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2009 DIGILAW 243 (GUJ)

Naynaben Jashvantsinh Vihol v. State of Gujarat

2009-04-02

RAVI R.TRIPATHI

body2009
Judgment Ravi R.Tripathi, J.—Learned Advocate Mr. Joshi for the petitioner seeks permission to amend the prayer clause. 2. Permission is granted. Amendment to be carried out during the course of the day. 3. Heard Mr. Joshi, learned Advocate for the petitioner. 4. As a pure question of law is raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, the matter requires consideration. 5. Rule. 6. With the consent of the learned Advocates appearing for Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, the matter is taken up for final disposal. 7. The present petition is filed challenging order dated 19th February, 2009 passed in Revision Application No. 15 of 2008 (Annexure-L to the petition, Page-118) and also Notice dated 24th February, 2009 issued by Respondent No. 2 to the petitioner (Annexure-M to the petition, Page-121). 8. The petitioner has described herself and her husband as Directors of Janu Impax Pvt. Ltd. It is the case of the petitioner that in the year 2000 the Company wanted some financial assistance and they had approached Respondent No. 3-Bank. Later on, the company and its Management-the Directors decided not to avail the said financial assistance. It is the case of the petitioner as is setout in Para-3.1 that after the decision was taken not to avail of financial assistance, the petitioner along with her husband had requested the Respondent No. 3-Bank to return all documents which were signed by them. The request was not acceded by saying that the petitioner need not worry about the return of the documents more so when the petitioner has not availed of any financial assistance. It is also the case of the petitioner that once again in the year 2001, the petitioner approached the Bank requesting to return those documents on which petitioner’s signatures were obtained. The said request was also not acceded to. The petitioner was told that they need not worry about those documents more particularly when the petitioner has not availed of any financial assistance. Later on, the Bank went into liquidation. 9. The petitioner was surprised when the petitioner received a Notice dated 5th January, 2007, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure-A. The notice is to the effect that as per the books of accounts of the Bank, the petitioner (The Private Limited Company of which petitioner was one of the Directors) and the two guarantors, owe an amount of Rs. 32,72, 822/- is due and payable and that the said amount be paid to the Liquidator and a lawful receipt be obtained, failing which, as provided in Clause-(h) of Section 110 of the Gujarat State Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, (‘the Act’ , for short) the liquidator will be obliged to collect that amount with 7% liquidation charge and surcharge upto extent of 10% and that the said amount will be recovered from the petitioner (The Private Limited Company of which petitioner was one of the Directors) as arrears of land revenue by virtue of Section 103 of the Act. It will be important to note that immediately on receipt of this first notice, the same was replied through an Advocate and the case of the petitioner as set out in Para-2 of that reply is as under, which is reproduced for perusal,— “..XXXX” “You have got no right to serve such notice and under the sections, which are mentioned are not applicable. My clients were to surprise to see the notice neither my client nor (1) has taken any loan from the Vikas Co-op. Bank Ltd., nor there is question of guarantor No. (3), It seems that the somebody else at the relevant point of time might have taken loan in collusion with the officers of the Vikas Co-op. Bank Ltd., and a false and fabricated notice has been served to my clients and its seems that the officer at the relevant point of time illegally committed fraud and might have shown any loan in the name of the my client No. 1, Nevertheless, my clients submit and request you to please go through the matter in deep e.g. when was the loan sanctioned and when was disbursed and who have signed the said documents of loan. You are also requested to send zerox copy of original documents and date of sanction and disbursement so that my clients will clarify to the same. It seems from the contents of the notice that big fraud has been committed by the officer of the Vikas Co-op.Bank Ltd. (In liquidation).” (emphasis supplied) Instead of paying any heed to the reply and contents therein, the Liquidator again issued another notice dated 1st February, 2007, which too was replied by letter dated 13th February, 2007 through an Advocate. It seems from the contents of the notice that big fraud has been committed by the officer of the Vikas Co-op.Bank Ltd. (In liquidation).” (emphasis supplied) Instead of paying any heed to the reply and contents therein, the Liquidator again issued another notice dated 1st February, 2007, which too was replied by letter dated 13th February, 2007 through an Advocate. As if it was decided by the Liquidator not to look into the replies and it’s contents, the Liquidator did not bother to reply to the petitioner and issued third notice on 1st March, 2007. The petitioner having felt that Liquidator is adamant, is not paying any heed to request made by the petitioner, the petitioner, filed an application in the year 2007 before the District Registrar Co-operative Societies, City Ahmedabad seeking permission to file a suit under Section 96 of the Act stating therein that this is a case of fraud and that the petitioner has never availed of any financial assistance from the Vikas Co-operative Bank Ltd. and that the matter was required to be looked into in a regular proceedings. The said application of the petitioner was forwarded to the Registrar Co-operative Societies, Gujarat State which was again supported by an affidavit, a copy of which is produced as Annexure-H. The Registrar Co-operative Societies, by its order dated 7th November, 2007 rejected that application, a copy of which is produced as Annexure-J (Page-104). 10. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the perusal of the order will reveal that the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Gujarat State has not given any cogent reasons for not granting permission to file a suit under Section 96 of the Act. The learned Advocate for petitioner submitted that if the permission would have been granted, no prejudice was going to be caused to any person. More so when the case of the petitioner is that it is a case of fraud of financial assistance which is stated by the petitioner from day one i.e. right from the beginning i.e. the day on which the petitioner replied to the first notice dated 5th January, 2007. 11. More so when the case of the petitioner is that it is a case of fraud of financial assistance which is stated by the petitioner from day one i.e. right from the beginning i.e. the day on which the petitioner replied to the first notice dated 5th January, 2007. 11. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the order was taken in revision being Revision Application No. 15 of 2008 before Deputy Secretary (Appeal), Cooperation Department, Gujarat State, who too dismissed that revision application by order dated 19th February, 2009, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure-L, which is the subject matter of challenge in this petition as is set out in prayer Clause Para-10(A) of the petition. 12. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is again served with notice dated 24th February, 2009 stating therein that the necessary action under Section 110(h) will be required to be taken which too is challenged by way of this petition. 13. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that, ‘in view of Section 114(1) of the Act, the liquidation proceedings stand terminated on expiry of the period prescribed therein. The contention is raised by setting out the details in draft amendment which was moved and allowed on 31st March, 2009. The learned Advocate for the petitioner invited attention of the Court to Sub-section (1) of Section 114 of the Act, which reads as under:— “1. The winding up proceedings of a society shall be closed within three years from the date of the order of the winding up, unless the period is extended by the Registrar: Provided that, the Registrar shall not grant any extension for a period exceeding one year at a time and four years in the aggregate, and shall , immediately after the expiry of seven years from the date of the order for winding up of the society, deem that the liquidation proceedings have been terminated, and pass an order terminating the liquidation proceedings. (emphasis supplied) Explanation.—In the case of a society which is under liquidation at the date of the commencement of this Act, an order for the winding up of the society shall be deemed for the purpose of this Section to have been passed on the said date.” (Explanation is not relevant for the facts of this case). 14. (emphasis supplied) Explanation.—In the case of a society which is under liquidation at the date of the commencement of this Act, an order for the winding up of the society shall be deemed for the purpose of this Section to have been passed on the said date.” (Explanation is not relevant for the facts of this case). 14. The learned Advocate for the petitioner invited attention of the Court to provisions of Section 161 of the Act. Section 161 is provided for power to exempt societies from provisions of Act. Section 161 reads as under:— “The State Government may, by general or special order, to be punished in the Official Gazette, exempt any society or class of societies from any of the provisions of this Act, or may direct that such provisions shall apply to such society or class of societies with such modifications not affecting the substance thereof as may be specified in the order. Provided that, no order to the prejudice of any society shall be passed, without an opportunity being given to such society to represent its case.” 15. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that as submitted in the draft amendment, the question of granting exemption from the operation of Sub-section (1) of Section 114, under Section 161 had come up before this Court not once but twice. Once it was before the learned Single Judge in the matter between Bhavnagar Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. H.M. Joshi and Ors., reported in 1985 (2) GLR 1087 , and second time it was before the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of The Bhavnagar District Co-op. Bank Ltd. (As a liquidator) vs. Government of Gujarat & Anr., reported in 1985 (2) GLR 1380 . The learned Advocate for the petitioner strenuously submitted that the law on the point is well settled as declared by the Division Bench of this Court, that Section 161 of the Act cannot be resorted to grant exemption from operation of Section 114. In this regard, the learned Advocate relied upon the following observations made by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court. “4. Section 161 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 is reproduced below for ready reference: “161. In this regard, the learned Advocate relied upon the following observations made by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court. “4. Section 161 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 is reproduced below for ready reference: “161. The State Government may, by general or special order, to be published in the Official Gazette, exempt any society or class of societies from any of the provisions of this Act, or may direct that such provisions shall apply to such society or class of societies with such modifications not affecting the substance thereof as may be specified in the order: Provided that, no order to the prejudice of any society shall be passed, without an opportunity being given to such society to represent it’s case.” Mr. Joshi, the learned Counsel who argued for the District Co-operative Bank-common petitioner of these four matters, urged that Section 161 should be so interpreted as to achieve the purpose underlying the objective of advancing the co-operative movement and curbing the contrary object when a co-operative society is not able to discharge its functions and achieve the objectives underlying the co-operative working. We find that the power to exempt or the power to direct which may include the provisions of Section 114 also shall apply to such societies with such modifications not affecting the substance thereof as may be specified in the order. Section 114 has been couched by the legislature in very emphatic terms. Section 114 requires that winding up proceedings of a society shall be closed within three years from the date of the order of the winding up. The anxiety of the legislature is self-evident. If the society can be revived it may be revived in reasonable time. If the society cannot be reconstituted or revived it must obliterate itself from the field or scene so that further obligations or complications do not arise. That is why the legislature’s keenness to see that the winding up proceedings are concluded or closed within a period of three years from the date of the order of the winding up. The legislature, however is not oblivious of the day-to-day difficulties and that is why the proviso appended to Sub-section (1) of Section 114 provides that the Registrar may extend the period in the aggregate of four years. The legislature, however is not oblivious of the day-to-day difficulties and that is why the proviso appended to Sub-section (1) of Section 114 provides that the Registrar may extend the period in the aggregate of four years. But here, again, the legislature’s anxiety is to see that this aggregate period of four years, which is permissible as the maximum period is not to be granted at a stretch but not more than one year’s period is to be granted at a stretch, the idea being that the Registrar should closely watch those proceedings and should try to see that if the winding up proceedings can be concluded in four years no extension is given. So the substance of Section 114(1) is that the winding up proceedings under any circumstance cannot go beyond a period of seven years.” 16. The learned Advocate also invited attention of the Court to observations made by the Hon’ble Division Bench in Para-5 of its judgment, which reads as under:— “5. Section 161 is a general Section not limited to Section 114(1). Let us assume for the sake of argument that Section 114(1) is also contemplated to be covered by Section 161. The moot question that would arise before us is whether such an exemption can be granted or a direction can be issued to apply a Section with modification retroactively. To us it appears clear that here the seven years’ period is over and the resultant effects automatically follow and the powers under Section 161, assuming that they are there, cannot be exercised. It is the rule of interpretation that legislative provisions are prospective in operation and not retroactive. The science of interpretation is not oblivious of the legislature’s power to give retroactive authority. But this retroactive operation of any law or retroactive exercise of any statutory power conferred by the law is to be inferred only when there is express provision to that effect or if there is a necessary implication permissible in the facts and circumstance of a particular provision or a particular power. Reading Section 161 of the Act and particularly noting the legislature’s anxiety that the substance of any provision is not to be adversely affected. Reading Section 161 of the Act and particularly noting the legislature’s anxiety that the substance of any provision is not to be adversely affected. we would say that the powers of extending the period under Section 114(1), even if presumably existing there, cannot be so exercised as to adversely affect the real thrust of the provisions of Section 114 of the Act. The said Section in very clear and unambiguous language provides that the winding up proceedings of a society are to be closed within three years from the date of the order or within the extended period which cannot in aggregate exceed seven years in all. There is a legal fiction contained in the proviso appended to sub-sec (1) of Section 141 of the Act. and it is to the effect that immediately after the expiry of seven years from the date of the order of the winding up of the society the liquidation proceedings shall stand terminated and the Registrar shall pass an order terminating the liquidation proceedings. When the legislature’s intent is explained in very clear terms, that auxiliary verb “shall” would stare in our face it is too much to say that the powers under Section 161 qua Section 114 can be exercised retroactively. The fact that the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act is a sort of a welfare legislation would not mend the matter in any or the power under that text. The power delegated to the authority by the legislature cannot be exercised with retrospective effect. This is the view accepted by our bother Ahmadi, J. in his judgment in the Special Civil Application No. 1311 of 1978 decided by him on 25th June, 1985, following the ratio of the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of the Collective Farming Society Ltd. and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, AIR 1974 Madhya Pradesh 59, where the Madhya Pradesh High Court was dealing with Section 91 of the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act. pari materia with Section 161 of our Act.” (emphasis supplied) 17. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that once there is a Division Bench judgment on the issue, he need not refer to and rely upon a judgment of the learned Single Judge, but only with a view to make the record complete, he is referring to the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that once there is a Division Bench judgment on the issue, he need not refer to and rely upon a judgment of the learned Single Judge, but only with a view to make the record complete, he is referring to the judgment of the learned Single Judge. He invited attention of this Court to the following observations in Para-5, which reads as under:— “Mr. Joshi, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, contended that since the Act was a welfare legislation, it should be given retrospective operation. In support of this contention he placed reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in Paragraph 11 of its judgment in Registrar Co-operative Societies vs. K.K. Kunjabmu, AIR 1980 SC 350 . However, there cannot be a straight jacket formula that every welfare legislation must necessarily be retrospective in effect. The Court must look to the language, setting, context book. I have pointed out earlier that if the power conferred by Section 161 were to be exercised retrospectively, it would render nugatory certain statutory consequences which the legislature intended to follow on the expiry of the period stipulated in Section 114(1) of the Act. In the view that I am taking, I find myself fortified by a decision of the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Collective Farming Society vs. State, AIR 1974 MP 59 . While dealing with Section 91 of the same as Section 161 of the Act with which we are concerned, the Full Bench held that the said power could not be exercised with retrospective effect. In Paragraph 37 of the judgment, Dayayl, J., speaking for the Full Bench observed as under: “When power is delegated to an authority by the legislature such authority has no power to exercise it with retrospective effect.” Section 114(1) of the Act it is difficult to understand why the State Government should invoke Section 161 retrospectively because the ultimate objective for the same would be to bring about regular termination of the liquidation proceedings which is achieved by the fiction engrafted in the former provision.” 18. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that once there is a binding decision of the Division Bench of this Court and also a decision of the learned Single Judge, it is not necessary to refer to and rely upon the decisions of the other High Courts but to see that the Court is assisted in the matter of adjudicating the issue involved in this matter, he cited a decision of Division Bench of High Court of Bombay. He submitted that Co-operative Societies Act of the State of Gujarat is having identical provisions which fell for consideration of the High Court of Bombay in the matter of Jagannath Maruti Pisal vs. District Deputy Registrar in Writ Petition No. 4150 of 1986, which was decided on November 26, 1996, (1997-CTJ-0-369 = 1997 (TLS) 1316679), a xerox copy of which is made available for the perusal of the Court. Similarly, the learned Advocate for the petitioner also placed a copy of the judgment of the learned Single Judge of High Court of Bombay in the matter between Krishnanath A. Prabhu Dessai vs. State of Goa in Writ Petition 357 of 2001, which was decided on November 29, 2006, (2007-BCR-4-385, 2007-Mhlj-6-106 = 2007 (tls) 1325058) a xerox copy of which is made available for the perusal of the Court. 19. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that in view of the aforesaid decision, position of law is very well settled. Provisions contained in Section 161 are general in nature whereas provisions contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 114 are specific. Not only that unless there is a specific mention of Section 114(1) in Section 161 as a rule of interpretation, Section 161 cannot be made applicable to Section 114(1). 20. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that he may not be able to put it better than what it is already placed by a Division Bench of this Court when the Division Bench of this Court said that,— “It is the rule of interpretation that legislative provisions are prospective in operation and not retroactive. The science of interpretation is not oblivious of the legislature’s power to give retroactive authority. The science of interpretation is not oblivious of the legislature’s power to give retroactive authority. But this retroactive operation of any law or retroactive exercise of any statutory power conferred by the law is to be inferred only when there is express provision to that effect or if there is a necessary implication permissible in the facts and circumstance of a particular provision or a particular power. Reading Section 161 of the Act and particularly noting the legislature’s anxiety that the substance of any provision is not to be adversely affected. we would say that the powers of extending the period under Section 114(1), even if presumably existing there, cannot be so exercised as to adversely affect the real thrust of the provisions of Section 114 of the Act. The said Section in very clear and unambiguous language provides that the winding up proceedings of a society are to be closed within three years from the date of the order or within the extended period which cannot in aggregate exceed seven years in all. There is a legal fiction contained in the proviso appended to Sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the Act. and it is to the effect that immediately after the expiry of seven years from the date of the order of the winding up of the society the liquidation proceedings shall stand terminated and the Registrar shall pass an order terminating the liquidation proceedings. When the legislature’s intent is explained in very clear terms, that auxiliary verb “shall” would stare in our face it is too much to say that the powers under Section 161 qua Section 114 can be exercised retroactively.” (emphasis supplied) 21. The learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. C.B. Upadhyay appearing for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, with best of his ability, tried to support the order passed by the State Government in Revision Application No. 15 of 2008 on 19th November, 2009. He submitted that it is required to be kept in mind that the petitioner is a borrower and he has come to this Court challenging the orders passed below. His case is that he has not taken any financial assistance from the Bank and therefore the petitioner is liable to pay money to the Bank. He is, therefore, trying to take shelter under Sections 161 and 114(1) of the Act. His case is that he has not taken any financial assistance from the Bank and therefore the petitioner is liable to pay money to the Bank. He is, therefore, trying to take shelter under Sections 161 and 114(1) of the Act. He submitted that aforesaid two decisions are not applicable to the facts of the present case, more particularly, because in Division Bench before this Court it was a liquidator who was before this Court and in the present case it is the borrower who is before this Court. He also submitted that in the case before Division Bench an order was already passed by the Registrar whereas in the present case, there is no order passed by the Registrar. 22. The learned AGP submitted that any provisions of law is required to be so interpreted that the object of the act is achieved, and, therefore, the present petition should not be entertained and should be dismissed accordingly. 23. The submissions of learned Assistant Government Pleader are not found worth accepting. The principles of interpretation of law are well settled and they apply equally to all the matters. When there is a binding decision of the Division Bench the submissions made by learned Assistant Government Pleader cannot be accepted which is to the effect that a particular provision is to be interpreted in a particular manner if the petition is filed by a borrower. The submissions made by the learned Assistant Government Pleader are not found acceptable in view of the binding decisions of the Division Bench of this Court. Besides, the Court cannot be unmindful of the fact the case of the petitioner right from day one i.e. on 5th January, 2007, when the first notice was received and was replied by the petitioner through an Advocate by letter dated 19th January, 2007 is that its a case of fraud, that the petitioner has not availed of any financial assistance from the Bank, the normal reaction of the Liquidator should have been that the matter requires consideration and let the matter be adjudicated in a regular proceedings. Instead of Registrar, Co-operative Societies rejected application of the petitioner seeking permission for filing a suit before the Board of Nominees. The Court restrains itself from going into the question of propriety of the orders passed by the authorities coupled with the stand taken by the authorities in such a matter. 24. Instead of Registrar, Co-operative Societies rejected application of the petitioner seeking permission for filing a suit before the Board of Nominees. The Court restrains itself from going into the question of propriety of the orders passed by the authorities coupled with the stand taken by the authorities in such a matter. 24. An affidavit-in-reply is filed by one Shri Aabidkhan Chhatekhan Pathan, Legal Superintendent from the office of Co-operative Societies, Gujarat State. The officer is looking after the litigation relating to Co-operative societies and cooperation department in this court nearly for last 20 years. When he is looking after the litigation relating to the Co-operative societies and the cooperation department, the Court has reasons to draw an inference that he is in know of all the decisions of this Court. If he is not, he is not fit to continue as a Legal Superintendent in the office of Registrar Co-operative Societies. This officer has filed an affidavit wherein in Para-4 it is stated as under.— “. . . . . . . The contention regarding termination of winding up proceedings by the petitioner on completion of seven years is misleading. Though Section 114 stipulates that if the liquidation proceedings are not completed within seven years in total, then the same shall stand terminated, the Government is empowered under Section 161 of the Act to grant exemption from the provisions of Section 114. In instant case, the bank has already moved proposal for extension of time which has been forwarded to the Government and the same is pending.” This affidavit is affirmed on 20th March, 2009. An officer who is attending the High Court for last 20 years exclusively for the matters relating to Co-operative societies and Co-operative department under the Co-operative Societies Act, his ignorance about the aforesaid two decisions is not pardonable. The first impression which arises from the facts is as to whether there is deliberate attempt to mislead the Court on the part of the officer. At this juncture, the said officer tenders unconditional apology. 25. With reluctance, the apology is accepted. 26. The learned Advocate Ms. Paurmi Sheth appearing for Respondent No. 3 submitted that the present petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground that the petitioner is not the borrower and that the petitioner has not stated that the petition is filed on behalf of company who was the borrower. 25. With reluctance, the apology is accepted. 26. The learned Advocate Ms. Paurmi Sheth appearing for Respondent No. 3 submitted that the present petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground that the petitioner is not the borrower and that the petitioner has not stated that the petition is filed on behalf of company who was the borrower. The submission of learned Advocate Ms. Sheth is very strange. Normally when a person avoids service on behalf of a Private Limited Company though holds the control over the same such submission may come forward. In the present case, when the petitioner-Director along with her husband in the company concern is before this Court and has taken pains to reply to notice issued by liquidator right from the beginning i.e. from 5th January, 2007 such a plea is not only strange but also not acceptable. 27. The learned Advocate for Respondent No. 3 who has filed an affidavit of one Shri Shambhuprasad Son of Kanjibhai Brahmbhatt who is the liquidator at present. He has tried to deal with the matter with no seriousness. Not only that, the affidavit filed by Respondent No. 3 is conveniently vague and that particular-materials missing. For example, in Para-7.1, it is stated that,— “Respondent No. 3 bank has been taken into liquidation under Section 307 of Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 vide order dated 3.5.2001. By subsequent order dated 31.05.2007 the time had been extended from 3.5.2007 to 2.5.2008. After my appointment as liquidation by letter dated 27.02.2008 I have requested through Respondent No. 2 to Respondent No. 1 to further extend time of 2 years from 2.5.2008 which is under active consideration.” (emphasis supplied) 28. Without being mindful of the specific requirement of Sub-section (1) of Section 114 of the Act, which provides that,—”. . . . . . .Registrar shall not grant any extension for a period exceeding one year . . . . . . .” , the material information is kept back. The deponent could have placed on record as he is in-charge of Respondent No. 3 Bank. Initially under Sub-section (1) of Section 114 winding up proceedings of a society under mandate of legislation, come to a close at the expiry of three years. . . . . . .” , the material information is kept back. The deponent could have placed on record as he is in-charge of Respondent No. 3 Bank. Initially under Sub-section (1) of Section 114 winding up proceedings of a society under mandate of legislation, come to a close at the expiry of three years. It is only by way of proviso that the Legislature thought it fit to provide for extension that too not exceeding one year at a time and four years in aggregate. In the present case, Respondent No. 3 very conveniently does not mention anything about the intervening period and straight way referred to order dated 3rd May, 2001. This shows that the Respondent No. 3 is either ignorant about the provisions of law or is deliberately keeping back the material fact from the Court to see that an order of his choice that is dismissal of the petition is obtained from the Court. 29. Every provision of law is to be read ‘as it is’ and while so reading the reader has to be conscience of the fact that every provision is placed on the statute book with a purpose. Let no impression be created that a legislation is made for the sake of making and words therein are used for the purpose of beautifying the same. If one keeps these principles in mind, will immediately put a question to oneself as to why the legislature while providing for extension for an aggregate period of four years made it mandatory that, ‘it should not be extended for a period of one year at a time.’ The answer is obvious. The legislature wanted everybody to be on the guard. The liquidator is not supposed to go in slumber after his appointment as a liquidator. Every year the authority which is granting extension is supposed to take stock of the situation and then to grant further extension if found necessary and imperative. The difficulty is that the legislature in its wisdom enacts laws but then all these enactments are to be implemented through human agency in the form of government officers who have various reasons more-so extraneous reasons for implementing or not implementing the particular provision. 30. The difficulty is that the legislature in its wisdom enacts laws but then all these enactments are to be implemented through human agency in the form of government officers who have various reasons more-so extraneous reasons for implementing or not implementing the particular provision. 30. In the present case, not a word is stated as to what was done during all these six years or seven years by the liquidator, may be some other officer then the present Respondent No. 3 officer was working in his place. Nothing is coming on record. Not only that, affidavit filed by the Government is also silent as to whether Registrar- Gujarat Co-operative Societies had ever taken stock of the work done by the liquidator,-respondent No. 3 herein. That being so, the submission made by the learned Advocate for Respondent No. 3 are found not acceptable and the same are rejected. 31. The learned Advocate for Respondent No. 3 submitted that there is no prayer to the effect that the liquidation proceedings be declared to have come to close or that the same shall stand terminated in view of Sub-section (1) of Section 114 of the Act. In the considered opinion of this Court the said objection is a technical objection and the Court cannot encourage such technicalities. Therefore, in the interest of justice the Court permitted the petitioner to amend prayer Clause and accordingly the petitioner has added prayer Clause 10(BB) wherein it is prayed that, ‘it may kindly declare that by virtue of provisions of Section 114 the liquidation proceedings stand terminated and it is not permissible to the State Government to grant extension under Section 161 of the Act.’ 32. The learned Assistant Government Pleader is permitted to place a copy of order of extension passed by the authorities under Section 161 on 25th March, 2009 on record. The said order is quashed and set aside. The relief, as is sought for in Para-10(BB) is granted. Notice dated 24th February, 2009 is also quashed and set aside. It is also declared that by virtue of Section 114(1) of the Act, liquidation proceedings of Vikas Co-operative Societies Bank Ltd., stands terminated. 33. The said order is quashed and set aside. The relief, as is sought for in Para-10(BB) is granted. Notice dated 24th February, 2009 is also quashed and set aside. It is also declared that by virtue of Section 114(1) of the Act, liquidation proceedings of Vikas Co-operative Societies Bank Ltd., stands terminated. 33. The Court is not able to restrain itself from observing that besides making benevolent legislation it is equally important for the Government to see that those legislation are implemented in their true spirit and officers are sensitized to see that object of benevolent legislation are not frustrated by their indifferent approach. 34. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.