ORDER Dhirendra Mishra, J. This batch of petitions are being disposed of by this common order as the petitioners have impugned the constitutional validity of Chhattisgarh Sthaniya Kshetra Me Mal Ke Pravesh Par Kar Adhiniyam, 1976 ("the Act of 1976"), to declare the Entry Tax (Amendment) Act, 2001, whereby maximum limit of tax imposable under section 4A has been enhanced from 10 per cent to 50 per cent, as also notification issued under section 3(2), 4A under section 10 of the Act of 1976 from time to time, as unconstitutional and refund of the taxes collected under the Act of 1976. The validity of the Act of 1976 has been questioned on the ground that it is violative of articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution of India as it impedes free-flow of trade and commerce. The tax levied under the impugned enactment is not compensatory tax and is not commensurate with the cost of facilities provided for the trade and does not pass the doctrine of working test laid down by the honourable Supreme Court in Automobile Transport's case AIR 1962 SC 1406 . The tax levied under the Act of 1976 is merely to augment revenue of the State and therefore, the same is in violation of article 301 of the Constitution of India. Before entering into the grounds on which the petitioners have proposed to challenge the Act of 1976, we advert to the background in which these petitions have been filed. The constitutional validity of the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 was challenged before the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in Sanjay Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1994] 93 STC 589 (MP). The Division Bench considering the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act and also considering the summary in respect of levy and details of allotment made to local bodies, held that budgetary provisions to compensate the municipalities were made, the subsequent statutory changes made in the Act, have no significance; entry tax remains compensatory in nature and therefore, it is immune from challenge. The finding of the M.P. High Court was impugned before the honourable Supreme Court and validity of the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 came for consideration in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl. (1) SCC 673 and validity of the Act was upheld. The finding of the M.P. High Court was impugned before the honourable Supreme Court and validity of the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 came for consideration in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl. (1) SCC 673 and validity of the Act was upheld. In State of Bihar v. Bihar Chamber of Commerce [1996] 103 STC 1 (SC); [1996] 9 SCC 136 while considering whether the amount of tax under the Bihar Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale Therein Act, 1993, was compensatory or whether it can be called a regulatory measure, the honourable Supreme Court relying upon the decision in the matter of Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673, opined that the tax was compensatory in nature. The honourable Supreme Court in the matter of Jindal Stripe Ltd. v. State of Haryana [2004] 134 STC 303 (SC); [2003] 8 SCC 60, while considering the constitutional validity of the Haryana Local Area Development Tax Act, 2000 doubted the correctness of the observations made in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 that "the concept of compensatory nature of tax has been widened and if there is substantial or even some link between the tax and the facilities extended to such dealers directly or indirectly the levy cannot be impugned as invalid". It was observed that since the concept of compensatory tax has been judicially evolved as an exception to the provisions of article 301 of the Constitution and as the parameters of this judicial concept are blurred by reason of decisions in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 and Bihar Chamber of Commerce [1996] 103 STC 1 (SC); [1996] 9 SCC 136, interpretation of article 301 vis-a-vis compensatory tax should be authoritatively laid down with certitude by the Constitution Bench under article 145(3). In Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. State of M.P. [2004] 136 STC 241 (SC); [2004] 5 SCC 209, challenge to the constitutional validity of the Entry Tax Act was on the ground that it is hit by article 301 of the Constitution for not satisfying the conditions laid down under article 304(b). In Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. State of M.P. [2004] 136 STC 241 (SC); [2004] 5 SCC 209, challenge to the constitutional validity of the Entry Tax Act was on the ground that it is hit by article 301 of the Constitution for not satisfying the conditions laid down under article 304(b). Dismissing the appeals of the appellants, the honourable Supreme Court held that the entry tax is compensatory in nature. Therefore, it is not open to challenge under article 301 and there is no need to venture into the argument based on article 304(b) and the constitutionality of the Act was, accordingly, upheld. The Constitution Bench in Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC), in conclusion, held that the doubt expressed by the referring Bench about the correctness of the decision in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar's case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673, followed in the case of Bihar Chamber of Commerce [1996] 103 STC 1 (SC); [1996] 9 SCC 136 was well founded. The test of "some connection" indicated in para 8 of the judgment in the case of Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 and followed in Bihar Chamber of Commerce [1996] 103 STC 1 (SC); [1996] 9 SCC 136 is not good law. After decision was rendered by the Constitution Bench in Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC), a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana [2006] 7 SCC 271 observed in para 5 of the judgment that since relevant data have not been placed before the High Courts, the parties are permitted to place them in writ petitions concerned within two months and the High Court were to deal with the basic issue as to whether the impugned levy was compensatory in nature. The constitutional validity of Act of 1976 was not the subject-matter of Jindal Stainless Ltd. The batch of the writ petitions have been filed questioning the constitutional validity of the Act of 1976 after delivery of the decision by the Constitution Bench. Challenge to maintainability of the constitutional validity of the Act. We propose to deal with the preliminary objection of the respondents/State regarding maintainability of challenge to the constitutional validity of the Act of 1976. Challenge to maintainability of the constitutional validity of the Act. We propose to deal with the preliminary objection of the respondents/State regarding maintainability of challenge to the constitutional validity of the Act of 1976. Shri C. S. Vaidyanathan, learned senior advocate with Shri Prashant Mishra, learned Advocate-General and Shri Rohit Singh, learned counsel appearing for the State/respondents, would argue that the validity of the Act of 1976 has already been upheld by the High Court of M.P. in Sanjay Trading Co. [1994] 93 STC 589 (MP) and affirmed by the honourable Supreme Court in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673. The judgment of the Supreme Court upholding the validity of the Act of 1976 is a judgment in rem. It has binding effect under article 141 of the Constitution of India. The judgment of the Constitution Bench in the matter of Jindal Stainless Ltd. (2) [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC) does not overrule Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 in its entirety, but only the obiter in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 in respect of the test of "some connection" has been overruled. It was also argued that whether Jindal Stainless Ltd. (2) [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC) overruled Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 in part or in full, it only denudes Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 of its value as a precedent and the efficacy and binding nature of the operative order upholding the validity of the Act of 1976 remains in view of article 141 of the Constitution, and such overruling would not upset the binding nature of the decision on the parties to an earlier litigation on whom the principle of res judicata would apply. The binding efficacy of a decision does not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered therein or not. The parties are not permitted to take fresh litigation because of new views they may entertain of the law of the case. The binding efficacy of a decision does not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered therein or not. The parties are not permitted to take fresh litigation because of new views they may entertain of the law of the case. It was further argued that the State of Madhya Pradesh and the State of Chhattisgarh having not been noticed or heard before the honourable Supreme Court while deciding Jindal Stainless Ltd. (2) [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC), clearly establishes that Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 has not been overruled in its entirety, and its efficacy and binding nature of the operative order upholding the validity of the Act of 1976 binds the parties. Validity of an Act once upheld cannot be reopened. Reliance is placed on the judgments in the matters of Shenoy & Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer [1985] 60 STC 70 (SC); [1985] 2 SCC 512, A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak [1988] 2 SCC 602, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Union of India [2006] 3 VST 95 (SC); [2006] 145 STC 91 (SC); [2006] 282 ITR 273 (SC); [2006] 3 SCC 1, Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra [2002] 4 SCC 388, Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M. R. Apparao [2002] 4 SCC 638, Mahesh Kumar Saharia v. State of Nagaland [1997] 8 SCC 176 and U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Kanoria Industrial Ltd. [2002] 128 STC 26 (SC); [2001] 2 SCC 549. Shri Ravindra Shrivastava, learned senior advocate with Shri Jagmohan Sharma, Shri Prashant Kumar, Shri Prem Francis and Shri Akhilesh Dalpari, learned counsel for the petitioner - Steel Authority of India (in short, "SAIL") in W.P. (T) No. 1336 of 2007, argued that fresh challenge to the constitutional validity of the taxing statute can be made on discovery of new facts and new grounds. Article 265 of the Constitution commands that no tax shall be levied or collected except by the authority of law. The above constitutional provision clearly mandates that a tax must continue to be levied and collected by authority of law and not otherwise and the taxing law must always pass through the rigours of article 265. Article 265 of the Constitution commands that no tax shall be levied or collected except by the authority of law. The above constitutional provision clearly mandates that a tax must continue to be levied and collected by authority of law and not otherwise and the taxing law must always pass through the rigours of article 265. On submission that the observation in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 that "even if there is some link between the tax and the facilities extended to trade directly or indirectly, the levy cannot be impugned as unconstitutional", only to this extent Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar's case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 has been overruled, and the conclusion part of Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 has not been overruled, it was argued that once the "some connection" theory has been overruled, the conclusion does not survive and the same are not binding on these cases. It was further argued that once prior decision is overruled by a larger Bench, the decision is completely wiped out and article 141 has no application. A law which may have been held to be valid at the inception may become unconstitutional with the passage of time. The Act was held to be valid on the basis of fact existed at the relevant time, however, it is open to the petitioners to demonstrate by concrete facts and proof that the situation has since changed. The very basis of the conclusion in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673, i.e., "some connection" theory, has been overruled. Reliance is placed on Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. [2006] 3 VST 95 (SC); [2006] 145 STC 91 (SC); [2006] 282 ITR 273 (SC); [2006] 3 SCC 1, Ram Das Bhikaji Chaudhari v. Sadanand [1980] 1 SCC 550, Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India [2008] 5 SCC 287 and Godfrey Philips India Ltd. v. State of M.P. [2008] 17 VST 465 (MP). Shri (Dr.) Debi Prasad Pal, learned senior advocate with Shri Ananda Sen and Shri Akhilesh Dalpati, advocates appearing on behalf of Bharat Aluminum Co. Shri (Dr.) Debi Prasad Pal, learned senior advocate with Shri Ananda Sen and Shri Akhilesh Dalpati, advocates appearing on behalf of Bharat Aluminum Co. Ltd., repelling the arguments of the respondents with respect to their preliminary objection to maintainability to the challenge to the Act of 1976, would argue that in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673, the appellants did not dispute the figures furnished by the State in its counter-affidavit. In these circumstances, it was held that it is settled by now that if the tax is compensatory it is immune from challenge under article 301. Thus, the question whether the impugned tax was compensatory or not was decided on the basis of concession by the parries. The honourable Supreme Court did not accept the argument of the counsel for the appellants that compensation is that which facilitates the trade only, and held that the concept of compensatory nature of tax has widened or if there is substantial or even some link between the tax and the facilities extended to such dealers, directly or indirectly, levy cannot be impugned as invalid. The Constitution Bench in Jindal Stainless Ltd. (2) [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC) considering the above "some link" theory propounded in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 held that since the concept of compensatory tax has been judicially evolved as an exception to the provisions of article 301 and as the parameters of the said judicial concept as evolved in the matters of Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam AIR 1961 SC 232 , Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1962 SC 1406 , have been blurred, particularly by reasons of the decisions in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 and Bihar Chamber of Commerce [1996] 103 STC 1 (SC); [1996] 9 SCC 136, the interpretation of article 301 vis-a-vis compensatory tax should be authoritatively laid down with certitude by the Constitution Bench. The law declared in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar's case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 has been overruled by the Constitution Bench and therefore, the same cannot be treated as declaration of law under article 141 of the Constitution. The law declared in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar's case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 has been overruled by the Constitution Bench and therefore, the same cannot be treated as declaration of law under article 141 of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the U.P. Pollution Control Board [2002] 128 STC 26 (SC); [2001] 2 SCC 549, Shenoy & Co. [1985] 60 STC 70 (SC); [1985] 2 SCC 512 and Godfrey Philips India Ltd. [2008] 17 VST 465 (MP). Shri H. S. Shrivastava, learned senior advocate with Shri Abhijeet Shrivastava and Shri Akhilesh Dalpati, for the petitioners, also advanced similar arguments and submitted that the very foundation of the judgment in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673, i.e., "some connection" theory has been overruled and thus, the judgments in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 and Bihar Chamber of Commerce [1996] 103 STC 1 (SC); [1996] 9 SCC 136 stand overruled in its entirety and therefore, the same cannot be treated as declaration of law under article 141 of the Constitution. Writ petitions filed by Sanjay Trading Company, Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar and several other petitions concerning the constitutional validity of the M.P. Entry Tax Act were decided by the M.P. High Court ([1994] 93 STC 589 (MP)) together by a common judgment. Sanjay Trading Company did not separately go up in appeal before the honourable Supreme Court, however, Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar went in appeal ([1995] 96 STC 654 (SC)). In the matter of Sanjay Trading Co. [1994] 93 STC 589 (MP), the petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 also on the ground that the imposition of entry tax is a restriction imposed on the inter-State trade and commerce and therefore, the Act offends articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution. The stand of the State before the High Court was that the levy of entry tax is compensatory in character, which has been imposed to compensate the municipalities for the losses of income by way of octroi which has been abolished in the State. The stand of the State before the High Court was that the levy of entry tax is compensatory in character, which has been imposed to compensate the municipalities for the losses of income by way of octroi which has been abolished in the State. The above contention was contested by the petitioner by pointing out that the legislative provisions indicative of the compensatory nature of the levy have been deleted and therefore, it is not open to the State to contend that the levy is compensatory in character. The High Court repelled the challenge against the vires of the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 with an observation that the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act states that it is enacted to levy a tax on entry of goods in lieu of octroi tax collected by the municipalities and municipal corporations and to make transportation of goods trouble-free by abolishing octroi check-posts. It indicates that the statute had the view of raising financial resources to compensate local bodies consequent upon abolition of octroi with a view to simplifying the taxation structure. Further considering the summary in respect of levy and details of allotment made to the local bodies, it was observed that the provision was made in the budget to compensate the municipalities and the amount budgeted was made over. It was further observed that there was regular annual increment of 10 per cent in the total compensation amount. Accordingly, it was held that the entry tax remains compensatory in nature and therefore, it is immune from challenge. The appellant, Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar went in appeal against the decision of the M.P. High Court rendered in Sanjay Trading Co. [1994] 93 STC 589 (MP). The main thrust of challenge to the constitutional validity of the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 was on the nature of levy, its ambit and whether it impedes free-flow of trade and commerce in violation of article 301 of the Constitution of India. Challenge to the legislation based on article 301 of the Constitution was repelled by referring to the decisions in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. AIR 1961 SC 232 and Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1406 and it was held that so long as a tax is regulatory and compensatory, it is not within the mischief of article 301. Challenge to the legislation based on article 301 of the Constitution was repelled by referring to the decisions in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. AIR 1961 SC 232 and Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1406 and it was held that so long as a tax is regulatory and compensatory, it is not within the mischief of article 301. Referring to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State, in which figures were furnished by the State to demonstrate the nature of levy to be compensatory, the appellants did not dispute the figures furnished by the State and in these circumstances, it was held that the stand of the State that revenue earned is being made over to the local bodies to compensate for the losses caused, makes the impost compensatory in nature, as augmentation of their finance would enable them to provide municipal services more efficiently, which would help or ease free-flow of trade and commerce, because of which the impost has to be regarded as compensatory in nature. It was also observed that submission of Shri Ashok Sen, learned senior counsel, that compensation is that which facilitates the trade only does not appear to be sound. The concept of compensatory nature of tax has been widened and if there is substantial or even some link between the tax and the facilities extended to such dealers, directly or indirectly, the levy cannot be impugned as invalid. In Bihar Chamber of Commerce [1996] 103 STC 1 (SC); [1996] 9 SCC 136, their Lordships in para 12 of their judgment referred the concept of "even some link" theory propounded in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 with approval. In Jindal Stainless Ltd. (2) [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC), the Constitution Bench of the honourable Supreme Court while considering the scope of articles 301, 302 and 304 of the Constitution vis-a-vis compensatory tax, observed that taxing laws are not excluded from the operation of article 301, which means that tax laws can and do amount to restrictions on the freedom guaranteed to trade under Part XIII of the Constitution. Referring to the principles settled in the case of Atiabari Tea Co. Referring to the principles settled in the case of Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. AIR 1961 SC 232 , it was observed that whenever law is challenged on the ground of violation of article 301, the court has not only to examine the pith and substance of the levy, but in addition thereto, the court has to see the effect and operation of the impugned law on the inter-State trade and commerce as well as intra-State trade and commerce. It has been further observed that when any legislation is challenged as violating article 301, the first question to be asked is : what is the scope of the operation of the law ? Whether it has chosen an activity like movement of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout India, as the criterion of its operation ? If yes, the next question is : what is the effect of operation of the law on the freedom guaranteed under article 301 ? If the effect is to facilitate free-flow of trade and commerce then it is regulation and if it is to impede or burden the activity, then the law is a restraint. After finding the law to be a restraint/restriction, one has to see whether the impugned law is enacted by the Parliament or the State Legislature. Clause (b) of article 304 confers a power upon the State Legislature similar to that conferred upon the Parliament by article 302. Further dealing with the background, in which the matter was placed before a Bench of five-judges, it was observed in para 43 as under : "43. As stated above, in the post 1995 era, the said working test propounded in Automobile Transport AIR 1962 SC 1406 , stood disrupted when in Bhagatram's case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673, a Bench of three-Judge enunciated the test of 'some connection' saying that even if there is some link between the tax and the facilities extended to the trade directly or indirectly, the levy cannot be impugned as invalid. In our view, this test of 'some connection' enunciated in Bhagatram's case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 is not only contrary to the working test propounded in Automobile Transport's case AIR 1962 SC 1406 but it obliterates the very basis of compensatory tax. In our view, this test of 'some connection' enunciated in Bhagatram's case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 is not only contrary to the working test propounded in Automobile Transport's case AIR 1962 SC 1406 but it obliterates the very basis of compensatory tax. We may reiterate that when a tax is imposed in the regulation or as a part of regulatory measure the controlling factor of the levy shifts from burden to reimbursement/recompense. The working test propounded by a Bench of seven-Judges in the case of Automobile Transport AIR 1962 SC 1406 and the test of 'some connection' enunciated by a Bench of three-Judges in Bhagatram's case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 cannot stand together. Therefore, in our view, the test of 'some connection' as propounded in Bhagatram's case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 is not applicable to the concept of compensatory tax and accordingly to that extent, the judgments of this court in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 and State of Bihar v. Bihar Chamber of Commerce [1996] 103 STC 1 (SC); [1996] 9 SCC 136 stand overruled." In para 10 of the judgment it was observed that in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673, the challenge was to the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976. In that case, although it was demonstrated by the State and not disputed by the assessee that the levy was compensatory, nevertheless, the court went on to say, vide para 8, that "the concept of compensatory nature of tax has been widened and if there is substantial or even some link between the tax and the facilities extended to such dealers directly or indirectly levy cannot be impugned as invalid". On careful reading of the judgments delivered in Sanjay Trading Co. [1994] 93 STC 589 (MP), Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 and Jindal Stainless Ltd. (2) [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC), we find that in Sanjay Trading Co. On careful reading of the judgments delivered in Sanjay Trading Co. [1994] 93 STC 589 (MP), Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 and Jindal Stainless Ltd. (2) [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC), we find that in Sanjay Trading Co. [1994] 93 STC 589 (MP), challenge to the constitutional validity of the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 was repelled keeping in view the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, which states that the Act was enacted to levy a tax on entry of goods in lieu of octroi tax collected by the municipalities and municipal corporations and to make transportation of goods trouble-free by abolishing octroi check-posts. It also indicated that the statute had the view of raising financial resources to compensate local bodies consequent upon abolition of octroi with a view to simplifying the taxation structure. Further considering that the provisions were made in the budget to compensate the municipalities and the amount budgeted was made over and there has been regular increment of 10 per cent in the total compensation amount, it was held that the entry tax was compensatory in nature. Thus, from reading of the judgment in Sanjay Trading Co. [1994] 93 STC 589 (MP), it cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional validity of the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 was upheld as a result of concession by the petitioners. In Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 also, challenge to the constitutional validity of the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 has been repelled by affirming the decision of the M.P. High Court in Sanjay Trading Co. [1994] 93 STC 589 (MP). It has been observed that in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State, figures were furnished to demonstrate the compensatory nature of levy of entry tax and the same were not disputed by the appellants. It has been further observed that it is settled by now that if the tax is compensatory, then it is immune from challenge under article 301 of the Constitution. Having held thus, the observation propounding "some link" theory has been made and the Constitution Bench in Jindal Stainless Ltd. (2) [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC) has overruled the same. It has been further observed that it is settled by now that if the tax is compensatory, then it is immune from challenge under article 301 of the Constitution. Having held thus, the observation propounding "some link" theory has been made and the Constitution Bench in Jindal Stainless Ltd. (2) [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC) has overruled the same. The test of "some connection", as propounded in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar's case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 is not applicable to the concept of compensatory tax and accordingly to that extent, the judgments of this court in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 and Bihar Chamber of Commerce [1996] 103 STC 1 (SC); [1996] 9 SCC 136 stand overruled. As already observed, the M.P. High Court upheld the constitutional validity of the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 by treating the imposition of tax as compensatory in nature, keeping in view the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, which was enacted to augment revenue to compensate the losses suffered by the local bodies on account of abolition of octroi check-posts. The avowed purpose of abolition of octroi check-posts was to make the transportation of goods trouble-free. Thus, by confirming the order of the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court upholding the constitutional validity of the M. P. Entry Tax Act, 1976, the law declared by the honourable Supreme Court is that the statute imposing entry tax with an avowed object of compensating the local bodies for the losses suffered by them as a result of abolition of octroi check-posts, is compensatory in nature and the same is immune from challenge under article 301 of the Constitution. The question of constitutional validity of the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 was neither referred to the Constitution Bench nor the same was answered in Jindal Stainless Ltd. (2) [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC). We find force in the argument of learned counsel for the respondents/State that Jindal Stainless Ltd. (2) [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC) does not overrule Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 in its entirety but only the obiter in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 in respect of the test of, "some connection" has been overruled. The argument that the decision in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 was rendered as a result of concession by the appellant, is also without any substance. We have already referred to the decision in the matter of Sanjay Trading Co. [1994] 93 STC 589 (MP), and from reading of the same, it cannot be said that the judgment was rendered as a result of any concession by the appellants. Reference to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State, which was not disputed, in which the nature of levy has been demonstrated to be compensatory, stands clarified as it has been subsequently observed that the appellants did not dispute the figures furnished by the State. Since the challenge to the statute was based on article 301, the question of the appellants accepting the nature of levy to be compensatory does not arise as the same was the very foundation of the appellants' argument before the honourable Supreme Court. The Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in Godfrey Philips India Ltd., [2008] 17 VST 465 (MP), in para 14 onwards, has dealt with the submissions of learned Advocate-General that the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 has been held to be intra vires in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 and Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. [2004] 136 STC 241 (SC); [2004] 5 SCC 209, and it has been held to be compensatory in nature and therefore, the same does not require reconsideration. Referring to the decisions in Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy AIR 1971 SC 2355 and Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab [1995] 6 SCC 614, it has been held that the doctrine of res judicata belongs to the domain of procedure and the same is applicable between the same parties where the cause of action of the subsequent proceeding is also the same as in the previous proceeding. The principles of constructive res judicata would not apply when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority. The principles of constructive res judicata would not apply when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority. Reference is also made to Atom Prakash v. State of Haryana AIR 1986 SC 859 wherein the constitutional validity of section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 was earlier challenged on the ground that it offended article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, and it was held by the Constitution Bench in Ram Sarup v. Munshi AIR 1963 SC 553 that there was no infringement of article 19(1)(f) and the provision was valid. However, challenge to the above provision with reference to articles 14, 15, 19(1)(d) and (g) of the Constitution in the background of the preamble of the Constitution and article 39(c) of the Directive Principles of the State Policy, was entertained. Further relying upon the three Judge-Bench decision of the Supreme Court, detailed in para 19 of its judgment, it was held that the law, which was at one point of time constitutional, may be rendered unconstitutional because of the passage of time. In paras 20 and 21 it has been observed thus : "20. As is manifest, the 1976 Act was held to be constitutionally valid on different parameters. Presently, the parameters have been changed by the decision rendered by their Lordships in Jindal Stainless Limited [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC); [2006] 7 SCC 241. Keeping in view the decision rendered in Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal AIR 1971 SC 2355 , Nand Kishore [1995] 6 SCC 614, Atam Prakash AIR 1986 SC 859 , and Indian Handicrafts Emporium [2003] 7 SCC 589, I am of the considered opinion that once the parameters change there can be a fresh challenge and fresh adjudication. 21. In view of the aforesaid, I am unable to accept the submission of the learned Advocate-General that the writ petitions are barred by res judicata or constructive res judicata and accordingly it is repelled." In Shenoy & Co. [1985] 60 STC 70 (SC); [1985] 2 SCC 512, large number of writ petitions were filed in the High Court of Karnataka challenging the constitutional validity of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale Therein Act, 1979 (for short, "the 1979 Act"). The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petitions and struck down the 1979 Act. The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petitions and struck down the 1979 Act. The State preferred appeal against the order of the High Court passed in a petition filed by the Hansa Corporation, and the Supreme Court allowed the appeal of the State ([1980] 4 SCC 697; [1981] 1 SCR 823; AIR 1981 SC 463 ), set aside the order of the Karnataka High Court and upheld the validity of the 1979 Act. After the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the 1979 Act, the authorities issued notices to all the dealers including those dealers, who had filed petitions earlier. Aggrieved by the notices, the petitioners again filed writ petition contending that the notices issued to them were bad as a writ of mandamus issued in their favour by the High Court still survives. The writ petitions were dismissed by the learned single judge, and appeal was also dismissed by the Division Bench. Repelling the contention of the petitioners that the vice of that judgment operated only against the parties to the judgment and not against those who were not parties thereto, in para 22 it was held thus : "22. Though a large number of writ petitions were filed challenging the Act, all those writ petitions were grouped together, heard together and were disposed of by the High Court by a common judgment. No petitioner advanced any contention peculiar or individual to his petition, not common to others. To be precise, the dispute in the case or controversy between the State and each petitioner had no personal or individual element in it or anything personal or peculiar to each petitioner. The challenge to the constitutional validity of 1979 Act proceeded on identical grounds common to all petitioners. This challenge was accepted by the High Court by a common judgment and it was this common judgment that was the subject-matter of appeal before this court in Hansa Corporation's case [1980] 4 SCC 697; [1981] 1 SCR 823; AIR 1981 SC 463 . When the Supreme Court repelled the challenge and held the Act constitutionally valid, it in terms disposed of not the appeal in Hansa Corporation's case [1980] 4 SCC 697; [1981] 1 SCR 823; AIR 1981 SC 463 alone, but all petitions in which the High Court issued mandamus on the non-existent ground that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. When the Supreme Court repelled the challenge and held the Act constitutionally valid, it in terms disposed of not the appeal in Hansa Corporation's case [1980] 4 SCC 697; [1981] 1 SCR 823; AIR 1981 SC 463 alone, but all petitions in which the High Court issued mandamus on the non-existent ground that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. It is, therefore, idle to contend that the law laid down by this court in that judgment would bind only the Hansa Corporation and not the other petitioners against whom the State of Karnataka had not filed any appeal. To do so is to ignore the binding nature of a judgment of this court under article 141 of the Constitution. Article 141 reads as follows : 'The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.' A mere reading of this article brings into sharp focus its expanse and its all pervasive nature. In cases like this, where numerous petitions are disposed of by a common judgment and only one appeal is filed, the parties to the common judgment could very well have and should have intervened and could have requested the court to hear them also. They cannot be heard to say that the decision was taken by this court behind their back or profess ignorance of the fact that an appeal had been filed by the State against the common judgment. We would like to observe that, in the fitness of things, it would be desirable that the State Government also took out publication in such cases to alert parties bound by the judgment, of the fact that an appeal had been preferred before this court by them. We do not find fault with the State for having filed only one appeal. It is, of course, an economising procedure." In A. R. Antulay [1988] 2 SCC 602, in paras 104, 105 and 106, the honourable Supreme Court while considering the practice of overruling a decision of the smaller Bench by a larger Bench, categorically observed that overruling when made by a larger Bench of an earlier decision of a smaller one is intended to take away the precedent value of the decision without affecting the binding effect of the decision in the particular case. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. [2006] 3 VST 95 (SC); [2006] 145 STC 91 (SC); [2006] 282 ITR 273 (SC); [2006] 3 SCC 1, the preliminary objection of the State regarding maintainability of the petition on the ground that it is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, has been repelled with an observation that res judicata does not apply in matters pertaining to tax for different assessment years because res judicata applies to debar courts from entertaining issues on the same cause of action whereas the cause of action for each assessment year is distinct. In para 22 of the above judgment, it has been observed that "no one can dispute that in our judicial system, it is open to a court of superior jurisdiction or strength before which a decision of a Bench of lower strength is cited as an authority, to overrule it. This overruling would not operate to upset the binding nature of the decision on the parties to an earlier lis in that lis, for whom the principle of res judicata would continue to operate." In Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra [2002] 4 SCC 388, it has been observed that the Supreme Court is the court of last resort - the final court on questions both of fact and of law including constitutional law. The law declared by this court is the law of the land; it is precedent for itself and for all the courts/Tribunals and authorities in India. In Hoystead v. Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 155; [1925] All ER Rep 56 (PC), Lord Shaw observed thus : "Parties are not permitted to begin fresh litigation because of new views they may entertain of the law of the case, or new versions which they present as to what should be a proper apprehension by the court the legal result. ... If this were permitted litigation would have no end, except when legal ingenuity is exhausted." The honourable Supreme Court in Shenoy & Co. [1985] 60 STC 70 (SC); [1985] 2 SCC 512, Mahesh Kumar Saharia [1997] 8 SCC 176, and U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Kanoria Industrial Ltd. [2002] 128 STC 26 (SC); [2001] 2 SCC 549, has held that validity of the statute once upheld cannot be reopened. [1985] 60 STC 70 (SC); [1985] 2 SCC 512, Mahesh Kumar Saharia [1997] 8 SCC 176, and U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Kanoria Industrial Ltd. [2002] 128 STC 26 (SC); [2001] 2 SCC 549, has held that validity of the statute once upheld cannot be reopened. Shri Ravindra Shrivastava, learned senior advocate, placing reliance on paras 16 and 20 of the decision in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. [2006] 3 VST 95 (SC); [2006] 145 STC 91 (SC); [2006] 282 ITR 273 (SC); [2006] 3 SCC 1, submitted that if a new ground is urged, the court may have to consider it on the merits, because, strictly speaking, the principle of res judicata may not apply to such a case. We have already extracted the proposition of law made in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. [2006] 3 VST 95 (SC); [2006] 145 STC 91 (SC); [2006] 282 ITR 273 (SC); [2006] 3 SCC 1 and have already observed that in the matters of taxation, doctrine of res judicata is not applicable with respect to assessment proceedings for the subsequent year as it gives new cause of action to the petitioner. However, precedent value of the earlier judgment and the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding in taxation laws also. In Ram Das Bhikaji [1980] 1 SCC 550, the respondents were acquitted of the charge under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act by the Bombay High Court on the basis of decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajaldas Gurunamal Pamanani v. State of Maharashtra [1975] 3 SCC 375. The larger Bench of five Judges overruled the judgment of Rajaldas [1975] 3 SCC 375 in State of Kerala v. Alasserry Mohammed [1978] 2 SCC 386. Rejecting the argument of the respondents that it must be held that the law propounded in Rajaldas [1975] 3 SCC 375 is the law laid down under article 141 of the Constitution, it was observed that it is settled that whenever previous decision is overruled by a larger Bench, the previous decision is completely wiped out and article 141 will have no application to the decision, which has already been overruled, and the court would have to decide the cases according to law laid down by the latest decision of the Supreme Court and not by the decision, which has expressly been overruled. In Satyawati Sharma [2008] 5 SCC 287, the petition was filed in the Delhi High Court for declaring section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution insofar as it does not provide for eviction of the tenant from the premises let for non-residential purposes. The Full Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition referring to the earlier judgment of the Division Bench in H. C. Sharma v. LIC of India [1973] ILR 1 Del 90. The petitioners went up in appeal. Allowing the appeal and partly striking down section 14(1)(e), it was observed thus : "It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rational at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equality and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent. ..." In paras 38 and 39 of the above judgment, it has been specifically observed that in Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain [1986] 4 SCC 736, on which reliance has been placed by the Full Bench of the High Court for negating the appellant's challenge to section 14(1)(e), the unconstitutionality of section 14(1)(e) was neither raised nor debated with any seriousness and the observation made by the court in that regard, cannot be treated as the true ratio of the judgment, which as mentioned above, mainly rested on the interpretation of the expression "reasonably suitable residential accommodation". In Godfrey Philips [2008] 17 VST 465 (MP), the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court referring to various judgments of the Supreme Court, held that once the parameters change, there can be fresh challenge and fresh adjudication, and the argument of the State that the writ petitions are barred by res judicata or constructive res judicata, was repelled. In Godfrey Philips [2008] 17 VST 465 (MP), the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court referring to various judgments of the Supreme Court, held that once the parameters change, there can be fresh challenge and fresh adjudication, and the argument of the State that the writ petitions are barred by res judicata or constructive res judicata, was repelled. We have already held in the foregoing paragraphs that by confirming the order of the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court upholding the constitutional validity of the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976, the law declared by the honourable Supreme Court under article 141 is that the statute imposing entry tax with an avowed object of compensating local bodies for the losses suffered by them as a result of abolition of octroi check-posts, is compensatory in nature and the same is immune from challenge under article 301 of the Constitution. The avowed purpose of abolition of the octroi check-posts was to make transportation of goods trouble-free. Referring to interpretation of article 301 of the Constitution in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. AIR 1961 SC 232 and Automobile Transport AIR 1962 SC 1406 it was observed that so long as tax is regulatory or compensatory in nature, it is not within the mischief of article 301. The Division Bench of the M.P. High Court has not taken into consideration article 141 of the Constitution while holding that fresh challenge to and fresh adjudication of validity of the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 is maintainable. The Division Bench has also observed that the parameters have been changed by the decision rendered by their Lordships in Jindal Strips Ltd. [2004] 134 STC 303 (SC); [2003] 8 SCC 60. However, we are of the opinion that in Jindal Stripe Ltd. [2004] 134 STC 303 (SC); [2003] 8 SCC 60 also the doctrine of "direct and immediate effect" of the impugned law on trade and commerce under article 301, as propounded in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. AIR 1961 SC 232 and the working test enunciated in Automobile Transport AIR 1962 SC 1406 for deciding whether the tax is compensatory or not, has been reiterated, and it has been held that it will continue to apply. Thus, there was no change in parameters for fresh challenge and fresh adjudication, as observed by the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court. Thus, there was no change in parameters for fresh challenge and fresh adjudication, as observed by the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court. Thus, on the basis of aforesaid discussions, it is held that the Supreme Court in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 following the interpretation of article 301 propounded in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. AIR 1961 SC 232 and the principles of working test enunciated in Automobile Transport case AIR 1962 SC 1406 , has rejected the challenge to the constitutional validity of the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 by confirming the judgment in Sanjay Trading Co. [1994] 93 STC 589 (MP) and held the imposition of tax compensatory in nature. The larger Bench of the Supreme Court in Jindal Stainless Ltd. [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC) has not overruled the above law declared by the Supreme Court holding the Haryana Local Area Development Tax Act, 2000, intra vires. The observation to the extent that "the concept of compensatory nature of tax has been widened and if there is substantial or even some link between the tax and the facilities extended to such dealers, directly or indirectly, levy cannot be impugned as invalid" made in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar case [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673, has been overruled in Jindal Stainless Steel [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC). Therefore, fresh challenge to the constitutional validity of the Act of 1976 is not maintainable in view of the law declared under article 141 of the Constitution in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673. Challenge to the constitutional validity of section 4A, as amended vide Amendment Act, 2001 and notifications issued under sections 3(2), 4A and 10 of the Act of 1976 from time to time : The petitioners have also impugned the Chhattisgarh Sthaniya Kshetra Me Mal Ke Pravesh Par Kar Sanshodhan Adhiniyam, 2001 (in short, "the Amendment Act, 2001") and notifications issued under sections 3(2), 4A and section 10 of the Act from time to time on the ground that they are unconstitutional, and have also claimed refund of the taxes collected under the Act of 1976. For the sake of convenience, we shall advert to the facts in W.P. No. 1336 of 2007 and wherever it is felt necessary, we shall be also referring to the facts pleaded in other petitions. The petitioner has filed this petition with the averment that it is a Government of India, Public Sector Undertaking under the administrative control of Ministry of Steel. Its Bhilai Steel Plant is located at Bhilai, Distt. Durg. The petitioner requires large quantity of raw material, such as coal, iron ore, limestone, ferro manganese, ferro silicon, furnace oil, diesel oil and large number of spares and parts of the machines and equipments. Some of them are brought from outside the State and some are imported from outside the country. It has also established a captive power generation plant to meet the power requirement. The Act of 1976 was enacted by the State Legislature to levy tax on goods in lieu of octroi tax being collected by the local municipal bodies. Under section 3 of the Act of 1976, entry tax is levied on entry in the course of business of a dealer of goods specified in Schedule II into each local area for consumption, use or sale therein. Similarly, entry tax is levied on the entry of goods specified in Schedule III for consumption or use of such goods but not for sale therein. Section 4 prescribes that the entry tax shall be payable by the dealer relating to goods specified in Schedules II and III at the rate mentioned in the said Schedule. Section 4A was inserted in the said Act by the Entry Tax Amendment Act of 1976 with effect from December 31, 1976, however, provision for levy of entry tax at enhanced rate up to 10 per cent was made in respect of certain goods consumed or used in the manufacture of other goods in specified local area or areas. The State increased the rate of entry tax from one per cent to 10 per cent on entry of ferro manganese and silico manganese manufactured outside the State of Chhattisgarh with effect from February 28, 2002. However, the rate was again reduced to five per cent with effect from July 1, 2004 vide notification of annexure P3. The State increased the rate of entry tax from one per cent to 10 per cent on entry of ferro manganese and silico manganese manufactured outside the State of Chhattisgarh with effect from February 28, 2002. However, the rate was again reduced to five per cent with effect from July 1, 2004 vide notification of annexure P3. Proviso to sub-section (1) of section 9 of the Act of 1976 provides that rate of tax in respect of any goods specified in Schedules II and III shall not exceed twice the rate of tax specified in the Schedule. Sub-section (2) of section 9 provides that revision cannot be made without previous notice in the Gazette so that the affected parties may make their representation to the State Government. Sub-section (3) further provides that every notice amending the rate of tax in Schedules II and III is required to be laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly as soon as possible. Vide Amendment Act, 2001 (annexure P4), permissible rate of tax under section 4A of the Principal Act was raised from 10 per cent to 50 per cent. The Amendment Act, 2001 was neither introduced nor moved in the Legislature of State without previous sanction of the President. Entry tax on raw material for manufacture of other goods specified in Schedules II and III was fixed at half per cent under proviso (i) to section 4(1) of the Act. The same was enhanced to one per cent with effect from April 1, 1995. The provision was applicable only in respect of goods specified in Schedule II and the provision was no longer made applicable in respect of goods specified in Schedule III. Section 3(1) of the Act of 1976 provides for levy of entry tax on entry of goods into local areas. This section does not provide for imposition of entry tax based on origin of the goods. The State cannot discriminate between the rate of entry tax for goods manufactured in the State of Chhattisgarh and other States. Any discrimination on this count is ultra vires article 304(a) of the Constitution, which empowers the State to impose tax on goods imported from other States, to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subjected so. The State cannot discriminate between the rate of entry tax for goods manufactured in the State of Chhattisgarh and other States. Any discrimination on this count is ultra vires article 304(a) of the Constitution, which empowers the State to impose tax on goods imported from other States, to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subjected so. However, the State has imposed discriminatory rate of entry tax based on their entry into a local area from any other local area within the State of Chhattisgarh and from any place outside the State of Chhattisgarh. To demonstrate the above fact, discriminatory rates for various goods have been given in a tabular form in para 5.12 of the petition. The petitioner has also pleaded that the above discrimination directly affects the freedom to trade and commerce. On the principles of protecting the interests of local industries, various notifications, vide annexure P6, have been issued levying discriminatory rate of entry tax based on the origin of the goods, vide annexure P6. It has also been pleaded that the manufacturers in the State of Chhattisgarh are subjected to entry tax on their own mined ore, which are being raised at their own captive mines, and brought to their factories for further manufacture of final products. The petitioner is required to pay entry tax on its own mined ore, which are captively produced in its own mines and consumed in the plant. Whereas State of M.P. has granted exemption to certain industries from payment of entry tax if the own manufactured materials are transferred from one local area to another local area for use as raw material in the manufacture of other goods. Notification in this regard is annexure P7. The State has provided exemption from payment of entry tax to various steel mills in the State on raw materials and incidental goods including capital goods. Similar exemption on capital goods, steel and cement has been provided to the Aluminum Industries (M/s. BALCO-Korba) when the said goods are used for expansion of the existing plants, vide notification of annexure P9. The State has been levying different rates of entry tax in different local areas leading to discriminatory taxation. Similar exemption on capital goods, steel and cement has been provided to the Aluminum Industries (M/s. BALCO-Korba) when the said goods are used for expansion of the existing plants, vide notification of annexure P9. The State has been levying different rates of entry tax in different local areas leading to discriminatory taxation. Iron ore and coking coal are charged to entry tax at six per cent when entered into Bhilai-Durg Special Area whereas these materials are charged to entry tax at three per cent (iron ore) and one per cent (coal) when entered into any other areas of the State of Chhattisgarh. The petitioner has impugned the amended section 4A on the ground that it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation as it empowers the State authorities to levy tax without any guidelines, policy or principles. No control has been retained by the Legislature regarding the area, the goods and the rate at which the tax is to be levied under section 4A of the Act. Section 4A overrides the rates fixed by the Legislature under section 4 read with Schedules II and III of the Act. The above provision empowers the State to levy entry tax to the extent of 50 per cent of the value of the goods. Such a prohibitive rate is not only unreasonable, but is also confiscatory in nature and thus, ultra vires. Different rates of entry tax for the goods imported from other States and manufactured in the State impedes free-flow of trade. Total exemption from entry tax to in-State manufacturers only by the State Government is discriminatory and violative of articles 301 and 304(a) of the Constitution. The classification based on origin of the goods for the purposes of imposition of entry tax, is contrary to the provisions made under section 3(1) of the Act of 1976. Levy of entry tax on goods imported from other countries, is ultra vires the Constitution as article 286(1)(b) provides that "no law of a State shall impose or authorize the imposition of tax on the purchases of goods where such purchase takes place in the course of import of goods in the territory of India". The respondents/State have not filed any separate return in this petition and have adopted the return and additional return filed in W.P. (T) No. 4054 of 2006, Grasim Cement v. State of Chhattisgarh. The respondents/State have not filed any separate return in this petition and have adopted the return and additional return filed in W.P. (T) No. 4054 of 2006, Grasim Cement v. State of Chhattisgarh. At the outset, a preliminary objection has been taken with respect to maintainability of fresh challenge to the constitutional validity of the Act of 1976 on the ground that earlier challenge to the constitutional validity has been negated by the Division Bench of the High Court of M.P. and the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 has been held to be intra vires. Tax levied under the Act is compensatory in nature, which only means that the tax collected under the Act, should be spent for the benefit of trade and local bodies. The judgment of the M.P. High Court has been further affirmed and validity of the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 has already been upheld by the honourable Supreme Court in the case of Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673, and the Supreme Court has held that the Act is compensatory in nature. The respondents/State in their additional return filed on June 24, 2009 have averred that the landing cost of iron ore per ton for the petitioners is Rs. 506.97 (annexure D1) whereas landing cost of iron ore for another manufacturer of steel, namely, HEG Ltd. is Rs. 4,670 per ton (annexure D2). Thus, entry tax being paid by the petitioner at six per cent is lesser than the entry tax imposed at three per cent on HEG in actual terms. It has been further averred that imposition of higher rate of tax for the goods brought to the local area from outside the State is with a view to provide level playing field to all the entry tax payers and to bring them at par for the purposes of imposition of value added tax (in short, "VAT") on the final product. The person purchasing goods from outside the State does not pay VAT and therefore, its landing cost is less as compared to the person purchasing goods from within the State. Keeping in view the above fact, to bring the entry tax payers at par, different rates of entry tax have been imposed for the goods brought from outside the State and the goods brought from within the State. Keeping in view the above fact, to bring the entry tax payers at par, different rates of entry tax have been imposed for the goods brought from outside the State and the goods brought from within the State. The constitutional validity of section 4A has already been decided by the High Court of M.P. in the case of Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. State of M.P. [1997] 106 STC 340 (MP); AIR 1996 MP 116 and M.P. Cement Manufacturer's Association v. State of M.P. [2006] 143 STC 432 (MP); [2004] 32 TLD 36. VAT on petroleum product/diesel in the State of Chhattisgarh, as was accepted by the High Court of M.P., is levied at 25 per cent, however, when petroleum product is brought from outside the State, the State is deprived of VAT at 25 per cent as the same is purchased from outside the State on C form by paying only four per cent Central tax. Therefore, in public interest and in the interest of revenue, the entry tax on petroleum product has been enhanced to 25 per cent. The learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the petitioners have challenged the aforesaid provision on its present form on the ground that the same enables the State Government to impose exorbitant and excessive rates of entry tax upon certain goods in certain local areas. Imposition and collection of exorbitant and excessive rate of entry tax does not bear any nexus with the object and levy of the compensatory tax, which entry tax is required to be. There is no co-relation with any special benefit or facility extended or sought to be extended to the class of traders for better conduct of their trade and commerce in the local areas. The amendment in section 4A conferring the State with a power to impose entry tax at 50 per cent clearly reveals that the same has been done with an object of augmentation of revenue rather than any compensatory tax in lieu of certain service or special benefit to the traders. Section 4A as amended is prima facie discriminatory inasmuch as it seeks to tax the same very class of goods to differential higher rate of tax as compared to those very goods which are included in Schedules II and III of the Act of 1976, prescribing much lower rate of tax. Section 4A as amended is prima facie discriminatory inasmuch as it seeks to tax the same very class of goods to differential higher rate of tax as compared to those very goods which are included in Schedules II and III of the Act of 1976, prescribing much lower rate of tax. It suffers from excessive delegation of power to the executive. There are no guidelines available either in the Act or otherwise for exercise of purely discretionary power of imposition of rate of tax which may vary from 10 per cent to 50 per cent in the given case. A blanket, uncontrolled and unchannelised, power has been conferred upon the executive, contrary to the initial scheme and design of the rate of tax in respect of the goods specified in Schedules II and III of the Act, which were not intended to be exorbitant and excessive. The above provision also circumvents the statutory safeguards engrafted under section 9 of the Act of 1976 in relation to power of executive to enhance rates of tax. Section 9 has been rendered otiose making the whole scheme and power of taxation unjust, arbitrary and discriminatory. Shri Ravindra Shrivastava, learned senior advocate, argued that notifications of annexure P6 in W.P. (T) No. 1336 of 2007 issued under section 4A grossly suffer from the vice of discrimination with regard to differential rates of tax in respect of goods. The notifications have been impugned on the ground, firstly that differential rates of tax have been prescribed between the class of goods which are manufactured within the State and brought into local area and those class of goods which are manufactured outside the State and brought into the local area, such classification is wholly unconstitutional as origin or place of production of the goods has no co-relation with the recovery of the cost of service or the facility. Secondly, there is apparent discrimination between the goods brought into local area of Bhilai-Durg and the other local areas in the State of Chhattisgarh. Iron ore and coking coal are charged to entry tax at six per cent when entered into Bhilai-Durg special area (where the petitioner's business exists) whereas these materials are charged to entry tax at three per cent (iron ore) and at one per cent (coking coal) when entered into any other areas of the State of Chhattisgarh. Iron ore and coking coal are charged to entry tax at six per cent when entered into Bhilai-Durg special area (where the petitioner's business exists) whereas these materials are charged to entry tax at three per cent (iron ore) and at one per cent (coking coal) when entered into any other areas of the State of Chhattisgarh. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the matter of Weston Electroniks v. State of Gujarat [1988] 70 STC 52 (SC); [1988] 2 SCC 568. It has been further argued that the effect of differential and higher rate of taxes which are exorbitant and excessive, is to create unequal level playing field for the petitioners, which has a direct and immediate effect on free flow movement of goods in the course of petitioners' trade, commerce and intercourse and the same is violative of article 301 of the Constitution. It was specifically pointed out that the respondents have taken inconsistent stand to defend their above discriminatory stand. Initially, it was suggested that the high rate of tax is imposed to encourage the local manufacturers and traders, however, in their latest affidavit dated June 24, 2009, stand of the respondents is that since the petitioner is not paying VAT, higher rate of entry tax has been imposed for making up the losses of VAT. Both the reasons are absolutely extraneous and run contrary to the object of levy of compensatory tax. Shri H. S. Shrivastava, learned senior advocate, has challenged the notifications on the ground that the same are discriminatory. Relying upon the judgments in the matters of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Laxmi Paper Mart [1997] 105 STC 1 (SC); [1997] 2 SCC 697, Loharn Steel Industries Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1997] 105 STC 30 (SC); [1997] 2 SCC 37 and Amit Paper Products v. State of M.P. [1998] 110 STC 125 (MP), it was argued that imposing levy of tax on the goods brought from outside the State and exempting from levy of tax the goods manufactured within the State is discriminatory and offends provisions of articles 301 and 304(a) of the Constitution. Challenging the constitutional validity of section 4A as amended vide Amendment Act, 2001, on the ground of excessive delegation, it was argued that the power to fix the rate of tax is an essential legislative function and unless the subordinate law-making authority is afforded guidance by the policies being formulated, principles enunciated and standards laid down, the legislation will suffer from the vice of excessive delegation and would be void as arbitrary or unconstitutional. In the instant case, by amending section 4A, the Legislature has empowered the subordinate law-making authority to impose entry tax at 50 per centum in place of 10 per centum without laying down the principles and guidance to the subordinate law-making authority and therefore, the same suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the matters Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema AIR 1965 SC 1107 , Vasanlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. State of Bombay AIR 1961 SC 4 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi AIR 1968 SC 1232 . On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the source of legislative power to impose entry tax, earlier imposed by the local authorities as octroi tax, is in entry No. 52 of the State List (List II) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Act of 1976 was enacted with an object to levy tax on entry of goods in lieu of octroi tax collected by the local bodies to make the transportation of goods trouble-free by abolition of octroi check-post for providing a single point tax for free-flow of trade and commerce. Section 4A was inserted by the Amendment Act of 1976 and the same came into force with effect from December 31, 1976. A power was conferred upon the State Government to impose entry tax to such goods, which are used or consumed in such local area or areas for manufacture of other goods, at a rate not exceeding 10 per centum. By the Amendment Act, 2001, maximum rate of tax imposable under section 4A(1) has been increased from 10 per cent to 50 per cent. Under section 4A, the State has been empowered to treat each local area as a specific unit for different rates of taxation for specified goods, and this power has been conferred, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 4. Under section 4A, the State has been empowered to treat each local area as a specific unit for different rates of taxation for specified goods, and this power has been conferred, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 4. Therefore, the power of declaring rate, at which the goods can be subject to entry tax under section 4 read with power to amend Schedules II and III provided under section 9, are separate and distinct from the power conferred on the State Government under section 4A. The validity of section 4A was unsuccessfully challenged before the High Court of M.P. in the case of Associated Cement Co. [1997] 106 STC 340 (MP); AIR 1996 MP 116 and in M.P. Cement Manufacturer's Association [2006] 143 STC 432 (MP); [2004] 32 TLD 36. Though by making enabling provision, the maximum limit of entry tax imposable has been increased from 10 per cent to 50 per cent, yet the maximum rate at which any commodity has been charged is 25 per cent on petroleum products and that too, when these products are bought/purchased from outside the State. When purchase is made from within the State, no entry tax is payable on petroleum products like diesel, petrol as they are exempted from payment of entry tax by issuing notification under section 10 of the Act of 1976. Reliance has been placed on the judgments in the matters of V. Venugopala Ravi Verma, Rajah v. Union of India AIR 1969 SC 1094 , Hira Lal Rattan Lal v. Sales Tax Officer, Section III, Kanpur [1973] 31 STC 178 (SC); AIR 1973 SC 1034 and Mysore Cement Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2006] 143 STC 432 (MP); [2003] 2 STJ 615 (MP). In W.P. No. 1841 of 2002, petitioners - Kanoi Paper Industries Ltd., apart from challenging constitutional validity of section 4A of the Act as amended, has also impugned the notification dated September 14, 2001 as amended vide notification dated April 1, 2002 (annexure P3) imposing entry tax at five per cent on goods HDPE/PP woven sacks with effect from September 20, 2001. In W.P. (T) No. 18 of 2007, petitioner - Bharti Airtel; W.P. (T) No. 5342 of 2007, petitioner - Reliance Telecom Ltd.; W.P. (T) No. 5482 of 2007, petitioner - Reliance Telecom Infrastructure Ltd.; W.P. (T) No. 5483 of 2007, petitioner - Reliance Communication Infrastructure Ltd. and W.P. (T) No. 5596 of 2007, petitioner - Reliance Communication Ltd., have impugned the constitutional validity of section 3(2) of the Act of 1976 as unconstitutional as also two notifications of annexure P6 dated March 31, 1999, whereby entry tax at four per cent has been imposed on telecommunication cables and accessories thereof with effect from April 1, 1999. In W.P. (T) No. 1804 of 2002, petitioner - Maharashtra Electrosmelt Ltd., has impugned the constitutional validity of section 4A of the Act of 1976 as also the notification dated April 5, 2002 issued under section 4A of the Act of 1976 enhancing the rate of entry tax from one per cent to 10 per cent in respect of "high carbon ferro manganese and high carbon ferro silico manganese" manufactured outside the State of Chhattisgarh on the ground that the very same goods manufactured within the State of Chhattisgarh are levied entry tax at one per cent, as discriminatory, arbitrary and ultra vires the Act of 1976. In order to appreciate the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to refer to certain provisions of the Act of 1976. Section 2(b) of the Act of 1976 defines "entry tax", which reads as under : "2(b) entry tax means a tax on entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein levied and payable in accordance with the provisions of this Act (and includes composition money payable under section 7A)"; Section 3 deals with the incidence of taxation. Sub-section (1) reads as under : "3. Incidence of taxation. Sub-section (1) reads as under : "3. Incidence of taxation. - (1) There shall be levied an entry tax, - (a) on the entry in the course of business of a dealer of goods specified in the Second Schedule, into each local area for consumption, use or sale therein; and (b) on the entry in the course of business of a dealer of goods specified in the Third Schedule, into each local area for consumption or use of such goods as raw material or incidental goods or as packing material or in the execution of works contracts but not for sale therein; and such tax shall be paid by every dealer liable to tax under the Sales Tax Act who has effected entry of such goods : Provided ..." First proviso to sub-section (1) of section 3 further provides for contingency, in which no tax under sub-section (1) of section 3 is to be levied. Sub-section (2)(a) of section 3 reads as under : "(2)(a) There shall be levied an entry tax on the entry into any local area for consumption, use or sale therein, - (i) of such goods specified in the Second Schedule or Third Schedule, other than motor vehicles, on which entry tax is not leviable under the provisions of sub-section (1); and (ii) by such persons or class of persons, (...) as may in either case, be notified by the State Government and thereupon such tax shall be paid by such person or class of persons : Provided that entry tax under this sub-section shall not be levied on the entry of such goods, if it is proved to the satisfaction of the assessing authority that such goods have already been subjected to entry tax or that the entry tax is liable to be paid by any other person or dealer under this Act." Sub-section (5) of section 3 empowers the State Government to amend Schedule I, Schedule II or Schedule III to include therein any goods or to exclude therefrom the goods so included from either of the Schedules. Sub-section (1) of section 4 prescribes that entry tax shall be charged on the goods specified in the Second Schedule and Third Schedule at the rates mentioned in the said Schedules. Sub-section (1) of section 4 prescribes that entry tax shall be charged on the goods specified in the Second Schedule and Third Schedule at the rates mentioned in the said Schedules. Section 4(1)(i) stipulates that entry tax payable in respect of goods specified in Schedule II other than iron and steel, which are consumed or used as raw material for the manufacture of other goods shall be one per cent, if the rate of tax prescribed exceeds one per cent. Section 4A was inserted vide Amendment Act of 1976 and it read as under before Amendment Act of 2001 : "4A. Provision for entry tax at enhanced rate on certain goods consumed or used in manufacture of other goods. - (1) The State Government may, by notification, specify the local area or areas and the goods which are used or consumed in such local area or areas mainly for the manufacture of other goods and may direct that, as from the date specified in the notification and in such manner as may be prescribed, the entry tax payable by a dealer under this Act shall be charged on his taxable quantum relating to such goods at a rate not exceeding ten per centum as may be specified in such notification notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 4. (2) On the issue of notification under sub-section (1), entry tax shall not be chargeable and payable on such goods at any other rate mentioned in any other provisions of this Act." The word "ten" occurring after "rate not exceeding" in sub-section (1) of section 4A was substituted by word "fifty" vide Amendment Act of 2001 with effect from September 4, 2001. Sub-section (1) of section 9 stipulates that the State Government may, by notification, amend Schedule II and Schedule III. However, it has been further provided that the rate of tax shall not exceed twice the rate of tax specified in the Schedules. Sub-section (3) further provides that notification issued under sub-section (1) shall be laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly after it is issued. Section 10 empowers the State Government that it may, by notification, exempt prospectively or retrospectively, in whole or in part, any class of dealers or persons or any goods from payment of entry tax in respect of all or any of the local areas, for a specified period by issuance of notification. Section 10 empowers the State Government that it may, by notification, exempt prospectively or retrospectively, in whole or in part, any class of dealers or persons or any goods from payment of entry tax in respect of all or any of the local areas, for a specified period by issuance of notification. Section 12 provides for rate at which entry tax to be charged on goods under section 3(2). Sub-section (1) further provides that entry tax payable under section 3(2) shall not exceed 20 per cent of the value of the goods. In Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. State of M.P. [1997] 106 STC 340 (MP); AIR 1996 MP 116 , the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court while repelling the challenge to the constitutional validity of section 4A held that sections 3, 4 and 9 deal with goods specified in Schedule II and Schedule III to the exactions and concessions provided under the statutory provisions for which rates of tax are prescribed in Schedules II and III, subject to power of the State Government under section 9 to modify the rate which is subject to the limitation contained in the proviso. Section 4A takes certain local areas and certain goods from outside the purview of the rates specified in Schedules II and III subject to the amendatory power of the State Government. Section 12 takes certain categories of persons dealt with under section 3(2) outside the purview of the rate of tax specified in Schedules II and III. Thus, the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 9 relates only to the rates of tax specified in Schedules II and III, which in turn are applicable only in case not governed by sections 4A and 12. Under section 4A and section 12, entries of certain goods in certain areas or entry caused to be made by persons falling under certain categories are excluded from the operation of the rates of tax specified in Schedules II and III and, therefore, must necessarily be outside the purview of section 9. Accordingly, contention that the impugned notifications being violative of the first proviso to section 9(1) of the Act, are beyond the competence of the State Government, was rejected. Accordingly, contention that the impugned notifications being violative of the first proviso to section 9(1) of the Act, are beyond the competence of the State Government, was rejected. In Vasanlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala AIR 1961 SC 4 , the Constitution Bench of the honourable Supreme Court while dealing with the nature and permissible extent of delegation of legislative powers under article 245 of the Constitution observed thus : "4. It is now well established by the decisions of this Court that the power of delegation is a constituent element of the legislative power as a whole, and that in modern times when the Legislatures enact laws to meet the challenge of the complex socio-economic problems, they often find it convenient and necessary to delegate subsidiary or ancillary powers to delegates of their choice for carrying out the policy laid down by their Acts. The extent to which such delegation is permissible is also now well-settled. The Legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in any case. It must lay down the legislative policy and principle, and must afford guidance for carrying out the said policy before it delegates its subsidiary powers in that behalf ..." It has been further observed thus : "In dealing with the challenge to the vires of any statute on the ground of excessive delegation it is, therefore, necessary to enquire whether the impugned delegation involves the delegation of an essential legislative function or power and whether the Legislature has enunciated its policy and principle and given guidance to the delegate or not. As the decision in Bagla's case [1955] 1 SCR 380; AIR 1954 SC 465 , shows, in applying this test this Court has taken into account the statements in the preamble to the Act, and if the said statements afford a satisfactory basis for holding that the legislative policy and principle has been enunciated with sufficient accuracy and clarity the preamble itself has been held to satisfy the requirements of the relevant tests. In every case it would be necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Act in relation to the delegation made and the question as to whether the delegation is intra vires or not will have to be decided by the application of the relevant tests." In Corporation of Calcutta AIR 1965 SC 1107 , the Constitution Bench held thus : "The validity of the guidance required to make delegation of power good cannot be judged by a stereo-typed rule. The guidance furnished must be held to be good if it leads to the achievement of the object of the statute which delegated the power. The validity of the power to fix rates of taxes delegated to the Corporation by section 548 of the Act must be judged by the same standard. All taxes including the one under section 548 can be collected and used by the Corporation only for discharging its functions under the Act. The Corporation, subject to certain controls is an autonomous body. It has to perform various statutory function. It is often given power to decide when and in what manner the functions are to be performed. For all this it needs money and its needs will vary from time to time with the prevailing exigencies. Its power to collect tax, however, is necessarily limited by the expenses required to discharge those functions. It has, therefore, where rates have not been specified in the statute, to fix such rates as may be necessary to meet its needs. That would be sufficient guidance to make the exercise of its power to fix the rates valid. The Act in the present case impliedly provides the same guidance, see section 127(3) and (4). It would be impracticable to insist on a more rigid guidance. In the case of a self-governing body with taxing powers, a large amount of flexibility in the guidance to be provided for the exercise of that power must exist. In the case of a big municipality like that of Calcutta, its needs would depend on various and changing circumstances. There are epidemics, influx of refugees, labour strikes, new amenities to be provided for, such as hospitals, schools and various other such things may be mentioned, which make it necessary for a colossal municipal corporation like that of Calcutta to have a large amount of flexibility in its taxing powers. There are epidemics, influx of refugees, labour strikes, new amenities to be provided for, such as hospitals, schools and various other such things may be mentioned, which make it necessary for a colossal municipal corporation like that of Calcutta to have a large amount of flexibility in its taxing powers. These considerations lead to the view that section 548 is valid legislation. There is sufficient guidance in the Act as to how the rate of the levy is to be fixed." In Municipal Corporation of Delhi AIR 1968 SC 1232 , the Constitution Bench considering the constitutionality of the delegation of pecuniary powers to municipal corporations and the effect of Validation Act, dismissed the writ petition by upholding the Validation Act by referring to various authorities of the Supreme Court, and the principles of law propounded in the above cited two judgments, have been referred with approval. In V. Venugopala Ravi Verma Rajah AIR 1969 SC 1094 , in para 14, it has been observed thus : "14. Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not enjoin equal protection of the laws as abstract propositions. Laws being the expression of legislative will intended to solve specific problems or to achieve definite objectives by specific remedies, absolute equality or uniformity of treatment is impossible of achievement. Again tax laws are aimed at dealing with complex problems of infinite variety necessitating adjustment of several disparate elements. The courts accordingly admit, subject to adherence to the fundamental principles of the doctrine of equality, a larger play to legislative discretion in the matter of classification. The power to classify may be exercised so as to adjust the system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways : the Legislature may select persons, properties, transactions and objects, and apply different methods and even rates for tax, if the Legislature does so reasonably. Protection of the equality clause does not predicate a mathematically precise or logically complete or symmetrical classification : it is not a condition of the guarantee of equal protection that all transactions, properties, objects or persons of the same genus must be affected by it or none at all. If the classification is rational, the Legislature is free to choose objects of taxation, impose different rates, exempt classes of property from taxation, subject different classes of property to tax in different ways and adopt different modes of assessment. If the classification is rational, the Legislature is free to choose objects of taxation, impose different rates, exempt classes of property from taxation, subject different classes of property to tax in different ways and adopt different modes of assessment. A taxing statute may contravene article 14 of the Constitution if it seeks to impose on the same class of property, persons, transactions or occupations similarly situate, incidence of taxation, which leads to obvious inequality. A taxing statute is not, therefore, exposed to attack on the ground of discrimination merely because different rates of taxation are prescribed for different categories of persons, transactions, occupations or objects." In Hira Lal Rattan Lal [1973] 31 STC 178 (SC); AIR 1973 SC 1034 , while considering the challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute on the ground of excessive delegation, it was observed thus : "30. ... It is true that the Legislature cannot delegate its legislative functions to any other body. But subject to that qualification, it is permissible for the Legislature to delegate the power to select the persons on whom the tax is to be levied or the goods or the transactions on which the tax is to be levied. In the Act, under section 3 the Legislature has sought to impose multi-point tax on all sales and purchases. After having done that it has given power to the executive, a high authority and which is presumed to command the majority support in the Legislature to select for special treatment dealings in certain class of goods. In the very nature of things, it is impossible for the Legislature to enumerate goods, dealings in which sales tax or purchase tax should be imposed. It is also impossible for the Legislature to select the goods which should be subjected to a single point sales or purchase tax. Before making such selections several aspects such as the impact of the levy on the society, economic consequences and the administrative convenience will have to be considered. These factors may change from time to time. Hence in the very nature of things, these details have got to be left to the executive. Before making such selections several aspects such as the impact of the levy on the society, economic consequences and the administrative convenience will have to be considered. These factors may change from time to time. Hence in the very nature of things, these details have got to be left to the executive. Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1958] 9 STC 388 (SC); AIR 1958 SC 909 referred to." In the matter of Weston Electroniks [1988] 70 STC 52 (SC); [1988] 2 SCC 568 section 7 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 provided for levy of sales tax on the turnover of sales of goods specified in Schedule. The tax at the rate of 15 per cent was applicable to the turnover of the television sets up to 1981 irrespective of whether television sets were manufactured and sold within the State of Gujarat or imported from outside the State. By subsequent notification, the State Government reduced the rate of sales tax to 10 per cent for the television sets imported from outside the State and the tax was reduced to one per cent for the television sets manufactured within the State. The petitioner specifically claimed that the notification specifying a lower rate for local manufacturers should be quashed. In these circumstances, it was held thus : "While a State Legislature may enact a law imposing a tax on goods imported from other States as is levied on similar goods manufactured in that State, the imposition must not be such as to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured. An exception to the mandate declared in article 301 and the prohibition contained in clause (1) of article 303 can be sustained on the basis of clause (a) of article 304 only if the conditions contained in the latter provision are satisfied. An exception to the mandate declared in article 301 and the prohibition contained in clause (1) of article 303 can be sustained on the basis of clause (a) of article 304 only if the conditions contained in the latter provision are satisfied. No support can be derived from clauses (b) and (c) of article 39 on the ground that the rate of tax was reduced in the case of goods manufactured locally in order to provide an incentive for encouraging local manufacturing units." In Loharn Steel Industries Ltd. [1997] 105 STC 30 (SC); [1997] 2 SCC 37 also, it has been held that finished products from the re-rolled mills which are sold in Andhra Pradesh cannot be subjected to discrimination while imposing sales tax under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 on the ground that these products have been manufactured outside the State and not inside the State. The act of the State is in clear violation of article 304(a) of the Constitution. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Laxmi Paper Mart [1997] 105 STC 1 (SC); [1997] 2 SCC 697 also, on account of discrimination on the basis of purchase of raw materials within and without the State, levying of sales tax was held to be ultra vires article 304(a) of the Constitution. The constitutional validity of the unamended section 4A of the M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976 has been upheld by the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court. Fresh challenge has been laid to the amendment effected in the year 2001 vide Amendment Act of 2001, whereby the State has been empowered to impose entry tax up to 50 per cent. We are in respectful agreement with the views of the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court expressed in Associated Cement Co. [1997] 106 STC 340 (MP); AIR 1996 MP 116 wherein it has been held that proviso to sub-section (1) of section 9 is not applicable to the goods which are covered under the scheme of sections 3, 4A and 12. The principles of law that may be deduced from various judgments of the honourable Supreme Court referred to above, are that 'the Legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in any case. It must lay down legislative policy and principle, and must afford guidance for carrying out the said policy before it delegates its subsidiary powers in that behalf. The principles of law that may be deduced from various judgments of the honourable Supreme Court referred to above, are that 'the Legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in any case. It must lay down legislative policy and principle, and must afford guidance for carrying out the said policy before it delegates its subsidiary powers in that behalf. If the Statement of Objects and Reasons offers satisfactory basis for holding that the legislative policy and principle have been enunciated with sufficient accuracy and clarity, it may consider that it satisfies the requirements of necessary guidance to the delegatee. Guidance furnished must be held to be good if it leads to the achievement of the object of the statute which delegated the power. It is permissible for the Legislature to delegate the power to select persons on whom the tax is to be levied or the goods or the transactions on which tax is to be levied. It is not possible for the Legislature to enumerate goods on which the tax is to be imposed, the manner of taxation, the different rates at which tax is to be imposed on different categories of goods/persons/areas as various aspects such as impact of levy on the society, economic consequences and the administrative convenience, etc., are required to be considered and these factors may change from time to time. Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not enjoin equal protection of the laws as abstract propositions. Laws are enacted to solve specific problem or to achieve definite objectives by specific remedies; absolute equality or uniformity of treatment is impossible of achievement. Taxation laws are aimed at dealing with complex problems of infinite variety necessitating adjustment of several disparate elements. A taxing statute is not, therefore, exposed to attack on the ground of discrimination merely because different rates of taxation are prescribed for different categories of persons, transactions, occupations or objects. Challenge to the constitutional validity of section 4A on the ground that the same suffers from vice of excessive delegation as it confers unguided and unchannelised power to the State in imposing entry tax up to an exorbitant rate of 50 per cent of the value of the goods, is to be tested in the light of above principles of law laid down by the apex court. The entry tax has been imposed for the purposes of compensating the local bodies for the losses suffered by them due to abolition of octroi. Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Statute provides sufficient guidance to the State for imposing entry tax. The Legislature has already fixed maximum permissible limit for imposition of entry tax. From perusal of the notifications under challenge, we also observe that except for petroleum products and Bauxite, entry tax is being levied at 10 per cent or less for other goods. We also take note of the fact that notification issued under the Act of 1976 is to be laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly soon after issuance of the notification. Thus, the aforesaid provision also demonstrates that the notification issued under section 4A has to face scrutiny of the Legislature. The petitioners have also challenged the validity of the notifications on the ground that by the notifications the rates of tax have been arbitrarily and exorbitantly increased. The imposition of higher rate of tax by the notifications on the goods brought from outside the State is discriminatory and violative of articles 14, 19 as well as article 301 of the Constitution. Placing heavy reliance on Weston Electroniks [1988] 70 STC 52 (SC); [1988] 2 SCC 568, Loharn Steel Industries Ltd. [1997] 105 STC 30 (SC); [1997] 2 SCC 37 and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Laxmi Paper Mart [1997] 105 STC 1 (SC); [1997] 2 SCC 697, it was argued that discrimination in imposition of tax on the ground of its origin, i.e., taxing the goods brought in the State from outside the State at higher rate than the goods which is brought from within the State, is ultra vires article 301 of the Constitution as the same is impediment in free-flow of trade and commerce. In the judgments cited by the petitioners, discrimination in the matters of imposition of sales tax between the goods manufactured within the State for sale and the goods imported from outside the State for sale, was disapproved on the ground that the same is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. In the judgments cited by the petitioners, discrimination in the matters of imposition of sales tax between the goods manufactured within the State for sale and the goods imported from outside the State for sale, was disapproved on the ground that the same is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. However, in the instant case, the State Government has justified imposition of increased rate of tax on the goods brought from outside the State on the ground that it is in the interest of Revenue to avoid evasion of tax to ensure that price of the final product remains equal for all the traders. The respondents, in their additional affidavit dated June 24, 2009, have stated that higher rate of entry tax is imposed to provide level playing field to all entry tax payers and to bring them at par for the purposes of imposition of VAT on the final product. It has been stated that when the goods are purchased from outside the State, the dealer bringing the goods, does not pay VAT and therefore, its landing cost is less. The entry tax is leviable on the basis of value of the goods brought in the local area or areas. The person, who is purchasing the goods from within the State, is required to pay entry tax and thus, the landing cost of such dealer is more in comparison to the importer of the goods from outside the State. In order to maintain parity in price of the finished products produced by all persons, different rates of entry tax have been imposed on the goods brought from outside the State. The notifications were subjected to challenge on similar grounds before the High Court of M.P. on three occasions and the High Court of M.P. negated the challenge in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. [1997] 106 STC 340 (MP); AIR 1996 MP 116 as well as Mysore Cement Ltd. [2006] 143 STC 432 (MP); [2003] 2 STJ 615 (MP) and Godfrey Philips India Ltd. [2008] 17 VST 465 (MP). So far as imposition of entry tax on iron ore and coking coal at six per cent when entered into Bhilai-Durg special area and at the lower rate into any other area, is concerned, the Act of 1976 specifically empowers the State Government to impose different rates of entry tax for local area/areas of the State. So far as imposition of entry tax on iron ore and coking coal at six per cent when entered into Bhilai-Durg special area and at the lower rate into any other area, is concerned, the Act of 1976 specifically empowers the State Government to impose different rates of entry tax for local area/areas of the State. The justification offered by the State, in its additional affidavit, for levy of different rates of entry tax, which has not been controverted by the petitioners in their rejoinder, appears to be reasonable as landing cost of the iron ore for the petitioners is much less than the landing cost for other manufactures of the State. Similarly, enhancement of the entry tax on petroleum product/diesel at 25 per cent in the State of Chhattisgarh is same as was imposed in the State of M.P. We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning assigned by the High Court of M.P. in upholding the constitutional validity of imposition of entry tax at enhanced rate for the petroleum products brought from outside the State. It is settled law that though taxing laws are not outside article 14, however, having regard to the wide variety of diverse economic criteria that go into the formulation of a fiscal policy, Legislature enjoys a wide latitude in the matter of selection of persons, subject-matter, events, etc., for taxation. The tests of the vice of discrimination in a taxing law are, accordingly, less rigorous. In examining the allegations of a hostile, discriminatory treatment what is looked into is not its phraseology, but the real effect of its provisions. A Legislature does not, as an old saying goes, have to tax everything in order to be able to tax something. If there is equality and uniformity within each group, the law would not be discriminatory. (Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India v. Union of India [1989] 74 STC 102 (SC); AIR 1990 SC 1637 ). It is also settled law that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of statutory provisions and the burden is upon the petitioner to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles. It is also settled law that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of statutory provisions and the burden is upon the petitioner to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles. In order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality, the court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a Legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation. (Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S. R. Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538 ). The petitioners have also challenged the notifications on the ground that it violates article 301 as well as articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. However, in the entire petitions, the petitioners have neither alleged nor given any figures to demonstrate and establish that they suffered loss in the business as a result of increase in the rate of entry tax or that the discriminatory levy of entry tax has adversely affected their trade and the same constitutes a direct and immediate impediment for their business. Relying upon the judgment in the matter of V. Venugopala Ravi Verma Rajah AIR 1969 SC 1094 , we hold that imposition of different rates of entry tax by the notifications issued by the State, on the goods imported from outside the State and brought into the local areas and the goods brought from within the State, would not render the notifications ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution and unconstitutional. Protection of the equality clause does not predicate a mathematically precise or logically complete or symmetrical classification. Protection of the equality clause does not predicate a mathematically precise or logically complete or symmetrical classification. After considering the reasons assigned by the respondents for imposing higher rates of entry tax on the goods brought from outside the State, we hold that the classification is rational as the same has been done to provide level playing field to all the taxpayers and the dealers, who purchase the goods from other registered dealers of the State. Accordingly, we hold that the impugned notifications do not offend article 14 of the Constitution and they are valid in law. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, we record our conclusion as under : (a) that the constitutional validity of the Act of 1976 has been upheld, firstly in the matters of Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 and thereafter, in Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. [2004] 136 STC 241 (SC); [2004] 5 SCC 209. The larger Bench of the honourable Supreme Court in Jindal Stainless Ltd. [2006] 145 STC 544 (SC) has not overruled Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673 in its entirety. Therefore, fresh challenge to the constitutional validity of the Act of 1976 is not maintainable, in view of the law declared under article 141 of the Constitution in Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar [1995] 96 STC 654 (SC); [1995] Suppl (1) SCC 673. (b) amendment in section 4A vide Amendment Act of 2001, whereby the State has been empowered to levy entry tax up to 50 per cent of the value of the goods, is a valid law. Challenge to its constitutional validity is rejected. (c) the notifications issued by the State Government from time to time under sections 3(2), 4A and section 10 of the Act of 1976, vide annexure P6, and other notifications impugned by the petitioners in the connected petitions, are valid law and the same are in consonance with the provisions of the Act of 1976. In the result, the petitions are hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. A copy of this order be placed in the records of the connected petitions.