Judgment : P. Jyothimani, J. These applications are filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the applicant for grant of injunction against the respondent from entering, utilizing, removing or shifting the materials, machineries or in any manner disrupting the applicant from carrying out works on behalf of Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL), Bhagpat area pending arbitration and also for injunction not to threaten, abuse or intimidate or indulge in any physical harm to the applicant. 2. The applicant company which is involved in the business of construction as contractor was awarded a contract by the Indian Oil Corporation Limited for main line laying works for 132 KM 32” dia Cross Country R-LNG and combined station works for Dadri-Panipat R-LNG pipeline project as per the Work Order dated 12. 2008. The applicant has given a part of the work to the respondent being the sub-contractor under the letter of intent dated 19. 2008. By a subsequent letter of intent dated 111. 2008, the work of submerged crossing and cased crossing work was entrusted to the respondent and thereafter, a Work Order was issued on 12. 2008, as per which the work should be completed before 1. 2009. 2.(a) As per the terms, if the work is delayed beyond the time, the applicant is entitled for liquidated damages at the rate of 1% per week subject to the maximum of 5% of the contract value. The work order also provides for arbitration and it is also stated that the Courts in Chennai only will have jurisdiction. The respondent has to arrange for adequate equipments along with tools and tackles, spares and also manpower with experienced operators, Engineers and Supervisors to ensure quality work. The payment has to be made as per the measurement sheet submitted by the respondent on verification certificate by IOCL. In the running account, 10% of the amount of bills which are to be produced by the respondent will be retained by the applicant towards performance guarantee. 2(b) It is also undertaken that the applicant shall not be liable to pay all idling charges due to suspension of work. It is stated that the applicant has supplied all materials, machines and expertise of manpower for the work. 2(b) It is also undertaken that the applicant shall not be liable to pay all idling charges due to suspension of work. It is stated that the applicant has supplied all materials, machines and expertise of manpower for the work. On a bill raised by the respondent for a sum of Rs.14,69,385/- the sum was certified and paid, however, by mistake, it was omitted to deduct the cost of materials, machines and expertise of manpower which works out to Rs.8 lakhs. The respondent started raising bills not in conformity with the work order and in some cases, the bills were also fabricated. In spite of several requests to produce copies of wages sheets and provident fund details of employees, the same were not supplied by the respondent. 2(c) When there was an attempt to resolve the dispute, the respondent through Mr. Shahid Rana, has threatened with his henchmen to kill the officials. There was a compliant lodged to the Inspector of Police, Meerut on 24. 2009. By letter dated 5. 2009, the applicant informed the respondent to submit necessary NOCs. Failing which the work will be allotted to other persons as per Clause 14 of the Work Order. The claim of the respondent in respect of works done was exorbitant and even though the total value of work is Rs.2.04 crores, the respondent raised 11 bills to a total amount of Rs.2,58,44,076/-. Some of the bills were disputed and were not certified. Even before the amount was received from the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., the applicant paid approximately a sum of Rs.67 lakhs to the respondent for the works. The respondent has failed to complete the works and in those circumstances, the applicant issued a letter dated 15. 2009, terminating the contract and appointing Mr. M. Sundaramurthy, Deputy General manager of the applicant company as sole Arbitrator in terms of the contract. 2(d) The materials and instruments which were supplied by the applicant to the respondent are still in the work spot and the applicant under its contract with the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Has to complete the work. However, the respondent is threatening and not allowing the officials of the applicant to continue the work. 2(d) The materials and instruments which were supplied by the applicant to the respondent are still in the work spot and the applicant under its contract with the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Has to complete the work. However, the respondent is threatening and not allowing the officials of the applicant to continue the work. The work for the public purpose by Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Has been completed by 90% and the project is nearing completion and the respondent is not allowing the employees of the applicant to enter into the work spot. Therefore, the applicant has filed the above applications for the reliefs. 3. This Court, having been prima facie satisfied, by order dated 25. 2009, granted an order of injunction. 4. In the counter affidavit While denying various allegations made in the application, it is stated by the respondent that the work done registers are all with the applicant. It is stated that till the Arbitrator takes a decision, no injunction can be granted, by relying upon the judgment in Jammu & Kashmir State Forest Corporation v. Abdul Karim Wani and Others AIR 1989 SC 1498 : (1989) 2 SCC 701 . It is stated that as per the Work Order, the respondent has completed the work. It is stated that the materials and equipments belong to the respondent and the applicant attempted to usurp the same. It is also stated that Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Itself in its letter dated 6. 2009, directed the applicant to settle the amount due to the respondent and in spite of the same, the applicant failed to settled the amount, which itself shows dishonest intention of the applicant. 4(a) It is stated that by virtue of interim injunction, the arbitration proceeding is scuttled. It is now stated that Clause 27 of the work order regarding appointment of an Arbitrator belonging to applicant company is invalid and not permissible in law. It is also stated that it is only the applicant who has kept the project idle not paying the charges to the respondent. It is also stated that the applicant has not provided any expertise manpower. The applications are filed only to deny the legitimate dues to the respondent. The respondent is keen in completing the project. It is also stated that it is only the applicant who has kept the project idle not paying the charges to the respondent. It is also stated that the applicant has not provided any expertise manpower. The applications are filed only to deny the legitimate dues to the respondent. The respondent is keen in completing the project. The respondent while denying the allegation about quality of work and performance as per the work order, admitted that the arbitral Tribunal has already directed the parties to complete the pleadings. It is the case of the respondent that the work has been completed and bills have been raised only for the works done as per the Work Order. The respondent is not aware of various clauses in the agreement between the applicant and Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. The payment of amount to the respondent is not based on the payment by Indian oil Corporation Ltd. to the applicant. 5. The applicant has also filed a rejoinder reiterating the earlier contentions raised in the affidavit filed in support of the application. 6. Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant submits that the project involves public interest and therefore, it should be completed and by virtue of arbitration clause, the matter has been referred to the Arbitrator and the contract with the applicant has been terminated on 15. 2009. The application is filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act for the purpose of completing the work. .7. On the other hand, Mr. S. Veeraraghavan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that as per the terms of the contract and on the facts of the case, this Court has no jurisdiction. He would submit that by consent of parties, the Courts at Delhi are having jurisdiction. According to him, no part of cause of action in respect of the contract has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. He would also submit that the appointment of an official of the applicant as Arbitrator as per Clause 27 of the Work Order is not permissible in law and it can only be a case of bias. .7(a) He would also raise a plea that the applicant has not complied with the provisions of Order 39, Rule 3, of Code of Civil Procedure. .7(a) He would also raise a plea that the applicant has not complied with the provisions of Order 39, Rule 3, of Code of Civil Procedure. He submits that the copy of injunction order supplied to the respondent does not contain any reason and therefore, the order should be set aside on that ground. He would rely upon various judgments including the judgments in Road Flying Carrier and another v. General Electric Company of India Ltd., AIR 1990 Allahabad 134, Silver Granites v. Murugan and Others AIR 1995 Madras 117 and Jammu & Kashmir State Forest Corporation v. Abdul Karim Wani and Others (supra). He would also rely upon Section 20 CPC to substantiate his contention that the respondent’s place of business is not at Chennai and no work was done in Chennai and therefore, on the jurisdictional point also, the application is liable to be dismissed. He would rely upon the judgment in Jabalpur Cable Network Pvt. Ltd., v E.S.P.N. Software India Pvt. Ltd., and Others AIR 1999 MP 271 , to state that the appointment of an employee of the applicant as Arbitrator is not permissible in law. 8. I have heard the learned senior counsel for the applicant as well as for the respondent and perused the records. 9. It is not in dispute that the respondent was appointed as a sub-contractor by the applicant and the work has been entrusted to the respondent as per the terms of the work order. A reference to the Work Order dated 12. 2008 issued by the applicant for pipeline laying work which relates to the mainline laying works for 132 KM 32” dia Cross Country R-LNG and combined station works for Dadri-Panipat R-LNG pipeline states that the job is to be completed by the respondent by 1. 2009 and in the event of delay in completing the job within the time stipulated, the applicant is entitled for liquidated damages at the rate of 1% per week subject to the maximum of 5% of the contract value. .10. Clause 9 of the Work Order also stipulates the terms of payment stating that upon receipt of corresponding payment by KCEL viz., applicant from Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., the applicant has to release the payment to the sub-contractor based on the running account bills. .10. Clause 9 of the Work Order also stipulates the terms of payment stating that upon receipt of corresponding payment by KCEL viz., applicant from Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., the applicant has to release the payment to the sub-contractor based on the running account bills. It is also stated in the said Clause that while making payment as per running account bill, 10% has to be retained towards performance guarantee by the applicant. Clause 10 also makes it clear that the sub-contractor viz., the respondent .should ensure that the work is done as per the conditions of contract between the applicant and Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. It also stipulates various other conditions making it clear that the ultimate satisfaction of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Is important in the matter of performance of work as well as the payment. 11. It is also stated in Clause 14 that the sub-contractor/respondent has to work in accordance with the terms given in the work order and the applicant reserves its right to engage another sub-contractor for the same work at the risk and cost of the respondent, if the respondent fails to do the work, in order to complete the project. Clause 26 also provides for termination of sub-contract by the applicant by giving 7 days notice to the sub-contractor and where some omissions are done by the respondent which are in breach of terms and conditions of the Work Order, termination can be done by the applicant without even notice and in any event, the matter will be set right, if the deficiency is cured within five days from the date of notice. Clause 27 of the Work Order enables the parties to refer the dispute to an Arbitrator, who shall be appointed by the applicant as per the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. the said arbitration clause is as follows: “27 Arbitration: In case any dispute relating to the terms & conditions of this Work Order/Contract or the interpretation thereof arises between the parties, the same shall promptly and in good faith be negotiated with a view of its amicable resolution and settlement. the said arbitration clause is as follows: “27 Arbitration: In case any dispute relating to the terms & conditions of this Work Order/Contract or the interpretation thereof arises between the parties, the same shall promptly and in good faith be negotiated with a view of its amicable resolution and settlement. In the event no amicable resolution or settlement is reached within a period of 30 days from the day on which the dispute(s) or difference(s) arose, such disute(s) or difference (s) shall be referred to and settled by the arbitration of sole arbitrator who shall be appointed by KCEL, as per the provision of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The decision of such arbitrator shall be final and bidding on all parties. It is hereby clarified that the Parties to this Work Order/Contract hereby give their consent to not only the appointment of an arbitrator but also their pre-consent for reference of the dispute to such sole arbitrator. The existence of any dispute(s) or difference(s) or the initiation or continuance of the arbitration proceedings shall not permit the parties to postpone or delay the performance by the parties of their respective obligations pursuant to this Deed. The place of arbitration shall be Chennai. The decision and award resulting from such arbitration shall be final and binding on the parties.” 12. Clause 28(i) which speaks about the jurisdiction is as follows: “28. Miscellaneous: .(a) to (h) xxxx .(i) Jurisdictions: Notwithstanding any other Court or Courts having jurisdiction to decide the question(s) forming the subject matter of the reference if the same and been the subject matter of a suit, any and all actions and proceedings arising out of or incidental and/or related thereto to the Work Order/Contract shall lie only in the Court of Competent Civil Jursidiction of this behalf at Delhi and only the said Court(s) shall have jurisdiction to entertain and try any such action(s) and/or proceeding(s) to the exclusion of the other Court.” As per the said clause of jurisdiction, the parties have conferred jurisdiction to the Courts at Delhi. It is not the case of respondent that the place of work which is the subject matter of work order is in Delhi, nor its place of business is in Delhi. It is also not in dispute that no amount under the contract was received in Delhi. 13. It is not the case of respondent that the place of work which is the subject matter of work order is in Delhi, nor its place of business is in Delhi. It is also not in dispute that no amount under the contract was received in Delhi. 13. A reference to various communications and also the counter affidavit filed before this Court by the respondent shows that the respondent, viz., the sole proprietor of the respondent Company is residing in Word No.2, Gayatripuram, Baghpat (Uttar Pradesh). In such circumstances, when no part of cause of action has arisen at Delhi even by application of the Code of Civil procedure, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondent that it is only the Courts at Delhi which are having jurisdiction and that consequently the application is to be rejected. 14. On the other hand, the arbitration clause under Clause 27 of the Work order makes it clear that the place of arbitration shall be in Chennai and as seen in the letter of the applicant dated 15. 2009, terminating the contract with the respondent, the applicant has infact appointed its Deputy General manager, Mr. sundaramurthy, as the sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute. The work Order is stated to have been issued by the applicant from Chennai. In fact, the letter of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Dated 6. 2009 relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the respondent which is filed in the typed-set of papers is addressed to the applicant at Chennai. 15. It is true that the applicant has got its branch at Haryana, Panipet. In the circumstances, it is clear that the place of arbitration has been agreed by the parties to be at Chennai. However, the question to be decided in this case is, whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short, “the Act”). It is one thing to say that the parties have decided to have arbitration at Chennai but that itself cannot confer jurisdiction on this Court under Section 9 of the Act, unless the dispute involved in the contract which is the subject matter of arbitration can be decided by way of a suit within the jurisdiction of this Court in the absence of arbitration clause. It is, in this regard, relevant to refer to the definition of ‘Court’ under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, which reads as follows: “2. Definitions: .(1) (a) to (d) xxxx .(e) “Court” means the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes.” 16. A reading of the said definition makes it clear that the “Court” includes High Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction, but the said Court must have the jurisdiction to decide the questions under the arbitration agreement if the same is made as a subject matter of the suit in the absence of such arbitration clause. Section 8 of the Act which empowers the judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration for resolution of dispute, in case the agreement contains a clause for arbitration, reads as follows: “8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.- .(1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration. .(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. .(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.” 17. By construing the said provisions, it is clear that even if an arbitration award is made, the Court in which such an award can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act will be the competent Court having jurisdiction where the question under the arbitration agreement can be decided. 18. By construing the said provisions, it is clear that even if an arbitration award is made, the Court in which such an award can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act will be the competent Court having jurisdiction where the question under the arbitration agreement can be decided. 18. Again, an application under Section 9 of the Act by way of interim measure can be filed before that Court which is having jurisdiction to decide the subject matter involved in the arbitration agreement, in a suit in the absence of arbitration clause. It is also relevant to note that while Sections 9 and 34 use the term, ‘Court’ Section 8 refers to the words, ‘judicial authority’. That was also the view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G. Raju AIR 2000 SC 1886 , wherein it was held that the Court to which a party shall have recourse to challenge the award would be the Court within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. In the present case, even if the arbitration award is made in Chennai as per the agreement between the parties, inasmuch as the subject matter of arbitration agreement relating to laying of road in Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, such arbitration award can be challenged only in the Courts at Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, where the subject matter of arbitration agreement would have been otherwise decided by a competent civil Court in the absence of arbitration clause. A reference to the Work Order shows that the contract on behalf of the applicant has been signed by its official at Panipet where the respondent has also signed and therefore, it cannot be presumed that the contract has been entered at Chennai. 19. It is not in dispute that the work carried on under the Work Order was not done within the jurisdiction of this Court, nor the respondent is residing or carrying on its business within the jurisdiction of this Court so as to confer the status of “Court” on this Court for the purpose of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 19. It is not in dispute that the work carried on under the Work Order was not done within the jurisdiction of this Court, nor the respondent is residing or carrying on its business within the jurisdiction of this Court so as to confer the status of “Court” on this Court for the purpose of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In such circumstances, simply because the parties have agreed to have arbitration at Chennai, which is only for the purpose of completing the arbitration proceedings after dispute has arise, it does not mean that this Court will have jurisdiction for entertaining the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 20. Even by the construction of the word, ‘Court’ found in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, wherein it is said that in the absence of arbitration clause, the Court where the subject matter can be raised in the form of a suit is the Court for the purpose of arbitration. It is relevant to note that Section 20 of CPC makes it clear that the place of jurisdiction is the place of defendant who voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain or where cause of action either wholly or partly arises Section 20, C.P.C. reads as follows: “20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises.- Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction- .(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for grain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or .(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.” 21. On the factual matrix of the case, it is clear that in the absence of arbitration clause in the Work order, the applicant could file suit only in the place of the respondent or in the place where cause of action has arisen that is, either in Panipet, Haryana or in Uttar Pradesh. When such is the touchstone for a decision about the Court of jurisdiction under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, there is no difficulty to conclude that on the facts of the present case this Court cannot be termed as a Court to entertain the application under Section 9 of the Act. Even though the applicability of the Code of Civil procedure during the arbitration proceedings has been consciously taken away by the law makers when compared to Arbitration Act, 1940, where there was a specific provision for application of Code of Civil Procedure in arbitration proceedings and in the present Act, the same has been dispensed with the same is left to be decided by consent of parties before the Arbitrator as seen under Sections 23 and 24 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 22. I am in total disagreement with the contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondent relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jammu & Kashmir State Forest Corporation v. Abdul Karim Wani and Others (supra), wherein Section 41(b) of the Jammu & Kashmir Arbitration Act, 2002 was construed and that the Code of Civil Procedure was specifically included to be followed during arbitration proceedings. The judgment of the Supreme Court is not applicable to the present case, since that was a case wherein by a specific provision, Code of Civil Procedure is made applicable to the Jammu & Kashmir Arbitration Act, and the present Act is totally difference as stated above. Therefore, it cannot be said that by filing an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the object of the arbitration would be frustrated and that the appointment of one of the officials of the applicant company is not permissible especially in the circumstances expressed in the agreement and on the basis of consent given by the respondent for such appointment. However, on the point of jurisdiction, I am of the considered view that the application under Section 9 of the Act for interim measure before this Court is not maintainable. 23. However, on the point of jurisdiction, I am of the considered view that the application under Section 9 of the Act for interim measure before this Court is not maintainable. 23. The submission made by the learned senior counsel for the respondent that the requirement of order 39, Rule 3, C.P.C. has not been complied with in this case is liable to be rejected. Learned senior counsel while admitting that immediately after the order of injunction was granted on 25. 2009, copies of affidavit and documents were served, would state that the communication contains a certified copy of order of injunction granted by this Court which does not spell out any reason. According to him, under order 39, Rule 3 CPC, the order copy which is delivered to the party must contain the reason so as to enable the party to take necessary steps to approach the Court for the purpose of vacating the order. On the other hand, it is not in dispute that after the injunction was granted on 25. 2009, on the every next day viz., on 25. 2009, the copy of order was communicated by the counsel for applicant to the respondent and an affidavit was filed before the Court to that effect on 25. 2009. It is stated that subsequently, it took one or two days for the applicant counsel to receive certified copy of the order dated 25. 2009 and after the same was obtained, immediately a certified copy was also communicated to the respondent. Therefore, the applicant has complied with the requirement of Order 39, Rule 3 C.P.C. Now it is relevant to extract Order 39, Rule 3 C.P.C. which is as follows: “Order 39. Temporary Injunctions and Interlocutory order: Rule : 1 and 2 … Rule : 3 Before granting injunction, Court to direct notice to opposite party.- The Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay before granting injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party. (Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object or granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and require the applicant. (Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object or granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and require the applicant. (a) to deliver to the opposite party, or to send to him by registered post, immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made, a copy of the application for injunction together with- .(i) a copy of the affidavit filed in support of the application; .(ii) a copy of the plaint; and (iii) copies of documents on which such injunction is granted or on the day immediately following that day, an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have been so delivered or sent.)” 24. A reference to the said provision makes it clear that when the Court proposes to grant an order of injunction without notice to the opposite side, the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay, which means that for the purpose of granting an order without notice to the opposite side, the Court must apply its mind and record its reasons or its prima facie finding. But, when the order is communicated to the opposite side a along with a copy of the affidavit, etc., it does not mean that at that stage the entire reasons which prompted the Court to grant injunction without notice to the opposite side should also be communicated to the respondent. What is required at this stage, is only to inform the factum of injunction granted to the opposite party so as to prevent for doing something and not doing something and that order is not final and on receipt of notice, it is always open to the opposite party to come to the Court and file an application either for modification or for vacating the order. In such circumstances, the question of disclosing the prima facie grounds by the Court while granting an order of injunction without notice does not arise. In any event, the non-disclosure to the opposite side of the reasons noted by the Court while granting injunction as stated above itself will not make such order as either invalid or inoperative. In this case, the learned Judge on 25. 2009 passed the following order: “3. In any event, the non-disclosure to the opposite side of the reasons noted by the Court while granting injunction as stated above itself will not make such order as either invalid or inoperative. In this case, the learned Judge on 25. 2009 passed the following order: “3. It is seen from the records that the contract has been cancelled between the applicant and the respondent and there is some urgently in completing the work. This Court is of the opinion that prima facie and balance of convenience lies with the applicant and hence there is an order of ad-interim injunction as prayed for. 4. Notice to the respondent returnable in three weeks. Requirements of Order 39 Rule 3 CPC should be complied with.”… However, while issuing certified copy of the injunction order the office has not enumerated the reasons which weighed the learned Judge for a prime facie satisfaction for grant of injunction ex parte. It is only the factum of injunction order which was communicated to the other side. It is only after the opposite party comes to the Court and files its counter affidavit and after hearing both the parties, a detailed and reasoned order would be passed by the Court and that order would be made available to the parties. Therefore, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondent that Order 39, Rule 3, C.P.C. has not been complied with is not acceptable. 25. The further contention that Order 39, Rule 3A, C.P.C. mandates that application for injunction should be disposed of within 30 days and in the present case, the order was passed on 25. 2009 and the application was taken up for hearing only in July, 2009 and therefore, more than 30 days passed and on that ground also, the injunction should be vacated, is not sustainable. First of all, on the facts of the present case, it is seen that the order of injunction was granted on 25. 2009 and the respondent itself filed counter affidavit only on 16. 2009 and thereafter, the application was taken up for hearing and orders are being pronounced and therefore, on the factual matrix of this case, there is no much delay. 2009 and the respondent itself filed counter affidavit only on 16. 2009 and thereafter, the application was taken up for hearing and orders are being pronounced and therefore, on the factual matrix of this case, there is no much delay. In any event, it is true that the Courts, while granting interim orders without notice to other side, should dispose of such applications by following Order 39 Rule 3A, C.P.C. in true letter and spirit, which mandates a very noble dictum that parties should not be made to suffer by ex parte interim orders and continue to suffer without opportunity to defend their case. But, in day-to-day function of the Courts such delays are unavoidable as such delays are due to so many reasons including heavy work load, convenience of counsel, nature of case, time taken for advancing arguments, etc. When within 30 days of granting of order of interim orders without notice to other side, the parties are before the Court, there should not be any violation of Order 39, Rule 3A, C.P.C., especially when the Court is seized of the matter by hearing the parties in such applications. However, on the facts of the present case, I do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that Order 39, Rule 3A, C.P.C. has not been complied with and therefore, the interim injunction has to be vacated. 26. In any event, as stated above, on the point of jurisdiction I have taken the view that the application filed before this Court under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is not maintainable. In such view of the mater, the applications stand dismissed and the order of injunction granted already is vacated.