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2009 DIGILAW 25 (ORI)

Ashok Kumar Mittal v. Ram Kumar Gupta

2009-01-09

J.M.PANCHAL, R.V.RAVEENDRAN

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JUDGMENT R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J. — Mrs Amita Gupta, learned counsel, appears for the respondents and waives notice. 2. The petitioner filed a suit for specific performance of an alleged agreement of sale dated 15.7.2003. The trial court dismissed the suit by judgment and decree dated 19.5.2008. The High Court dismissed the petitioner’s appeal on 29.9.2008. Both the courts held that the petitioner had not approached the court with clean hands and that he had failed to prove any concluded contract for sale. 3. The High Court found that the defendants in the suit were also not above board in their conduct. It found that both sides were guilty of having lied on oath and deserved to be prosecuted. On the ground that courts were overburdened with litigation, the High Court decided that instead of directing prosecution, heavy costs should be levied on both the petitioner and the respondents “to be paid to the State which spends money on providing the judicial infrastructure”. It then proceeded to impose exemplary costs of Rs. 1,00,000 on the petitioner and Rs. 1,00,000 on the respondents, and directed that the costs should be deposited with the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee. 4. Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of his appeal, the petitioner is before this Court. On merits, we find that the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court do not warrant interference and therefore this is not a fit case for grant of leave. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that levying costs of rupees one lakh against the petitioner was not warranted. He submitted that as the appeal before the High Court arose out of a civil suit, costs were governed by Sections 35 and 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the Code”, for short) and cannot exceeded what is leviable under those provisions. 6. Under Section 35 of the Code, award of costs is discre¬tionary but subject to the conditions and limitations as may be prescribed and the provisions of any law for the time being in force. Under Section 35-A, compensatory costs for vexatious claims and defences may not exceed Rs.3000. Further, the primary object of levying costs under Sections 35 and 35-A CPC, is to recompense a litigant for the expense incurred by him in litiga¬tion to vindicate or defend his right. Under Section 35-A, compensatory costs for vexatious claims and defences may not exceed Rs.3000. Further, the primary object of levying costs under Sections 35 and 35-A CPC, is to recompense a litigant for the expense incurred by him in litiga¬tion to vindicate or defend his right. It is therefore payable by a losing litigant to his successful opponent. When an appellant or a plaintiff has already paid the prescribed court fee in regard to the appeal or suit, to the State at the time of insti¬tution, it is debatable whether any costs can be awarded to the State by way of penalty, in a litigation between two private parties. Courts will have to act with care while opening new frontiers. 7. One view has been that the provisions of Sections 35 and 35-A CPC do not in any way affect the wide discretion vested in the High Court in exercise of its inherent power to award costs in the interests of justice in appropriate civil cases. The more sound view however is that though award of costs is within the discretion of the Court, it is subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed and subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force; and where the issue is gov¬erned and regulated by Sections 35 and 35-A of the Code, there is no question of exercising inherent power contrary to the specific provisions of the Code. 8. Further, the provisions of Section 35-A seem to suggest that even where a suit or litigation is vexatious, the outer limit of exemplary costs that can be awarded, in addition to regular costs, shall not exceed Rs. 3000. It is also to be noted that huge costs of the order of rupees fifty thousand or rupees one lakh, are normally awarded only in writ proceedings and public interest litigations, and not in civil litigation to which Sections 35 and 35-A are applicable. The principles and practices relating to levy of costs in administrative law matters cannot be imported mechanically in relation to civil litigation governed by the Code. 9. The present system of levying meagre costs in civil matters (or no costs in some matters), no doubt, is wholly unsat¬isfactory and does not act as a deterrent to vexatious or luxury litigation borne out of ego or greed, or resorted to as a “buying-time” tactic. 9. The present system of levying meagre costs in civil matters (or no costs in some matters), no doubt, is wholly unsat¬isfactory and does not act as a deterrent to vexatious or luxury litigation borne out of ego or greed, or resorted to as a “buying-time” tactic. More realistic approach relating to costs may be the need of the hour. Whether we should adopt suitably, the west¬ern models of awarding actual and more realistic costs is a matter that requires to be debated and should engage the urgent attention of the Law Commission of India. 10. We do not however propose to examine or decide the above issues here, except to observe that courts should not exceed or overlook the limitations placed by the Code with refer¬ence to costs in civil litigation. Insofar this case is con¬cerned, even though the order relating to costs may not strictly be correct, we do not propose to interfere with the same, in exer¬cise of our jurisdiction under Article 136, as the order has not resulted in any injustice. It is stated that the respondents have already deposited the costs. The time for deposit of costs by the petitioner is extended at his request by a month from today. 11. We would however like to refer to two aspects of the order of the High Court relating to costs. The first is, whether a court, having reached a conclusion that a party deserves to be prosecuted for perjury, should let him off with what it considers to be a stiff penalty by way of costs, on the ground that courts are overburdened with work. We propose to leave open for the present, this question involving moral and ethical issues. 12. The second aspect relates to the recipient of the costs. In para 38 of the impugned judgment, the High Court spe¬cifically stated that it had decided to saddle the parties with heavy costs to be paid to the State which spends money on judi¬cial infrastructure. Having said so, in para 39, the High Court directed that the costs should be paid to the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee. The High Court Legal Services Commit¬tee, a statutory authority under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, is not the “State” that spends money on providing judicial infrastructure, referred to in the earlier para. Having said so, in para 39, the High Court directed that the costs should be paid to the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee. The High Court Legal Services Commit¬tee, a statutory authority under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, is not the “State” that spends money on providing judicial infrastructure, referred to in the earlier para. Once the Court held that costs had to be paid to the State, it should have directed payment of the costs to the State and not the High Court Legal Services Committee. 13. No litigant should be made to feel that heavy costs are being levied in some cases by Judges to create a corpus or ex¬pense fund for the High Court Legal Services Committee or the State Legal Services Authority. While levy of a uniform token sum, as costs payable to the Legal Service Authority/Committee by way of a deterrent fine, in regard to non-compliance with proce¬dural requirements, delays in representation of papers, etc. may not be objectionable, levy of huge amounts as costs in selected cases, made payable to the Legal Service Authorities, may invite adverse comments and evoke hostility to legal services in gener¬al. We have also come across cases of costs being levied and made payable to some non-party charitable organisations. Levy of such costs should be avoided. 14. The Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee when it receives the sum of rupees two lakhs as costs from the parties, shall make over the same to the State Government as directed in para 38 of the impugned judgment. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee, for com¬pliance. 15. With the above said observations regarding costs, the special leave petitions are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.