Judgment :- F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J. The Revenue has come forward with these appeals challenging the order of the learned singe Judge dated 33. 2005, passed in W.P.Nos.10607, 10608, 10628 to 10631 of 2005. There were three sets of writ petitions filed by three assessees and the challenge in the writ petitions was to identical notices issued under Section 148 dated 111. 2004 and orders passed under Section 281B of the Income Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) dated 211. 2004. As the impugned orders are identical in nature, for the sake of convenience, we refer to the impugned notices and the connected proceedings in relation to the petitioner in W.P.Nos.10607 and 10608 of 2005, the orders of which are the subject matter of challenge in W.A.Nos.766 and 767 of 2005. 2. The writ petitioner was issued with a notice dated 111. 2004, under Section 148 of the Act calling upon him to file return of income in the prescribed format for the assessment year 2000-01, as the assessing authority had a reason to believe that his income in respect of the said assessment year chargeable to tax has escaped assessment within the meaning of Section 147 of the Act. Closely followed by that, by an order dated 211. 2004, purported to have been passed under Section 281B of the Act, the deposits held by the writ petitioner in the Union Bank of India, T.Nagar, Chennai – 600 017 under Capital Gain Scheme (in short CGS) to an extent of more than Rs.15 crores, was provisionally attached. The said order came to be passed with the approval of the Commissioner of Income Tax. In pursuance of the notice issued under Section 148, the first respondent herein, viz., the writ petitioner filed his return of income along with the statement. In the schedule filed along with the said statement, it was specifically claimed, as regards the alleged escaped income, as provided from sale of shares of S.S.I. Limited to the value of Rs.216,723,750.00. The details of the CGS deposits with the Union Bank of India with the amounts kept in deposit were also furnished. On behalf of the writ petitioner, his Auditors came forward with the letter dated 211. The details of the CGS deposits with the Union Bank of India with the amounts kept in deposit were also furnished. On behalf of the writ petitioner, his Auditors came forward with the letter dated 211. 2004, calling upon the appellant to furnish a copy of the recording of reasons for reopening of assessment under Section 147 by relying upon a decision of the Honble Supreme Court with reference to the provisional attachment order passed. 3. By another letter dated 211. 2004, the Auditors while contending that the provisional attachment order under Section 281B was bad in law, requested to furnish the basis for quantification of the sum mentioned in the order of provisional attachment. On 12. 2004, the appellant furnished a copy of the recording of reasons for reopening of assessment under Section 147. Thereafter, the Auditors of the assessee, in their letter dated 112. 2004, sought for various statements said to have been recorded from various persons to be furnished in order to enable the assessee to file their objections against the reopening of the assessment. Thereafter, by letter dated 212. 2004, the appellant informed the assessee that at the time of hearing of the case for completion of reassessment proceedings, copies of all materials and other evidences would be made available. .4. On behalf of the assessee, detailed objections were filed by their Auditors on 212. 2004 raising as many as twelve objections and general submissions. In the said objections, it was ultimately contended that the assessing officer could not have had any reason to believe that income liable to tax had escaped assessment, that therefore, the reassessment proceedings were not warranted or justified and that a speaking order should be passed. Subsequently, by letter dated 1. 2005, the Auditors of the assessee filed their additional objections. The appellant, by its letter dated 2. 2005, furnished the copies of statements taken from the Chief Manager of Union Bank of India, T.Nagar Branch and also the calculation of demand for attachment made in the provisional attachment order dated 211. 2004 passed under Section 281B of the Act, as requested by the assessee. In the said communication, it was also stated that if there were any further submissions, the same should be submitted before 12. 2005. On 12. 2004 passed under Section 281B of the Act, as requested by the assessee. In the said communication, it was also stated that if there were any further submissions, the same should be submitted before 12. 2005. On 12. 2005, on behalf of the assessee, the Auditors again filed five more objections to the notice issued under Section 148/147 of the Act. 5. The appellant, by its order dated 23. 2005, while rejecting the various objections in seriatim, concluded that the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 2000-01 have been validly reopened under Section 147 of the Act and the said order was passed after considering the objections submitted by the assessee, by a speaking order. It was at that stage, i.e. on 23. 2005, the assessee filed the present writ petitions seeking to challenge the notice issued under Section 148 dated 111. 2004 and the provisional order of attachment passed under Section 281B of the Act. .6. It is relevant to state that in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petitions, the assessee has specifically referred to the order dated 23. 2005 rejecting the various objections raised by him and ultimately holding that the reassessment proceedings were validly made. While the writ petitions came up for admission on 33. 2005, the same came to be straightaway allowed setting aside the notice issued under Section 148 dated 111. 2004 as well as the consequential proceedings of provisional attachment dated 211. 2004 passed under Section 281B by holding that the same would be without prejudice to the right of the appellant to issue fresh notice for reopening the assessment, if it is so advised, and also giving liberty to the assessees to submit their objections to the same, which should be considered by the appellant strictly in accordance with law as per the ratio laid down by the Apex Court, the Division Bench of this Court and other High Courts. In the said order, the learned single Judge has recorded the concession made by the learned Standing Counsel for the appellant, in paragraph Nos.8.1 to 3. Aggrieved against the said common order passed by the learned single Judge, the appellant has come forward with these appeals. 7. We heard Mr.T.Ravi Kumar, learned Standing Counsel for the appellant and Mr.R.Krishnamoorthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents/assessees. Aggrieved against the said common order passed by the learned single Judge, the appellant has come forward with these appeals. 7. We heard Mr.T.Ravi Kumar, learned Standing Counsel for the appellant and Mr.R.Krishnamoorthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents/assessees. Learned Standing Counsel, in his submissions, contended that before the learned Single Judge, the learned Standing Counsel never came forward to extend the concession to set aside the issuance of the notice under Section 148 of the Act and at that point of time when the writ petitions came up for admission, the learned Standing Counsel was not even aware of the development which had taken place after the issuance of the initial notice dated 111. 2004, the other objections made and the ultimate order passed on 23. 2005. 8. According to the learned Standing Counsel for the appellant, at the time of hearing of the writ petitions for admission, the learned Standing Counsel could not have made any concession with reference to the legal consequences in particular about the reassessment proceedings made under Section 147/148, the provisional attachment passed under Section 281B of the Act and in the said circumstances, any order passed based on such alleged concession would be contrary to the provisions of the statute. It was therefore contended that merely based on such alleged concession made on behalf of the learned Standing Counsel, the entirety of reassessment proceedings including the provisional attachment ought not to have been set aside. On merits, the learned Standing Counsel contended that there were enough materials available with the appellant, which would support the "reason to believe", for issuing the reassessment proceedings under Section 147/148 of the Act. The learned counsel relied upon very many decisions in support of his submissions. .9. As against the above submissions, Mr.R.Krishnamoorthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents/assessees raised a preliminary objection that when once the learned single Judge passed orders based on the concession made by the learned Standing Counsel, the appellant cannot be allowed to challenge the said order by filing this appeal. The learned Senior Counsel, however, proceeded to make his submission on the merits of the case and contended that there could have been no "reasonable belief" for the appellant to initiate reassessment proceedings. The learned Senior Counsel, however, proceeded to make his submission on the merits of the case and contended that there could have been no "reasonable belief" for the appellant to initiate reassessment proceedings. The learned Senior counsel, therefore, contended that setting aside the impugned proceedings by the learned single Judge was well justified and the same does not call for interference. The learned Senior Counsel placed reliance upon various decisions in support of his submissions. 10. Having heard the learned Standing Counsel for the appellant and the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents and after having perused the various materials placed before us as well as the order of the learned single Judge, at the outset, we wish to deal with the submissions made with regard to the concessions said to have been made by the learned counsel for the appellant. The concession said to have been made by the learned Standing counsel have been recorded by the learned single Judge in paragraph Nos.8.1 to 8.3, which reads as under:- "1. Mrs. Pushya Sitaraman, learned counsel taking notice on behalf of the respondent fairly concedes that the objections of the petitioners made on 212. 2004, 10.02.2005 and 112. 2005 were not considered by the respondent, while concluding that the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 2000-01 have been validly re-opened under section 147 of the Act by proceedings dated 21.03.2005. 8. 2. Learned counsel for the respondent also concedes that the respondent has committed an error apparent on the face of the record by pre-determining the issue, while holding that it is a fit case for levy of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act, even while giving opportunity to the petitioners in his proceedings even dated 10.02.2005 to submit their objections on or before 18.02.2005 with regard to re-opening of the assessment for the assessment year 2000-01 and before deciding the matter on merits. 8. 3. However, the learned counsel for the respondent seeks liberty to issue fresh notices to the petitioners and to proceed in accordance with law, if it is so proposed by the respondent." 11. Before considering the respective submissions of the learned counsel, we feel it appropriate to refer to certain decisions of the Honble Supreme Court on the issue of concession made by the learned counsel before the Court and its implication in deciding the case. Before considering the respective submissions of the learned counsel, we feel it appropriate to refer to certain decisions of the Honble Supreme Court on the issue of concession made by the learned counsel before the Court and its implication in deciding the case. In the decision reported in AIR 1998 S.C. 465 (Tripura Goods Transport Association v. Commissioner of Taxes), the Honble Supreme Court has held as under:- "4. ... The concession made on behalf of the State counsel was against the statutory provisions and was unauthorised. It has been submitted that order passed on the basis of this erroneous concession should be recalled. 9. The assurance given by the counsel of the State in Court was "whether the applicants are dealers or not, he assures that if and when the applicants approach the Commissioner of Taxes, he shall ensure that these forms are supplied to the petitioners." This assurance was clearly against the law. Form 18A cannot be issued to the transporters. 10. Although the order dated 3-3-1997 was based on the assurance given by the Senior Advocate appearing for the State the order will have to be recalled. An advocate appearing on behalf of the State cannot undertake that the State will do something contrary to the statute. Therefore, this application is allowed. We will recall the order passed on 3-3-1997 and restore the I.A.2 of 1996 for hearing and disposal. These applications are disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs." Again, in the decision reported in AIR 1998 SC 1681 (Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan), the Supreme Court has stated the legal position as under:- "23. In view of this observation, the question whether the stipulation for automatic termination of services of overstaying the leave would be legally bad or not, was not decided by this Court in the judgement relied upon by Mr.Manoj Swarup. In that judgment the grounds on which the interference was made were different. The judgment of the High Court was set aside on the ground that it could not decide the disputed question of fact in a writ petition and the matter should have been better left to be decided by the Industrial Tribunal. Further, the High Court was approached after more than six years of the date on which the cause of action had arisen without there being any cogent explanation for the delay. Further, the High Court was approached after more than six years of the date on which the cause of action had arisen without there being any cogent explanation for the delay. Mr.Manoj Swarup contended that it was conceded by the counsel appearing on behalf of the employee that the provision in Standing Orders regarding automatic termination of services is not bad. This was endorsed by this Court by observing that "Learned counsel for the respondent rightly made no attempt to support his part of the high Courts order." This again cannot be treated to be a finding that provision for automatic termination of services can be validly made in the Certified Standing Orders. Even otherwise, a wrong concession on a question of law, made by a counsel, is not binding on his client. Such concession cannot constitute a just ground for a binding precedent. The reliance placed by Mr.Manoj Swarup on this judgment, therefore, is wholly out of place." (Emphasis added) In the decision reported in AIR 2001 SC 2306 (Central Council for Research in Ayurveda and Siddha v. K. Santhakumari), the legal position has been set out in paragraphs 12 and 13, which is to the following effect:- "12. In the instant case, the selection was made by Departmental Promotion Committee. The Committee must have considered all relevant facts including the inter-se merit and ability of the candidates and prepared the selects list on that basis. The respondent though senior in comparison to other candidates, secured a lower place in the select list, evidently because the principle of "merit-cum-seniority held been applied by the Departmental Promotion Committee. The respondent has no grievance that there was any mala fides on the part of the Departmental Promotion Committee. The only contention urged by the respondent is that the Departmental Promotion Committee did not follow the principle of seniority-cum-fitness. In the High Court, the appellants herein failed to point out that the promotion is in respect of a selection post and the principle to be applied is merit-cum-seniority. Had the appellants pointed out the true position, the learned Single Judge would not have granted relief in favour of the respondent. If the learned Counsel has made an admission or concession inadvertently or under a mistaken impression of law, it is not binding on his client and the same cannot enure to the benefit of any party. 13. Had the appellants pointed out the true position, the learned Single Judge would not have granted relief in favour of the respondent. If the learned Counsel has made an admission or concession inadvertently or under a mistaken impression of law, it is not binding on his client and the same cannot enure to the benefit of any party. 13. This Court in Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammit Bhan AIR 1998 SC 1681 : (1998 AIR SCW 1447: 1998 Lab IC 1545: 1998 All LJ 1099) pointed out that a wrong concession on question of law made by counsel is not binding on his client and such concession cannot constitute a just ground for a binding precedent." (Emphasis added) In the decision reported in (2004) 3 SCC 628 (Union of India v. Mohanlal Likumal Punjabi), the Honble Supreme Court has stated the legal position as under:- "8. We shall first deal with the effect of concession, if any, made by learned counsel appearing for the present appellants before the High Court. Closer reading of the High Courts order shows that the High Court took the view that in view of the revocation of the order on 19-12-1994 and the order passed by the High Court on 11-1-1995, no further order could have been passed under Section 7 of the Safema. After having expressed this view, the so-called concession is recorded. In our view the concession, if any, is really of no consequence, because the wrong concession made by a counsel cannot bind the parties when statutory provisions clearly provided otherwise. It was observed by a Constitution Bench of this Court in sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal ltd. that courts are not to act on the basis of concession but with reference to the applicable provisions. The view has been reiterated in Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan and Central Council for Research in Ayurveda & Siddha v. Dr. K. Santhakumari. In para 12 of Central Council case it was observed as follows: (SCC p.64, para.12)...... 9. In Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan, it was held that a case decided on the basis of wrong concession of a counsel has no precedent value. K. Santhakumari. In para 12 of Central Council case it was observed as follows: (SCC p.64, para.12)...... 9. In Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan, it was held that a case decided on the basis of wrong concession of a counsel has no precedent value. That apart, the applicability of the statute or otherwise to a given situation or the question of statutory liability of a person/institution under any provision of law would invariably depend upon the scope and meaning of the provisions concerned and has got to be adjudged not on any concession made. Any such concessions would have no acceptability or relevance while determining rights and liabilities incurred or acquired in view of the axiomatic principle without exception, that there can be no estoppel against statute." (Emphasis added) Again, in the decision reported in AIR 2006 SC 3566 (Union of India v. S.C. Parashar), the Honble Supreme Court has held as under:- "11. Before adverting to the said question we may record that wrong concession of a counsel on a pure question of law is not binding upon a party. It is furthermore trite that non-mentioning or wrong mentioning of a provision in an order may be held to be irrelevant if it is found that the requisite ingredients thereof were available on records for passing the same. We may further notice that the High Court proceeded on the basis that the penalty imposed upon him was a major penalty. 13. However, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the Disciplinary Authority never intended to impose a minor penalty. The concession of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant before the High Court was apparently erroneous. It is now well-settled that wrong concession made by a counsel before the court cannot bind the parties when statutory provisions clearly provide otherwise." (Emphasis added) 12. In fact, Mr.R.Krishnamoorthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents/assessees also referred to the decisions reported in (i) (2004) 10 SCC 598 (Ram Bali v. State of U.P.), (ii) AIR 2003 SC 2418 (Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani) and (iii) AIR 1982 SC 1249 (State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak). 13. In fact, Mr.R.Krishnamoorthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents/assessees also referred to the decisions reported in (i) (2004) 10 SCC 598 (Ram Bali v. State of U.P.), (ii) AIR 2003 SC 2418 (Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani) and (iii) AIR 1982 SC 1249 (State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak). 13. In the decision reported in 2004 10 SCC 598 , the Honble Supreme Court, in paragraph 9 of the said judgment, has held that where the High Court has specifically recorded to the effect that only two points were urged before it, in order to ascertain as to what transpired in the Court, the record in the judgment of the Court should be taken as a conclusive proof and no one should be allowed to contradict such statement on an affidavit or by other evidence. It was further held that if a party wanted to take a stand that what was recorded was erroneous, the party should approach the concerned Court for making any rectification and it is not open to the party to contend contrary to what has been recorded before the Honble Supreme Court. 14. In the decision reported in AIR 2003 SC 2418 , it was again reiterated in paragraph No.11 that it is not open to a party to turn around and take a plea that no concession was given. Which would amount to a case of sitting on the fence, which should not be encouraged. It was again stated that if really there was no concession, the only course open to the party was to move the concerned Court and not by approaching the appellate court. 15. In the decision reported in AIR 1982 SC 1249 , the Honble Supreme Court, while reiterating the said position, however, carved out an exception, which reads as under:- "4. Of course a party may resile and an Appellate Court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment." (Emphasis added) 16. The principles that emerge from the above decisions are:- a) Any concession made by a Counsel against the statutory provisions would be unauthorised and any order based on such erroneous concession should be recalled. The principles that emerge from the above decisions are:- a) Any concession made by a Counsel against the statutory provisions would be unauthorised and any order based on such erroneous concession should be recalled. ( AIR 1998 SC 465 ); b) A wrong concession on a question of law made by a counsel is not binding on his client. Such concession cannot constitute a just ground for a binding precedent. ( AIR 1998 SC 1681 ); c) If the learned counsel has made an admission or concession inadvertently or under a mistaken impression of law, it is not binding on his client and the same cannot enure to the benefit of any party; d) Courts are not to act on the basis of concessions but with reference to the applicable provisions; e) Any concession would have no acceptability or relevance while determining the rights and liabilities incurred or acquired in view of the axiomatic principle without exception, that there can be no estoppel against statute; f) Any wrong concession made by a counsel before the Court cannot bind the parties when statutory provisions clearly provide otherwise; g) A party may be allowed to revile and an Appellate Court may permit in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice though one may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment. .17. In the decision reported in AIR 1998 SC 1681 , it has again been reiterated that a wrong concession on a question of law made by a counsel is not binding on his client .and such concession cannot constitute a just ground for a binding precedent. It was pointed out therein that if the appellant in that case had pointed out the true position, the learned single Judge would not have granted relief in favour of the respondent. It was further held that if the counsel had made an attempt to give concession inadvertently or under a mistaken impression of law, it would not be binding on the client and the same cannot any how benefit any party. The said decision was followed again by the Honble Supreme Court in the decision reported in AIR 2001 SC 2306 . The said decision was followed again by the Honble Supreme Court in the decision reported in AIR 2001 SC 2306 . In the decision reported in (2004) 3 SCC 628 , the Honble Supreme Court had gone one step further and has held that applicability of the statute or otherwise to a given situation or the question of statutory liability of a person/institution under any provision of law could invariably depend upon the scope and meaning of the provisions and has got to be adjudged not on any concession; that any such concessions would have no acceptability or relevance while determining the rights and liabilities incurred or acquired in view of the axiomatic principle that there can be no estoppel against the statute. 18. A cumulative consideration of the above principles set out in the various decisions would make it clear that in the normal course, a party who made a concession in one Court cannot be allowed to resile from it in the appellate court, but yet, under certain exceptional circumstances, when such concessions came to be made on a wrong appreciation of law which had led to gross injustice, then in such cases, the appellate court can permit in appropriate cases to resile from a concession on such exceptional grounds. The established legal position, however, remains that there can never be a concession made at the instance of the counsel on a wrong appreciation of law on the principle that there can never be an estoppel against the statute. In fact, in the decision of the Honble Supreme Court reported in AIR 2001 SC 2306 , it is made clear that an admission or concession by a counsel made inadvertently or under a mistaken impression of law will not only bind on his client, but also the same cannot enure to the benefit of the other party. .19. Keeping the above legal principles in mind, when we examined the so-called concession said to have been made by the learned Standing Counsel for the appellant, in the first place, it will have to be stated that it is not the case of the appellant that the learned Standing Counsel did not make any concession at all. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellant only contended before us that in the order dated 2. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellant only contended before us that in the order dated 2. 2005, while furnishing the copies of the statement of the Manager of the Bank and the details of the figures mentioned in the order of provisional attachment, a statement has been made to the effect that it was a fit case for levy of penalty under Section 271 (1)(c) and that if minimum amount of penalty is levied, it will work out to Rs.5.8 crores, which statement in all fairness could not have been made at that stage. We, however, proceed on the premise that the concession as recorded by the learned single Judge was made at the time of passing of the order impugned in these appeals. However, for the reasons to be stated that while dealing with the merits of the issue raised in the writ petitions, we are of the considered opinion that such a concession given, would not bind the appellant as, such concession would run contrary to the relevant provisions relating to issuance of notice under Section 148/147 of the Act. 20. Apart from the said position, even if such concession is taken to be true, the same does not correctly reflect the factual situation inasmuch as the so-called concession as recorded by the learned single Judge was stated to be on the basis of various objections raised by the assessee made on 212. 2004, 10.02.2005 and 18.02.2005, which according to the respondents, were not considered in the order dated 23. 2005. On the contrary, the order dated 23. 2005 runs to as many as nine pages and a cursory glance of the said order discloses that there were consideration of the objections in seriatim in the said order. Moreover, for issuing the proceedings under Section 147/148 of the Act, the relevant criteria to be seen is as to whether there was a reasonable belief available for the assessing authority for making a reassessment. Unfortunately, the said legal requirement, with reference to issuance of reassessment proceedings, was never considered nor examined as to whether the concession made by the learned counsel would cover such a legal principle relating to issuance of reassessment proceedings. Unfortunately, the said legal requirement, with reference to issuance of reassessment proceedings, was never considered nor examined as to whether the concession made by the learned counsel would cover such a legal principle relating to issuance of reassessment proceedings. If that be so, applying the settled legal position that based on a wrong concession on question of law made by a counsel, the same will not bind the party, the so-called concession, cannot be the basis to interfere with the proceedings impugned in the writ petitions. .21. The concession said to have been made by the learned standing counsel as recorded by the learned Judge in para 8.1 is to the effect that the objections of the writ petitioner made on 212. 2004, 10.02.2005 and 112. 2005 were not considered by the appellant. The said statement is contrary to the actual facts. A perusal of the proceedings dated 21.03.2005 disclose that every one of the objections raised by the writ petitioners were considered threadbare before expressing the decision to make a reassessment. Moreover, when, the writ petition was moved for admission, it is not known how the learned counsel could have expressed any such concession without even referring to the order dated 21.03.2005. It can only be said that such a concession as recorded by the learned Judge can only be construed as one made inadvertently and not in consonance with law. Further, when a detailed exercise was carried out by the appellants in dealing with the notice issued by it under Section 148 of the Act, and when very serious consequence would follow in pursuance of such a notice, as held by the Honble Supreme Court, Court cannot act by merely based on the concession of a counsel, but should examine the feasibility of granting any relief or pass any order by making a detailed reference to the legal principles and the relevant provision of law or otherwise it would run counter to the well established principle that there can be no estoppel against a Statute. Moreover such a concession being contrary to the real facts, will have to be taken as a wrong one and on this score also it cannot bind the appellant. In any event, in our considered opinion, in view of the special facts involved and demonstrated before us with reference to the initial order dated 111. Moreover such a concession being contrary to the real facts, will have to be taken as a wrong one and on this score also it cannot bind the appellant. In any event, in our considered opinion, in view of the special facts involved and demonstrated before us with reference to the initial order dated 111. 2004, the subsequent correspondence exchanged between the writ petitioner and the appellant, which ultimately culminated in the order dated 21.03.2005 it will be travesty of justice if the efforts taken by the appellant in initiating the reassessment proceeding were to be set at naught in such a cursory manner by relying upon the said concession of the learned counsel. We are therefore convinced that the appellant should be allowed to resile from the concession said to have been made by the learned counsel or otherwise it will result in gross injustice. In our considered opinion, having regard to the legal effect of Section 148 notice dated 111. 2004 and the consequent developments that had taken place in which, the writ petitioner have travelled to a very long distance, it is a fit case where, the appellant should be permitted to contest the writ petition on merits and examine the claim of the writ petitioner in making a challenge to the said notice. .22. As far as the so-called over statement said to have been made with reference to Section 271(1)(c) of the Act, about which the learned Standing Counsel is stated to have made a concession, it can be safely held that at that stage, even assuming that such an excess statement found in the order dated 2. 2005 was uncalled for, the same cannot in any way whittle down the effect of Section 148 notice or provide any valid ground for interfering with the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act, unless it is held that there was no basis for the reasonable belief for issuance of the said notice.