Judgment :- Venugopala Gowda, J. Plaintiff is the appellant. He had filed an application dated 12.6.1997 (Ex.D1) before the Commissioner, Corporation of City of Mysore, for grant of open space for putting up a STD/ISD booth. The appellant was allotted open space (Ex.D2) measuring 4 x 4 feet, at Palace Ground (South Gate), Purandaradasa Road, behind Gun House. K.R. Mohalla, Mysore. A rent agreement (Ex.D4) was entered into between the parties for a period of 11 months, commencing from 23.12.1997, fixing the ground rent at Rs.250/- per month. Pursuant thereto, the appellant put-up a Telephone booth, obtained telephone connection (Ex.P2) and is carrying on the business. Before expiry of the agreed period, renewal having been sought, was granted for a further period of 11 months and an agreement (Ex.D10) was entered into on 27.11.1998. The Commissioner sent a notice dated 19.1.1999 (Ex.D11) intimating the appellant that, the Corporation has resolved (Exs.D14 -16) not to extent the licence to any footpath business within the radius of 2 k.ms., from Krishna Rajendra Circle, to which the appellant submitted a reply dated 28.1.1999. The appellant received a communication dated 5.2.1999, wherein he was informed that, his request for extension cannot be considered. The Mangalore Electricity Supply Company (respondent No.2) sent a communication dated 8.9.1999 (Ex.P9) informing the appellant that the electricity supply to the booth, would be disconnected, in view of the cancellation order passed by the Commissioner of Corporation of City of Mysore. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed the suit for decree, to declare the aforesaid communications (Exs.P8 and P9) as void and unenforceable and for permanent injunction. 2. The suit was contested by the first defendant by filing the written statement, inter-alia contending that, the suit is not maintainable and is also devoid of merit. Based on the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed. The plaintiff deposed as P.W.1 and Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.13 were marked. For the defendant, D.W.1 deposed and Ex.D.1 to Ex.D.17 were marked. Considering the record and the rival contentions, the Trial Court dismissed the suit, inter alia holding that the footpath belongs to the Corporation or local body and as per the decisions of the appellate Court, the provisions of Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1974 is not applicable and that the plaintiff was called upon the surrender the possession of vacant space by removing the booth. It was held that Exs.P8 and P9 have been issued in discharge of obligations and duties vested under law and also in terms of the condition in the agreement executed by the plaintiff to surrender possession in case the 1st defendant withdraws/cancels the permission. It was further held that, Exs.P8 and P9 being mere Communications, cannot be held to be acts of interference or otherwise to forcibly dispossess the plaintiff. 3. Being aggrieved, an appeal was preferred, which after consideration was dismissed by the first appellate Court by inter alia holding that, the plaintiff is not a tenant but was only a licencee and the rent paid is ground rent and not a rent for the premises and in view of the resolutions of the Corporation at Exs.D14 to D17. which have not been challenged before the competent authority, the plaintiff/appellant is not entitled to any relief. Challenging the aforesaid decrees of the Courts below, this second Appeal has been filed. 4. I have heard Sri. Manmohan, Learned Counsel for the appellant and Smt. Geetha Devi Papanna, Learned Counsel for the first respondent. 5. Sri. Manmohan, vehemently contended that the Courts below have committed an error in holding that, the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. 1974. (hereinafter referred to as the Act'. for short) is not applicable to the case. He contended that, looking into the definition of ‘Public Premises’ under Section 2(e) of the Act, the premises in question is a public premises and hence, the provisions of the Act are applicable. Placing reliance on the decision in the case of Corporation of Calicut Vs. K. Srinivasan (2002)5 SCC 361 , Learned Counsel contended that, without initiating the proceedings under the Act and obtaining an order of eviction there under against the occupant-appellant, the impugned action of the respondents is arbitrary and illegal. He placed reliance on the decision in the case of Krishna Ram Mahale Vs. Shobha Venkatrao (1989) 4 SCC 131 to contend that an occupant in possession, cannot be dispossessed without recourse to law. Reliance was also placed on the decision in the case of C. Bhaskar Vs. State of Karnataka 1995 (5) Kar. He placed reliance on the decision in the case of Krishna Ram Mahale Vs. Shobha Venkatrao (1989) 4 SCC 131 to contend that an occupant in possession, cannot be dispossessed without recourse to law. Reliance was also placed on the decision in the case of C. Bhaskar Vs. State of Karnataka 1995 (5) Kar. L.J. 69 to contend that, a person in settled possession cannot be dispossessed even by the owner otherwise than by proceeding in accordance with the procedure established by law and even the true owner has to resort the due process of law for getting evicted the person from his property who is in settled possession though unlawfully. It is contended that no opportunity of hearing was granted by the first respondent. Learned Counsel also contended that, the Courts below have not appreciated the oral and documentary evidence on record in proper perspective and hence there is perversity and illegality and consequently, the substantial question of law arises for consideration, in view of which, the Appeal may be admitted for further consideration. 6. Per contra. Smt. Geetha Devi Papanna. contended that, the appellant was permitted to put-up a Telephone booth on the footpath for a temporary period. which having expired long ago and he having been informed of the decision of the Corporation resolving not to extend the licence to any footpath business within the radius of 2 k.ms. from Krishna Rajendra Circle in Mysore City, the appellant has no right to retain the Telephone booth on the footpath which belongs to the Corporation. According to her, the decisions on which the reliance is placed by the Learned Counsel for the appellant, have all been rendered in cases wherein the buildings of Corporation was leased and which arouse out of the interpretation of the provisions of -the Act', which statute, has no application to the case on hand. By referring to Section 282(2) and (4) of Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, (hereinafter referred to as 'KMC Act', for short) and placing strong reliance on the decision in the case of Gigajid Vs. State of Karnataka ILR 1986 KAR 3679, she contended that the provisions under Section 288 (2) and (4) of KMC Act. override the provisions under 'the Act' and that. State of Karnataka ILR 1986 KAR 3679, she contended that the provisions under Section 288 (2) and (4) of KMC Act. override the provisions under 'the Act' and that. footpath is not a public premises and the provisions of `the Act' are not attracted and the permission for temporary construction falls within sub-Section (2) of Section 288 of KMC Act and for removing such a structure, power is conferred on the Commissioner, under sub-Section (4) of Section 288 of KMC Act, which was invoked. keeping in view the fact that, the booth in question is situated very close to Mysore Palace, which is a heritage structure, situated in the heritage city of Mysore, which is having worldwide attraction. Learned Counsel also contended that, the Courts below have appreciated the oral and documentary evidence in the proper perspective and even otherwise, in view of the applicability of the provisions of Section 288(2) and (4) of KMC Act and the interpretation given to the same in the decision stated supra, the contentions canvassed by the Learned Counsel for the appellant are devoid of merit. She made the submissions in support of the conclusions in the impugned judgments of the Courts below. 7. Having heard the Learned Counsel on both sides, after perusing the records, the grounds urged by the Learned Counsel for the appellant, are not substantial questions of law, since identical questions have already been decided in the case of Wajid (supra). 8. What is a substantial question of law in a second appeal under S. l00 CPC has been explained by the Apex Court in the "case of State Bank Of India & Others Vs. S.N. Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 92 as follows: 9.1 Second appeals would lie in cases, which involve substantial questions of law. The word 'substantial' prefixed to 'question of law' does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions of law of general importance, but refers to impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lis between the parties. ‘Substantial questions of law. means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties. ‘Substantial questions of law. means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties. In the context of Section 100 CPC, any question of law which affects the final decision in a case, is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A question of law, which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing in the final outcome, will not be a substantial question of law. Where there is a clear and settled enunciation on a question of law, by this Court or by the High Court concerned, it cannot be said that the case involves a substantial question of law. It is said that a substantial question of law arises when a question of law, which is not finally settled by this Court (or by concerned High Court so far as the State is concerned), arises for consideration in the case. But this statement has to he understood in correct perspective. Where there is a clear enunciation of' law and the lower Court has followed or rightly applied such clear enunciation of law, obviously the case will not he considered as giving rise to a substantial question of law, even if the question of law may be one of general importance. On the other hand, if there is a clear enunciation of law by this Court (or by the concerned High Court), but the lower Court had ignored or misinterpreted or misapplied the same, and correct application of the law as declared or enunciated by this Court (or the concerned High Court) would have led to a different decision, the appeal would involve a substantial question of law as between the parties. Even where there is an enunciation of law by this Court (or the concerned High Court) and the same has been followed by the lower Cowl if the appellant is able to persuade the High Court that the enunciated legal position needs reconsideration alteration, modification or clarification or that there is a need to resolve an apparent conflict between two view points, it can be said that a substantial question of law arises for consideration. There cannot therefore, be a straitjacket definition as to when a substantial question of law arises in a case. Be that as it may. There cannot therefore, be a straitjacket definition as to when a substantial question of law arises in a case. Be that as it may. Keeping in view the decision of this Court in the case of WAJID (supra), which was affirmed by the Division Bench in W,A.Nos.1302-1337 of 1986 by judgment dated 23.6.1987, the point to be considered is, whether the lower Courts have mis-interpreted or misapplied the same and the correct application of the law as declared in the said judgments would lead to a different decision? Though the Courts below have not made specific reference to the aforesaid decisions, the Trial Court appears to have kept in view the said decisions, since it has held that in view of the decisions of the appellate Court the Act is not applicable to the toot path which belongs to the Corporation or local body. I fence this is not a case of ignoring the law settled by this Court or misinterpreting the same or misapplying the same. 9. However keeping in view the contentions raised by the Learned Counsel for the appellant the points that arise for consideration are: (i) Whether the provisions of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of in authorised Occupants) Act, 1974, is applicable to a temporary structure, put up on a foot path? (ii) Whether any notice is required to be issued to the' occupant while directing the removal of the construction? Re: Point (i) 10. In the case of Wajid (supra), the petitioners were petty traders and were carrying on business of vending vegetables, bruits, ready-made garments stainless steel articles old clothes, artificial ornaments, hosiery goods, Beedi stalls in the bunk shops which were situated at the footpath between the Victoria Hospital Old Main Gate and the Corporation sub-way and other foot paths in Bangalore City. It was contended that they were carrying on petty business on the footpaths and that the Government had passed an order dated 22.7.1982 directing the Corporation to provide places for putting up bunk shops by the petitioners and also to grant licence for running the same, in pursuance of which the Corporation of City of Bangalore, by obtaining the undertaking permitted them to put-up bunk shops and granted temporary licence for conducting the business in the bunk shops. I t was contended that the bunk shops had not at all caused any hindrance to the movement of public on the footpaths and they having lawfully come in possession of the places given to them to put-up hunk shops and having been permitted to carry on business under the licences granted to them, cannot at all he evicted by the Corporation and that the road margins where the hunk shops are situated are public premises as defined under the Act and that no proceedings under the Act was initiated and consequently the Corporation is estopped from evicting them. The writ petition having been contested, the points for consideration were raised. The relevant points required to be noticed are the point Nos.4. 5. 6 and 8. which read as follows: "(4) Whether the areas on which the petitioners are permitted to put up the hunk shops are 'Public Premises' attracting the provisions of the Public Premises Act? (5) Whether the areas on which the bunk shops are permitted to be put up pursuant to the Government Order dated 22nd July, 1982 (Annexure-A), are foot-paths? (6) If the answer to Point No.(5) is in the affirmative, whether it is open to the Corporation to permit the petitioners to put up bunk shops on the foot-paths? (7) Whether the petitioners ought to have been served with notice to show cause and afforded an opportunity of hearing before directing them to vacate the bunk shops?'' 11. After considering the rival contentions. it has been held that, it is not at all open to the Corporation to permit the petitioners to put-up the bunk shops on the footpaths in question and it was further held that Section 288 of KVIC Act, when compared to the Act becomes a Special Statute and it overrides the provisions of the Act and that the footpaths are not public premises as defined under the Act. Consequently it was held that the areas on which the bunk shops in question were permitted to be put-up are not public premises and as such the provisions of the Act are not attracted. While answering the contentions, the Learned Single Judge has held as follows: “Footpaths are public places. The bunk shops in question are put up on foot paths. While answering the contentions, the Learned Single Judge has held as follows: “Footpaths are public places. The bunk shops in question are put up on foot paths. Sub-Section (2) of Section 288 of the Act, specifically provides that the Commissioner may grant a licence subject to such conditions and restrictions as he may think fit for any temporary construction in any street or in any public place the control of-which is vested in Corporation. Therefore the permission granted to the petitioners to put up bunk shops temporarily for a particular period of 11 months can be held to fall under sub-Section (2) of Section 288 of the Act. Hence, power under sub-Section (4) of Section 288 can he exercised to remove the constructions put up pursuant to the permission granted under sub-Section (2) of Section 288 of the Act." (Emphasis supplied by me) 12. Said Order was questioned in W.A.Nos.1302-1337/1986, and connected appeals. The Division Bench by its judgment dated 23.6.1987 has held as follows: "The only other question that remains for consideration is whether the area over which the Bunk shops are put up are public premises to which the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction often authorised Occupants), Act, 1974, is applicable. The Learned Single Judge has in our opinion, rightly negatived the said contention. The Corporation is vested with necessary powers under the Act itself; specifically under Sec.288, to take necessary action to remove any obstruction or projection which is likely to endanger the health of the citizens or cause public inconvenience or otherwise materially interfere with the use of the road and the foot-path as such. Therefore, the provisions of the Public Premises Act are not attracted to the case. (Emphasis supplied by me) 13. Indisputably the open space that was allotted by the Commissioner of the Corporation to the appellant is part of the footpath, which is vested in the Corporation. Therefore, the provisions of the Public Premises Act are not attracted to the case. (Emphasis supplied by me) 13. Indisputably the open space that was allotted by the Commissioner of the Corporation to the appellant is part of the footpath, which is vested in the Corporation. The allotment and the licence granted for occupation by the Commissioner of the Corporation, is in exercise of the power conferred under Section 288 (2) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, which reads as follows: "(2) The Commissioner may grant a licence subject to such conditions and restrictions as he may think fit for any temporary construction in any street or in any public place the control of which is vested in Corporation." Sub-Section (4) of Section 288 reads as follows: On the expiry of any period for which a licence has been granted under this Section or after due communication of an order of suspension or revocation of such licence the Commissioner may, without notice, cause any projection or construction put up under sub-Section (1) and (2) to be removed, and the cost of so doing shall be recoverable in the manner provided in Section 470 from the person to whom the licence was granted”. (..underlining is by me) The said provision empowers the Commissioner to suspend or revoke the licence and to direct the removal of any construction put up thereon even without a notice. Footpaths or pavements are public properties, which are intended to serve the convenience of general public. In the case of Olga Tellis Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180 , the intention for laying the pavement/footpath has been stated as follows: "In the first place, foot-paths or pavements are public properties which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public. They are not laid for private use and indeed, their use for a private purpose frustrates the very object for which they are carved out from portions of public streets. The main reason for laying out pavements is to ensure that the pedestrians are able to go about their daily, affairs with a reasonable measure of safety and security. That facility, which has matured into a right of' the pedestrians, cannot be set at naught by allowing encroachments to be made on the pavements. The main reason for laying out pavements is to ensure that the pedestrians are able to go about their daily, affairs with a reasonable measure of safety and security. That facility, which has matured into a right of' the pedestrians, cannot be set at naught by allowing encroachments to be made on the pavements. There is no substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the claim of the pavement dwellers to put up construction on pavements and that of the pedestrians to make use of the pavements for passing and repassing are competing claims and that the former should be preferred to the latter. No one has the right to make use of a public property for a private purpose without the requisite authorisation and, therefore, it is erroneous to contend that the pavement dwellers have the right to encroach upon pavements by constructing dwellings thereon. Public streets of which pavements form a part. are primarily dedicated for the purpose of passage and, even the pedestrians have put the limited right of using pavements for the purpose of passing and repassing. So long as a person does not transgress the limited purpose for. which pavements are made, his use thereof is legitimate and lawful. But if a person puts any public property to use for which it is not intended and is not authorised so to use it, he becomes a trespasser. The common example which is cited in some of the English cases (see for example Hickman Vs. Maisey (1900) 1 QB 752 is that if a person. while using a highway for passage, sits down for a time to rest himself by the side of the road. he does not commit a trespass. But if a person puts up a dwelling on the pavement whatever may be the economic compulsion behind such an act, his user of the pavement would become unauthorised. As stated in Rickman, it is not easy to draw an exact line between the legitimate user of a highway as a highway and the user which goes beyond the right conferred upon the public by its dedication. But, as in many other cases, it is not difficult to put cases well on one side of the line. As stated in Rickman, it is not easy to draw an exact line between the legitimate user of a highway as a highway and the user which goes beyond the right conferred upon the public by its dedication. But, as in many other cases, it is not difficult to put cases well on one side of the line. Putting up a dwelling on the pavement is a case which is clearly on one side of the line showing that it is an act of trespass." 14. Since the footpaths or pavements are meant to serve the convenience of general public, the hunk shop erected on the footpath located close by to the heritage structure / Mysore Palace causes obstruction to the movement of the pedestrians thereon. As such, the decision taken by the Mysore City Corporation not to extend the licence to any footpath business within the radius of 2 Kms from Krishna Rajendra Circle is well founded and is justified. If any inconvenience caused to the general public is brought to the notice of the Commissioner of Corporation or is found to be so by the Commissioner himself, Section 288 (4) can be invoked by him to remove the obstruction or projection or any encroachment made by any structure in public place in the manner provided therein. Section 58 (19 & 20) of the Act casts duty upon the Corporation to clear any such obstruction. In view of the above and the decision of the Learned Single Judge in the case of Wajid (supra), affirmed by the Division Bench as noticed supra, it is clear that the Act' is not applicable to a bunk shop or any temporary structure put up on a footpath or pavement. Re:point (ii) : 15. He constitutional validity of sub-Section (4) of Section 288 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976, was also the subject matter of consideration in the case of Wajid (supra). Learned Single Judge had upheld the constitutional validity of the said provision and when the same was put in issue, the contention was negatived in Writ Appeal by the Division Bench by holding as follows: 16. Learned Single Judge had upheld the constitutional validity of the said provision and when the same was put in issue, the contention was negatived in Writ Appeal by the Division Bench by holding as follows: 16. In writ appeal Nos.1302-37 of 1986 disposed on 23.06.1987 (supra) with regard to "There is also no merit in the challenge to the validity of Section 288 (4) on the ground that it is opposed to Articles 14, 21 & 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India." the contention relating to the necessity of formal notice by the Corporation before taking any action to demolish the bunk shops and to dispossess a person, it has been held as follows: "Although it is provided that after the expiry of the period for which licence was issued to the appellants, their continued occupation of the foot-paths became unauthorised and the Corporation could take action to clear it without notice under the provisions of Sec.288(4) of the Act, before evicting the appellants an opportunity of hearing could have been given to show cause against the proposed action, the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis Case (Supra) has specifically pointed to the necessity of affording such an opportunity. However. in the instant case the Corporation has not yet taken any steps to evict the appellants from the foot paths; and secondly all the contentions that could be raised by the appellants have been considered in these proceedings. The observations of the Supreme Court at para-51 in OLGA TELLIS case is a complete answer to the said contention. As such the point does not survive for further consideration. (Emphasis is supplied by me). In the case of Olga Tellis (supra), it was held that although no hearing was afforded by the statutory authority, if aggrieved party got sufficient opportunity of hearing before Court, the authority need not be directed to afford an opportunity of hearing the party again and that there is no standard measure of reasonableness which can be applied to all situations alike. 17. In the instant case, the period for which the permission was granted to the appellant expired and was not extended. The Corporation also resolved not to extend any licence for any footpath business within the radius of 2 Kms from Krishna Rajendra Circle in Mysore City, which fact was intimated to the appellant on 19.01.1999 and the appellant submitted a representation dated 05.02.1999. The Corporation also resolved not to extend any licence for any footpath business within the radius of 2 Kms from Krishna Rajendra Circle in Mysore City, which fact was intimated to the appellant on 19.01.1999 and the appellant submitted a representation dated 05.02.1999. Thus the appellant was notified of the intended action of the Corporation which amounts to granting of an opportunity of hearing, thereby complying with the requirement of hearing if any. Point N o.2 is answered accordingly. 18. The decisions cited by the Learned Counsel for the appellant have no application to the instant case. The decision in the case of Corporation of Calicut Vs. K. Sreenivasan (Supra), is in respect of a permanent building owned by the Corporation and permitted to be occupied by a licensee on pavement of licence fee. It is not a case wherein any temporary structure was permitted to be put up on a footpath/pavement. In the case of Krishna Ram mahale (Supra), it was held that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he has no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. Same is the position of law in the case of C. Bhaskar (supra). The appellant is not in settled possession of the property and even otherwise, was not sought to be dispossessed, except by recourse to law. 19. In the instant case. since the period for which the licence was granted to install a telephone booth on the footpath expired and since the Corporation also passed a resolution not to extend licence for any footpath business within the radius of 2 Kms from Krishna Rajendra Circle after notifying the appellant and after considering his representation dated 05.02.1909, further action was taken as per Ex.P8, directing removal of the telephone booth and to the surrender of vacant space. In pursuance of Ex.P8, the second defendant sent the communication as per Ex.P9, intimating the appellant that, it would be disconnecting the electricity facility to the booth. Hence, it cannot be said that without recourse to law, action was taken against the appellant by the respondents. 20. The lower Courts have examined the record In accordance with law. There is proper appreciation of evidence. Hence, it cannot be said that without recourse to law, action was taken against the appellant by the respondents. 20. The lower Courts have examined the record In accordance with law. There is proper appreciation of evidence. The findings recorded in the impugned judgment by the Courts below are not perverse and do not suffer from any illegality. The points raised for consideration, have already been settled by the decisions of the Apex Court and this Court, noticed supra. Hence, no substantial question of law arises for consideration to admit this appeal for further consideration. 21. At this stage the Learned Counsel for the appellant sought time to enable the appellant to remove the bunk shop and over the open space to the first respondent Corporation. Learned Counsel filed an affidavit/undertaking of the appellant undertaking to hand over the possession before 31.05.2009 to the first respondent. The affidavit is taken on record. In view of the undertaking given, I deem it proper to grant time to the appellant to remove the bunk shop from the footpath and hand over the possession of the open space to the first respondent Corporation on or before 31.05.2009., by complying with the terms of the undertaking. In the result, the appeal fail; and shall stand dismissed. However, permission is accorded to the appellant to retain the bunk shop in the suit property in question till 31.05.2009 subject to the observation made hereinabove. Appeal stands dismissed accordingly.