JUDGMENT Asok Potsangbam, J. 1. Heard Mr. S. Shyam, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. A.K. Bhattacharyya, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Shri Kamal Agarwal, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Also heard the learned Govt. advocate appearing for the respondent No. 3. 2. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated March 16, 2007 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 6499/2004, this appeal has been filed by the appellants, five in number, who are the respondent Nos. 5 to 9 in the Writ Petition No. 6499/2004. The respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and other private respondents in W.P.(C) No. 6499/2004 have not filed any appeal against the impugned Judgment dated March 16, 2007. 3. The facts., in brief, which are necessary for disposal of the writ appeal may be noticed as hereunder. 3(i) The respondent Company, Nandalall & Sons Tea Industries (P) Limited owns and possesses a tea garden namely, Hukimpukri Tea Estate in the district of Tinsukia, Assam. The company inspite of its best efforts started incurring huge financial losses since the year, 1998. It is further stated that the Company due to aforesaid losses, could not make payment of salary/wages to its employees/workers for the period from July 19, 2003 to October 10, 2003 and according to the Respondent Company, the defaulted amount for the aforesaid period was worked out to be Rs. 21,10,320.00 and because of this default in payment, there was labour unrest in the Tea Garden of the Respondent Company adversely affecting the production and manufacture of tea resulting into suspension of work in the Tea Garden temporarily. 3(ii) To resolve the stand-off, a tripartite agreement was arranged on September 5, 2003 on the understating that one month salary and fortnightly wages would be paid within September, 2003 and the remaining payment would be sorted out mutually. The Asstt. Labour Commissioner, Tinsukia, was a signatory to the agreement. Pursuant to the aforesaid arrangement, an amount of Rs. 3,27,350.00 was disbursed to the workers and the employees as wages for the period from July 19, 2003 to August 1, 2003 by the respondent Company. The Asstt. Labour Commissioner, Tinsukia, was a signatory to the agreement. Pursuant to the aforesaid arrangement, an amount of Rs. 3,27,350.00 was disbursed to the workers and the employees as wages for the period from July 19, 2003 to August 1, 2003 by the respondent Company. As the respondent Company could not make further payment of the unpaid wages/salary to the workers and staff due to financial difficulty, as discussed above, a bipartite agreement was arrived at on December 10, 2003 wherein the respondent Company has agreed to make payment of wages/salary regularly from August, 2003. At or about the same time, the Labour Inspector, Tinsukia, respondent No. 4 in the writ petition, made an application on October 18, 2003 to the Assistant Labour Commissioner, respondent No. 2 in the writ petition, alleging that an amount of Rs. 41,53,000.00, being the arrear wages of 1105 workers of the aforesaid Tea Garden, for the period from July 19, 2003 to October 10, 2003, had not been paid and accordingly, a direction under Section 15(3) of the Payment of Wages Act was sought for disbursement of their arrear wages. The aforesaid application was registered as Application No. 12/2003 and, thereafter a notice was issued by the Asstt. Labour Commissioner on October 20, 2003 to the respondent Company. The respondent Company submitted a representation on October 23, 2003 requesting the Asstt. Labour Commissioner to furnish details of the claimed amount of Rs. 41,53,000.00 with a prayer for condonation of delay in making the payment. Without furnishing the details of the claimed amount, as requested for, the respondent Company was directed by the Asstt. Labour Commissioner by order dated October 23, 2003, to pay the claimed amount within 15 days. The respondent company being not in a position to comply with the directions of the Asstt. Labour Commissioner, filed an application dated October 23, 2003 praying for extension of time and in the meantime, an amount of Rs. 3,27,350.00 was disbursed to the workers being the wages for the period from July 19, 2003 to August 1, 2003. 3(iii) Being faced with the situation as discussed above, the respondent Company also submitted another application on November 18, 2003 praying for review of the order dated October 23, 2003 wherein it was categorically stated by the respondent Company that the liability of the Company was Rs. 22,10,320.00, not Rs. 3(iii) Being faced with the situation as discussed above, the respondent Company also submitted another application on November 18, 2003 praying for review of the order dated October 23, 2003 wherein it was categorically stated by the respondent Company that the liability of the Company was Rs. 22,10,320.00, not Rs. 41,53,000.00, as claimed, of which an amount of Rs. 3,27,350.00 had already been paid thereby leaving only a balance liability of Rs. 18,52,970.00. The respondent Company requested the Asstt. Labour Commissioner to verify the correctness of the amount claimed i.e. Rs. 41,53,000/- and allow them sufficient time to pay the outstanding wages. According to the respondent Company, no opportunity was, afforded to them to adduce any oral or documentary evidence in support of their stand. Instead, a requisition was forwarded by the Asstt. Labour Commissioner, Tinsukia, to the Certificate Officer, Tinsukia, for recovery of the claimed amount of Rs. 41,53,000.00 by initiating a Bakijai Proceeding. The Certificate Officer, Tinsukia (respondent No. 3 in the writ petition) issued a notice dated March 3, 2004 under Section 7 of the Bengal Public Demand Recovery Act, 1913 (in short the Recovery Act.) intimating the respondent Company that a certificate for an amount of Rs. 41,53,000/- has been filed and the respondent Company was further informed to file application within 30 clays, if they wanted to deny their liability of Rs. 41,53,000.00. The Respondent Company, after receipt of the notice dated March 3, 2004 of the recovery proceeding on April 12, 2004, submitted an application on April 29, 2004 before the said authority denying their liability of the claimed amount. It is stated that in consideration of the welfare of the workers/employees and also to get the tea garden back to track, the respondent Company also informed the authority to give sufficient time for payment of the admitted amount by way of instalment payment or even by disposing a part of their property and as there was no response to the aforesaid application, the respondent Company again submitted another application on May 5, 2003. 3(iv) It is stated that the respondent Company was taken by surprise when the Certificate Officer issued a proclamation of sale of property belonging to the respondent Company on June 5, 2004, measuring 31 B 3 K 15 L, fixing June 9, 2004 as the date of sale and on the same day, a notice was also issued fixing June 29, 2004 for settlement of terms of the proclamation. The respondent Company, on receipt of proclamation of sale and notice on June 23, 2004, submitted an application on the next day before the Certificate Officer (respondent No. 3 in the writ petition) to compute the amount payable by them, as the claimed amount of Rs. 41,53,000/- was incorrect and fictitious. They also prayed for an opportunity of hearing besides seeking leave to sell a part of the Company's land to liquidate the outstanding dues. As there was no further communication/order coming from the authority, the respondent Company, by a representation dated July 5, 2004 reiterated the above and prayed for cancellation of the certificate of sale. By an order dated July 7, 2004, the aforesaid representation of the respondent Company was rejected by the authority but the respondent company alleged that the rejection was made without giving any opportunity of hearing. 3(v) Consequent upon the recovery proceeding and the Bakijai proceeding initiated by the Certificate Officer, the auction sale in respect of land measuring approx 31 Bighas 3 Kathas and 15 Lechas, which belong to respondent Tea Company, was held on June 29, 2004 and this auction sale was made absolute by the Certificate Officer by an order dated July 30, 2004. Thereafter, the Certificate Officer also directed that the auction purchasers be provided with necessary certificate and delivery of possession of the purchased land. The disbursement of sale proceeds under various heads was also directed by the Certificate Officer. However, the Respondent Company stated that the auction sale of 24 Bighas of land which included standing tea crops was made at throw away price of Rs. 28,43,000/-, and the price was highly undervalued. 4. The disbursement of sale proceeds under various heads was also directed by the Certificate Officer. However, the Respondent Company stated that the auction sale of 24 Bighas of land which included standing tea crops was made at throw away price of Rs. 28,43,000/-, and the price was highly undervalued. 4. Assailing the validity of the proceeding under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter referred to as the Wages Act) before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, the proceeding under the Bengal Public Demand Recovery Act, 1913 (hereinafter referred to as Recovery Act) before the Certificate Officer i.e. Deputy Commissioner, Tinsukia, the Bakijai proceeding thereto, which culminated into auction sale of 24 Bighas of land belonging to the respondent Company and the order dated July 30, 2004 confirming the auction sale, a writ petition was filed by the respondent Company before the learned single Judge and the same was registered as W.P. (C) No. 6499/2004. The respondent Company also challenged the authority of the Assistant Labour Commissioner on the ground that the Assistant Labour Commissioner was not one of those named under Section 15 of the Wages Act as an authority authorized by law to hear and decide any claim arising in proceedings under the Wages Act and, therefore, the relevant proceedings conducted, by the Assistant Labour Commissioner were without jurisdiction and legal competence. 5. It is noticed that while moving the writ petition, an interim order dated September 14, 2004 was passed by the learned single Judge with a direction not to change the features of the land involved in the Bakijai Case No. 6/Misc./2003 and also to maintain status quo of the said land. It was also further directed that the disbursement of sale proceeds would remain suspended. No affidavit was filed by the State respondents. The appellants and some of the auction purchasers filed applications for vacation/modification of the interim order, referred to above, wherein their cases were exhaustively stated. 6. The learned single Judge after hearing the parties at length, allowed the writ petition by holding that the proceeding before the Asstt. Labour Commissioner, Tinsukia being application No. 12/2003 and the Bakijai Case No. 6/Mic/2003 before the Certificate Officer were illegal, null and void, and, consequently, the impugned order dated October 23, 2003 and the requisition dated December 24, 2003 of the Asstt. Labour Commissioner, Tinsukia were set aside. Labour Commissioner, Tinsukia being application No. 12/2003 and the Bakijai Case No. 6/Mic/2003 before the Certificate Officer were illegal, null and void, and, consequently, the impugned order dated October 23, 2003 and the requisition dated December 24, 2003 of the Asstt. Labour Commissioner, Tinsukia were set aside. The certificate dated March 3, 2004, proclamation of sale dated June 5, 2004 and the impugned order dated April 29, 2004, June 24, 2004, July 7, 2004, July 22, 2004 and July 30, 2004 were interfered with by the judgment under appeal and the auction sale held on June 29, 2004 and proclamation of sale dated June 5, 2004 were also adjudged as ineffectual and nonest in law. 7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid Judgments and order of the learned single Judge, the writ appeal has been filed by the appellants, who are respondents Nos. 5 to 9 in the writ petition, contending, inter alia, that they are bona fide auction purchasers who purchased 12 Bighas of land by paying an amount of Rs. 28,43,000/- in the Auction Sale and delivery of possession of the purchased land has been completed followed by confirmation of the sale on July 30, 2004. The auction sale and purchase therein, as referred to above, have been rendered ineffectual by the impugned judgment dated March 16, 2007 passed by the learned single Judge. 8. The grounds taken in the writ appeal, amongst others, maybe noticed as hereunder. That the order dated October 23, 2003 passed by the Asstt. Labour Commissioner was not appealed against despite availability of appeal provisions under Section 17 of the Wages Act, 1936, and that no appeal was preferred against various orders passed by the Certificate Officer despite availability of provision for appeal in the Recovery Act. The maintainability of the writ petition is also questioned on the ground that the writ petition involves serious disputed question of facts. It is also contended that appropriate remedy available Under Section 34/35 of the Recovery Act, 1913, was not resorted to and that the remedy to the grievances of the Respondent Company, if any, is not by way of writ petition. It is further contended that the Respondent Company having participated in the entire proceeding conducted by the Asst. Labour Commissioner, without raising any demur, the Respondent Company could not have been permitted to raise the question of jurisdiction and competence of the Asstt. It is further contended that the Respondent Company having participated in the entire proceeding conducted by the Asst. Labour Commissioner, without raising any demur, the Respondent Company could not have been permitted to raise the question of jurisdiction and competence of the Asstt. Labour Commissioner at such a belated stage. The appellants being the bona fide auction purchasers, the right of the appellants with regard to the land purchased on auction sale, which was conducted in execution of the certificate issued by the competent authority, cannot be interfered with inasmuch as the title of the purchased land have already, validly, transferred to the appellants and, therefore, submits the learned Counsel of the appellants, the impugned judgment order dated March 16, 2007 is liable to be set aside. In support of the aforesaid proposition, reliance/is placed in Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh and Anr. AIR 1967 SC 608 . 9. Though many contentions/issues have been raised in the writ appeal, as discussed above, Mr. S. Shyam, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants has, confined himself, in his arguments, mainly, on two points/issues. The first one relates to the authority and competence of the Asstt. Labour Commissioner to hear and decide claims under Section 15, Wages Act, which eventually culminated into issuance of order dated October 23, 2003 and requisition dated December 24, 2003 for recovery of the claimed amount and the second being the protection of right of the bona fide auction purchasers. 10. With regard to the first issue, it is submitted by Mr. Shyam, learned Counsel for the appellants that as the respondent Company have all along participated in the proceedings by submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Asstt. Labour Commissioner including the tripartite agreement arrived on September 5, 2003 to which the Asstt. Labour Commissioner was a party, they cannot be allowed to raise the question of jurisdiction and competence of the Asstt. Labour Commissioner at such a belated stage, more so when the certificate issued on the requisition of the Asstt. Labour Commissioner had already been executed in Bakijai Case No. 6/Misc/2003 before the Certificate Officer in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery Act. The appellants being the bona fide third party auction purchasers, after successful bid in the auction sale, have been given delivery of possession of the land in question followed by confirmation of sale. Further, the particular order appointing the Asstt. The appellants being the bona fide third party auction purchasers, after successful bid in the auction sale, have been given delivery of possession of the land in question followed by confirmation of sale. Further, the particular order appointing the Asstt. Labour Commissioner as the authority under Section 15 of the Wages Act, was not put to challenge in the writ proceedings and, therefore, the learned single Judge ought not to have declared the proceeding before the Asstt. Labour Commissioner as illegal and without jurisdiction. 11. Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the respondent Company has taken us to the provisions of Section 15 of the unamended Wages Act. Section 15 of the Wages Act lays down that claims arising out of deduction from wages or delay in payment of wages and penalty of malicious and vexatious claims are to be scrutinized and examined by persons who may be appointed against one of the Offices mentioned therein, by notification to be issued by the Government in the official Gazette. It is not in dispute that Section 15 of the Wages Act was amended on November 9, 2005 and the category of the persons identified in the pre-amended Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, is as follows: (a) Presiding Officer of any Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or under any corresponding law relating to the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in the State or (b) Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or (c) Any Officer with the experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or a stipendiary Magistrate. 12. A plain reading of the pre-amended Section 15 of the Wages Act, as reproduced hereinabove, would leave no doubt that the Office/Post of Assistant Labour Commissioner is not included as one among the Offices/Posts identified by the Statute. After amendment of Section 15 of the Wages Act, Office of the Assistant Labour Commissioner has been included as one of the authorities identified in the Section, to hear and decide, for any specific area, all the claims arising due to deduction from the wages of delay in payment of wages etc. The relevant portion of the amended Section 15 of the relevant Wages Act is reproduced below: 15. The relevant portion of the amended Section 15 of the relevant Wages Act is reproduced below: 15. Claims arising out of the deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and penalty for Malicious or vexatious claims-- (1) The appropriate Govt. may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint- (a) Any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation; Or (b) Any Officer of the Central Government exercising functions as- (i) Regional Labour Commissioner or (ii) Asstt. Labour Commissioner with atleast two years' experience or (c) Any office of the State Govt. not below the rank of Asstt. Labour Commissioner with at least two years' experience or (d).... (e).... 13. It is a settled position of law that all amendment of Acts/Rules, unless specifically provided therein to be retrospective, shall be prospective in its operation. Admittedly, amendment of Section 15 of the Wages Act, 1936, was without any retrospective effect, and as such the Office of the Assistant Labour Commissioner became an authority to hear and decide claims under Section 15 of the Wages Act, only with effect from November 9, 2005. It is also noticed that the State Government respondents did not file any affidavit showing the source of power to appoint Assistant Labour Commissioner as the authority under Section 15 of the Wages Act to hear and decide cases etc., prior to the aforesaid amendment dated November 9, 2005 and as such the proceedings conducted by the Assistant Labour Commissioner including the issuance of order dated October 23, 2003 and the requisition for recovery dated December 24, 2003 as referred to above, were without jurisdiction and legal competence and consequently, all the proceeding before the Assistant Labour Commissioner are ab-initio void and order; passed thereunder are null and void. 14. Any order issued/passed by an authority without showing its source of power to pass such order is a nullity. In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel Apex Court held that following at p. 262 of LLJ: 114. There cannot be an exercise of a power unless such power exists in law. If such power does not exist in law, the purported exercise of it would be an exercise of non existent power and would be void. The exercise of a power is, therefore, always referable to the source of such power and must be considered in conjunction with it.... If such power does not exist in law, the purported exercise of it would be an exercise of non existent power and would be void. The exercise of a power is, therefore, always referable to the source of such power and must be considered in conjunction with it.... It is also well settled that where a source/of power exists, the exercise of such power is referable only to that source and not to some source under which were the power exercises, the exercise of such power should be invalid and without jurisdiction. 15. Further, it goes without saying that the jurisdiction to hear and decide the claims and counter claims in a proceeding, can only be provided by statute/law and as such, in the absence of any statute/law providing such jurisdiction, the same cannot be assumed by any quasi judicial authority, Tribunal or Court by consent of the parties or by submission to such authority. In view of the above discussions, the arguments of Mr. Shyam, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants that the jurisdiction and the competence of the Assistant Labour Commissioner could not be questioned at a belated stage, is not acceptable and accordingly, the same is rejected. The reasoning and the conclusion of the learned single Judge on the first issue, are cogent and sustainable in law. 16. Coming to the argument on the second issue, Mr. Shyam, the learned Counsel for the appellants, submits that the appellants being the bona fide auction purchasers are entitled to protection of their interest in the purchased land and in support of his submission, Mr. Shyam relies upon a decision of the Apex Court Janak Raj v. Guridal Singh and Ors. (supra). In the aforesaid case, the question before the Apex Court was whether a purchaser in an auction sale made in execution of a decree, was entitled to get the sale confirmed even after the decree had been subsequently set aside. The Apex Court held that the appellant auction purchaser therein was entitled to a confirmation of the sale notwithstanding the fact that after holding of the sale the decree had been set aside. The Apex Court held that the appellant auction purchaser therein was entitled to a confirmation of the sale notwithstanding the fact that after holding of the sale the decree had been set aside. The policy of the Legislature seems to be that unless a stranger auction purchaser is protected against the vicissitudes of the fortunes of the suit, sales, in execution would not attract customers and it would be to the detriment of the interest of borrowers and the creditor alike if sales were allowed to be impugned merely because the decree was ultimately set aside or modified. In the circumstances, it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant that there is no jurisdiction for the learned single Judge to pass the impugned judgment and order interfering with the absolute right and title of the appellants on the land purchased under the aforesaid auction sale. Further, it is submitted that if the respondent company has any grievance against the auction sale and the purchase of the land by the appellants, the appropriate remedy for the writ petitioners was to resort to Section 34 and Section35 of the Recovery Act and not by way of writ proceeding. 17. On the other hand, Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee, the learned senior Counsel for the Respondent Company, submits that the proceedings before the Assistant Labour Commissioner as well as before the Certificate Officer suffer from irregularity and illegality from stage to stage thereby rendering the entire proceedings and the orders passed thereunder as null and void. Mr. Bhattacharjee further submits that the aforesaid proceedings were fraught with unholy nexus inasmuch as the certificate of sale was issued on July 19, 2004 whereas the auction sale was confirmed on July 30, 2004 i.e. the certificate of sale was issued eleven days before the sale was confirmed. It is further submitted that opportunities of hearing were denied to the Respondent Company from stage to stage. The applications/representations questioning the proceedings before Assistant Labour Commissioner as well as the proclamation of sale before the Certificate Officer were not disposed before the auction sale was made and confirmed. 18. Mr. Bhattacharjee further submits that in the case of Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh and Anr. The applications/representations questioning the proceedings before Assistant Labour Commissioner as well as the proclamation of sale before the Certificate Officer were not disposed before the auction sale was made and confirmed. 18. Mr. Bhattacharjee further submits that in the case of Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh and Anr. (supra), the auction sale therein was conducted under a valid decree which was passed by the Court in a valid proceeding, though the decree was set aside subsequently and as such the Apex Court held that the sale made in execution of a valid decree is entitled to be confirmed even after the decree was set aside subsequently. It is submitted that the ratio laid down in Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh and Anr. (supra) has no application in the present case inasmuch the entire proceeding before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Tinsukia, which culminated into the issuance of order dated October 23, 2003 and requisition dated December 24, 2004, were null and void for want of jurisdiction and competence. Admittedly, the Office/Post of Assistant Labour Commissioner was not one of the authorities identified under Section 15 of the Wages Act for the purpose of appointment as an authority to hear and decide claims arising under Section 15 of the Wages Act till Section 15 of the Act was amended w.e.f. November 9, 2005 and as such all the proceedings before the Assistant Labour Commissioner prior to November 9, 2005 and order(s) passed thereunder are null and void and consequently, the recovery proceedings as well as Bakijai proceedings before the Certificate Officer are also illegal and unsustainable in law. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned Sr. counsel, has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Ram Chandra Arya v. Man Singh AIR 1968 SC 954 in which the Apex Court distinguished the case of AIR 1967 Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh and Anr. (supra). The Apex Court held that in Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh and Anr. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned Sr. counsel, has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Ram Chandra Arya v. Man Singh AIR 1968 SC 954 in which the Apex Court distinguished the case of AIR 1967 Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh and Anr. (supra). The Apex Court held that in Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh and Anr. (supra) case, the sale having been held in execution of a valid existing decree, was itself valid, and the only question that came up for decision was whether such valid sale could be set aside otherwise than by resort to the provision of Rule 89 and 90 of the order 21, C.P.C. In the case of Ram Chandra Arya v. Man Singh (supra): The Apex Court held that the decree being a nullity, has to be treated as non-est and consequently the sale, when held, was void initio. In such a case, there is no question of any party having to resort to the provision of Rule 89 and 90 of order 21 CPC to have the sale set aside. Any claim based on a void sale can be resisted without having the sale set aside. The principle laid down in the Ram Chandra Arya v. Man Singh (supra) case is applicable in the present case inasmuch as the Assistant Labour Commissioner did not have the jurisdiction and competence to hear and decide any claim under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. 19. In view of the discussion made above, all the proceedings before the Assistant Labour Commissioner and the order dated October 23, 2003 and requisition dated December 24, 2004, issued thereunder are null and void and they are to be treated as non-est in law. Consequently, action taken and order issued by the Certificate Officer on the basis of proceedings and the requisition dated December 24, 2004 of the Assistant Labour Commissioner shall also be treated as non-est. We are in agreement with the finding of the Learned single Judge on the second issue, as discussed above. 20. For the reasons discussed herein above, we do not find any merit in the writ appeal and accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed, No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed