Judgment K.M. Thaker, J.—In this petition, the District Panchayat, Kheda has, through Chief Medical Officer, challenged award dated 10.3.1999 passed by the Labour Court, Nadiad in Reference (LCN) No. 520/89 whereby the Labour Court has directed the petitioner-Panchayat to reinstate the respondent-workman and pay 25% of backwages from 4.7.1988 till the date of actual reinstatement. 2. Mr. Ahuja, learned Advocate has entered appearance for the petitioner-Panchayat however was not present at the hearing of this petition and Mr. Ansari, learned Advocate has appeared for the respondent. Mr. Chauhan was present on behalf of Mr. Ahuja to attend the hearing. 3. At the outset, it is required to be mentioned that Mr. Ansari for the respondent-workman submitted that the respondent has already reached the age of retirement and that therefore the question of actual reinstatement does not survive or arise. 4. So far as the facts of the case are concerned, they are in narrow compass. The respondent, who was working as Assistant Midwife-Nurse, was transferred to Udel and she reported at the place of transfer. However, in view of mental disturbances coupled with or occasioned by domestic problems and her mother’s illness, she tendered resignation on 27th July, 1975. It is the case of the petitioner that no decision on her resignation was taken by the respondent for long time. After some time, as she was recovering and since until then no decision with regard to her resignation was taken by the respondent, she withdrew her resignation by her communication dated 30.12.1975. The respondent also claimed that though she had withdrawn her resignation with effect from 30.12.1975, she was not allowed to report for work and suddenly, as a bolt from the blue, after a gap of almost 4 years she received a letter dated 5.5.1979 conveying that her resignation of 27th July, 1975 was accepted. In the interregnum, neither she was allowed to report for duty nor she was paid any wages. Aggrieved by such an action of respondent, she raised an industrial dispute which culminated into aforesaid Reference. The Reference proceeding was opposed by the petitioner-Panchayat by filing written statement and placing on record certain documents to oppose the claim of present respondent. The respondent gave her oral evidence and placed some documents on record to support her claim. After considering rival submissions and the material available on record, the Labour Court passed impugned award. 5. Mr. The Reference proceeding was opposed by the petitioner-Panchayat by filing written statement and placing on record certain documents to oppose the claim of present respondent. The respondent gave her oral evidence and placed some documents on record to support her claim. After considering rival submissions and the material available on record, the Labour Court passed impugned award. 5. Mr. Chauhan for Mr. Ahuja for the petitioner submitted that the award directing reinstatement with 25% backwages is unjust and upon considering material available on record, appropriate order may be passed. He has not made any other submission. Mr. Ansari on the other hand urged that the respondent’s withdrawal of resignation took place before its acceptance was conveyed to her and therefore her claim is justified and award may not be set aside as prayed for in the petition. No other submissions are made by either side. 6. It deserves to be mentioned that, between the parties, there is no dispute on the fact that the respondent had tendered resignation on 27.7.1975 and until 5.5.1979 it was not accepted. There is also no controversy between the parties that before the decision on respondent’s resignation was taken and conveyed to the respondent on 5.5.1979, the respondent had, by her communication dated 30.12.1975, withdrawn the resignation and during this period neither she worked nor she was paid. 6.1. Tender of resignation is an offer to put an end to contract of employment and it gets concluded upon acceptance of resignation. The acceptance may be by competent authority’s order of acceptance or by operation of law which includes a deeming fiction, in light of which even in absence of specific order by competent authority, the resignation would be deemed to have been accepted. Applicable rules may provide for right to reject or refuse the offer i.e. resignation. In present case, the respondent sought to withdraw the resignation four months after having tendered it but much before it was accepted. Thus, she expected that her request for withdrawal of resignation would be accepted. 6.2. She, however, did not hear anything about the acceptance or even rejection of her request. The respondent claims that while she awaited some positive response, to her dismay, she received the decision dated 5.5.1979. Thus, she expected that her request for withdrawal of resignation would be accepted. 6.2. She, however, did not hear anything about the acceptance or even rejection of her request. The respondent claims that while she awaited some positive response, to her dismay, she received the decision dated 5.5.1979. In light of such facts, the learned Labour Court has proceeded on the premise that once the respondent withdrew her resignation, it could not have been accepted 4 years after the withdrawal. 6.3. Normally, tenderer can withdraw resignation before the effective date mentioned in the resignation or its acceptance. This position may, however, differ when rules provide different eventuality or consequence. 6.4. It appears that after withdrawing the resignation, the respondent requested for posting order on 10th May, 1976, 14th June, 1976 and 26.4.1977, though the respondent requested for posting, she does not appear to have actually reported for work, not even at the place where she was posted at the time when she tendered resignation. Even in her communication dated 26.4.1977, she requested for posting ?Sat some suitable place??, which would mean that she had not presented herself and merely repeatedly requested for posting instructions. 6.5. From the record, it also comes out that even when she withdrew the resignation, the respondent was not well or completely fit to resume duty on 30.12.1975 or immediately inasmuch as in the letter dated 30.12.1975 withdrawing the resignation, the respondent had mentioned that she would report for work after recovering from illness. How far would such empty and hollow requests, not coupled with action (of actually reporting) help the respondent. In view of this Court, it would not. 7. The direction in the award requesting the petitioner Panchayat to reinstate respondent and pay 25% backwages is, unfortunately, made without due consideration and appreciation of aforesaid aspects. 7.1. Further, the impugned direction about backwages is unsustainable as the learned Labour Court has also not considered and not applied the “No Work No Pay” principle. 7.2. The respondent would, however, still request for reinstatement and would urge not to upset the said direction on the ground that before the resignation was accepted, she had withdrawn it. This submission calls for further consideration of the matter. 7.3. 7.2. The respondent would, however, still request for reinstatement and would urge not to upset the said direction on the ground that before the resignation was accepted, she had withdrawn it. This submission calls for further consideration of the matter. 7.3. It deserves to be mentioned that the petitioner claimed before the learned trial Court that the respondent had not mentioned in the resignation any date on which the resignation was supposed to be effective. This assertion is not disputed by the respondent. 7.4. In light of this factual position, it should also be noticed that it is not the case of the respondent that after tendering the resignation she continued to work until the effective date of resignation or that she had continued to attend her duties expecting it to be accepted and when it was not accepted for almost 4 months, she ultimately withdrew it. On the contrary, it transpires that, the respondent had stopped attending her duties right from the day she tendered resignation. 7.5. In this context, it is relevant to take into account the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case between P. Lal and Union of India & Ors, reported in 2003(2) LCJ Page 164. In the said case, the Hon’ble Apex Court has, in Para 2, recorded some relevant facts as follows:— “2. On May 5, 1993 he again applies for voluntary retirement with immediate effect. He deposits Rs. 30,870/- in lieu of three months’ advance notice. Respondent No. 3 does not even wait for his application to be accepted. He again goes away abroad. As Respondent No. 3 had applied for voluntary retirement DGP, Punjab recommends that the charge-sheet against him be withdrawn. On September 27, 1993 the Government of India rejects the request for voluntary retirement on the ground that three months’ notice period had not been given. The Government of Punjab by its representations dated September 29, 1933 and July 8, 1994 requests the Government of India to accept the application for voluntary retirement. This request is again turned down by the Government of India on September 13, 1994. The Government of Punjab by its representations dated September 29, 1933 and July 8, 1994 requests the Government of India to accept the application for voluntary retirement. This request is again turned down by the Government of India on September 13, 1994. As Respondent No. 3 was not even in India and was not reporting for duty the Government of Punjab, on November 29, 1994, points out to the Government of India that Respondent No. 3 has not been attending office since May 5, 1993 and that his three months’ notice period may be considered from the date of application i.e. May 5, 1993 and he may be allowed voluntary retirement. On March 2, 1995 the Government of India permits Respondent No. 3 to retire from service with effect from May, 1993. It may be mentioned that in the meantime, on the recommendation of the D.G.P., Punjab, the charge-sheet had been dropped against Respondent No. 3. This was done in view of the fact that he was retiring voluntarily.” and then in Para 25, the Hon’ble Court has held thus:— “25. We have considered the submissions of both the parties. As has been set out, in Shambhu Murari’s case (Supra) and Bank of India’s case (Supra), an employee can withdraw his application for voluntary retirement before the effective date. The effective date would necessarily be the date on which the retirement takes effect. The request; which Respondent No. 3 had made by his latter dated May 5, 1993, was to be allowed to retire voluntarily with immediate effect. He had also deposited Rs. 30,870/- in lieu of three months’ notice. Thus so far as Respondent No. 3 was concerned the effective date was May 5, 1993. Of course Rule 16 (2-A) of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement) Rules, 1958 provides that a notice of retirement had to be accepted by the Government of India. In this case, the Government of India accepted the request on March 2, 1995 and permitted Respondent No. 3 to retire with effect from May, 1993. The moment Government of India accepted the notice the retirement became effective. The relationship of master and servant came to an end. We are unable to accept the submission that the relationship of master and servant did not terminate till the acceptance was communicated to Respondent No. 3. The moment Government of India accepted the notice the retirement became effective. The relationship of master and servant came to an end. We are unable to accept the submission that the relationship of master and servant did not terminate till the acceptance was communicated to Respondent No. 3. It must be remembered that Rules 16 (2) and 16 (2-A) enable a member to retire from service on giving the required notice. Once such a notice is given it merely has to be accepted by the Government of India. The moment it is accepted the retirement would be effective. If any other view is taken it would lead to absurd results. Such a view would mean that even though a member had given a notice for voluntary retirement stopped attending office and/or gone away aboard and/or taken up some other employment after a number of years of absence the member could claim to come back into service because the Government, for some unforeseen reasons, had not communicated its acceptance. Taken to its absurd length such a member could after superannuation claim that, as the services were not terminated, he was entitled to pension and gratuity on the basis that he had continued in service. The requirement of communication of acceptance would only arise in cases where, even after giving of a notice of voluntary retirement the member continues to work/perform his duties. In such cases the member would need to know from what date he can stop attending office. In cases where the member has by his own conduct abandoned service the severance of the relationship of master and servant takes place immediately on acceptance of notice. We are unable to accept the submission that the severance of relationship of master and servant cannot take effect until there is an order by the President of India and the same is duly notified in the Gazette. Rules 16 (2) and 16 (2-A) have been set out hereinabove. All that it requires is acceptance by the Government of India and not by the President of India. Admittedly the request for voluntary retirement has been accepted by the Government of India on March 2, 1995. No provision or rule could be shown which requires such acceptance to be gazetted. All that it requires is acceptance by the Government of India and not by the President of India. Admittedly the request for voluntary retirement has been accepted by the Government of India on March 2, 1995. No provision or rule could be shown which requires such acceptance to be gazetted. On the contrary, as has been set out hereinabove, in its affidavit before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the Government of Punjab had categorically stated that there was no provision for gazetting such an order.” 7.6 At this stage, it is necessary to take note of the fact that it is, by now, settled position that the employees in Panchayat service are State employees or/are in State Civil Service.. It is held in the case between G.L. Shukla & Another vs. The State of Gujarat & Ors., reported in 1967 (8) GLR 833, the Hon’ble Court held that; “9. The conclusion which emerges from this discussion is that the panchayat service is a distinct and separate service set up for serving the Panchayat Organization of the State and it is as much a civil service of the State as the State service. The State can have many services such as State service, police service, engineering service etc. and panchayat service is one of them. In the panchayat service, as in the State service, the State is the master and every officer or servant employed in the panchayat service is the servant of the State and not of the panchayat under which he may be serving for the time being. The panchayat service is one single service with the State as the master. There is, therefore no termination of service when an officer or servant of the State service is allocated to the panchayat service. On allocation he is merely transferred from one civil service of the State to another, his master remaining the same, namely, the State. His service under the State continues unbroken and uninterrupted, the only difference being that whereas prior to the order of allocation he was a member of one civil service of the State, namely, the State service, he is, after the order of allocation, a member of another civil service of the State, namely, the panchayat service. His service under the State continues unbroken and uninterrupted, the only difference being that whereas prior to the order of allocation he was a member of one civil service of the State, namely, the State service, he is, after the order of allocation, a member of another civil service of the State, namely, the panchayat service. The order of allocation does not, therefore, bring about termination of service of the officer or servant of the State who is allocated to the panchayat service and sec. 206 cannot be assailed as authorizing or permitting violation of the constitutional guarantee contained in Article 311(2). The challenge to the validity of the impugned sections on the ground of contravention of Article 311(2) must, therefore, fail and be rejected.” Then in the case between R.K. Soni vs. State of Gujarat and Others, reported in AIR 1977 Guj. Page 76, this Hon’ble Court held:- “65. Under the Scheme of the Act examined earlier in the light of the pronouncements in G.L. Shukla’s case (1976 Cri LJ 1256)(FB) (Guj), it is absolutely clear that the Panchayat Service constituted under the Act is a State Service with the State as the master and each and every officer or servant employed in the Panchayat Service is the servant of the State and not of the panchayat under which he may be serving for the time being. Such a single service has been constituted with the end in view of bringing about uniform scales of pay and uniform conditions of service for persons employed in the discharge of functions and duties of panchayats, irrespective of the different sources from which such persons were drawn and the widely differing scales of pay and conditions of service applicable to them before their allocation to the Panchayat Service. For administrative purposes, such single service may be conveniently divided into classes or cadres and posts with differing scales of pay may be allocated to each class or cadre. However, the division of a single service into several classes or cadres does not make the holders of the posts in each of such class or cadre anytheless members of such single service. However, the division of a single service into several classes or cadres does not make the holders of the posts in each of such class or cadre anytheless members of such single service. When, therefore, a general revision of pay scales and other conditions of service including retirement benefits is undertaken, it would ordinarily militate against the mandate of Article 16 to exclude from such revision a class or cadre of such service.” In the case between Shamji Karsan vs. State of Gujarat (1976 Cri.L.J. 1256) also, the Hon’ble Full Bench held that Panchayat Service is civil service under the State. Then, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in appeal in the matter between State of Gujarat vs. Ramanlal Keshavlal Soni And Ors., reported in 1983 (1) GLR Page 708 observed that:- “The Gujarat High Court in Ramanlal Keshavlal Soni and Others vs. State of Gujarat & Others, A.I.R. 1977 Guj.76 had held that Panchayat Service was a State Service. The High Court in that case allowed the writ petition holding that the members of the panchayat service belonging to the local cadre were government servants and directed the State Government for revision of pay scales, payment of amount payable to them as a consequence of rationalisation or revision of pay scale etc..... His Lordship referring to the Judgment given by Hon’ble Sjt. Bhagwati, J. as he then was, in G.L. Shukla vs. State of Gujarat, 8 G.L.R. 833-ILR 1967 Guj. 560, entirely agreeing with the observations made therein held, that the panchayat service constituted under sec. 203 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act is a civil service of the State and that the members of the service are government servants. Further held, that the High Court did not commit any error in issuing the directions which were consequential to its findings. The High Court had directed the State Government to discharge its statutory duty to make orders for the equation of posts and to extend the benefits arising out of the reports of the two Pay Commissions, which benefits had been denied to the local cadre only.” 7.7. The said legal position and also the provisions under “Gujarat Panchayat Service (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1996 brings in picture Rule 3 of Gujarat Panchayat Service (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1996, which makes the Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959 (except the revised Pension Rules, 1950) applicable to the panchayat employees. The said legal position and also the provisions under “Gujarat Panchayat Service (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1996 brings in picture Rule 3 of Gujarat Panchayat Service (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1996, which makes the Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959 (except the revised Pension Rules, 1950) applicable to the panchayat employees. The said Rule 3 of aforesaid 1996 Rules reads thus; 3. Application of Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959 to Panchayat Servants.—The Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959 (except the Revised Pension Rules, 1950 and the rules relating to pension, gratuity and other retirement benefits elsewhere contained therein) (hereinafter referred to as “the Civil Service Rules”) as in force at the commencement of these rules shall, as amended by Government from time to time, apply to the Panchayat Servants subject to the modifications specified in rule 4.” Hence, it is necessary to take into consideration Rule 33-A of Bombay Civil Services Rules which has been inserted on 18.6.1974; “33-A (1)(a) A Government servant may at any time resign from the services of the State by giving a notice of one month in writing to the appointing authority: Provided that in the case of a temporary servant who has put in service of less than one year, the period to such notice shall be one week. (b) Nothing in this rule shall affect the provisions of any special contract of service of bond entered into by the Government servant with the Government, or the provisions of any special rules, if any, applicable to him, in respect of the period of notice to be given for resignation from service or payment of any sum by the Government servant, to the Government for premature resignation by him. (2) The resignation tendered by a Government servant shall be effective from the date on which it is accepted by the appointing authority : but if it is not accepted before the expiry of the period of notice for resignation to be given by such servant under sub-rule (1) it shall be deemed to have become effective on the date of the expiry of such period, unless the Government servant is informed, before such date, that his resignation has been rejected and of the reasons for such rejection : Provided that the resignation of a Government servant shall not be rejected except in a case where___ (a) any ascertained or ascertainable amount to money is found outstanding against him and payment thereof is not made by him within the period mentioned above; (b) he is under suspension; (c) any departmental inquiry or criminal prosecution is contemplated or pending against him. (3) A Government servant shall not be relieved from his office, if his resignation is rejected. (4) Where a Government servant remains absent from duty before his resignation has become effective or if his resignation has been rejected without prior grant of leave for such absence, it shall be lawful for the competent authority to treat his absence as leave without pay and to take disciplinary action against him for unauthorised absence from duty. (5) Any notice of resignation from service shall not be permitted to be withdrawn after the resignation has become effective, except of exceptional ground or in public interest.” (emphasis supplied) 7.8. In view of the said provision, one month’s notice is necessary in case of resignation by employee who has put-in not less than 1 year service and in case if the service is less than 1 year, then 1 week’s notice is necessary. As per sub-rule (2)resignation becomes effective from the date on which it is accepted by appointing authority and in a case where it is not accepted before the expiry of the period of notice for resignation specified under Rule 1(a), it shall be deemed to have become effective on the date of expiry of the notice period except in the case where the resignation has been, before the expiry of notice period, rejected and reasons are informed. Further, as per sub-rule (5), a resignation which has become effective shall not be permitted to be withdrawn except on exceptional ground or in public interest. 7.9. Hence, the said provision postulates (1) notice period for resignation, (2) order of acceptance by appointing authority (3) implied acceptance of resignation (i.e. resignation becoming effective) on expiry of notice period in the event order of rejection is not passed by appointing authority and (4) no permission to withdraw the resignation after it becomes effective, except for the specified two-reasons. 7.10. In present case, the respondent did not specify any date on which she intended the resignation to become effective and she did not give any notice. Tenure of her service appears to be of more than 1 year and that therefore 1 month’s notice was necessary. Thus, though she did not give one month’s notice, for her benefit this Court may read notice into her resignation. Once that is done, the resignation would become effective from 26-8-1975 in view of sub-rule(2) and consequently in light of sub-rule (5), the said resignation could not have been withdrawn and could not have been allowed to be withdrawn, in absence of either of the two grounds mentioned in sub-rule (5). In present case, neither public interest nor exceptional reason is pleaded or established. Resultantly, the letter dated 30.12.1975 would not be of any avail to the respondent because by virtue of sub-rule (2) the resignation shall be deemed to have been accepted and became effect at the end of notice period (since it was not rejected/refused before the end of notice period) 7.11. The resignation became effective after one month from the date of tender and thereafter it could not have been withdrawn since after the resignation is duly accepted, it cannot be withdrawn as a matter of right. The offer (i.e. resignation) to put an end to the contract of employment stands concluded on acceptance of resignation and the employment contract comes to an end. Hence the respondent could not have withdrawn it after gap of 4 months and the withdrawal letter is of no consequence. 7.12. The offer (i.e. resignation) to put an end to the contract of employment stands concluded on acceptance of resignation and the employment contract comes to an end. Hence the respondent could not have withdrawn it after gap of 4 months and the withdrawal letter is of no consequence. 7.12. In view of Rule 33-A(2), the respondent’s resignation had become effective one month after its tender and as there was no exceptional circumstance or any public interest involved, there is no question or avenue for its withdrawal and the learned Labour Court has erred in taking cognizance of withdrawal letter dated 30.12.75 and in giving effect to the same, as a consequence of which the learned Labour Court has set aside the order-communication dated 5.5.1979 and directed reinstatement of the respondent. 7.13. The said direction overlooks the effect of the Rule 33-A(1)(a), 33-A(2) and 33-A(5). Hence, the said direction calls for interference at the hands of this Court. 8. There are certain other aspects which also deserve reference. The respondent herein challenged the petitioner’s action-order dated 5.5.1979 after delay of almost 2 years and then neglected the proceedings, hence the Reference was once dismissed for non-prosecution. The respondent has thus demonstrated indifference and insincerity towards court proceedings as well. The other fact which calls for appropriate weightage, is the respondent’s admission before the trial Court that she was, in the interregnum, employed in another hospital/s. Besides this, it is relevant to note that the respondent also did not dispute that she had not cleared the departmental examination. Upon considering all the above discussed points, particularly regarding Rule 33-A, it becomes clear that the award impugned in present petition is unsustainable and deserves to be set aside. Accordingly, it is hereby set aside. 8.1. Upon considering all the above discussed points, particularly regarding Rule 33-A, it becomes clear that the award impugned in present petition is unsustainable and deserves to be set aside. Accordingly, it is hereby set aside. 8.1. It, however, needs to be observed that (a) since for almost 4 years the petitioner had not taken any decision on respondent’s resignation and had also responded, though against the dictum of Rule 33-A, to respondent’s requests for posting instruction by its letter dated 23.1.1976 asking which type of leave she wanted to avail and (b) since the notice period has been read into the resignation, it is directed that the petitioner shall not act upon its advice-decision to deduct/adjust one month’s notice pay in lieu of notice and no such deduction and/or recovery from respondent’s dues - or otherwise - shall be made Further, if the retiral and other legal dues, payable to respondent on cessation of her service, are not paid then the same shall be paid, without effecting deduction of amount of notice pay, within 4 weeks from receipt of writ. 9. With the aforesaid clarification and observations and aforesaid directions, Rule is partly made absolute. The petition stands disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.