Judgment :- Aggrieved by the award passed by the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation (Deputy Commissioner of Labour), Salem, dated 02.08.2004 in W.C.No.412 of 2003, the insurance company has filed the present appeal. 2. (a) The averments made in the application are as follows: The husband of the 1st respondent, namely, Balasubramaniam, was working as a lorry driver under the 2nd respondent. On 312. 2002 when the said Balasubramaniam was in the course of his employment, namely, driving a lorry bearing registration No.TN-27-U-2425 at Ramachandrapuram in Andhra Pradesh State, he had developed chest pain due to heavy workload and he was immediately taken to the local hospital at Ramanachandrapuram. But even before reaching the hospital, he died. Hence, the wife of the deceased, the 1st respondent herein, made a claim for a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-as compensation as against the employer, the 2nd respondent and the insurer of the vehicle, the 1st respondent herein stating that due to the stress and strain that had been undergone during the course of employment, her husband had developed chest pain and died. (b) The claim of the 1st respondent was resisted by the insurance company, denying the allegation of the claimant that the deceased died during the course of employment under the 1st respondent and contending that the 1st respondent had come forward with the claim petition taking advantage of the death of the her husband only to get unlawful enrichment. (c) In order to prove the claim, on the side of the claimant, she examined herself as P.W.1 and marked Exs.A-1 to A-7. On the side of the respondents, the 2nd respondent employer examined himself as R.W.1 but no document was marked on his behalf. On the side of the insurance company, no evidence was let in. After analysing the evidence, the authority below came to the conclusion that the death was caused only due to the stress and strain of the work, which the deceased had undergone during the course of his employment, by relying upon the evidence of R.W.1 employer and Ex.A-6, i.e. the certificate issued by the private hospital in its letterhead at Ramachandrapuram. On coming to such a conclusion, the authority below has assessed the compensation as per the schedule of Workmens Compensation Act and arrived at a sum of Rs.3,03,669/- and consequently, directed the insurance company to pay the said amount. On coming to such a conclusion, the authority below has assessed the compensation as per the schedule of Workmens Compensation Act and arrived at a sum of Rs.3,03,669/- and consequently, directed the insurance company to pay the said amount. Aggrieved over the said finding, the present appeal is filed by the insurance company. 3. At the time of admission of this appeal, this Court framed the following substantial questions of law for consideration: (1) Whether the Deputy Commissioner of Labour is correct in awarding compensation to a person not coming under the purview of Workman as defined under Section 2(n) of the Act ? (2) Whether the Deputy Commissioner was correct in holding that the appellant is liable to pay compensation in spite of the fact that the death has not occurred as envisaged under section 3(1) of the Act ? (3) Whether the Deputy Commissioner of Labour was correct in holding that the appellant is liable to pay the compensation awarded in spite of the fact that the policy does not cover the said risk ? 4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently contended that firstly, the evidence on record is not sufficient to hold that the deceased was working under the 1st respondent. Secondly, absolutely no evidence was produced on the side of the 1st respondent/claimant to strengthen her case that the heart attack suffered by the deceased was only due to the stress and strain of the work that he had undergone during the course of employment. With regard to this submission, the learned counsel for the appellant invited the attention of this Court to the evidence of R.W.1, the owner of the vehicle and the evidence of P.W.1, the wife of the deceased, and contended that when it was the case of the claimant that the deceased had died while he was driving the lorry at Ramachandrapuram, Andhra Pradesh State, they ought to have examined the co-worker, who accompanied him in the lorry. But the 1st respondent/claimant did not examine the co-worker. So far as the evidence of P.W.1 and R.W.1 is concerned, they were not the persons, who were present while the deceased developed a chest pain while he was at Ramachandrapuram. Therefore, their evidence is not sufficient to come to a conclusion that the deceased had suffered heart attack due to stress and strain of the work. So far as the evidence of P.W.1 and R.W.1 is concerned, they were not the persons, who were present while the deceased developed a chest pain while he was at Ramachandrapuram. Therefore, their evidence is not sufficient to come to a conclusion that the deceased had suffered heart attack due to stress and strain of the work. Except the oral evidence of R.W.1, no proof was filed before the authority below to show that the deceased was the workman under the 1st respondent employer. Similarly, no document was filed to show that on the date of accident, the deceased had gone in the lorry as a duty driver to Andhra Pradesh. Under such circumstances, the authority below ought not to have come to the conclusion that the death was due to the stress and strain suffered by the deceased in the course of employment. Hence, the order passed by the authority below is liable to be set aside. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent/ claimant contended that the authority below, on appreciation of the evidence placed before him, has come to the conclusion that the deceased had died due to the stress and strain sustained during the course of employment. The said finding rendered by the authority below is purely a question of fact. As such, no interference is called for in exercising power under Section 30 of the Workmens Compensation Act since no substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. 6. By way of reply, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision reported in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti ..vs.. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali and another (2007 (I) p.1) and contended that the dictum laid down in the said judgment clearly show that the Deputy Commissioner did not have jurisdiction to grant damages unless the evidence brought on record before him would show that the death by way of cardiac arrest was only due to the stress and strain of the work. Hence, the jurisdiction question will involve as a substantial question of law. Therefore, it is incorrect to state that no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal. Hence, the jurisdiction question will involve as a substantial question of law. Therefore, it is incorrect to state that no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal. Further more, the learned counsel for the appellant also contended that there is a bounden duty on the part of the person making claim to prove that there was a casual connection between the injury and the accident and the work was done in the course of employment. Secondly, the onus is upon the claimant to show that it was the work, that had resulted in strain which contributed to and aggravated the injury. But, in the instant case, absolutely no evidence was available to show that there was a nexus between the injury sustained by the victim, namely, heart attack and to his employment. Under such circumstances, by allowing the claim petition, the authority below has committed a jurisdictional error in awarding the amount. That apart, the learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on the judgment reported in Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd., ..vs.. Chinnapillai and another ( 2009 ACJ 711 ) and contended that if the finding of the authority below is not based on any evidence, the order passed by the Commissioner is not sustainable both in law and on facts. 7. Heard the learned counsel for both sides and perused the materials available on record. 8. On a careful scrutiny of the award as well as the evidence on record, I find that the specific case of the 1st respondent/claimant was that her husband was working under the 2nd respondent as a lorry driver and on 312. 2002 while he was on duty as a driver in lorry bearing registration No.TN-27-U-2425 at Ramachandrapuram, Andhra Pradesh, he had developed chest pain due to the work load and immediately he was taken to the private hospital, where he was declared as brought dead. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, P.W.1 was not present while the deceased was suffering from heart attack. Further, in Ex.A-6, the certificate issued by the private hospital, namely, Samatha Clinic, it has been stated as follows: "...Balasubramanyam, M. s/o.Marappan was brought to our hospital on a dead condition, reported to have been suffering from chest pain since two days according to Velu Murugan, P., a relative of the deceased". Further, in Ex.A-6, the certificate issued by the private hospital, namely, Samatha Clinic, it has been stated as follows: "...Balasubramanyam, M. s/o.Marappan was brought to our hospital on a dead condition, reported to have been suffering from chest pain since two days according to Velu Murugan, P., a relative of the deceased". But the said Velmurugan, who was along with the deceased at the time of his death, was not examined before the authority below. Except the death certificate issued by the private hospital in its letterhead, no other document was produced on the side of the claimant that the deceased developed the chest pain while he was on duty on the particular date. Further, the contents of Ex.A-6 also in no way establish the case of the claimant that the deceased had developed chest pain while he was carrying on his work. Though the employer of the deceased was examined as R.W.1, except his oral evidence, the crucial documents, such as, trip sheet,etc., were not filed before the authority below to show that the deceased had gone to Andhra Pradesh on duty by driving the lorry, where he developed chest pain and died. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, P.W.1 and R.W.1 are not the proper persons to speak about the cause of death of the deceased which happened in Andhra Pradesh. In this regard, it is relevant to extract para 28 of the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in 2007(I) ACJ 1, which reads as follows: "28. Only because a person dies of heart attack, the same does not give rise to automatic presumption that the same was by way of accident. A person may be suffering from a heart disease although he may not be aware of the same. Medical opinion will be of relevance providing guidance to court in this behalf". 9. A reading of the above would show that there is a onerous duty on the part of the claimant to prove before the authority below that the deceased had suffered heart attack only due to the stress and strain of the work. When the approved legal position is above, the conclusion arrived at by the authority below, by merely relying upon Ex.A-6, is not legally sustainable. Further, in the said judgment, it has been clearly held as follows: "38. When the approved legal position is above, the conclusion arrived at by the authority below, by merely relying upon Ex.A-6, is not legally sustainable. Further, in the said judgment, it has been clearly held as follows: "38. Unless the evidence is brought on record to elaborate that the death by way of cardiac arrest has occurred because of stress or strain, the Commissioner would not have jurisdiction to grant damages. In other words, the claimant was bound to prove jurisdictional fact before the Commissioner. Unless such jurisdictional facts are found, the Commissioner will have no jurisdiction to pass an order. It is now well settled that for arriving at a finding of jurisdictional fact, reference to any precedent would not be helpful as a little deviation from the fact of a decided case or an additional fact may make a lot of difference by arriving at a correct conclusion. For the said purpose, statutory authority is required to pose unto himself the right question. 39. Section 30 of the said Act postulates an appeal directly to High Court if a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. 40. A jurisdictional question will involve a substantial question of law. A finding of fact arrived at without there being any evidence would also give rise to a substantial question of law. From the order passed by the Commissioner, it appears, he has not arrived at a finding that the job involved any stress or strain. It was merely stated that he was working as a khalasi in a truck which was going to Tavarewadi Village from Kolhapur to get the milk.....The Commissioner came to the conclusion that the death took place during the course of the employment but then no evidence has been brought on record to show that it had a casual connection between accident and serious injury so as to fulfil the requirements of the term out of employment. Indisputably, there has to be an proximate nexus between cause of death and employment. A stray statement made by appellant that deceased had died while working in the vehicle and stress or strain of the work did not appear to have any foundation. Admittedly, she was not present at the spot. She had also no personal knowledge. All these facts she had admitted in the cross examination". 10. A stray statement made by appellant that deceased had died while working in the vehicle and stress or strain of the work did not appear to have any foundation. Admittedly, she was not present at the spot. She had also no personal knowledge. All these facts she had admitted in the cross examination". 10. In my considered opinion, the principles laid down in the said decision of the Apex Court cited by the learned counsel for the appellant squarely apply to the facts of the present case. On going through the entire evidence, I find that no material was available to come to a conclusion that on the date of death, the deceased was in employment under the 1st respondent and he died due to stress and strain of the work. Since the authority below has awarded the amount without adequate evidence, I am of the opinion that the authority below has granted damages without any jurisdiction. Therefore, the jurisdictional question is involved in this appeal as a substantial question of law, which essential fact is neither proved nor established. Under such circumstance, I am not inclined to accept the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents that the question whether the deceased had died due to stress and strain is only a question of fact and not question of law, particularly when there is no substantial evidence available on record. For the foregoing reasons, the civil miscellaneous appeal is allowed and the order passed by the authority below is set aside. Pending appeal, if the award amount was withdrawn by the 1st respondent/claimant, the appellant insurance company is permitted to recover the same from the owner of the vehicle, namely, the 2nd respondent. No costs.