Judgment K.S. Radhakrishnan, C.J.—The question that is posed for consideration of this Court is whether notice issued under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Act, 2002 (for brevity “the Act”) would lose its efficacy, if the secured creditor commits delay in taking recourse to Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act, as soon as, the borrower fails to discharge his liability, in full within the period specified in Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act? 2. Learned Single Judge (Coram: D.A. Mehta, J.) in Special Civil Application No. 12426 of 2007 took the view in the facts and circumstances of that case, that action under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act should be initiated within a reasonable period from the date of objection/representation under Sub-section (3-A) of Section 13 of the Act and that delay of more than two years in initiating steps under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act would vitiate the proceedings initiated under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act. 3. In the instant case, Learned Single Judge (Coram: Jayant Patel, J.), following the above judgment, took the view that there has been a gap of more than five years in taking recourse to Sub-section (4) to Section 13 of the Act, after issuance of notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act, and hence notice issued under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act lost its life, though it is open to the secured creditor to initiate fresh proceedings under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act. 4. Learned Advocate General Mr. Kamal B. Trivedi appearing for the secured creditor submitted that even though no specific time limit has been stipulated under the Act, in the facts and circumstances of this case, learned Single Judge was not justified in holding that delay of more than five years in taking recourse to Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act, has vitiated the proceedings initiated by the secured creditor under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act. 5. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. 5. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Percy Kavina appearing for the borrower has taken up the stand that five years is too long a period and delay in taking recourse to Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act has the effect of nullifying the proceedings initiated under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act, and the only course open to the secured creditor is to initiate fresh proceedings under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act. 6. We may at the out-set indicate that statute has not prescribed any time limit for taking recourse under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. In such an event, the question is whether the Court is justified in inferring that the secured creditor should take recourse to Sub-section (4) of Section 13 within the reasonable time. Before we examine the legal issues, we may refer to the facts emerging in this case. 6.1. Industrial Finance Corporation of India, appellant herein, in the year 1997, had granted financial assistance by way of a Foreign Currency Loan to first respondent company, for an amount of USD 11.07 million. As security, borrower had created joint mortgage in favour of appellant Corporation on pari passu basis with State Bank of India of its immovable property situated at GIDC Gem & Jewellery Park, village Bhat, Dist. Gandhinagar and had also executed a deed of hypothecation creating first charge in favour of the appellant on company’s movables. Borrower had also offered personal guarantee of its Directors, corporate guarantee and also pledged its shares with the appellant. Borrowing company had however, failed to make payment of instalments of principal, interest and other monies to the appellant. Resultantly, Corporation took steps under the Act and issued a notice dated 29.04.2003 under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act, to the first respondent borrower, calling upon him to deposit the borrowed amount together with interest, expenses and costs, totaling to an amount of Rs. 67,11,32,267/- (up to and inclusive as on 31.12.2002), within sixty days, failing which borrower was informed that appellant would take recourse to Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. 6.2. The borrower however, in the meantime, informed appellant that a meeting of the Board of Directors of the company would be meeting on 26th May, 2003 to discuss about the notice received from the Corporation. 6.2. The borrower however, in the meantime, informed appellant that a meeting of the Board of Directors of the company would be meeting on 26th May, 2003 to discuss about the notice received from the Corporation. Item No. 17 of the Agenda of Board meeting reads as follows:— “To take on record the notice received by the Company under Chapter- III of “The Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 from IFCI” and to take appropriate decision thereon. . . . . . The company is in a process of replying to this notice. Since the company has submitted the restructuring proposal and further the Dubai project is under process, the company has been assured that the said notice sent is a routine one, and that the restructuring proposal will be considered.” Later, on 29.3.2004, borrower company had addressed the Corporation, submitting a revised restructuring proposal without any concrete proposal for paying up the dues. Later, on 29.3.2004, company wrote another letter informing Corporation that the company’s request was registered before BIFR under Section 15(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Later, during the pendency of the reference before the BIFR, borrower company submitted a proposal on 23.11.2005 for one time settlement of its dues. As a proposal for One Time Settlement, borrower company had offered to pay 15% of the principal amount outstanding as on the date when its account became a non-performing asset in the books of the respective Banks and financial institutions in full and final settlement. Borrower company had provided all particulars of the outstanding dues in excess of Rs. 239 crores and the performance indicators and the accumulated losses suffered by the borrower. Borrower company had also indicated other statutory liabilities such as income-tax dues, sales-tax dues, provident fund dues etc. to show that company was unable to offer more than 15% of the principal amount as and by way of one time settlement. Later on 7.5.2007, borrower had written a letter to the Corporation offering a sum of Rs. 7.5 crores towards release of corporate guarantee by virtue of one time settlement. Yet another letter was addressed on the same day stating that 10% of Rs. Later on 7.5.2007, borrower had written a letter to the Corporation offering a sum of Rs. 7.5 crores towards release of corporate guarantee by virtue of one time settlement. Yet another letter was addressed on the same day stating that 10% of Rs. 5.46 crores would be paid as advance and the balance amount of 90% shall be paid in six bi-monthly instalments i.e. within 12 months from the date of receipt of OTS letter. Another communication dated 10.07.2007 was addressed to the Corporation that 1.09 crores was paid to secured creditors by one M/s. Deism Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. on behalf of the borrower company. Later yet another letter was sent to the Corporation on 22.08.2007, requesting to refund the amount of Rs. 1.09 crores paid by M/s. Deism Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., since they were not interested in proceeding further with the matter. Corporation later responded to the borrower’s letter on 05.09.2007 stating that it would agree to the one time settlement proposal in principle, but the same would be subject to the company making payment of Rs. 36 crores, including Rs. 5.46 crores being 10% of the principal amount. This was agreed subject to further conditions that total settlement amount of Rs. 7.25 crores to be paid immediately; 15% of the settlement amount constituting Rs.5.40 crores to be paid within 15 days from 05.09.2007 and balance settlement amount of Rs. 23.35 crores to be paid in five equal monthly instalments of Rs. 4.67 crores each. Two other letters on the same day were also issued by the borrower company for giving some more clarity. However, borrower company had failed to make any payment on the proposals made. Later M/s. Deism Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. wrote a letter to the Corporation on 3.10.2007, stating that payment of Rs. 1.09 crores given by way of two cheques on behalf of borrower company be treated as payment received from M/s. Wrinkle Enterprises Pvt.Ltd. On 29.03.2008, BIFR had rejected the reference of the borrower company. Later Corporation had addressed a letter on 1.5.2008 to the company stating that since company had committed default in payment of OTS amount, benefit granted through OTS would stand revoked. 6.3. Later Corporation had addressed a letter on 1.5.2008 to the company stating that since company had committed default in payment of OTS amount, benefit granted through OTS would stand revoked. 6.3. Secured creditor has taken up the stand that after issuance of notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act, considerable indulgence was shown to the borrower to pay the amount, and benefit of OTS was even extended but the same was not availed as per the agreed terms and the Corporation proceeded with steps already initiated and took recourse to Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. Consequently, Collector/ District Magistrate issued a notice to the borrower company on 23.7.2008, directing borrower company to attend a hearing fixed on 30.7.2008, with relevant records. Petitioner, under these circumstances, approached this Hon’ble Court seeking a writ of certiorari to quash notice received from second respondent, contending that the same is illegal, ultra-vires and un-enforceable, especially when such a recourse was taken by the secured credit after a period of five years from the date of issuance of notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act. It was also stated that apart from the Corporation, no other secured creditors have taken any recourse to the provisions of the Act and hence, action is arbitrary and liable to be set aside. 7. Learned Single Judge found that there is considerable delay in taking recourse to Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act, after issuance of notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act and hence restrained the Corporation and second respondent from proceeding further on the basis of notice issued on 29.04.2003. Learned Judge however, opined that it would be open to the secured creditor to initiate fresh proceedings under Sub-section (2) to Section 13 of the Act. 8. We, in this case, are concerned only with the question whether the action of the secured creditor in taking recourse to Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act after a period of 5 years is justified or not. There is no challenge against the initiation of proceedings under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act. Admittedly, on receipt of that notice, borrower had not discharged his liabilities in full within sixty days from the date of notice. There is no challenge against the initiation of proceedings under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act. Admittedly, on receipt of that notice, borrower had not discharged his liabilities in full within sixty days from the date of notice. Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act states that if the borrower fails to discharge in full his liabilities to a secured creditor, within sixty days from the date of notice, the secured creditor is entitled to take recourse to Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act states that in case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full within sixty days from the date of notice, the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more measures stipulated therein to recover his secured debt. Sub-section (3A) of Section 13 of the Act however, enables the borrower to make representation or to raise objection on receipt of the notice issued under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act, and if such a representation/objection is received by secured creditor, same shall have to be considered and if representation/objection is not acceptable or tenable, secured creditor shall communicate to the borrower within one week of such representation/objection, the reason for non-acceptance of the objection/ representation. So far as the present case is concerned, on receipt of notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act, borrower had addressed a letter to the secured creditor stating that Board of Directors of the company would be meeting on 23.05.2003 to resolve the issue. Further secured creditor was also informed that borrower company had submitted a proposal for revival before the BIFR on 23.11.2005. Borrower company had also submitted a proposal for One Time Settlement. Few correspondences were also enured between borrower and the secured creditor in this regard. Ultimately on 05.09.2007, secured creditor had made an offer, which obliged the borrower to pay an amount of Rs. 36 crores, apart from other conditions, however, those offers were not complied with. Further, one Deism Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. as well as Wrinkle Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. had also addressed letters to the secured creditor. These facts would clearly indicate that secured creditor had shown indulgence to the borrower to pay and to satisfy his liabilities after initiation of proceedings under the Securitization Act, but that opportunity was not availed of by the borrower. Further, one Deism Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. as well as Wrinkle Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. had also addressed letters to the secured creditor. These facts would clearly indicate that secured creditor had shown indulgence to the borrower to pay and to satisfy his liabilities after initiation of proceedings under the Securitization Act, but that opportunity was not availed of by the borrower. Under these circumstances, secured creditor took recourse to Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. 9. Looking at the correspondences exchanged between the parties and the various discussions enured between the parties for extending One Time Settlement facility to the borrower, we are inclined to take the view that the notice issued under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act has not lost its efficacy, since it kept alive the notice, correspondences, proposals and discussions between the parties. Statute has not fixed any time limit for taking recourse to proceedings under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act, after issuance of notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act, or after rejecting representation/objection submitted by the borrower as per Sub-section (3A) of Section 13 of the Act. For discharging the liability, sixty days time has been stipulated in Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act. For disposing of the representation/objection, one week’s time has been provided under Sub-section (3A) to Section 13 of the Act. Statute however, has not fixed any time limit for taking recourse to Sub-section (4) to Section 13 of the Act, presumably for the reason that parties may negotiate and settle the disputes between themselves. Legislature in its wisdom thought it fit to give exclusive right to the secured creditor to give as much time as possible to the borrower before taking recourse under Sub-section (4) to Section 13 of the Act, but the borrower cannot be heard to content that the mere fact that secured creditor did not take recourse to Sub-section (4) to Section 13 of the Act immediately after non-discharging of liability by the borrower within sixty days from the date of notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act, the entire proceedings initiated under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act would come to an end. Further, it is also relevant to refer to Sub-section (8) to Section 13 of the Act, which provides that if dues of the secured creditor together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by him are tendered to the secured creditor at any time before the date fixed for sale or transfer, the secured asset shall not be sold or transferred by the secured creditor, and no further step shall be taken by him for transfer or sale of that secured asset, which shows that the borrower has been given yet another opportunity to discharge his liability. Delay occurred in taking recourse to Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act, in our view, cannot be taken advantage of by the borrower in contending that the entire proceedings initiated under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act has come to an end. However, the question is in the absence of any time limit prescribed in Sub-section (4) to Section 13 of the Act, can the secured creditor take recourse to that provision at any time at his sweet will and pleasure? In our view, it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 10. Securitization Act was enacted to regulate securitisation and reconstruction of financial assets and for enforcement of security interest and to enable the banks and financial institutions to realize long-term assets, manage problems of liquidity, asset liability mis-match and improve recovery by exercising powers to take possession of securities, sell them and reduce non-performing assets by adopting measures for recovery or reconstruction. Object and purpose of the Act has been elaborately dealt with by the Apex Court in the case of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311 and therefore, it is unnecessary to reiterate the same. The mere fact that drastic provisions have been made under the Act to assist the secured creditor to realize his debts does not mean that secured creditor cannot show leniency to a debtor to discharge full liabilities by extending various schemes, including One Time Settlement Scheme, but indulgence shown by a secured creditor shall not boomerang on the ground that statute has not fixed any time limit. Therefore, in a given case after issuance of notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act, if no proposal was made by the borrower either for re-scheduling the loan or for seeking one time settlement, or slept over his right to take recourse to Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act for a considerable long time equities may be worked out since initiation of proceedings under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act has to reach its logical conclusion. Since no time limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under the statute, it must be exercised within a reasonable time. 10.1. In State of Gujarat vs. Patil Raghav Natha and Ors., 1969 (2) SCC 187 , the Apex Court was dealing with scope of Sections 63 and 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879. Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code confers revisional power on the Commissioner, but no period of limitation is prescribed for exercising the power. Question arose whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under Section 65 at any time? The Apex Court held that though no period of limitation is provided under Section 211 of the Code, that power must be exercised in a reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised. 10.2. In Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim, (1997) 6 SCC 71 , the Apex Court was dealing with scope of Section 84-C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1976, to decide as to when a Mamlatdar can exercise suo-motu power under Section 84-C of the Act. The Court opined that where no time limit has been prescribed for exercise of power under a statute, it should be exercised within a reasonable time. The Court further held that where no time-limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute, it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time. 10.3. Meaning of expression “at any time” appearing in Section 50(1) of M.P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973, came up for consideration of the Apex Court in Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran vs. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 705 . 10.3. Meaning of expression “at any time” appearing in Section 50(1) of M.P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973, came up for consideration of the Apex Court in Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran vs. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 705 . The Apex Court held that words “at any time” do not confer upon any statutory authority an unfettered discretion. The words “at any time” are not charter for the exercise of an arbitrary decision. The words “at any time” have no exemption from all forms of limitation for unexplained and undue delay. Such an interpretation would not only result in the destruction of citizens’ rights but would also go contrary to the entire context in which the power has been given to the authority. 11. We are therefore, of the considered view that even if no time limit has been prescribed under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act, secured creditor has to take recourse to measures prescribed therein within a reasonable time depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In a case where the secured creditor has shown indulgence to the borrower by giving reasonable time, may be a few years, does not mean the entire proceedings initiated by it under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act has lapsed or vitiated. So far as the present case is concerned, we are of the view that taking recourse to Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act after a period of five years from the date of issuance of notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act as such would not frustrate the proceedings initiated for recovery of the debt from the company. Facts in this case shows that secured creditor has shown considerable indulgence and even scaled down the debt to a considerable extent by offering One Time Settlement Scheme to the borrower, but that has not been availed of by the borrower. Borrower cannot raise a contention, in such an event that the proceedings initiated under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act has come to an end. Further, we find as on 11.09.2008, total outstanding dues payable by the borrower to the secured creditor was to Rs. Borrower cannot raise a contention, in such an event that the proceedings initiated under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act has come to an end. Further, we find as on 11.09.2008, total outstanding dues payable by the borrower to the secured creditor was to Rs. 173.31 crores and by taking recourse to Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act, the secured creditor took symbolic possession of one of the properties of the debtor on 05.03.2009 after publication in the Newspaper. 12. That being the factual situation, we find no reason to interfere with the proceedings taken under Sub-section (4) to Section 13 of the Act, even though in compliance with the directions of the learned Single Judge, secured creditor has issued a fresh notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act, on 22.10.2008, to the borrower, that was however, without prejudice to its rights. Since we have found that there is no illegality in the secured creditor taking recourse to Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act, and that we are setting aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, subsequent notice issued on 22.10.2008 has lost its efficacy. 13. Appeal is allowed by holding that there is no illegality in the secured creditor taking recourse to Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. Judgment and order of the learned Single Judge is accordingly set aside.