JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amitava Lala, J.—This appeal has been preferred by the Insurance Company on the ground of quantum in spite of rejection of application under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which, according to us, is not maintainable in view of the judgment of this Court reported in 2007 (4) ADJ 101 (Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Smt. Manju and others) following three Judges’ Bench judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 2002 SC 3350 (National Insurance Co. Ltd., Chandigarh v. Nicolleta Rohtagi and others). Ratio of such judgment is also followed two other three Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court in 2003 (3) SCC 524 , (Sadhna Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and another). 2. It has been contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that by a subsequent order of a two Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court in SLP No. 17301­17302/07 converted to appeal Civil No. 6026-6027 of 2007 (United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shila Dutta and others), the principle laid down in Nicolleta Rohtagi (supra) has been referred to a larger Bench. Therefore, an interim order is required to be passed keeping the appeal pending as in the F.A.F.O. No. 2730/2008 (National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Shashikala Maskara and others). 3. Since order of the two Judges of the Supreme Court, as shown by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, referred the matter to the larger Bench ignoring the binding effect of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court, we inclined to see the legal aspect for the sake of judicial discipline. A debate arose before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in AIR 1989 SC 1933 (Union of India and another v. Raghubir Singh) whether a Division Bench of Judges is obliged to follow the law laid down by the Division Bench or a larger number of Judges. The Constitution Bench answered as follows : “29. We are of opinion that a pronouncement of law by a Division Bench of this Court is binding on a Division Bench of the some or a smaller number of Judges, and in order that such decision be binding, it is not necessary that it should be a decision rendered by the Full Court or a Constitution Bench of the Court. We would, however, like to think that for the purpose of imparting certainty and endowing due authority decisions of this Court in the future should be rendered by Division Benches of at least three Judges unless, for compelling reasons, that is not conveniently possible.” 4. That apart we are of the view that mere reference of a matter to a larger Bench does not declare laying down law by the three Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court as nullity. The date of the order of reference is 3rd December, 2007 in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta and others (SLP No. 17301-17302/07 converted to Appeal Civil No. 6026-6027 of 2007) and as per the case status of the internet till this date, the matter is pending before a larger Bench. Propriety demands while such type of issue if in the seisin of the larger Bench for active consideration, the High Court may refrain from passing any order but not at a stage where mere reference has been made which is pending for considerable time. We are governed by our own judgment in the case of M/s MAK Plastics (P) Ltd. and others v. U.P. Financial Corporation and others, 2008 (7) ADJ 546 (DB), to understand difference between laying down law and a reference. In further, we cannot pass any order on the apprehension keeping the appeal pending only at the stage of reference to mount the arrears of pendency on the High Court. Law will bind only when it has laid down by the Parliament or Legislature or by the declaration of the Supreme Court or by judgment or final order of the larger and parallel Bench of the High Court. Situation is not such in this case. Hence mere reference of any matter by the Bench of the Supreme Court to a larger Bench or passing an interim order by a Division Bench of this Court or a referendum by any legislative body for the necessary amendment cannot lead us to deviate from our considered view. 5. Thus, the appeal cannot be admitted, hence dismissed, however, without imposing costs. 6. Incidentally, the appellant-Insurance Company prayed that the statutory deposit of Rs. 5. Thus, the appeal cannot be admitted, hence dismissed, however, without imposing costs. 6. Incidentally, the appellant-Insurance Company prayed that the statutory deposit of Rs. 25,000/- made before this Court for preferring this appeal be remitted back to the concerned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal as expeditiously as possible in order to adjust the same with the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimants, however, such prayer is allowed. Hon’ble D.K. Arora, J.—I agree. ————