing the quantum of sentence, but the discretion shall be exercised with due regard to larger interest of the society and it is needless to add that passing of sentence on the offender is probably the most public face of the criminal justice system." In the wake of the above decision, if the sentence imposed is considered, it is quite obvious and axiomatic that by no stretch of imagination it could be stated to be excessive, and that in this case three deaths are involved apart from grievous injuries and simple injuries to several persons. In the result, I could see no merit in the revision petition and it is dismissed.