JUDGMENT Honble Ashok Bhushan, J.—These writ petitions raising common question of facts and law having been heard together are being disposed of by this common order. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged between the parties in all the writ petitions. It is sufficient to refer pleadings of writ petition No. 32164 of 2009, which is treated as leading case for disposing of all the writ petitions. 2. By these writ petitions, prayer has been made to quash the identical orders dated 24.6.2009, issued by Territory Manager (Retail) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, Varanasi asking the petitioner to close their business w.e.f. 30.6.2009 by terminating the adhoc licence from the aforesaid date. 3. Brief facts necessary for deciding the writ petitions are; the petitioner of writ petition No. 32164 of 2009 by an order dated 12.1.2005 was appointed as adhoc dealer for retail outlet at Turra, Pipari, Sonbhadra for carrying out business of Motor Spirit, High Speed Diesel and Lubricants by Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited. The order dated 12.1.2005 contemplated that Corporation was in process of finalising regular dealership for carrying out the business from the aforesaid location and pending final decision, the petitioner was appointed directly on temporary basis to run the outlet. Initially, the dealership was granted to the petitioner for a period of one year i.e. up to 12.1.2006 with stipulation that if the petitioner was interested to carry on business even after expiry of the aforesaid date, the formal application had to be made to the company for the said purpose. After having been appointed as adhoc dealer, the petitioner also obtained licence under U.P. High Speed Diesel and Light Diesel Oil (Maintenance of Supplies and Distribution) Order, 1981, which is renewed up to 31.3.2011. The petitioner was allowed to continue as adhoc dealer even after 12.1.2006 and continued as such till the impugned order dated 24.6.2009 was passed terminating the adhoc licence w.e.f. 30.6.2009 and directing the petitioner to close its business. The petitioner in this writ petition has come up with a prayer to quash the order dated 24.6.2009 and further seeks a writ of mandamus to allow the petitioner to continue it as adhoc dealer as per existing terms and conditions. 4. The petitioner in this writ petition has come up with a prayer to quash the order dated 24.6.2009 and further seeks a writ of mandamus to allow the petitioner to continue it as adhoc dealer as per existing terms and conditions. 4. In the impugned order dated 24.6.2009, two reasons have been given for termination of adhoc licence; firstly the petitioner has been working as a regular dealer at the retail petroleum outlet situated at Murdvan district Sonbhadra vide selling licence dated 29.3.1972 and secondly, the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited has made arrangement for appointing a regular dealership/Licensee to sell BPCLs products at Turra District Sonbhadra. A counter affidavit has been filed by the Corporation stating therein that petitioners appointment as adhoc dealer was only a temporary appointment which is akin to temporary appointment of a Government servant. It is stated that the petitioner has no right being a temporary appointee in view of the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Uma Devi and others, 2006 (2) ESC 192 (SC) : (2006) 4 SCC 1 . It is further submitted that writ petition in respect of contractual matter is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance has been placed on the judgment in the cases of State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Ghulam Mohd. Dar and another, (2004) 12 SCC 327 ; Verigamto Naveen v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (2001) 8 SCC 334; Kerala State Electricity Board and another v. Kurien E. Kalathil and others, (2000) 6 SCC 293 and Bareilly Development Authority and another v. Ajai Pal Singh and others, (1989) 2 SCC 116 . Another judgment relied by learned counsel for the respondents is in the case of State of U.P. v. Prem Shanker Sharma and others, 2006 (10) ADJ 123. 5. Another reasons sought to introduce to support the impugned order is that unless the site in question is vacant and no retail out let is operating, the applicants are not interested in such dealership. Rejoinder affidavit has been filed reiterating the averments made in the writ petition. 5. Another reasons sought to introduce to support the impugned order is that unless the site in question is vacant and no retail out let is operating, the applicants are not interested in such dealership. Rejoinder affidavit has been filed reiterating the averments made in the writ petition. It has been stated in the rejoinder affidavit that from the averments made in the counter affidavit, it is proved that Bharat Petroleum Corporation has not made any arrangement for appointing a regular dealer hence, the reason given to that effect in the impugned order is incorrect and non-existent. It is stated that the petitioner has right to be heard before taking impugned decision. 6. Sri V.K. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Shiv Kumar Singh and Sri S. Shekhar contended that appointment of the petitioner as adhoc dealer was made pending regular appointment of dealer by the Corporation and no regular appointment of any dealer having taken place, the Corporation acted arbitrarily in terminating the adhoc licence of the petitioner. It is further contended that the reason given in the impugned order that Corporation had made arrangement for appointment of dealer is incorrect since not even advertisement has been issued for appointment of regular dealer. The action of the Corporation is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is further contended that the Corporation being State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, it has to act in consonance with Article 14 of the Constitution of India, while discharging its function be it statutory or commercial. It is further contended that no complaints of whatsoever has been ever received regarding petitioners functioning nor that is ground for terminating the adhoc dealership. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner for the last more than four years has been satisfactorily running the outlet and has tremendously increased the business of the Corporation and at this stage there being no regular selection of dealership, the termination of adhoc dealership of the petitioner is arbitrary and unreasonable. 7. Dr. R.G. Padia assisted by Sri Prakash Padia refuting the averments of learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the petitioner being only adhoc dealer, has no right to continue. It is contended that Corporation has right to terminate the adhoc dealership without assigning any reason. 7. Dr. R.G. Padia assisted by Sri Prakash Padia refuting the averments of learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the petitioner being only adhoc dealer, has no right to continue. It is contended that Corporation has right to terminate the adhoc dealership without assigning any reason. It has been further contended that even if there is some confusion in the impugned order regarding statement of making arrangement for regular dealership that is not fatal since even if there is a minor error in the decision making process that shall not furnish a ground for exercise of writ jurisdiction. It is contended that the right of the petitioner being contractual in nature, the writ petition is not maintainable and the remedy of the petitioner is to institute a suit in a competent Court for the relief of damages or any other relief. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court as well as of this Court, as referred to in the counter affidavit noticed above. He contends that although the judgment of the apex Court in Uma Devis case was a case of temporary employees, the principles laid down in the said judgments are fully attracted with regard to termination of adhoc dealership by the Corporation. 8. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 9. The first issue which is to be answered in the writ petition is as to whether the writ petition filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 24.6.2009 of the Corporation is maintainable. The submission which has been much pressed by Dr. R.G. Padia is that the order of the Corporation terminating the adhoc dealership is in accordance with the order of appointment of the petitioner as adhoc dealer and the same cannot be challenged in writ petition. The judgment of the Apex Court on which much reliance has been placed by the petitioner is the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi (supra). The Constitution Bench in the aforesaid case was considering the cases in which regular process for employment was by-passed and State and its instrumentalities have resorted to irregular appointments and permit those appointments to continue year after year. Such employees were approaching the Court seeking direction to make them permanent in their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to the posts concerned. Such employees were approaching the Court seeking direction to make them permanent in their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to the posts concerned. The Apex Court held that passing orders for continuance of such employees defeats the constitutional scheme of public employment and the power of the High Court under Article 226 are not intended to be used for the purpose of perpetuating illegalities, irregularities or improprieties. Following was laid down in paragraph 4 of the judgment : “4. But, sometimes this process is not adhered to and the Constitutional scheme of public employment is by-passed. The Union, the States, their departments and instrumentalities have resorted to irregular appointments, especially in the lower rungs of the service, without reference to the duty to ensure a proper appointment procedure through the Public Service Commission or otherwise as per the rules adopted and to permit these irregular appointees or those appointed on contract or on daily wages, to continue year after year, thus, keeping out those who are qualified to apply for the post concerned and depriving them of an opportunity to compete for the post. It has also led to persons who get employed, without the following of a regular procedure or even through the backdoor or on daily wages, approaching Courts, seeking directions to make them permanent in their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to the concerned posts. Courts have not always kept the legal aspects in mind and have occasionally even stayed the regular process of employment being set in motion and in some cases, even directed that these illegal, irregular or improper entrants be absorbed into service. A class of employment which can only be called litigious employment, has risen like a phoenix seriously impairing the constitutional scheme. Such orders are passed apparently in exercise of the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Whether the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution is intended to be used for a purpose certain to defeat the concept of social justice and equal opportunity for all, subject to affirmative action in the matter of public employment as recognized by our Constitution, has to be seriously pondered over. Whether the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution is intended to be used for a purpose certain to defeat the concept of social justice and equal opportunity for all, subject to affirmative action in the matter of public employment as recognized by our Constitution, has to be seriously pondered over. It is time, that Courts desist from issuing orders preventing regular selection or recruitment at the instance of such persons and from issuing directions for continuance of those who have not secured regular appointments as per procedure established. The passing of orders for continuance, tends to defeat the very Constitutional scheme of public employment. It has to be emphasized that this is not the role envisaged for High Courts in the scheme of things and their wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not intended to be used for the purpose of perpetuating illegalities, irregularities or improprieties or for scuttling the whole scheme of public employment. Its role as the sentinel and as the guardian of equal rights protection should not be forgotten." 10. It was laid down by the apex Court that such adhoc temporary or daily wage employees has no right to be absorbed in the service nor at their instance regular process of recruitment can be stopped. 11. There cannot be any dispute to the proposition as laid down by the Apex Court in the said judgment. However, the present is not a case of appointment of an employee in service on adhoc basis. The present is a case where the Corporation has appointed the petitioner as adhoc dealer to carry on business of Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel oil. The order specifically mentions that pending process of finalising regular dealership for carrying out the business of Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel, the appointment is made on temporary basis. It is useful to quote the first paragraph of the order of appointment which is relevant : “We are in the process of finalising regular dealership for carrying out the business of Motor Spirit (MS) and High Speed Diesel (HSD) and Lubricants from the aforesaid location. Pending final decision of the matter, we wish to appoint you purely on temporary basis to run the subject outlet and authorize you to run the same on the following terms and conditions:” 12. Pending final decision of the matter, we wish to appoint you purely on temporary basis to run the subject outlet and authorize you to run the same on the following terms and conditions:” 12. The petitioner in this writ petition is not claiming that he should be made a regular dealer or no appointment of a regular dealer be made or had a right to continue as adhoc dealer and there is no right in the Corporation to terminate his adhoc dealership in any event. The judgment of the Apex Court in Uma Devis case (supra) is not attracted in the present case nor any such proposition has been laid down by the apex Court in the said judgment that termination of adhoc dealership cannot be challenged in writ jurisdiction. 13. The judgment in State of U.P. v. Prem Shankar Sharma (supra) was also in a case where services of a Lecturer of an intermediate college were terminated after taking approval from the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Board. The said order was challenged in the writ petition by the employee. Learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the orders, dismissing the employee and directed him to be reinstated. The Special Appeal was allowed and order of learned Single Judge was set aside. The Division Bench considered the arguments of parties on merits and held that judicial review is permissible against the decision making process and not against the decision itself even when some defect is found in decision making process, the Court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution with great caution keeping in mind the larger public interest. The said judgment being also in a case of termination after disciplinary inquiry, it is clearly distinguishable from the case in hand. Present is not a case where dealership of the petitioner has been terminated on any charge or ground. Even in the counter affidavit, no shortcoming or violation of any conditions of appointment has been claimed. Another judgment relied on by learned counsel for the respondents i.e. State of Jammu and Kashmir (supra) was a case where the apex Court held that writ in the nature of mandamus would not ordinarily be issued for enforcing the terms and conditions qua the contract. It was also held that High Court would not entertain a writ petition involving disputed question of facts. It was also held that High Court would not entertain a writ petition involving disputed question of facts. There cannot be any dispute to the propositions laid down by the apex Court in the said case. The present is not a writ petition for enforcing any terms of the contract rather challenge in the writ petition is the action of terminating the adhoc dealership of the petitioner. Further, there is no dispute between the parties regarding any issue of fact in the present case. 14. In Kerala State Electricity Board (supra) the apex Court again laid down that in dispute relating to terms of contract, the Court is not ordinarily the proper forum for resolution. In the said case, the question was whether the State Electricity Board was justified in refusing to reimburse the respondents contractor for payment made regarding minimum wage rate. The apex Court took the view that writ Court was not appropriate remedy. However, on account of several years having elapsed, the apex Court itself examined the facts and declined to interfere with the order of the High Court. The last case relied by learned counsel for the respondents is the judgment in the case of Bareilly Development Authority (supra) where the apex Court laid down that person aggrieved by non-statutory and purely contractual rights, have to seek remedy elsewhere than in proceedings under Article 226. The apex Court also disapproved the findings recorded by the High Court in the said case to the effect that there is arbitrariness and unreasonableness on the part of the appellant in increasing the cost of house/flats. 15. There cannot be any dispute that normally for enforcing any right arising out of a concluded contract, the remedy has to be sought in the manner as provided in the contract. However, the apex Court in several cases have laid down certain exceptions with regard to action of the State and its instrumentalities even in exercise of their rights of granting contracts or granting largess. In Harbanslal Sahania and another v. Indian Oil Corpn., (2003) 2 SCC 107 , the appellants were appointed dealer of the Indian Oil Corporation. The dealership was cancelled by the Indian Oil Corporation. The writ petition was filed in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the remedy is to invoke arbitration clause. The appeal was filed in the Honble Supreme Court. The dealership was cancelled by the Indian Oil Corporation. The writ petition was filed in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the remedy is to invoke arbitration clause. The appeal was filed in the Honble Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and laid down following in paragraph 7 : “7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies; (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice or, (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act and is challenged. [See Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, (1998) 8 SCC 11]. The present case attracts applicability of first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings.” 16. In another case reported in JT 1999 (3) SC 61, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation v. Dolly Dass (supra) following was laid down in paragraph 9 : “9. We may now advert to the contention that the writ remedy is not appropriate in this case. Where interpretation of a contract arises in relation to immovable property and in working such contract or relief thereof or any other fall out thereto may have the effect of giving rise to an action in tort or for damages, the appropriate remedy would be a civil suit. Where interpretation of a contract arises in relation to immovable property and in working such contract or relief thereof or any other fall out thereto may have the effect of giving rise to an action in tort or for damages, the appropriate remedy would be a civil suit. But if the facts pleaded before the Court are of such nature which do not involve any complicated questions of fact needing elaborate investigation of the same, the High Court could also exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in such matters. There can be no hard and fast rule in such matters. When the High Court has chosen to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution we cannot say that the discretion exercised in entertaining the petition is wrong." 17. Again in JT 2003 (10) SC 300, ABL International Ltd. and another v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited and others, the apex Court laid down following in paragraph 53 mark : “53. From the above, it is clear that when an instrumentality of the State acts contrary to public good and public interest, unfairly, unjustly and unreasonably in its contractual, constitutional or statutory obligations, it really acts contrary to the constitutional guarantee found in Article 14 of the Constitution.” 18. There is one more aspect of the matter, which needs mention at this stage. As noticed above, the adhoc dealership was granted to the petitioner pending process of finalisation of regular dealership for carrying out business of Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel. The very first paragraph of the order of appointment as noticed above, mentions “we are in the process of finalising regular dealership for carrying out the business of Motor Spirit (MS) and High Speed Diesel (HSD) and Lubricants from the aforesaid location. Pending final decision of the matter, we wish to appoint you purely on temporary basis to run the subject outlet and authorize you to run the same .........” 19. The appointment of the petitioner being specifically made pending final decision of regular dealership, the petitioner has Legitimate Expectation that it shall be allowed to continue till a final decision regarding appointment of dealership is taken by the Corporation. The legitimate expectation can be said to arise on the representation of the Corporation itself that it is appointing the petitioner pending finalisation of the regular dealership. The legitimate expectation can be said to arise on the representation of the Corporation itself that it is appointing the petitioner pending finalisation of the regular dealership. It is true that mere legitimate expectation alone cannot be a ground to interfere with a decision which is not in accord with legitimate expectation but legitimate expectation furnishes a foundation to an aggrieved person to seek judicial review and such person, if satisfies that decision taken is arbitrary and unreasonable or unfair, he is entitled for relief from the Court. The principle governing the concept of legitimate expectation were elaborated by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation and others, JT 1993 (3) SC 15. Following was laid down in paragraph 36 : “On examination of some of these important decisions it is generally agreed that legitimate expectation gives the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation is to be confined mostly to right of a fair hearing before a decision which results in negativing a promise or withdrawing an undertaking is taken. The doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightway from the administrative authorities as no crystallised right as such is involved. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words where a persons legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then decision-maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest. Therefore even if substantive protection of such expectation is contemplated that does not grant an absolute right to a particular person. It simply ensures the circumstances in which that expectation may be denied or restricted. A case of legitimate expectation would arise when a body by representation or by past practice aroused expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfil. The protection is limited to that extent and a judicial review can be within those limits. But as discussed above a person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, must satisfy that there is a foundation and thus has locus standi to make such a claim. In considering the same several factors which give rise to such legitimate expectation must be present. But as discussed above a person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, must satisfy that there is a foundation and thus has locus standi to make such a claim. In considering the same several factors which give rise to such legitimate expectation must be present. The decision taken by the authority must be found to be arbitrary, unreasonable and not taken in public interest.” 20. Again Supreme Court in the case of Sethi Auto Service Station and others v. Delhi Development Authority, (2009) 1 SCC 180 considered the principles of legitimate expectation. Following was laid down in paragraphs 32 and 33 : “An examination of the afore-noted few decisions shows that the golden thread running through all these decisions is that a case for applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, now accepted in the subjective sense as part of our legal jurisprudence, arises when an administrative body by reason of a representation or by past practice or conduct aroused an expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfil unless some overriding public interest comes in the way. However, a person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, has to satisfy that he has relied on the said representation and the denial of that expectation has worked to his detriment. The Court could interfere only if the decision taken by the authority was found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or in gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice and not taken in public interest. But a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. It is well settled that the concept of legitimate expectation has no role to play where the State action is as a public policy or in the public interest unless the action taken amounts to an abuse of power. The Court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which is empowered to take the decisions under law and the Court is expected to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choice which the legislature is presumed to have intended. The Court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which is empowered to take the decisions under law and the Court is expected to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choice which the legislature is presumed to have intended. Even in a case where the decision is left entirely to the discretion of the deciding authority without any such legal bounds and if the decision is taken fairly and objectively, the Court will not interfere on the ground of procedural fairness to a person whose interest based on legitimate expectation might be affected. Therefore, a legitimate expectation can at the most be one of the grounds which may give rise to judicial review but the granting of relief is very much limited. (Vide Hindustan Development Corporation)” 21. From the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner had legitimate expectation that it shall be allowed to continue till regular appointment of a dealer takes place as noticed above. It is not necessary that even if policy of the Corporation is changed, the legitimate expectation of a person be always fulfilled but when the decision is questioned before a Court, it is incumbent on the Corporation to show that policy has been changed and the decision taken by the Corporation is in public interest. In such situation, the Court shall not interfere with such decision. The present is a case where the Corporation has passed a written order terminating the adhoc dealership and the reason which was mentioned for termination included the reason that Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited has made arrangements for appointing a regular dealership/Licensee to sell BPCLs products. In the counter affidavit, it is not even claimed that any regular dealer has been appointed nor it is mentioned that any step i.e. advertisement has been issued for appointment of regular dealership. Thus, the basis of the impugned order that arrangement has been made for appointment of regular dealership, is non-existent and incorrect. When the very premise of the order is unfounded, the decision of the Corporation is clearly arbitrary. Another reason, which has been mentioned in the impugned order to the effect that one regular dealership is being running from 29.3.1972 is of not much significance since the petitioner was given adhoc dealership on 12.1.2005, when the regular dealership was already continuing for more than 30 years. Another reason, which has been mentioned in the impugned order to the effect that one regular dealership is being running from 29.3.1972 is of not much significance since the petitioner was given adhoc dealership on 12.1.2005, when the regular dealership was already continuing for more than 30 years. It is further to be noticed that the order appointing the petitioner as adhoc dealer contains contingencies that licence shall come to an end which are mentioned in paragraph 20, which is quoted as below : “(i) If any member of your firm is adjudicated as insolvent or any compromise is entered into by the firm or any member thereof or a distress, execution or other process is levied upon or a receiver is appointed on any part of the asset or properties of the firm or any member of the firm. (ii) If licence of storage of petroleum products upon the said premises is/are cancelled/revoked. (iii) If you, for any reason other than due to the Corporations fault, fail to maintain supply to the public through the aforesaid facilities for any period exceeding 24 hours. (iv) If you fail to make any payment, which is supposed to be made by you to the Corporation within the time fixed by the Corporation. (v) If you are guilty of breach of any covenant and stipulations on your part contained in this agreement or you fail to perform any further instructions given by us to you in respect of the operation and/or carrying on the business of petroleum products from the aforesaid retail outlet.” 22. The termination of the petitioner is not on any of the ground as mentioned in paragraph 20. Paragraph 22 of the order contemplates that Corporation reserves the right to terminate the grant without assigning any reason whatsoever. The above clause gives the power to the Corporation to terminate adhoc dealership but the words “without assigning any reason” cannot be read as without any reason. The Corporation may not assign any reason for termination but when the action is questioned in the Court of law, the Corporation which is an instrumentality of the State is to support its decision by reasonable cause. Any action taken without reason can be termed unreasonable. The every act of instrumentality of the State has to be backed by valid reason. State authority is not free to act like a private businessman. 23. Any action taken without reason can be termed unreasonable. The every act of instrumentality of the State has to be backed by valid reason. State authority is not free to act like a private businessman. 23. Learned counsel for the respondents in his submissions also referred to one more reason as stated in the counter affidavit for termination of the dealership that unless the site in question is vacated and no retail outlet is operating, applicants are not interested in such dealership. There are two reasons due to which said arguments cannot be accepted. Firstly; although written order has been passed for terminating the adhoc dealership but the said reason has not been mentioned in the detailed three page order. It is well settled that in a writ of certiorari decision impugned is to be supported on the basis of the order itself and no additional reason can be given to support the order as held in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner of India, AIR 1978 SC 851 . 24. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the view that decision of the Corporation in terminating the adhoc dealership is not based on any valid reason and the writ petition in the facts of the present case, specially when there was legitimate expectation with the petitioner that it shall be allowed to continue till a regular dealer is appointed, the impugned order of termination cannot be sustained. In the result, the orders dated 24.6.2009 are set aside. However, we make it clear that setting aside of the orders dated 24.6.2009 shall not preclude the Corporation to take a decision in accordance with law. Furthermore, the petitioner cannot claim any right of continuance beyond the date the regular dealer is appointed as per the condition mentioned in the appointment order dated 12.1.2005 itself. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also fairly conceded that the petitioner cannot claim any right to continue as adhoc dealer as and when any regular dealer is appointed by the respondents. 25. With the aforesaid observations all the writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. ————