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2009 DIGILAW 251 (MP)

HINDUSTAN MOTORS LTD. v. D. R. MOTORS

2009-02-19

ARUN MISHRA, SUSHMA SHRIVASTAVA

body2009
Judgment Arun Mishra, J. ( 1. ) The appeal has been preferred by the defendant/appellant M/s Hindustan Motors Ltd. as against judgment and decree dated 4.5.1999 passed by 9th Addl. District Judge,Jabalpur in Civil Suit No.190-B/95. ( 2. ) The question agitated in the appeal is whether the instant suit filed for seeking damages owing to breach of contract of dealership which was awarded to the plaintiff could be said to be barred by limitation in view of the leave which was granted by the Court under Order II Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code in the previous Civil Suit No. 54-A/1968 and decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal No. 106/1980 decided on 28.7.1987. Further question is whether the defendant can be said to be debarred from raising the plea of limitation. ( 3. ) M/s D.R.Motors,Jabalpur was granted dealership of M/s Hindustant Motors Ltd. in respect of business of franchise of Hindustan Ambassador Cars and Bedford Chassis and spare parts. Dealership was terminated by M/s Hindustan Motors Ltd. Prayer was made in Civil Suit No.54-A/1968 to declare the termination of dealership to be illegal, injunction was sought against the Hindustan Motors Ltd. restraining it from preventing the plaintiff from acting as a Dealer. Agency was terminated on 20th May, 1968. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 24.4.1980. Plaintiff was held entitled to claim the damages after termination of the dealership, the relief of declaration and injunction was not granted. The trial Court had granted permission under Order II Rule 2CPC to the plaintiff to sue for damages. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the plaintiff had preferred FA No. 106/1980 before this Court which was decided by a Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 28.7.1987. Cross objections were preferred by the present defendant appellant M/s Hindustan Motors Ltd. assailing part of the decision permitting the plaintiff to file fresh suit for damages. The appeal as well as cross objections were dismissed. Cross objections were preferred by the present defendant appellant M/s Hindustan Motors Ltd. assailing part of the decision permitting the plaintiff to file fresh suit for damages. The appeal as well as cross objections were dismissed. It was held by the Division Bench of this Court that permission has been rightly granted to the plaintiff to file fresh suit to seek the damages,plea taken that after long lapse of time, permission could not have been granted was rejected and Division Bench of this Court held that plaintiff may file a suit against the defendant for damages in which the defendants would be debarred from raising the plea of limitation. Thereafter fresh suit was filed on 19.11.1987 claiming damages for Rs.13,05,000/- which amount included the investment made, stock purchased, sum spent on tools and the profit which would have been earned etc. It was submitted by the plaintiff that average income from sale of cars and spare parts was Rs.3,00,000 per annum, for three years it was quantified to be Rs.9,00,000, interest was also claimed. ( 4. ) In the written statement filed by the defendant, the claims made by the plaintiff have been denied. It is submitted that the suit is barred by limitation, the finding recorded in the previous civil suit and in the first appeal does not operate as res judicata, security amount of Rs.5,000 was not accepted by the plaintiff, no loss has been suffered as such plaintiff is not entitled for any amount on account of damages. ( 5. ) The trial Court by the impugned judgment and decree dated 4th May,1999 has decreed the suit for an amount of Rs.13,04,000. Dissatisfied thereby the instant appeal has been preferred. ( 6. ) It is submitted by Shri Ravish Agarwal,learned senior counsel appearing with Shri Pranay Verma for appellant that it was not open to Division Bench of this Court in the previous litigation out of which FA No. 106/1980 arose to bar the defendant from raising the plea of limitation. It was not open to High Court to act against the statutory provision of Limitation Act. Court could not curtail or extend the limitation prescribed by law for filing suit for damages. It was necessary to institute the suit within the period of limitation. Section 14 of the Limitation Act,1963 could not be said to be applicable. It was not open to High Court to act against the statutory provision of Limitation Act. Court could not curtail or extend the limitation prescribed by law for filing suit for damages. It was necessary to institute the suit within the period of limitation. Section 14 of the Limitation Act,1963 could not be said to be applicable. Section 3 of the Limitation Act cast a duty on the Court not to entertain time barred claim,although limitation has not been set up in defence. Even if a plaint is returned for presentation in proper Court, it is not in continuation of first suit, thus, drawing analogy, counsel has submitted that suit for damages, in the instant case, should have been filed within prescribed period of limitation . Cause of action arose on date of termination of agency i.e.20th May, 1968. Law of Limitation is not affected by the pendency of the first suit. Reference has also been made to Order XXIII Rule 2 CPC and the provisions of Order VII Rule 6 CPC. Relying upon Order VII Rule 6 CPC,it is submitted by the counsel that if a suit is instituted after the expiration of the period prescribed by the law of limitation, the plaint shall show the ground upon which exemption from such law is claimed. Cause of action arose on the date of termination of agency not when the judgment in earlier suit was pronounced. Agency was terminated in the year 1968,suit was filed on 19.11.1987 as such it was barred by limitation. ( 7. ) Shri Divesh Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondent M/s D. R. Motors Ltd. has contended that question as to limitation has been decided in the previous litigation between the same parties. The cross objection preferred against the decision rendered by the trial Court on 24.4.1980 in CSNo.54-A/68 were dismissed by this Court vide judgment dated 28.7.1987 rendered in FA No. 106/ 1980. Thus, question of limitation cannot be agitated again. Learned counsel has submitted that inter parties judgment rendered by the Court of competent jurisdiction, even if erroneous, would be binding upon the parties. The decision operates as res judicata . The question has attained finality, hence it cannot be reopened. Alternatively learned counsel has submitted that decision of the previous civil suit has given rise to fresh cause of action . The decision operates as res judicata . The question has attained finality, hence it cannot be reopened. Alternatively learned counsel has submitted that decision of the previous civil suit has given rise to fresh cause of action . On merits counsel has submitted that compensation prayed was not denied specifically in the written statement filed on behalf of defendant/appellant. There is no cross examination of the plaintiff with respect to the facts which he has stated supported by the documents. Consequently, no case for interference in appeal was made out. ( 8. ) The main question for consideration is whether the instant suit can be said to be barred by limitation in view of the decision rendered in the previous civil suit in which the permission was granted under Order II Rule 2 CPC to the plaintiff to file the instant suit for damages. Order II Rule 2 of CPC provides that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action;however, it is open to the plaintiff to relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order II CPC provides that where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim,he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. We are concerned with the omission in the instant case. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order II CPC provides that a person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs, but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. The provision of Order II Rule 2(3) requires all the reliefs to be joined based on the same cause of action, in case of omission, without leave of the Court, fresh suit cannot be filed for the relief so omitted without leave of the Court. Order II Rule 2 CPC is quoted below :- "2. The provision of Order II Rule 2(3) requires all the reliefs to be joined based on the same cause of action, in case of omission, without leave of the Court, fresh suit cannot be filed for the relief so omitted without leave of the Court. Order II Rule 2 CPC is quoted below :- "2. Suit to include the whole claim- (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. (2) Relinquishment of part of claim- Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. (3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs - A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs, but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. Explanation :- For the purposes of this rule an obligation and a collateral security for its performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed respectively to constitute but one cause of action." Leave of the Court is the sine qua non for entertaining a fresh suit to sue for the relief which has been omitted to be claimed. In the instant case, based on the termination of agency, in the previous civil suit relief was sought for declaration and injunction, it was open to the plaintiff to sue for relief of damages also as it was based on same cause of action, but he has omitted to sue for the relief of damages in the previous Civil Suit 54-A/68, however, plaintiff had filed an application under Order II Rule 2 CPC to permit it to file fresh suit seeking the relief for damages due to wrongful termination of the agency which prayer was allowed. It is not in dispute that in the previous civil suit it was held that plaintiff would be entitled for the damages not for declaration and injunction which was prayed for. It is not in dispute that in the previous civil suit it was held that plaintiff would be entitled for the damages not for declaration and injunction which was prayed for. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit No. 54-A/1968 granting permission to the plaintiff to file fresh suit for relief of damages, cross objections were preferred in FA No. 106/1980 by the defendant/appellant, the cross objections as well as appeal were dismissed vide judgment dated 28.7.1987. Division Bench of this Court in FA No. 106/1980 has considered the cross objections preferred in para 32 and 33 of the judgment thus :- "32. The plaintiff had filed an application on 17.4.1979 under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for leave of the Court for filing another suit for accounts and such other reliefs as the plaintiff may find itself entitled. The trial Court had allowed the application. The counsel for the respondent No. 1 argued in support of the cross- objection that such a relief could have been claimed in the suit itself and the trial Court was not justified in granting the said relief to the plaintiff after lapse of such a long period. 33. Since we have held that the appellant- plaintiff is entitled to damages and for the purpose of ascertaining the amount, all the necessary fact, documents and evidence would be necessary in the suit. A just claim of the plaintiff should not be allowed to be defeated. It is in the interest of justice to grant the relief prayed for. We,therefore, hold that the relief granted by the trial Court is proper. The appellant-plaintiff may now file a suit against the defendants for damages. The defendants are debarred from raising any plea of limitation. In appeal this question was agitated that whether after long lapse of time permission could have been granted. Division Bench of this Court repelled the submission and held that plaintiff may file fresh suit for damages in which defendants were debarred from raising the plea of limitation. The defendants are debarred from raising any plea of limitation. In appeal this question was agitated that whether after long lapse of time permission could have been granted. Division Bench of this Court repelled the submission and held that plaintiff may file fresh suit for damages in which defendants were debarred from raising the plea of limitation. In view of the fact that permission of the Court was required to sue for the relief which could have been claimed, but was omitted in the previous civil suit,the leave was prayed for and it was granted by the trial Court against which cross objections were preferred in FA No. 106/1980, the fresh suit could not have been preferred till the decision of the FA rendered on 28.7.1987. As the appeal is continuation of the suit and matter of grant of leave to file suit for the relief which was omitted to be claimed was subjudice in the appeal which was decided on 28.7.1987 and thereafter on 19.11.1987 the instant suit was preferred before the trial Court claiming damages of Rs.13,05,000. When we examine Order XXIII Rule 1(3) CPC which deals with withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim,where the Court is satisfied that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect,or that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, the Court may permit the plaintiff to withdraw the suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim. The provision of Order II Rule 2 CPC also provides for the permission of Court to sue with respect to relief which is omitted to be claimed. Order XXIII Rule 1(4) provides that in case withdrawal or abandonment is made without permission of the Court such plaintiff shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim. Order XXIII Rule 1(4) provides that in case withdrawal or abandonment is made without permission of the Court such plaintiff shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim. Sub-section (3) of Section 14 of Limitation Act provides notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of CPC,the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the Court under rule 1 of Order XXIII CPC where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the Court or other cause of a like nature. The leave of the Court is also contemplated to sue, that is, to file suit in case relief has been omitted to be claimed with respect to same cause of action under Order II Rule 2 CPC. Though section 14(3) of the Limitation Act does not provide for the exigencies contemplated under Order II Rule 2 CPC,but fact remains that without leave having been granted to sue with respect to the relief so omitted the suit could not have been preferred as that would have met with the dismissal. It was not in the hands of the plaintiff when the question of leave applied for would attain finality, once the leave has been granted that would have the effect of giving permission to sue with respect to relief omitted and thereafter suit has to be filed expeditiously. Admittedly the previous civil suit was filed in the year 1968 whereas dealership was also terminated in the year 1968, it was open to sue for the relief of damages also which was omitted, consequently permission became necessary to sue for the relief so omitted to be claimed in the previous suit,thus, grant of permission by the Court would have the effect of permitting the plaintiff to file the suit. In the instant case, in the previous civil suit, this question was in issue whether after long lapse of time permission could have been granted to the plaintiff to file suit for damages. In the instant case, in the previous civil suit, this question was in issue whether after long lapse of time permission could have been granted to the plaintiff to file suit for damages. In aforesaid para 32 and 33 of the judgment Division Bench of this Court has clearly held that even after long lapse of time such permission deserves to be granted and the defendants would be debarred from raising the plea of limitation in the suit for damages. ( 9. ) Shri Ravish Agarwal,learned senior counsel appearing with Shri Pranay Verma has relied upon decision of Apex Court in Shiv Kumar Sharma vs. Santosh Kumari (2007) 8 SCC 600 in which the Apex Court has held that if no leave has been taken a separate suit may or may not be maintainable but even a suit where for a prayer for grant of damages by way of mesne profit or otherwise is claimed, must be instituted within the prescribed period of limitation. The Apex Court has laid down thus :- "20. In terms of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code, all the reliefs which could be claimed in the suit should be prayed for. Order 2 Rule 3 provides for joinder of causes of action. Order 2 Rule 4 is an exception thereto. For joining causes of action in respect of matters covered by Clauses (a),(b) and (c) of Order 2 Rule 4, no leave of the court is required to be taken. Even without taking leave of the Court, a prayer in that behalf can be made. A suit for recovery of possession on declaration of ones title and/or injunction and a suit for mesne profit or damages may involve different cause of action. For a suit for possession, there may be one cause of action; and for claiming a decree for mesne profit, there may be another. In terms of Order 2 Rule 4 of the Code, however, such causes of action can be joined and therefor no leave of the court is required to be taken. If no leave has been taken, a separate suit may or may not be maintainable but even a suit where for a prayer for grant of damages by way of mesne profit or otherwise is claimed, must be instituted within the prescribed period of limitation. Damages cannot be granted without payment of court fee. If no leave has been taken, a separate suit may or may not be maintainable but even a suit where for a prayer for grant of damages by way of mesne profit or otherwise is claimed, must be instituted within the prescribed period of limitation. Damages cannot be granted without payment of court fee. In a case where damages are required to be calculated, a fixed court fee is to be paid but on the quantum determined by the court and the balance court fee is to be paid when a final decree is to be prepared." The Apex Court has laid down that if no leave has been taken then suit must be instituted within the prescribed period of limitation. The facts of Shiv Kumar Sharma vs. Santosh Kumari(supra) indicates that the parties had entered into an agreement to sell their respective properties. Appellants title over the property which was owned and possessed by him appeared to be defective, the suit was filed praying for the relief of possession and injunction, the suit was decreed, injunction was granted. In appeal the High Court directed subject to such exceptions including limitation, liberty was given to the plaintiff to claim relief by way of damages/ mesne profit in separate suit filed before the competent Court. The decision was assailed before the Apex Court and the question was also raised as to directions and damages awarded. The question was agitated that Order II Rule 2 CPC bars a second suit. The Apex Court held in the aforesaid backdrop of the facts that if no leave has been taken, a separate suit may or may not be maintainable, but even a suit where for a prayer for grant of damages by way of mesne profits or otherwise is claimed must be instituted within the prescribed period of limitation. He had not claimed damages in the suit, he had full knowledge about his right, thus, plaintiff could not be permitted to get the same indirectly as what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. The equity jurisdiction can be exercised only when no law operates in the field, Court of law cannot exercise discretionary jurisdiction dehors the statutory law. Its discretion must be exercised in terms of existing statute and must yield to law. The decision of the High Court was set aside. The equity jurisdiction can be exercised only when no law operates in the field, Court of law cannot exercise discretionary jurisdiction dehors the statutory law. Its discretion must be exercised in terms of existing statute and must yield to law. The decision of the High Court was set aside. In the instant case, previous decision has attained finality in which permission was granted to file fresh suit, the previous judgment and decree gives a right to plaintiff to maintain the suit and debars the defendant to raise the plea of limitation In case defendant/appellant was aggrieved by the adjudication made by this Court in FA No. 106/80 decided on 28.7.87 ought to have assailed the decision, but the decision having attained finality, filing of the fresh suit could not be permitted to be set at naught by permitting to raise the the same pleas afresh which were taken against the grant of permission and defence of lapse of time was also set up against grant of permission to grant leave to sue for damages. ( 10. ) Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon decision in Union of India and another vs. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. (1996) 4 SCC 453 in which the Apex Court considered the directions issued by the High Court not to reject the application on the ground that it is time barred. Referring to CCE vs. Doaba Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. AIR 1988 SC 2052 the Apex Court has posed the question whether it is permissible for the High Court to direct the authorities under the Art to act contrary to the aforesaid statutory provision. The answer was in negative. As the power conferred by Articles 226/227 of the Constitution is designed to effectuate the law, to enforce the rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accordance with law, it cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law. The decision is of no help in view of the provision of Order II Rule 2(3)CPC which provides for grant of leave to sue in case of omitted relief the Court was required to consider it and the decision of the previous suit having attained finality is not open to be challenged in the instant case. The decision is of no help in view of the provision of Order II Rule 2(3)CPC which provides for grant of leave to sue in case of omitted relief the Court was required to consider it and the decision of the previous suit having attained finality is not open to be challenged in the instant case. It was not merely observation made, it was a right conferred which has been permitted to attain finality. In Raja Traders,Jagdalpur vs. Union of India and another 1976 MPLJ713 it has been held that the Court cannot curtail or extend limitation prescribed by law. There is no dispute with respect to aforesaid proposition. Question of effect of grant of leave on limitation to file the suit for the reliefs omitted and the decision of previous civil suit dealing with question of limitation militates against the submission raised by the defendant/appellant. ( 11. ) Section 3 of the Limitation Act has been invoked by Shri Ravish Agarwal,senior counsel to support the submission that even if defendant-appellant is debarred from raising the plea of limitation, in the instant suit in view of the prevision decision , section 3 of limitation mandates the Court to dismiss the suit as it is apparently barred by limitation. We are not impressed by the submission in view of the clear decision in previous suit in which question of limitation was gone into thereafter permission had been granted. In view of the decision of First Appeal No. 106/1980 rendered by a Division Bench of this Court, it would not be proper to permit the defendant/appellant to raise the plea of limitation afresh. There is no equity in favour of defendant appellant. Right or wrong, previous decision has attained finality, it cannot be permitted to be reopened. ( 12. ) Shri Ravish Agarwal,learned senior counsel has also referred to provision of Order VII Rule 6 CPC which provides that the grounds of exemption from limitation law have to be mentioned in the plaint, where the suit is instituted after the expiration of the period prescribed by the law of limitation. In the instant case, it is clear that the permission granted under Order II Rule 2 CPC has been pleaded including the decision which was rendered in the previous suit, that is sufficient compliance of Order VII Rule 6 CPC. ( 13. In the instant case, it is clear that the permission granted under Order II Rule 2 CPC has been pleaded including the decision which was rendered in the previous suit, that is sufficient compliance of Order VII Rule 6 CPC. ( 13. ) Learned counsel has also referred to provision of Order VII Rule 10 of CPC which provides for return of the plaint and decision of the Apex Court in Amar Chand Inani vs. Union of India AIR 1973 SC 313 wherein the Apex Court has held that when plaint is presented in proper Court after its return is not continuation of a suit initially filed in wrong Court so as to attract section 4 of the Limitation Act. Question in the instant case is not of wrong court,but effect of grant of permission and adjudication as to plea of limitation which was set up as defence as against grant of permission under Order II Rule 2 of CPC in the previous lis. Thus, the decision is of no help to appellant. It cannot be said that Division Bench of this Court has legislated in the previous decision. In P. Ramchandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578 it has been held that Courts can declare law, they can interpret the law, they can remove obvious lacunae and fill the gaps,but they cannot entrench upon in the field of legislation properly meant for the legislature. Binding directions, deleting the bars of limitation on the twin grounds was made amounts to judicial legislation, it was not permissible and because they run counter to the doctrine of binding precedents. In the instant case, it could not be said that Division Bench of this Court has legislated while granting permission, what is the effect of grant of permission on the limitation was considered in the previous case and decision was rendered which has attained finality. Similar view has been taken in Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and others vs. State of T.N. and others (2002) 3 SCC 533 . Similar view has been taken in Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and others vs. State of T.N. and others (2002) 3 SCC 533 . In view of clear language of Order II Rule 2(3) of CPC having omitted to claim the relief of damages, it was not open to sue without grant of leave for the relief so omitted, hence, when the question of leave and limitation has attained finality in the previous first appeal, the suit which has been filed could not be said to be barred by limitation. ( 14. ) It would be appropriate to refer the decisions relied upon by Shri Divesh Jain, learned counsel appearing for respondents. In Barkat Ali and others vs. Badrinarain AIR 2001 Rajasthan 51 it has been held that decision on question of limitation even if erroneous operates as res judicata in subsequent proceedings. An order passed by a Court having jurisdiction over subject-matter and parties cannot be ignored as nullity unless it is corrected in accordance with law. Such orders bind the parties at a subsequent stage of the proceedings and operates as res judicata in subsequent proceedings. Reliance has also been placed on a decision in Gorie Gouri Naidu(Minor) and another vs. Thandrothu Bodemma and others (1997) 2 SCC 552 wherein the Apex Court has held that inter parties judgment rendered by Court of competent jurisdiction, even if erroneous, would bind the parties. In Amireddi Raja Gopala Rao and others vs. Amireddi Sitharamamma and others AIR 1965 SC 1970 , Life Insurance Corporation of India vs: India Automobiles and Co. and others (1990) 4 SCC 286 ,BabaCharan Dass Udhasi vs. Mahant Basant Das Babaji Chela Baba Laxmandas Udasi Sadhu(2000) 6 SCC1 and in Swamy Atmananda and others vs. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam and others (2005) 10 SCC 51 similar view has been taken. In Narashalli Kempanna and others vs. Narasappa and othrs AIR 1989 Karnataka 50 in which the Apex Court has laid down that if the Court dismisses the suit stating that relief has to be sought for partition, such a decree amounts to permitting the plaintiff to file a separate suit for partition and possession, thus, bar contained in Order II Rule 2CPC is not attracted because the dismissal of the suit on that ground not only gives rise to a fresh cause of action but also amounts to granting leave for filing another suit for such relief. ( 15. ) In view of aforesaid discussion, we are not inclined to accept the submission raised by Shri Ravish Agarwal,learned senior counsel that the instant suit is barred by limitation. The submission is hereby rejected. Coming to the submission made that there is no elaborate discussion with respect to grant of damages. We have gone through the pleadings and entire evidence on record. In the written statement there was general denial of the damages which were claimed, there was no specific denial of the various claims which were made. When we consider the evidence,Chiman Bhai Patel has clearly proved the damages which were suffered including loss of profit and in support of statement certain documents have been placed on record and in rebuttal no evidence has been adduced on behalf of the defendant/appellant. The plaintiff has not been cross examined on the point stated in the examination-in-chief, thus, the statement has been rightly accepted. ( 16. ) The trial Court, in the circumstances, is justified in granting damages which have been claimed, with respect to entitlement of the damages,there is no dispute. It was so held in the previous suit also that plaintiff would be entitled for damages in view of the wrongful termination of the agency. Resultantly,the appeal being devoid of merits is hereby dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs as incurred of the appeal. Appeal dismissed.