JUDGMENT By the Court.—This matter has come up before us pursuant to the reference made by Hon’ble Single judge vide order dated 18.12.2006, formulating the following two questions to be answered by a larger Bench : (i) Whether the decision in Pallav Sheth case, (2001) 7 SCC 549 , can be construed so as to apply all the principles enshrined in the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act (except Section 17 thereof) and as to whether the same can be made applicable to proceedings to be initiated under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. (ii) Whether the High Court in exercise of its powers for initiating contempt of its Court or the contempt of its subordinate Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, has the power to condone and waive the delay in initiation of contempt proceedings under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. 2. The two questions appear to have been formulated following the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant based on certain observations of the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and others, 2001 (7) SCC 549 relying whereof the learned counsel for the applicant has sought to apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1963) to the limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as Act, 1971) so that if the contempt proceedings are sought to be initiated after one year’s delay, the same may be condoned by the Court and proceedings may be initiated even after the above prescribed period. 3. Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that in State of West Bengal v. Kartik Chandra Das and others, (1996) 5 SCC 342 the Apex Court held that Section 5 of Act, 1963 would be applicable to the appeals filed under Section 19 of Act, 1971 beyond the period prescribed therein, empowering the Court to condone the delay. Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that in State of West Bengal v. Kartik Chandra Das and others, (1996) 5 SCC 342 the Apex Court held that Section 5 of Act, 1963 would be applicable to the appeals filed under Section 19 of Act, 1971 beyond the period prescribed therein, empowering the Court to condone the delay. Based thereon he submitted that it cannot be said that Act, 1971 is a complete code in all respect, inasmuch as, if for the purpose of appeal under Section 19 power to condone delay under Section 5 of Act, 1963 can be validly applied, there is no reason to exclude the same for the purpose of condoning delay if contempt proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation prescribed under Section 20 of Act, 1971. Further relying on Section 29 of Act, 1963 he submitted that unless the application of Act, 1963 is expressly excluded, it will apply to all the Courts which includes the High Court also. In support of the above submission, reliance is placed on Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1976) 1 SCC 392 ; Competent Authority, Tarana District, Ujjain (M.P.) v. Vijay Gupta and others, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 631; Shantilal M. Bhayani v. Shanti Bai, 1995 Supp(4) SCC 578; Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5 ; Shaik Saidulu @ Saida v. Chukka Yesu Ratnam and others, (2002) 3 SCC 130 ; State of Goa v. Western Builders, (2006) 6 SCC 239 . 4. Learned counsel for the applicant has also filed written submissions in support of his contention that Section 5 of Act, 1963 ipso facto would be applicable to Act, 1971 enabling this Court to entertain a contempt application filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 20 provided the applicant satisfy the Court about the reasons beyond his control in the occurrence of delay. 5. Having heard the above submissions and perusing the reference order of the learned single judge, the provisions of the statute and the relevant authorities on the subject applicable on the aforesaid questions, we find that though the questions are simple but has far reaching consequences and therefore need to be answered after careful consideration of the entire law on the subject. 6. 6. The genesis of the argument advanced by learned counsel for the applicant is the judgment of the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth (supra) and therefore before coming to other aspects of the matter it would be appropriate to have a perusal of the above judgment as to the dispute raised therein and the exposition of law laid down therein. 7. One M/s Fair Growth Finances Services Ltd. was notified on 2nd July, 1992 under the provisions of Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transaction Insecurities) Act, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the "Special Courts Act") All properties belonging to it stood automatically attached by operation of law due to above notification. The Custodian appointed under the Special Courts Act filed Misc. Application No. 193 of 1993 and sought a decree for Rs. Fifty Crores on behalf of the notified party against Pallav Sheth. On 24.2.1994, Sri Pallav Sheth submitted a consent decree for Rs. 51.49 crores which was to be paid in instalments. Shri Sheth paid Rs. Two Crores but thereafter committed default in payment of further instalments. The Custodian then moved an Execution Application No. 343 of 1994 and the Special Court thereupon required the appellant Sri Sheth to disclose all his assets and at the same time by an interim order dated 3.8.1994 restrained him from alienating, encumbering and selling off or parting with possession or transferring in any manner whatsoever any of his assets, movable or immovable, including bank accounts. The Special Court on 24.8.1994, after receiving an affidavit from Pallav Seth wherein he disclosed his assets, passed further interim order of attachment of some of the assets mentioned therein. 8. On 11th November, 1997 the Income Tax Department conducted raids on Pallav Sheth and taken note of the News Paper reports containing the details of the assets detected by the Income Tax Department, the Special Court directed the custodian to ascertain from the Income Tax Department complete details of all the assets of Sri Sheth. The Income Tax Department in reply to the query made by the custodian, vide letter dated 5th May, 1998 informed that during search operations, Pallav Sheth was detected being de-facto owner of five companies, namely Anzug Plastics (P) Ltd., Magan Hotels (P) Ltd, Klar Chemicals (P) Ltd., Malika Foods (P) Ltd. and Jainam Securities (P) Ltd.. The Income Tax Department in reply to the query made by the custodian, vide letter dated 5th May, 1998 informed that during search operations, Pallav Sheth was detected being de-facto owner of five companies, namely Anzug Plastics (P) Ltd., Magan Hotels (P) Ltd, Klar Chemicals (P) Ltd., Malika Foods (P) Ltd. and Jainam Securities (P) Ltd.. He had further reported to admit in the statements before the Income Tax Authorities that several cash deposits amounting to Rs. 2.81 crores made in the bank accounts of the aforesaid five companies were his undisclosed income. Thus according to the Income Tax Authorities the assets of the above 5 companies belong to Pallav Sheth and these companies were also to receive substantial amount from other companies/individuals. Besides, the Income Tax Department also informed about some further assets of Pallav Sheth. The Custodian on 18th June, 1998 filed Misc. Application No. 276 of 1998 before the Special Court with the prayer that the appellant should be punished for committing contempt of the Special Court’s order dated 24th August, 1994, whereupon the Special Court issued notices on 9th April, 1999 to Pallav Sheth to show cause for contempt. The allegations of defiance of the order of Special Court were denied by Pallav Sheth in his reply. The Special Court on 29th October, 1999 allowed amendment of Misc. Application No. 276 of 1998 permitting substitution of reference to the order dated 24th August, 1994 with order dated 3rd August, 1994. By order dated 31st January, 2001, the Special Court held Pallav Sheth guilty of contempt of Court and sentenced him to one month imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs. 2,000/-. By a separate order dated 7th February, 2001 the Special Court dealt with the contention with respect to limitation and held that the contempt application was not barred by limitation prescribed under Section 20 of Act, 1971 on the ground that it was a case of continuing wrong. 9. In appeal before the Apex Court, the arguments on behalf of Pallav Sheth were restricted only to the issue of limitation under Section 20 of Act, 1971. The appellant before the Apex Court chose not to advance any submission on the merits of the issue. 9. In appeal before the Apex Court, the arguments on behalf of Pallav Sheth were restricted only to the issue of limitation under Section 20 of Act, 1971. The appellant before the Apex Court chose not to advance any submission on the merits of the issue. In the circumstances, the question formulated by the Apex Court, which it required to decide in that case was as under, as mentioned in para 8 of the judgment: "The only question which survives for consideration in this appeal is whether in view of the provisions of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the Special Court was prohibited from taking any action as, according to Mr. Venugopal, the Court had initiated proceedings of contempt after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt was alleged to have been committed". 10. The Apex Court initially examined the provisions of Special Courts Act and with reference to Section 11(A) thereof, found that the Special Court was constituted under Section 5 of the said Act, consisting of one or more sitting Judges of the High Court and has the same power as the High Court in respect of contempt of itself. This power could be exercised in addition to the exercise of power under the provisions of the Act, 1971. In the circumstances it was noticed by the Apex Court that just as the High Court, being the Court of record, has the power under Article 215 of the Constitution of India to punish for contempt of Court itself, similarly, the Special Court consisting of a Judge of the High Court can also exercise that power available under Article 215. 11. Shri Venugopal, counsel for Pallav Sheth, appellant before Apex Court, for the purpose of attracting Section 20 relied on the date of the order which was said to be violated that is 3rd August, 1994 and 22nd August, 1994 and the date on which show cause notice was issued by the Special Court for contempt that is 9th April, 1999 and submitted that the limitation having expired long back, the contempt proceedings were barred by Section 20. He also contended that the provision of Section 20 will be attracted for determining the period of one year on the date when the Court applied its mind and not on the date on which the application was filed and since the limitation had expired long back, the entire proceedings were barred by limitation. To answer the above question, the Apex Court firstly considered as to what would be the date on which the Court can be said to have initiated proceedings, i.e. the date when notice is issued by the Court or from the date when an application is filed by the informant bringing to the notice of the Court the wilful disobedience or violation of order by the alleged contemnor and secondly as to when the period would commence i.e. from the date of the order of the Court or the date when the violation thereof takes place or when it comes to the knowledge of the informant. 12. Answering the first part about the date of initiation of proceedings , it was held that Section 20 has to be construed in a manner which would avoid an anomaly and hardship to both the litigants so as not to suffer for inaction on the part of the Court to punish for its contempt in taking up the application and apply its mind as to whether the notice is to be issued or not and also the harmonious construction of the various provisions of the statute so that a mischievous person may not take undue advantage of any avoidable lacuna in the language of the statute. The Court held that for the purpose of taking cognizance of a criminal contempt under Section 15, beginning of the action would be the date when the proceedings were initiated for contempt that is when the application is filed before the Advocate General or this Court. Similarly for civil contempt, filing of an application drawing the attention of the Court for further steps to be taken under Act, 1971 would be the date of commencement of the period prescribed in Section 20 and not when the Court issued notice. Therefore 18.6.1998 was held to be the date on which the Apex Court held that the proceedings for contempt were initiated under Section 20 for the purpose of considering the period of limitation or the period for taking cognizance. Therefore 18.6.1998 was held to be the date on which the Apex Court held that the proceedings for contempt were initiated under Section 20 for the purpose of considering the period of limitation or the period for taking cognizance. If an application is moved within one year thereafter it would be well within the time and cannot be said to be barred by Section 20. The Apex Court in para 44 of the judgment held as under : 44. "Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court’s own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different, while in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed". (emphasis added) 13. The Apex Court also took into consideration that where the alleged contemnor had been successfully hiding the facts by practising fraud etc., the delay caused thereof would not render the proceedings barred by limitation but in such case, date on which such facts came to the notice of the informant would be the date of commencement of violation of Court’s order. The Court considered the submissions of the appellant that application itself having been filed after almost four years when the order was passed, it was barred by time and repelling the same, in para 46 and 48 of the judgment observed as under : "The record disclosed that the Custodian received information of the appellant having committed contempt by taking over benami concerns, transferring funds to these concerns and operating their accounts clandestinely only from a letter dated 5.5.1998 from the Income Tax Authorities. It is soon thereafter that on 18.6.1998, a petition was filed for initiating action in contempt and notice issued by the Special Court on 9.4.1999...." (para 46.) "The fraud perpetuated by the appellant was unearthed only on the Custodian receiving information from the Income Tax Department, vide their letter dated 5.5.1998. On becoming aware of the fraud, application for initiating contempt proceedings was filed on 18.6.1998, well within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 20. It is on this application that the Special Court by its order of 9.4.1999 directed the application to be treated as a show-cause notice to the appellant to punish him for contempt. In view of the above stated facts and in the light of the discussion regarding the correct interpretation of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, it follows that the action taken by the special Court to punish the appellant for contempt was valid..." (para 48) 14. Since the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth (supra) held that the application was filed within time, it did not consider the further aspect of the matter as to whether there was a continuing wrong or not. 15. If we consider the question in the facts and circumstances of the case in which it cropped up before the Apex Court, we find that though the Interim Orders were passed by the Special Court on 3rd August, 1994 and 24th August, 1994 but their defiance came to the notice to the Custodian only when he received a letter dated 5th May, 1998 from the Income Tax Department and within one and a half month thereof he filed an application, i.e., on 18th June, 1998 for contempt before the Special Court requesting for initiating contempt proceedings against Pallav Sheth (supra). For determining the period of one year, the Apex Court found that the defiance having commenced on 5th May, 1998 the application was well within time. 16. We do not find that the Apex Court has relied on either Section 29 of Act 1963 or has held that Section 5 would be applicable for enabling the Court to initiate the contempt proceedings even after expiry of period of one year provided under Section 20 of 1971 Act. 17. 16. We do not find that the Apex Court has relied on either Section 29 of Act 1963 or has held that Section 5 would be applicable for enabling the Court to initiate the contempt proceedings even after expiry of period of one year provided under Section 20 of 1971 Act. 17. Sri Srivastava learned counsel for the appellant, however, placing reliance on later part of para 46 and 47 of the judgment in Pallav Sheth (supra) vehemently contended that therefrom the applicability of Section 5 of 1963 Act is very clear and is evident. The aforesaid extract of the judgment which has been heavily relied by Sri Srivastava, would be useful to be referred as under : "Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 and 24 (inclusive) shall apply insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. This Court in the case of Kartik Chandra Das has held that by virtue of Section 29(2) read with Section 3 of the Limitation Act, limitation stands prescribed as a special law under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and in consequence thereof the provisions of Sections 4 and 24 of the Limitation Act stand attracted". This Court in the case of Kartik Chandra Das has held that by virtue of Section 29(2) read with Section 3 of the Limitation Act, limitation stands prescribed as a special law under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and in consequence thereof the provisions of Sections 4 and 24 of the Limitation Act stand attracted". (para 46) "Section 17 of the Limitation Act, inter alia, provides that where, in the case of any suit or application for which a period of limitation is prescribed by the Act, the knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or application is founded is concealed by the fraud of the defendant or his agent Section 17(1)(b) or where any document necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or the applicant has been fraudulently concealed form his Section 17(1)(d), the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or the applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it; or in the case of a concealed document, until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of producing the concealed document or compelling its production. These provisions embody fundamental principles of justice and equity viz. That a party should not be penalized for failing to adopt legal proceedings when the facts or material necessary for him to do so have been wilfully concealed from him and also that a party who has acted fraudulently should not gain the benefit of limitation running in his favour by virtue of such fraud". (para-47) 18. Having given our considerable thoughts, we find that this submission is also plainly misconceived. The Hon’ble Single Judge himself has noticed the judgment of Apex Court in Pallav Sheth (supra) at length and also various authorities cited before him, and has observed that Section 20 leaves no room for doubt that the words used therein are almost prohibitory in nature to the effect that no Court shall initiate any proceedings after expiry of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. He has further observed that Section 20 takes away jurisdiction of the Court for initiation of contempt proceedings and as such the Court shall not punish such person if initiation has not taken place within a period of one year. He has further observed that Section 20 takes away jurisdiction of the Court for initiation of contempt proceedings and as such the Court shall not punish such person if initiation has not taken place within a period of one year. The Hon’ble Single Judge is also of the view that application of Section 5 of Act 1963 would make Section 20 and the prohibition therein nugatory which cannot be the intention of the legislature. By judicial process of interpretation the Court’s cannot find such a course. But, then, referring to some further observations of the Apex Court, his Lordship with a view to have a clear authority on the subject, as to whether Section 5 would be applicable to contempt proceedings under Section 12 of Act, 1971, particularly in view of the fact that the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth (supra) has taken note of Section 17 of the 1963 Act; has formulated the above two questions and referred the matter to the larger Bench though the judgment itself contain reply to the above questions on page 9 and 10. 19. Now we proceed to reply the above two questions in the light of the various authorities cited at the bar as also the submission that Section 17 has been taken note by the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth (supra) would also make all other provisions applicable including Section 5 of 1963 Act. 20. The law in respect to contempt of Court has been considered time and again in the last more than a century. We do not propose to deal in the matter at length, but it would be useful to have a brief reference of the relevant aspect of the matter. During pre-independence era the High Courts of Judicature were established by Letters Patent and were made superior Courts of record. As such they had power to attach and commit for acts amounting to contempt of their own proceedings as Contempt of Court without reference to whether the acts alleged constituted an offence under the Indian Penal Code. However, there appears to be conflict between High Courts as to the jurisdiction of the High Court to punish for contempt of subordinate Courts. The Madras High Court in the case of Venkata Rao, 12 I.C. 293 and the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of King Emperor v. P.G. Kulkarni, AIR 1922 Bom. However, there appears to be conflict between High Courts as to the jurisdiction of the High Court to punish for contempt of subordinate Courts. The Madras High Court in the case of Venkata Rao, 12 I.C. 293 and the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of King Emperor v. P.G. Kulkarni, AIR 1922 Bom. 52 held that they possess power to protect their subordinate Courts against such contempt. The Calcutta High Court in King Emperor v. Girindra Mohan Das and others, 17 C.W.N. 1285; and Legal Remembrancer v. Matilal Ghose and others, AIR 1914 Cal. 69 took a contrary view. Further it was also not clear as to whether the Court of Judicial Commissioners of the Central Provinces, Oudh and Sind have these general powers either in regard to contempt of their own proceedings or of the proceedings of Courts subordinate to them. It is in these circumstances that the Contempt of Courts Act (XII of 1926) (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1926") was enacted. Though the statement of objects and reasons included that the Act is being enacted considering that the Court of Judicial Commissioner whether would have power of contempt or not but the Act, 1926 as enacted, in fact, did not provide anything in respect to Judicial Commissioner. This was pointed out by Nagpur Judicial Commissioner’s Court in the case of Mst. Hira Bai v. Mangal Chand, AIR 1935 Nag. 46. It was a short Act containing only three sections. 21. After independence in the Constitution specific provisions were made with respect to powers of Contempt of Supreme Court and High Courts under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India. Article 215 of the Constitution makes every High Court, a Court of record having power to punish for its contempt. It reads as under : "215. High Courts to be Courts of record.—Every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself." 22. Courts of record are not defined either in the Constitution or in General Clauses Act. However, the Courts of record are those, whose acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled for a perpetual memorial testimony. Their proceedings are kept on record and are conclusive evidence of that which is recorded therein. Courts of record are not defined either in the Constitution or in General Clauses Act. However, the Courts of record are those, whose acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled for a perpetual memorial testimony. Their proceedings are kept on record and are conclusive evidence of that which is recorded therein. Whether a Court is Court of record or not would depend on the fact as to whether it has jurisdiction to punish for contempt of itself or other substantial offences. In respect to the statutory enactments, Article 246 (1) of the Constitution provides that the Parliament has exclusive power to make laws in respect to such matters as are enumerated in List I in Seventh Schedule. Article 246 (3) empowers the Legislature of the State to make law with respect to the subjects mentioned in List II in the Seventh Schedule subject to Article 246 (1) and (2). Article 246 (2) provides that notwithstanding anything in Clause 3 Parliament and subject to Clause 1 the legislature of any State shall have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. In respect to Courts, Entry 77 List-I VII Schedule provides as under : "77. Constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court (including contempt of such Court), and the fees taken therein; persons entitled to practice before the Supreme Court." 23. Similarly, in respect to Contempt of Courts other than that of Supreme Court, Entry 14 List III Schedule Seventh provides as under : "14. Contempt of Court, but not including contempt of the Supreme Court." 24. Therefore, the Constitution clearly provides for a law to be made by the Parliament or State legislature to the extent mentioned in Entry 77, List I and Entry 14 List III. The Parliament stepped in by enacting "Contempt of Court Act, 1952" (Act 33 of 1952) (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1952") after the commencement of Constitution and replaced the Act, 1926. The aforesaid Act was a short one and basically provided the extent of punishment which could be imposed by the High Courts in the matter of contempt. The Act, 1952 vide Section 6 thereof repealed not only Act, 1926 but some other provincial enactments enforced in pre-independent States which were mentioned in the schedule. The aforesaid Act was a short one and basically provided the extent of punishment which could be imposed by the High Courts in the matter of contempt. The Act, 1952 vide Section 6 thereof repealed not only Act, 1926 but some other provincial enactments enforced in pre-independent States which were mentioned in the schedule. The said enactments were as under : "(a) The Contempt of Courts Act, IV of 1855, as in force in the State of Hyderabad. The whole (b) The Indore Contempt of Courts Act, No. V of 1930, as in force in the State of Madhya Bharat. The whole (c) The Contempt of Courts Act, Gwalior State, Samvat 2001, as in force in the State of Madhya Bharat. The whole (d) The Contempt of Courts Act, 1930 (XI of 1930), as in force in the State of Mysore. The whole (e) The Contempt of Courts Act, S. 1991 (V of S. 1991), as in force in the Patiala and East Punjab States Union. The whole (f) The Patiala and East Punjab States Union Judicature Ordinance, S. 2005 (X of S. 2005) Section 33 (g) The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (XII of 1926) as in force in the State of Rajasthan before the commencement of the Act. The whole (h) The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (XII of 1926) as in force in the State of Saurashtra before the commencement of this Act. The whole (i) The High Court of Judicature Saurashtra State Ordinance, 1948 (Saurashtra Ordinance II of 1948) Section 31 (j) The Cochin Contempt of Courts Act (XXXII of 1911), as in force in the State of Travancore-Cochin. The whole 25. The aforesaid Act was substituted by the Act, 1971 which is a detailed enactment covering various aspects of the matter pertaining to contempt. The Act, 1971 came into force on 24.12.1971. A question in respect to earlier enactment of 1952 relating to contempt of High Court came to be considered before Apex Court. Fine was imposed on 25.2.1964 but was not paid and an amount of Rs. 500/- earlier deposited as security for appearance remained unattached till 1971. One R.L. Kapur filed application for refund of the security amount while the State filed another application for attachment of the said amount towards the unpaid fine. Fine was imposed on 25.2.1964 but was not paid and an amount of Rs. 500/- earlier deposited as security for appearance remained unattached till 1971. One R.L. Kapur filed application for refund of the security amount while the State filed another application for attachment of the said amount towards the unpaid fine. Sri Kapur contended that under Section 17 of Indian Penal Code, six years having elapsed since imposition of fine, the application of the State was barred by time. The Apex Court in R. L. Kapur v. State of T.N., AIR 1972 SC 858 held that the power to punish for contempt of the High Court as a Court of record is a substantial one. Whether it was inherent or conferred by Article 215 of the Constitution, but certainly was not derived from Act, 1971, and, therefore, not within the purview of the Indian Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the jurisdiction of contempt is of a special nature and should be used sparingly. In Ananta Lal v. A.H. Watson, AIR 1931 Cal. 257 Rankin, C.J. observed that "The Court’s jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless there is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice. It is not every theoretical tendency that will attract the action of the Court in its very special jurisdiction. The purpose of the Court’s action is a practical purpose and it is reasonably clear on the authorities that this Court will not exercise its jurisdiction upon a mere question of propriety." 26. Oswald, in its book ‘Contempt of Court’ 3rd Edn. Page 17 said that it is an offence purely sui generis and that its punishment involves in most cases an exceptional interference with the liberty of the subject, and that too by a method or process which would in no other case be permissible or even tolerated. Oswald, in its book ‘Contempt of Court’ 3rd Edn. Page 17 said that it is an offence purely sui generis and that its punishment involves in most cases an exceptional interference with the liberty of the subject, and that too by a method or process which would in no other case be permissible or even tolerated. It is highly necessary therefore in all questions of that nature where the functions of the Court have to be exercised in a summery manner that the Judge in dealing with the alleged offence should not proceed otherwise than with greater caution and deliberation and only in cases where the administration of justice would be hampered by the delay in proceeding in the ordinary course of law; and that when any antecedent process has to be put in motion, every prescribed step and rule, however technical should be carefully taken, observed and insisted upon. 27. In Baradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Mishra, AIR 1974 SC 2255 , the Apex Court observed "Even if the Court is prima facie satisfied that a contempt has been committed, the Court may choose to ignore it and decline to take action. There is no right in any one to compel the Court to initiate a proceeding for contempt even where a prima facie case appears to have been made out. The same position obtains even after a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court on a motion made to it for the purpose." We do not propose to burden this judgment by a catena of other decision on this aspect but suffice is to mention at this stage that these are the general principles in the light whereof, we have to consider whether vigour of Section 20 of Act, 1971 can be whittled down by applying Section 5 of Act, 1963. 28. The period of limitation prior to Act, 1971 was not prescribed in the Act of 1952 or 1926. For the first time it was introduced in Act, 1971. 29. The vires of Section 20 was challenged time and again before various High Courts and the matter also went to the Apex Court. While upholding the same, it has been said that the power of contempt conferred by the Constitution cannot be abrogated by an ordinary law but can be regulated by making a procedural enactment. 29. The vires of Section 20 was challenged time and again before various High Courts and the matter also went to the Apex Court. While upholding the same, it has been said that the power of contempt conferred by the Constitution cannot be abrogated by an ordinary law but can be regulated by making a procedural enactment. It was therefore held that the procedural restrictions regarding quantum of punishment or the period within which proceedings are to be initiated cannot be said to be ultra vires of Article 215 of the Constitution. 30. At this stage, we find it appropriate to quote Section 20 of Act 1971 to find out as to what has been said therein : "No Court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed." (emphasis added) 31. A perusal of the above provision shows that it restrain the Court from initiating any proceedings for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. The mandate is that the Court would have no jurisdiction whatsoever to initiate proceedings under Act 1971 if the period as prescribed therein has expired. The period of one year would commence on the date when the contempt that is defiance or disobedience of the Court’s order alleged to have been committed. Therefore, the date of commencement is the deliberate disobedience or defiance of the Court’s order by the alleged contemnor. This complaint that the alleged contemnor has disobeyed or defied deliberately order of the Court can be brought to the notice of the Court either by the informant or the Court can take cognizance on its own motion when such fact comes to its notice suo-motu or otherwise. This complaint that the alleged contemnor has disobeyed or defied deliberately order of the Court can be brought to the notice of the Court either by the informant or the Court can take cognizance on its own motion when such fact comes to its notice suo-motu or otherwise. If the defiance or disobedience remains hidden for a longer time, in our view that would not make the period under Section 20 to commence since defiance or disobedience is directly connected with the knowledge of such defiance to the informant or the Court as the case may be and therefore, we have to apply Section 20 in a manner that it may be functional and workable in a reasonable and appropriate manner meaning thereby it is not the mere date of defiance or disobedience but the date on which such defiance or disobedience comes to the notice of the informant or the Court as the case may be. If the application therefore is filed within one year from the date when such defiance or disobedience come to the notice of the informant or the cognizance is taken by the Court on its own motion within one year from the date this fact is brought to its notice that the alleged contemnor has defied or disobeyed deliberately an order of the Court, the proceedings would not be barred by Section 20 of Act 1971. 32. Section 20 of the Act is mandatory in the sense that if the proceedings are sought to be initiated after expiry of one year form the date the alleged contempt has been committed, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate such proceedings, but the said proposition has to be considered in a reasonable manner, in the light of the purpose and objective for which the above provision has been made. It applied to both the situations where the Court proceeds on its own motion suo motu or on the application made by a person aggrieved. This provision appears to have been enacted pursuant to the Sanyal Committee Report. The Act, 1971 lays down a different Scheme with regard to contempt of Courts than prevalent before. The preamble to the Act says, "an Act to define and limit the powers of certain Court in punishing for contempt of Courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto". The Act, 1971 lays down a different Scheme with regard to contempt of Courts than prevalent before. The preamble to the Act says, "an Act to define and limit the powers of certain Court in punishing for contempt of Courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto". This is an exhaustive Act providing for the procedure in relation to the contempt of Courts. 33. With reference to the application of Section 5 of Act 1963, it appears that entire emphasis has been placed on the observation of the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth (supra) whereby in paras 46, 47 and 48 of the judgment, it has referred to Section 29(2) of Act 1963 and thereby has observed that Section 17 of the Act 1963 would be applicable in the case in hand and therefore the fraud perpetuated by the appellant Pallav Sheth would not give him any benefit to claim the benefit of limitation running in his favour by virtue of such fraud. We have to consider whether the effect of the above observation is that Section 5 of Act 1963 can be said to be applicable so as to take away the effect and mandate of Section 20 of Act 1971. Since the Court has referred in this regard Kartik Chandra Das (supra), its earlier judgment, in order to appreciate Kartik Chandra Das and other judgments of the Apex Court cited at the bar, delivered prior to Pallav Sheth (supra) it would be necessary to look into those authorities and thereafter it would be proper to consider the consequences and to see how these statutes can be read in harmony. 34. In Kartik Chandra Das (supra), contempt proceedings, were initiated by Kartik Chandra Das. The State of West Bengal, against notice of contempt issued by Single Judge, filed a Letters Patent appeal which the Division Bench dismissed observing that the delay in filing letters patent appeal is non condonable as Section 5 of Act 1963 does not apply. In appeal before the Apex Court, it was admitted that an appeal under Section 19 of Act, 1971 would lie to the Division Bench and limitation of 30 days from the date of the order has been prescribed subject to the exclusion of the time taken for obtaining the certified copy thereof. In appeal before the Apex Court, it was admitted that an appeal under Section 19 of Act, 1971 would lie to the Division Bench and limitation of 30 days from the date of the order has been prescribed subject to the exclusion of the time taken for obtaining the certified copy thereof. The Appellate Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court were also placed before the Apex Court showing that the application of the Limitation Act was not excluded therein. Considering Rule 3 Chapter VIII of the Appellate Side Rules under the Letters Patent, the Apex Court held that the Division Bench was, therefore, right in holding that the Limitation Act was not extended for an appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order passed by the learned Single Judge under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. However, the Calcutta High Court had also framed rules under the Contempt of Courts Act and Rule 35 thereof provided as under : "In respect of appeals from the orders of any Judge or Bench of the original side the rules of the original side relating to appeals and in respect of appeals from the order of any Judge or Bench of the appellate side, the rules of the Appellate Side shall apply mutatis mutandis". 35. In view of Rule 35, the Apex Court found that the procedure prescribed on the appellate side would be applicable and has to be followed in respect of an appeal filed under Section 19 of Act 1971. Thereafter the Court referred to Section 29 of Act 1963 and relying on sub-section (2) thereof held that for the limitation prescribed under section 19 of Act 1971, which is a special law, Sections 4 to 24 of Act 1963 would be attracted by virtue of Section 29 (2) read with Section 3 of Act 1963 to the extent they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. It further held that the rules made on the Appellate Side for entertaining Letters Patent appeal under Clause 5 or appeals under Section 19 of Act 1971 had not expressly excluded Section 5 of Act 1963, it would apply to the appeals filed against the order of the learned Single Judge for the enforcement by a way of contempt and the High Court was not right in holding that Section 5 of Act 1963 would have no application. 36. Section 29, sub-section (2) of Act 1963 clearly provides where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply insofar as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. A perusal of Section 29 read with Section 3 of Act 1963 would show that the bar of limitation therein is in respect of suit, appeal or application. Though, the term ‘suit’ has not been defined but Section 3 (2) specify that for the purpose of Act 1963 when a suit would be treated to have been instituted and it reads as under : "3 (2) For the purposes of this Act,— (a) a suit is instituted,— (i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer; (ii) In the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and (iii) In the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the Court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator; (b) any claim by way of a set-off or a counter-claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted,— (i) in the case of a set-off, on the same date as the suit in which the set-off is pleaded; (ii) in the case of a counter-claim, on the date on which the counter claim is made in Court." 37. The term application has been defined in Section 2 (b) of Act 1963 which reads as under : "application" includes a petition." 38. This takes us to consider is whether the Limitation prescribed under Section 20 of Act 1971 can be said to be one in respect to be a ‘suit’ instituted, or an appeal preferred or an application made so as to attract the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of Act 1963 by virtue of Section 29 (2) of the Act. 39. Neither it has been argued nor learned counsel for the applicant did suggest that an application brought before the Court for initiating proceedings for contempt due to alleged disobedience or defiance of its order can be said to be a "suit instituted" or "appeal preferred". However, he strongly relied on the word ‘application made’ and submitted that in respect of an application made the above provisions would be applicable and such an application if made after expiry of one year from the date the contempt is alleged to have been committed, and if it is barred by Section 20 of Act 1971, it would attract Section 5 of Act 1963 by virtue of Section 29 (2) read with Section 3 of Act, 1963. 40. We, however, find ourselves unable to agree with the above submissions. The prohibition contained in Section 20 is in respect of taking cognizance i.e. for initiating contempt proceeding by the Court either on its own motion or otherwise. For attracting the provisions of the Act 1971, an application by informant is not a condition precedent. The concept of initiation of contempt proceeding is not dependent on an application to be submitted by a person but the nature of application is in fact like reporting or giving information to the Court about the alleged defiance or disobedience of its order. The purpose is to bring to the notice of the Court that some one is guilty of deliberate disobedience and defiance of its order and he should be punished for contempt. That is the only purpose of an application if it is made by an individual who in effect may be said to be an informant. The purpose is to bring to the notice of the Court that some one is guilty of deliberate disobedience and defiance of its order and he should be punished for contempt. That is the only purpose of an application if it is made by an individual who in effect may be said to be an informant. But even otherwise the Court on its own motion can also take cognizance of such defiance or disobedience if this fact had come to its notice from any other source and thereupon also it can initiate proceedings for contempt. 41. In the matter of contempt of Subordinate Court it is the report of a subordinate Court which forms the basis for initiation of contempt proceedings by the Court. By no stretch of imagination, the report of the Subordinate Court cannot be treated to be an application under Section 3 read with Section 2 (b) of the Act 1963 so as to attract Section 5 of Act, 1963. Similarly if the proceedings are initiated by the Court suo motu, it cannot be said that the same are preceded by any application. 42. Besides, in exercise of powers under Section 27 of the Act, 1971 this Court also has framed Rules to govern the procedural aspects for punishing a person for contempt of the Court. Chapter 35-E of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as "1952 Rules") provides that every application, reference or motion for taking proceedings under the Contempt of Court’s Act, 1971 shall mention, whether it relates to commission of civil contempt or criminal contempt, and where the allegations constitute both, separate applications shall be moved. Rule 3 refers to motion or Reference under Section 15 of the Act, 1963 dealing with the criminal contempt and provides the manner in which the statement stating forth the facts constituting the contempt, of which the person charged is alleged to be guilty, have been taken. Once the Court takes cognizance on such an application, motion or reference or suo-motu, Rule V provides for framing of charge and thereafter, the matter becomes an action relating to the Court and the contemnor. The person’s application loses any significance. 43. Once the Court takes cognizance on such an application, motion or reference or suo-motu, Rule V provides for framing of charge and thereafter, the matter becomes an action relating to the Court and the contemnor. The person’s application loses any significance. 43. Rule 10 Chapter 35-E makes it very clear and reads as under : "After writing information about the commission of contempt of Court by any person or persons, the informants shall not have any right to appear or plead or argue before the Court unless he is called upon by the Court specify to do so." 44. The Apex Court has also stated, time and again that contempt is a matter between the Court and the contemnor and the person who brings to the notice of the Court about the factum of defiance or disobedience of a Court’s order by a person is virtually out of picture. He can be said to be an informant but not personally interested in the matter and has no right for his own to proceed with the matter. 45. In Mahalaxmi Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others, JT 2008 (6) SC 177, the Apex Court in para 71 of the judgment said : "Contempt is a matter between the Court and the Contemnor." 46. In M/s. Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Mahendra C. Mehta and others, JT 2007 (12) SC 27 the Apex Court quoted and followed its earlier decision in R.N. Dey and others v. Bhagyabati Pramanik and others, 2000 (4) SCC 400 to the following effect : "We may reiterate that the weapon of contempt is not to be used in abundance or misused. Normally it cannot be used for execution of the decree or implementation of an order for which alternative remedy in law is provided for. Discretion given to the Court is to be exercised for maintenance of the Court’s dignity and majesty of law. Further, an aggrieved party has no right to insist that the Court should exercise such jurisdiction as contempt is between a contemnor and the Court......." 47. Discretion given to the Court is to be exercised for maintenance of the Court’s dignity and majesty of law. Further, an aggrieved party has no right to insist that the Court should exercise such jurisdiction as contempt is between a contemnor and the Court......." 47. The same view has been reiterated in Jaipur Municipal Corporation v. C.L. Mishra, (2005) 8 SCC 423 ; Bank of Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasandaya and another, 2004 (1) SCC 360 ; Commissioner, Agra and others v. Rohtas Singh and others, 1998 (1) SCC 349 and D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal, 1988 (3) SCC 26 . 48. The nature of an application and the position of the person who moved an application before the Court for initiating contempt proceedings also came to be considered before the Apex Court in D.N. Taneja (supra) and it was held : "A contempt is a matter between the Court and the alleged contemnor. Any person who moves the machinery of the Court for contempt only brings to the notice of the Court certain facts constituting contempt of Court. After furnishing such information he will assist the Court, but it must always be borne in mind that in contempt proceedings, there are only two parties namely the Court and the Contemnor". 49. It was also held by the Apex Court in D.N. Taneja (supra) that the person who has lodged the complaint is not entitled to a right of appeal because he was not a necessary party in contempt proceedings. The above observations of the Apex Court in D.N. Taneja (supra) have been followed in Commissioner, Agra v. Rohtas Singh (supra). 50. The term ‘application’ under Section 3 of Act, 1963 though has not been defined except of what has been said in Section 2(b) of Act, 1963 that the application includes petition but there can be no doubt that application contemplated under Act, 1963 must be one in respect whereto an applicant not only has a substantive right to move being a necessary party in the proceedings but also in case of any adverse order, he may take up the matter to the higher forum i.e. appeal etc. This is further clarified from the definition of the applicant, which is, though inclusive, but throws some light on the point and it would be useful to reproduce Section 2(a) of Act, 1963 as under : "2(a) "applicant" includes— (i) a petitioner ; (ii) any person from or through whom an applicant derives his right to apply ; (iii) any person whose estate is represented by the applicant as executor, administrator or other representative ;" 51. It would be useful to refer to the Apex Court decision in Sheikh Saidulu (supra) where the Apex Court observed that the meaning of the word "applicant" could be understood in a generic sense i.e. a prayer made to an authority for some relief to set aside an order of another authority. To the same effect is the law laid down in P. Philip v. Director of Enforcement, New Delhi, (1976) 2 SCC 174 where also the Court has observed that an ‘application’ would be a document containing certain material facts with a prayer to the Court or the authority to grant relief or remedy based on those facts. 52. We do not find any reason to have a different view in respect to the term "application" and therefore, an application preferred by a person requesting the Court to initiate contempt proceedings against someone who has violated deliberately Court’s order cannot be said to be an ‘application’ referred to in Section 3 read with Section 2(b) of Act, 1963. 53. In Shaikh Saidulu @ Saida (supra) the matter pertains to Sections 71 and 671(2) of Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 and the question was whether an election petition can be treated to be an application under Section 671(2) of the said Act. Holding that the term "application" is not defined in the said Act, the Court refers to dictionary meaning of the word "application" which is "(1) a formal request to an authority (2) the action of putting something into operation, practical use or relevance, (3) the action of applying something to a surface, (4) sustained effort, (5) computing a program or piece of software designed to fulfil a particular purpose." The Court held the word ‘application’ could be understood in a generic sense as a prayer made to an authority for some relief to set aside an order of another authority. Relying to its earlier judgment in Prem Raj v. Ram Charan, (1974) 2 SCC 1 , the Apex Court observed that the plaint which makes a request to the Court is an application. However written statement was held not to be an application because it does not include any request to the Court. It also relied on P. Philip (supra) where it was held that term "application" is synonymous with the term "petition" which means a written statement of material facts, requesting the Court to grant the relief or remedy based on those facts. It is a peculiar mode of seeking redress recognized by law. The Court therefore, held that an election petition would be covered by the word "application" used in Section 671 of the aforesaid Act and any other view would amount to adopting a hyper-technical approach which would defeat the very purpose of the Act and the provisions made therein for disputing the authenticity and the conduct of the election. Thereafter the Apex Court also referred to Act 1963 and observed that a term "application" having been defined therein which includes a petition, therefore it would be just and proper to include election petition in the word "application", and in these circumstances, the Court held that Section 71 would stand attracted with regard to limitation for filing election petition and would also attract Section 5 of Act 1963, since there was no express exclusion of the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963. 54. That being the position, the question would be whether in such cases, Section 5 of Act 1963 by virtue of Section 29(2) read with Section 3 would have any application to Section 20 of Act 1971. The answer is clearly No. The period prescribed under Section 20 is not in respect to an application, suit or appeal but it restrain the Court from initiating contempt proceedings after expiry of one year from the date of the alleged contempt. It is not a restraint in respect to any suit, appeal or application. Prohibition under Section 20 of Act 1971 is applicable in such matters also where the proceedings are initiated by the Court suo moto. It is not a restraint in respect to any suit, appeal or application. Prohibition under Section 20 of Act 1971 is applicable in such matters also where the proceedings are initiated by the Court suo moto. To limit the prohibition under Section 20 and to attract Act, 1963 only in such cases where the proceeding for contempt are initiated on an application given by a person, by including the said application in the definition of "application" under Section 2 (b) of Act 1963 and not in other case where the proceedings have been initiated on its own motion, would neither be conducive to the harmonious construction of the provision of Act 1971 and Act 1971, nor permissible. As we have already said, an application for initiating proceedings under Section 20 of Act 1971 and Act is in the nature of an information to the Court about the disobedience or defiance of the Courts’ order by the alleged contemnor. Thereafter the matter is between the Court and the contemnor. This by itself shows that it is not an application to which Sections 3 and 5 of Act 1963 are applicable. Therefore, even if it is to be held that Section 29 (2) of Act 1963 makes applicable the provisions of the said Act to the appeals under Section 19 of the Act 1971, the same cannot be extended to the provisions of Section 20 of Act 1971 since the limitation prescribed therein is not in respect to any application made or suit filed or appeal preferred but the period prescribed therein is in respect to the initiation of proceeding for contempt by the Court either on its own motion or otherwise. In view of the above, Section 5 of Act 1963 would have no application at all. Section 5 of Act 1963 empowers the Court to condone delay to an "appeal" or "application" other than an application under any provision of the Order 21 C.P.C. if filed after the prescribed period. Since, we have held that Section 20 of Act 1971 does not talk of any "appeal" or "application", ex-facie we have no manner of doubt that in the matter of Section 20 of Act 1971, neither Section 3 nor Section 5 of Act 1963 would have any application. 55. Since, we have held that Section 20 of Act 1971 does not talk of any "appeal" or "application", ex-facie we have no manner of doubt that in the matter of Section 20 of Act 1971, neither Section 3 nor Section 5 of Act 1963 would have any application. 55. So far as Section 17 of Act, 1963 it has been applied by the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth (supra) from a careful reading of the judgment, it would be evident that the Court has nowhere said that the provisions of Act, 1963 ipso facto would apply to all the proceedings under Act, 1971. It has referred to Kartik Chandra Das (supra) observing that for the purpose of appeal under Section 19 of the Act, 1971, in absence of any exclusionary provision, by virtue of Section 29 (2) read with Section 3 of Act, 1963, the provisions of Section 5 can be extended giving power to the Court to condone delay in filing appeal, but the same as such would have no application so far as Section 20 of 1971 is concerned. The reference to Section 17 has been made to stress the proposition that if a fraud would not benefit a person for any purpose whatsoever. It is well settled that a judgment is not to be read as a statute. Each and every "word" of the judgment are not to be construed like the provisions of a legislation which has to be given effect. 56. It is repeatedly held by the Apex Court that the precedent binding on the Courts is the exposition of law laid down by the Apex Court and binding precedent would be when an issue is raised, argued and decided. A difference in a fact or circumstance makes a world’s difference. In Escorts Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-II, JT 2004 (9) SC 265 it was held : "Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper." 57. In Escorts Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-II, JT 2004 (9) SC 265 it was held : "Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper." 57. In Pallav Sheth (supra) the issue raised before the Apex Court was as to when the period of one year under Section 20 of Act, 1971 would commence so as to attract the prohibition of initiation of proceedings after one year provided therein, and also, when it would be said that the Court has initiated proceedings for contempt. The Court held that the Act of disobedience or defiance would be said to have taken place when the said fact comes to the knowledge of the informant and as soon as an application is moved before the Court by the individual or in a matter of criminal contempt, on the application moved before the Advocate General or in the matter of contempt of subordinate Court when the reference is made by the sub-ordinate Court and in the matter of suo-moto action taken when the notice is issued by the Court, it would be said that the contempt proceedings have been initiated by the Court. The question as to whether Section 5 of Act, 1963 would be applicable when an application is filed for initiating contempt after expiry of one year as contained in Section 20 of Act, 1971 was not at all an issue raised in the above case. 58. At this stage, we may also notice that in Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal and another, AIR 2000 SC 1136 in para 15 of the judgment, the Apex Court considered the applicability of Section 5 of Act, 1963 to Section 20 of Act, 1971 and held "The heading of Section 20 is ‘limitation for actions for contempt’. Strictly speaking this section does not provide limitation in the sense in which the term is understood in the Limitation Act. Section 5 of the Limitation Act also does not, therefore, apply. Section 20 strikes at the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate any proceeding for contempt." 59. This judgment also held that mere filing of application or petition for initiating proceeding for contempt or a mere receipt of reference by the Court does not amount to initiation of the proceedings. Section 5 of the Limitation Act also does not, therefore, apply. Section 20 strikes at the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate any proceeding for contempt." 59. This judgment also held that mere filing of application or petition for initiating proceeding for contempt or a mere receipt of reference by the Court does not amount to initiation of the proceedings. However, this part of the finding in Om Prakash Jaiswal (supra) has been overruled by the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth (supra) as is evident from para 42 and 44 of the judgment which are reproduced as under : "42. The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal’s case (2000 AIR SCW 722 : AIR 2000 SC 1136 : 2000 Cri LJ 1700 (supra), to the effect that initiation of proceedings under Section 20 can only be said to have occurred when the Court formed the prima facie opinion that contempt has been committed and issued notice to the contemnor to show-cause why it should not be punished, is taking too narrow a view of Section 20 which does not seem to be warranted and is not only going to cause hardship but would perpetrate injustice. A provision like Section 20 has to be interpreted having regard to the realities of the situation. For instance, in a case where a contempt of a subordinate Court is committed a report is prepared whether on an application to Court or otherwise, and reference made by the subordinate Court to the High Court. It is only thereafter that a High Court can take further action under Section 15. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal’s case (supra) is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate Court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal’s case (supra) is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate Court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. On the other hand, if the filing of an application before the subordinate Court or the High Court making of a reference by a subordinate Court on its own motion or the filing an application before an Advocate-General for permission to initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation by the Court for the purposes of Section 20, then such an interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the power of the High Court to punish for contempt which power, de hors the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise that section with the powers of the Courts to punish for contempt which is recognised by the Constitution." "44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court’s own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed." 60. With reference to finding of the Apex Court in Om Prakash Jaiswal (supra) in respect to application of Section 5 of the Act, 1963, we do not find that the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth (supra) noticed any disagreement to the same. Further, while interpreting Section 20 of Act, 1971 in the light of Article 215 and/or 129 of the Constitution, it was observed that the procedure prescribed by Act, 1971 had to be followed even in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 215 of the Constitution. Further, while interpreting Section 20 of Act, 1971 in the light of Article 215 and/or 129 of the Constitution, it was observed that the procedure prescribed by Act, 1971 had to be followed even in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 215 of the Constitution. It is, therefore, Section 20 is to be so interpreted that it does not stultify the power under Article 129 or 215. Like other provisions of Act, 1971 relating to the extent of punishment which can be imposed, a reasonable period of limitation can also be provided. The underlying principle in respect to prescription of limitation under Section 20 is that a litigant must act diligently and not sleeps over its right. If a party has acted with utmost diligence, it would cause great hardship if for the inaction on the part of the Court, a contemner escaped despite of having committed gross contempt. The Apex Court observed that what sought to be argued by learned counsel for the appellant in Pallav Sheth (supra) if accepted would mean that Court would be rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully convinced for the blatant nature of a contempt having been committed and the same having been brought to the notice of the Court soon after the committal of the contempt and within the period of one year thereof. In these circumstances, the Apex Court read Section 20 consistence with Articles 129 and 215 and said in para 41 of the judgment as under : "41. .............Section 20, therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigant as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the Court to punish for its contempt. An interpretation of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the Appellant, which would render the constitutional power of the Courts nugatory in taking action for contempt even in cases of gross contempt, successfully hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in conflict with Art. 129 and/or Art. 215. Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided." 61. Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided." 61. In this regard, we may also notice that there was a Full Bench decision of Hon’ble Kerala High Court in Mayilswami v. State of Kerala, 1995 Cri LJ 3830 (FB) holding that limitation prescribed under Section 20 of Act, 1971 is not applicable when the action is taken under Article 129 or 215 of the Constitution but in view of the subsequent law laid down by the Apex Court, recently another Full Bench in P. Damodaran v. Cherkalam Abdulla and others, AIR 2007 Ker 153 has observed that the earlier decision is no more good law in view of the Apex Court decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal (supra) and Pallav Sheth (supra) as is evident from the following : "It is true that contrary view expressed by the Full Bench of this Court in Mayilswami v. State of Kerala ( 1995 (2) KLT 178 ) : (1995 Cri LJ 3830 (FB) that limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act is not applicable when action is taken under Article 129 or 215 of the Constitution of India is no more good law in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal, (2000) 2 SCC 171 : (AIR 2001 SC 1136). The above dicta with regard to the application of Section 20 was affirmed by the three member bench decision of the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549 : ( AIR 2001 SC 2763 ) even though three member Bench had differed with the view in Om Prakash Jaiswal’s case (supra), with regard to the question of starting point of limitation and the meaning of the word ‘initiate’ appearing in Section 20 of the Act." 62. The applicability of Section 5 of Act, 1963 with respect to Section 20 of Act, 1971 also came to be considered before a Division Bench of Hon’ble Orissa High Court in Khemchand Agarwal v. Commissioner, Irrigation and another, 2004 (17) AIC 684 wherein it was held that Section 5 has no application as is evident from the following : "Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no manner of application to a proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act." 63. It has been repeatedly held by the Apex Court that a decision is an authority of what it actually decides and not what logically follows. (See State of Orissa v. Sudhanshu Shekhar Misra and others, AIR 1968 SC 647 ; Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, 1996 (6) SCC 44 and State of Orissa v. Md. Illiyas, JT 2005 (10) SC 64). A careful reading of judgment in Pallav Sheth (supra) also makes it clear that the Apex Court has taken recourse to Section 17 of Act, 1963 in furtherance of the well accepted principle of law in the matter of fraud and fraudulent activities that fraud vitiates everything and therefore, if a person has been successful in concealing or hiding some fact by playing fraud, he cannot be allowed to take advantage of such fraudulent act on his part. Section 17 of Act, 1963 recognizes the said principle and this has been taken note of by the Apex Court to stress that the benefit of fraudulent activities cannot be availed by the person who is guilty of such fraud. It would be extending or enlarging the said proposition to an extent neither permissible nor warranted otherwise if we construe the said observations to hold that it has the affect as if the Apex Court has held that wherever any limitation is prescribed under Act, 1971 including Section 20, the provisions of Act, 1963 from Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall be applicable to such proceedings. 64. Section 17 of Act 1963, which has been made applicable by the Court in Pallav Sheth (supra) is not in the sense as if the provisions of Act 1963 have been held in entirety to Section 20 of Act 1971. It would have to be understood in the context that the Court held that a party cannot benefit itself if a fraud has been played by it. It has referred to Section 17 of Act 1963 observing that this provision embodies fundamental principles of justice and equity, viz. that a party should not be penalised for failing to adopt the legal proceeding if material necessary for him to do so has been wilfully concealed from him and a party who has played fraud should not be allowed to gain benefit on account of his fraud. that a party should not be penalised for failing to adopt the legal proceeding if material necessary for him to do so has been wilfully concealed from him and a party who has played fraud should not be allowed to gain benefit on account of his fraud. The Apex Court while referring to Section 29 (2) and Section 17 of Act has neither any occasion to consider as to whether delay in initiation of proceedings under Section 20 can be condoned by taking recourse to Section 5 of Act 1963 nor the said question was up for consideration before the Court. The reference to Section 29(2), 3 and 17 is in the context of the question as to whether the delay occurred due to fraud played by one of the party can be allowed to benefit such party who is guilty of playing such fraud. 65. In Khemchand Agarwal (supra) referring to Pallav Sheth (supra), the Hon’ble Orissa High Court also said that as per the Apex Court decision, Section 17 of the Limitation Act will apply to a contempt proceeding in case of fraud and not otherwise. Thereafter, observing that since no case of fraud was pleaded before the Court in Khemchand Agarwal (supra), it held that there was no question of applying the provisions of Limitation Act therein. For the purpose of holding that Section 5 of Act, 1963 has no application, the Hon’ble Orissa High Court also referred to the Apex Court decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal (supra) as is evident from para 7 of the judgment, which reads as under : "7. In another judgment of the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal and another, it has clearly been laid down that Section 20 of the Act is applicable to a proceeding for Contempt of Court. It has further been held that Section 20 does not provide limitation in the sense in which the term is understood in the Limitation Act and therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. In fact, the Supreme Court held in this judgment that Section 20 of the Act strikes at the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate any proceedings for contempt and Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no manner of application thereto." 66. There is another reason for taking the above view. In fact, the Supreme Court held in this judgment that Section 20 of the Act strikes at the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate any proceedings for contempt and Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no manner of application thereto." 66. There is another reason for taking the above view. Section 29(2) of Act, 1963 provides that Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. From the very reading of Section 20 of Act 1971, we are of the view that it expressly excludes the power of the Court to condone delay in giving to itself jurisdiction to initiate proceedings for contempt after expiry of one year from the date the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Applicability of Section 5 of Act, 1963 to the bar contained in Section 20 of Act, 1971 would make the mandate contained therein illusory for all purposes. Where the language of the statute is clear, it is not for the Court to interpret the provision of statute in a manner which would completely destroy the express provision of the statute. Reading Section 20 of Act 1971 in consonance with Section 29 (2) and 17 of Act 1963, it can be said that it excludes the period taken beyond one year by a person in moving application, due to lack of information on account of the fraud played by the alleged contemnor and the benefit of Section 17 may be stretched to what extent as there is nothing contrary in Section 20 to exclude Section 17 from its application but it does not mean that Section 5 can also be placed on the same pedestal since the purpose and object of Section 5 is totally different. 67. A Single Judge of Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court (Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.—as his Lordship then was) in Devi Kishan v. Madan Lal Verma, 2000 Cri. L.J. 3619 has also considered the question of applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act to Section 20 of the Act, 1971 and his Lordship has said that the same has no application at all. 68. Now in the light of the above discussion, we proceed to consider the various other authorities cited at the Bar. L.J. 3619 has also considered the question of applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act to Section 20 of the Act, 1971 and his Lordship has said that the same has no application at all. 68. Now in the light of the above discussion, we proceed to consider the various other authorities cited at the Bar. In Mangu Ram (supra) Section 5 of Act 1963 was made applicable in respect of the "application" for special leave against acquittal under Section 417, Cr.P.C. 1898 and the Court applied the provisions of the Act 1963 observing as under : "It is true that the language of sub-section (4) of Section 417 is mandatory and compulsive, in that it provides in no uncertain terms that no application for grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal. But that would be the language of every provision prescribing a period of limitation. It is because a bar against entertainment of an application beyond the period of limitation is created by a special or local law that it becomes necessary to invoke the aid of Section 5 in order that the application may be entertained despite such bar. Mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5. The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that in a case where an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is filed after the coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 would be available to the applicant." The above observations are self explanatory. 69. In Vijay Gupta (supra) the objection filed before the Competent Authority under M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 was held to be a ‘petition’ that is an ‘application’ and therefore the Court held that Section 5 of the Act, 1963 by virtue of Section 29 (2) would be applicable as there is no express exclusion of the provisions of Act 1963. 70. In Mukari Gopalan (supra) again it was an ‘appeal’ under Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. 70. In Mukari Gopalan (supra) again it was an ‘appeal’ under Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. It was held by the Court that in view of lack of any express exclusion of the provisions of Act 1963, Section 5 of Act 1963 would apply to such an appeal. 71. In Shanti Lal M. Bhayani (supra), the application of Section 5 of Act 1963 was considered in respect to an ‘appeal’ preferred under Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and noticing that there was no express exclusion in the said Act, the provisions of Act 1963 by virtue of Section 29(2) would bring in Section 5 of the said Act also. 72. This also makes it clear as to why in Kartik Chandra Das (supra) the Apex Court with reference Section 29 (2) read with Section 3 of Limitation Act of 1963 made applicable Section 5 of Act 1963 to an appeal preferred under Section 19 of Act 1971. 73. In Western Builders (supra), the question was about the applicability of Section 14 of Act 1963 to the proceedings under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Apex Court held in para 19 as under : "There is no provision in the whole of the Act which prohibits discretion of the Court. Under Section 14 of the Limitation Act if the party has been bona fidely prosecuting his remedy before the Court which has no jurisdiction whether the period spent in that proceedings shall be excluded or not. Learned counsel for the respondent has taken us to the provisions of the Act of 1996 : like Section 5, Section 8(1), Section 9, Section 11, sub-sections (4), (6), (9) and sub-section (3) of Section 14, Section 27, Sections 34, 36, 37, 39(2) and (4), Section 41, sub-section (2), Sections 42 and 43 and tried to emphasise with reference to the aforesaid Sections that wherever the legislature wanted to give power to the Court that has been incorporated in the provisions, therefore, no further power should lie in the hands of the Court so as to enable to exclude the period spent in prosecuting the remedy before other forum. It is true but at the same time there is no prohibition incorporated in the statute for curtailing the power of the Court under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It is true but at the same time there is no prohibition incorporated in the statute for curtailing the power of the Court under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Mush depends upon the words used in the statute and not general principles applicable. By virtue of Section 43 of the Act of 1996, the Limitation Act applies to the proceedings under the Act of 1996 and the provisions of the Limitation Act can only stand excluded to the extent wherever different period has been prescribed under the Act, 1996. Since there is no prohibition provided under Section 34, there is no reason why Section 14 of the Limitation Act (sic not) be read in the Act of 1996, which will advance the cause of justice. If the statute is silent and there is no specific prohibition then the statute should be interpreted which advances the cause of justice". 74. The above authority also therefore has no application in this case, since therein. It is not in dispute that the matter relates to an applications (petition) filed before the civil Court for setting aside the award. 75. Thus, the judgment in Pallav Sheth (supra), in our view, cannot be said to be an authority on the question as to whether the provisions of Section 5 of Act 1963 would have application where the contempt proceedings are initiated after expiry of the period of one year from the date of alleged contempt that is Section 20 of Act 1971. The above judgment is an authority for the proposition that contempt proceedings would be deemed to have been initiated by the Court when (1) an application is filed before the Court by an individual for bringing to its notice the disobedience or defiance of its order and requesting for punishing the contemner for committing contempt of the Court; (2) in a matter of criminal contempt when an application is moved before the Advocate General or when the Court permits to move before it directly; (3) in the matter of contempt of subordinate Court when reference is made by the subordinate Court; and (4) in the matter of suo motu action, when the notice is issued by the Court. The Apex Court said that if the above actions are taken within one year from the date, contempt is alleged to have been committed, the application would be deemed to be within the time prescribed under Section 20 of Act, 1971. It also says where the defiance or disobedience could not come to the knowledge of the applicant or the Court due to fraud played by the contemnor, the date of knowledge shall be treated to be the date when contempt is alleged to have been committed. 76. We, therefore, answer both the questions referred by the Hon’ble Single Judge in negative and hold that for the purpose of Section 20 of Act 1971, the Act 1963 and its provisions (except-Section 17) have no application whatsoever. The law laid down by the Apex Court in Pallav Sheth (supra) does not make Section 5 of Act 1963 applicable and would not confer power upon the Court to condone or waive delay where proceedings of contempt are sought to be initiated under Act 1971 after one year from the date when the contempt is alleged to have been committed. 77. Let the record of this matter be placed before the Hon’ble Single Judge for proceedings with the matter further in accordance with law. ————