JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard Sri A.K. Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 30.7.1991 whereby in purported exercise of power under U.P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the “1975 Rules”) the petitioner who was appointed on temporary basis on the post of Clerk/Typist was terminated. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the post on which he was appointed was a permanent post and vacancy was filled up after due advertisement for the post, the appointment of petitioner could not be said to be temporary but for all purposes a permanent appointment and, therefore, he could not have been terminated by the impugned order. He further contended that pursuant to the interim order dated 23.9.1991 the petitioner is continuing in service and, therefore, the dismissal of petition will cause serious prejudice to petitioner and so he may be allowed to continue in service. Lastly, he submitted that some other persons were regularised vide order dated 27.8.1984 and, therefore, the petitioner is also entitled for the same treatment. 4. From the perusal of record it appears that initially after entertaining the writ petition in 1991 the case was listed for the first time only on 18.9.2004 when it was adjourned on account of illness of counsel for the petitioner. Thereafter on 24.9.2004 it was listed before Hon’ble Rakesh Tiwari, J. and while dismissing the writ petition His Lordship was pleased to pass the following order : “When the case was taken up none appeared to press this petition. Heard Standing Counsel and perused the record. Prima facie, there does not appear any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.” 5. Thereafter, it appears that the petitioner filed a restoration application through Sri S.C. Mandhyan, Advocate and Hon’ble Rakesh Tiwari, J. rejecting the same vide order dated 14.8.2008, and passed the following order : “It is apparent from the order dated 29.7.2008 that no application has been filed by Sri A.K. Saxena and application filed by subsequent counsel for recall of the order is not maintainable. Since the recall application filed by Sri S.C. Mandhyan, who is subsequent counsel, the recall application is rejected.” 6. Since the recall application filed by Sri S.C. Mandhyan, who is subsequent counsel, the recall application is rejected.” 6. Thereafter, Sri A.K. Saxena, Advocate filed restoration application and it appears that the Hon’ble Court was not informed that the writ petition was already dismissed on merits. In the circumstances, the restoration application was allowed vide order dated 6.2.2009 by Hon’ble S.U. Khan, J. passing the following order : “Earlier restoration application filed by another counsel was dismissed on the ground that it was not maintainable and restoration application should have been filed by Sri A.K. Saxena, the original counsel. The application has been filed by Sri A.K. Saxena and Sri A.K. Saxena also filed his own affidavit on 4.10.2007. Accordingly, restoration application is allowed after condoning the delay in filing the same as sufficient ground has been made out. Order dated 24.9.2004 dismissing the writ petition in default is set aside. Writ petition is restored.” 7. In these circumstances this matter has not been listed before this Court. The case was argued by Sri A.K. Saxena, Advocate and a written argument has also been filed on behalf of petitioner by Sri Sharad Mandhyan, Advocate. 8. Coming to the merits of the case it is evident from the record that the petitioner was appointed on temporary basis as is evident from his appointment letter dated 29.8.1989. It is not the case of the petitioner that he was ever confirmed or made permanent. Sri Saxena, however, placed reliance on Annexure-5 to the writ petition whereby the Accounts Officer, Basic Shiksha Parishad has certified that the post on which the petitioner is working is a permanent post. He contended that since he was working on permanent post, therefore, 1975 Rules is inapplicable. 9. There is no bar in law for making appointment on temporary basis on a permanent post. Similarly, for making a temporary appointment the authorities are not prohibited from following the regular process of selection since Article 16 is applicable for making appointment whether permanent or temporary and if the authorities have advertised the vacancies and made selection for making temporary appointment, it cannot be said to be illegal or bad in any manner. Law nowhere requires that where a selection procedure has been followed, the appointment shall always be made on permanent basis or substantive basis. Law nowhere requires that where a selection procedure has been followed, the appointment shall always be made on permanent basis or substantive basis. On the contrary, an appointment can be made for temporary or permanent basis but when it has been made by following a selection procedure it would not be illegal and irregular. The term ‘regular procedure’ has nothing to do with permanency. Assumption on the part of petitioner is that since the appointment was made after making selection, he is deemed to have been appointed on permanent basis is wholly unfounded and baseless as there is no such legal proposition in law nor learned counsel for the petitioner could brought before this Court any such law. 10. In the written argument reliance has been placed on a Single Judge decision of this Court in Sanjeev Kumar and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2000 All CJ 753. A perusal thereof shows that this Court relied on its earlier two Division Bench judgments in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5276 of 1978, Km. Madhu Jain v. Chancellor Bundelkhand University and others, decided on 19.1.1979 and Dr. (Km.) Ranjana Saxena v. Vice Chancellor Rohilkhand University, Bareilly, 1980 UPLBEC 225. In Madhu Jain (supra) the selection committee made selection for making appointment on substantive post but at the time of appointment the committee of management decided to make appointment on temporary basis for one year and in these circumstances it was held by the Court that the appointing authority could not have make such appointment when the selection was made for substantive post. Similar was the position in Ranjana Saxena (supra) and the same facts were applied in Sanjeev Kumar (supra). However, in the present case, it is own admission of the petitioner that the post itself was temporary when he was selected and appointed on temporary basis and the post was regularised/made permanent on 20.5.1994. Similar was the position in Ranjana Saxena (supra) and the same facts were applied in Sanjeev Kumar (supra). However, in the present case, it is own admission of the petitioner that the post itself was temporary when he was selected and appointed on temporary basis and the post was regularised/made permanent on 20.5.1994. In para 3 of the written argument it has been said “Though in the appointment letter, the appointment was mentioned as temporary, however it was for the fact that posts at that time are temporary which were regularised by the government vide order dated 20.5.1994.” In view of the above fact admitted to the petitioner, it cannot be said that he could have been appointed on permanent or substantive basis in 1989 and, therefore, he was rightly appointed on temporary basis and that being so the authorities if sought to terminate him by exercising powers under 1975 Rules, I find it difficult to find any fault with the said order merely on the ground that the petitioner was appointed on temporary basis after advertisement of the vacancy and, therefore, the said Rules would not apply to him. The aforesaid judgment in Sanjeev Kumar (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case. 11. Now coming to the second submissions that 1975 Rules are inapplicable, in my view, this submission is also thoroughly misconceived. Rule 2 of 1975 Rules define temporary service which reads as under : “2. Definition.—In these rules “temporary service” means officiating or substantive service on a temporary post, or officiating service on a permanent post under the Uttar Pradesh Government.” 12. The term “officiating service” in Rule 2 of 1975 Rules is in contradistinction with the “substantive service”. The temporary service as defined in the Rules means the following : (1) Officiating service on a temporary post. (2) Substantive service on a temporary post. (3) Officiating service on a permanent post. 13. The term “officiating service” though has not been defined in 1975 Rules but it includes an appointment which is not substantive. Meaning thereby ad hoc, short-term and all other kinds of temporary appointments covered by the term “officiating service”. Since the post at the time of appointment was temporary, the definition of temporary service includes both kinds of appointment on such post i.e. officiating or substantive. Meaning thereby ad hoc, short-term and all other kinds of temporary appointments covered by the term “officiating service”. Since the post at the time of appointment was temporary, the definition of temporary service includes both kinds of appointment on such post i.e. officiating or substantive. The appointment of the petitioner in 1989 in view of the facts already discussed above clearly cannot be said to against a permanent post or a permanent appointment. In the circumstances, in my view, 1975 Rules are fully applicable in the case in hand and the authorities concerned cannot be said to have faulted in exercising its power thereunder. 14. Now coming to the next question that the appointment was terminated without assigning any reason this Court finds that the power of termination of an employee who is in temporary service has been conferred by Rule 3 and it does not require mention of any reason for such termination. In the cases of State of U.P. and another v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, JT 1991 (1) SC 108; Commissioner, Food and Civil Supplies v. Prakash Chandra Saxena, 1994(5) SCC 177 ; State of U.P. v. Kamla Devi, 1996(4) SCC 548 and Rudra Kumar Sain v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 2808 the Apex Court while considering 1975 Rules held that a temporary employee has no right to hold the post and can be terminated at any time under 1975 Rules. 15. So far as the second aspect that he is continuing under the interim order, it is now well settled that no person can take advantage of an interim order passed by this Court. A benefit under the interim order is tentative and subject to final decision in the matter and cannot go beyond the final decision. This aspect has been dealt with by this Court in Smt. Vijay Rani v. Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools Region-I, Meerut and others, 2007(2) ESC 987 . The service rendered by the petitioner pursuant to an interim order obtained from this Court in 1991 cannot place him in an advantageous position merely on the basis of such continuance since the said continuance cannot be based on his own rights. The service rendered by the petitioner pursuant to an interim order obtained from this Court in 1991 cannot place him in an advantageous position merely on the basis of such continuance since the said continuance cannot be based on his own rights. If the order of termination cannot be found to be wrong or illegal, any subsequent event also would not create any right of benefit in favour of the petitioner and the alleged regularisation/permanency of the post in 1994 or regularisation of some other persons in 1994 would not benefit the petitioner in any manner. The reliance placed by petitioner in another Single Judge decision of this Court in G.S. Asthana v. Uttar Pradesh Textile Corporation Ltd., 1995 All CJ 567 also would not help him for the reason that therein this Court in para 9 of the judgment recorded a finding that the petitioner, G.S. Asthana was entitled to be deemed confirm after completion of two years probation. There also the appointment was made on a permanent post and considering the facts and circumstances of that case this Court held that the appointment of Sri Asthana could not be said to be temporary but ought to be treated on probation and after completion of two years service he was entitled to be deemed confirm. The said judgment has no application to the facts of this case as already discussed above for the reason that the nature of appointment of petitioner, as I have discussed above, cannot be said to be substantive in any manner but it was a temporary appointment made on temporary post and admittedly till the petitioner was terminated by means of the impugned order the post is treated to be temporary one. 16. In view of the above discussion, I do not find any merit in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. ————