S. P. MEHROTRA, J. ( 1 ) THE present Habeas Corpus Petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the constitution of India, inter alia, praying for quashing the impugned detention order dated 6-12-2007 (Annexure 1 to the Writ petition) passed by the District Magistrate, gorakhpur (Respondent No. 2), detaining petitioner under Section 3 (2) of the National security Act, 1980 (in short "the N. S. Act"), and further, for directing the respondents to set the petitioner at liberty forthwith. ( 2 ) COUNTER affidavits have been filed on behalf of the respondents. ( 3 ) FROM a perusal of the averments made in the Writ Petition as also in the Counter affidavits, the facts as stated here-in-after, emerge. ( 4 ) IT appears that a First Information report was lodged by one Rajan Kumar jaiswal on 22-9-2007 regarding an incident alleged to have taken place on 21-9-2007. The said First Information Report was registered as Case Crime No. 1624 of 2007, under Section 302/34 of the Indian Panel code and Section 7 of the Criminal Law amendment Act, at Police Station Cantt. , district Gorakhpur against the following persons : 1. Sajan Lai alias Navin Jaiswal. 2. Anil Mishra, 3. Rajiv alias Pappu Mishra (Petitioner ). 4. Ratan Mishra. ( 5 ) THE aforesaid accused including the petitioner were arrested in connection with the said Crime Case. ( 6 ) DURING investigation, Section 2/3 of the u. P. Gangsters Act was also added in the aforesaid Crime Case. ( 7 ) WHILE the petitioner was in detention in connection with the aforesaid Crime Case, the S. H. O. , Police Station Cant. , District gorakhpur submitted his report dated 25-11-2007 to the Senior Superintendent of police, District Gorakhpur recommending detention of the petitioner under Section 3 (2)of the N. S. Act. The Circle Officer Cant. , district Gorakhpur also submitted his recommendation in this regard. ( 8 ) THEREUPON, the Senior Superintendent of Police, District Gorakhpur made similar recommendation dated 29-11-2007 to the district Magistrate, Gorakhpur. ( 9 ) THE District Magistrate, Gorakhpur (Respondent No. 2) thereafter passed, the detention order dated 6-12-2007 against the petitioner under Section 3 (2) of the N. S. Act. Copy of the said detention order dated 6-12-2007 has been filed as Annexure 1 to the writ Petition. ( 9 ) THE District Magistrate, Gorakhpur (Respondent No. 2) thereafter passed, the detention order dated 6-12-2007 against the petitioner under Section 3 (2) of the N. S. Act. Copy of the said detention order dated 6-12-2007 has been filed as Annexure 1 to the writ Petition. ( 10 ) THE petitioner was supplied with the grounds of detention as per the requirements of Section 8 (1) of the N. S. Act. Copy of the grounds of detention has been filed as annexure 5 to the Writ Petition. ( 11 ) THE detention order was approved by the State Government as per the requirements of Section 3 (4) of the N. S. Act. ( 12 ) THE petitioner made a representation dated 17-12-2007 addressed to the District magistrate, Gorakhpur, the Secretary, Home department, U. P. Government, Lucknow, the chairman, U. P. State Advisory Board, lucknow and the Secretary, Home Ministry (Internal Security Department), Government of India, North Block, New Delhi. ( 13 ) THE said representation of the petitioner was rejected by the District magistrate, Gorakhpur. The State government also rejected the said representation of the petitioner, and the same was communicated by the Radiogram dated 3-1-2008. ( 14 ) THE said representation dated 17-12-2007, as noted above, was also addressed to the Central Government. ( 15 ) FROM a perusal of the Counter Affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India (Respondent No. 5), it transpires that the said representation dated 17-12-2007 from the detenu along with the para-wise comments of the Detaining Authority was received by the Central Government at the concerned desk of the Ministry of Home Affairs on 1-1-2008 through the District Magistrate, gorakhpur by letter dated 21-12-2007. ( 16 ) AFTER the processing of the said representation, the same was considered and was rejected by the Union Home Secretary on 3-1-2008. ( 17 ) RADIOGRAM dated 8-1-2008 was sent in this regard. Copy of the said Radiogram dated 8-1-2008 has been filed as Annexure ca-1 to the said Counter Affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India (Respondent No. 5 ). ( 18 ) IT has been stated in the Counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no. ( 17 ) RADIOGRAM dated 8-1-2008 was sent in this regard. Copy of the said Radiogram dated 8-1-2008 has been filed as Annexure ca-1 to the said Counter Affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India (Respondent No. 5 ). ( 18 ) IT has been stated in the Counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no. 4 (Jail Superintendent, District Jail, gorakhpur) that the petitioner was informed regarding the said Radiogram on 8-1-2008; and that thereafter, after receiving the copy of the rejection order of the representation from the Central Government, the same was served upon the petitioner on 14-1-2008. ( 19 ) THE matter was referred to the advisory Board under Section 10 of the N. S. Act. The Advisory Board gave its opinion that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner. Thereupon, the State government passed an order dated 24-1-2008 confirming the detention order dated 6-12-2007 for a period of 12 months from the date of detention, namely, 6-12-2007. Copy of the said order dated 24-1-2008 has been filed as Annexure 6 to the Writ Petition. ( 20 ) WE have heard Sri A. B. L. Gaur, learned senior Counsel assisted by Sri B. K. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Tej prakash, learned counsel appearing for the union of India (Respondent No. 5) and Sri Ali murtaza, learned A. G. A. appearing for the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, and perused the record. ( 21 ) SRI A. B. L. Gaur, learned Senior counsel has made the following submissions : 1. One of the co-accused in the aforesaid crime Case, namely, Sajan Lal alias Navin jaiswal was also detained under the N. S. Act on similar allegations as against the petitioner. The Central Government did not approve the detention of the said Sajan Lal alias Navin Jalswal, and he was released from detention. On the principle of parity, the petitioner also deserves to be released from detention. Reliance in this regard has been placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in rajesh and others v. State of U. P and others, 2002 (45) ACC 738 : (2003) All LJ 1687) (DB ). 2. On the principle of parity, the petitioner also deserves to be released from detention. Reliance in this regard has been placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in rajesh and others v. State of U. P and others, 2002 (45) ACC 738 : (2003) All LJ 1687) (DB ). 2. Subjective satisfaction of the Detaining authority can be judicially reviewed by this court, and it is open to this Court to consider as to whether the subjective satisfaction had been arrived at by the Detaining Authority properly. Applying the above principle to the present case, it is evident that the detention order dated 6-12-2007 cannot be sustained as the subjective satisfaction has not been properly arrived at by the Detaining Authority. Reliance in this regard has been placed on a decision of the Apex Court in State of maharashtra and others v. Bhaurao punjabmo Gawande, 2008 (61) ACC 713 : ( AIR 2008 SC 1705 ). 3. The alleged incident relied upon by the detaining Authority in passing the detention order dated 6-12-2007, could, if at all, affect only law and order. Public order was not disturbed by the alleged incident. Public order would be disturbed when tempo of life is affected. In the circumstances, the detention order dated 6-12-2007 is patently illegal and is liable to be quashed. Reliance in this regard is placed on the following decisions : (a) Sheshdhar Mishra v. Supdt. , Central jail, Naini and others, 1985 (Supplement)ACC 304 : (1985 All LJ 1222) (FB ). (b) Collector and District Magistrate and others Vs. S. Sultan, AIR 2008 SC 2096 . 4. The petitioner was already in custody in connection with the aforesaid Crime Case, when the detention order dated 6-12-2007 under the N. S. Act was passed. The requirements to be fulfilled in such circumstances have not been fulfilled in the present case, and as such, the detention order is bad in law. Reliance in this regard has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Surya prakash Sharma v. State of U. P. and others, 1994 (31) ACC 765 : (1995 All LJ 777) (SC ). ( 22 ) IN reply, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 5 and the learned A. G. A. have made the following submissions : 1. The principle of parity has no application in the matter of detention. ( 22 ) IN reply, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 5 and the learned A. G. A. have made the following submissions : 1. The principle of parity has no application in the matter of detention. Reliance in this regard has been placed on the following decisions : (a) District Magistrate and another v. Kulbir chand, 1990 SCC (Cri) 538. (b) Chandresh Paswan v. State of U. P. 1999 (38) ACC 721 (FB): 1999 (2) JIC 2 (All) : (1999 all LJ 1167) (FB ). (c) Yogendra Murari v. State of U. P. and others, 1988 SCC (Cri) 992 : ( AIR 1988 SC 1835 ). 2. Subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining Authority can be challenged only on limited grounds as laid down by the supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and others v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande case ( AIR 2008 SC 1705 ) (supra ). None of the grounds mentioned in the said decision exists in the present case, and, therefore, the detention order dated 6-12-2007 is perfectly legal and valid. 3. Grounds of detention for passing the detention order dated 6-12-2007 clearly show that it was a case of disturbance to the public order, and not merely disturbance to the law and order. The detention of the petitioner was necessary to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the the maintenance of public order, and the detention order dated 6-12-2007 was validly passed under Section 3 (2) of the N. S. Act. 4. The requirements to be fulfilled in case a detention order under the N. S. Act is passed in respect of a person who is already in custody, are fulfilled in the present case, and the detention order dated 6-12-2007 was perfectly legal and valid. ( 23 ) LET us now consider the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties submission No. 1 made on behalf of the petitioner: submission No. 1, as noted above, is regarding the applicability of the principle of parity in the present case. In order to appreciate this submission, it is necessary to refer to paragraph 20 of the writ Petition which is as under : "20. In order to appreciate this submission, it is necessary to refer to paragraph 20 of the writ Petition which is as under : "20. That it is relevant to submit here that the deponent came to know from reliable sources that in respect of same incident, co-accused Sajan Lal alias Navin Jaiswal has also been chosen for detaining under section 3 (2)National Security Act by the similar order passed by respondent No. 2 and against whom not only vital role in the alleged incident of murder has been assigned but also the direct motive has been referred against co-accused Sajan Lal alias Navin jaiswal. The detention order against co-accused Sajan Lal alias Navin Jaiswal has not been confirmed and approved by the central Government and the detention order against co-accused Sajan Lal Jaiswal has been dropped and disapproved by the Central Government. " ( 24 ) THE averments made in paragraph 20 of the Writ Petition have been replied to by the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur (Respondent No. 2) in paragraph 10 of his counter Affidavit. The said paragraph 10 of the Counter Affidavit is reproduced below : "10. That in reply to the contents of paragraph Nos. 20 and 21 of the Habeas corpus Petition, it is submitted that the case of the petitioner is not identical to co-accused. Since the representation of the petitioner was rejected by the State Government. However, co- accused was released in pursuance of the order of the Central Government. As per activity of the petitioner and co-accused are concerned the same were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and even tempo of society. However, while considering the representation there are different circumstances with regard to different accused for granting or refusing the relief. ( 25 ) IT may be mentioned that photostat copy of the Radiogram in respect of the said sajan Lal alias Navin Jaiswal has been filed as Annexure RA-1 to the Rejoinder Affidavit, filed on behalf of the petitioner in connected criminal Misc. (Habeas Corpus) Writ Petition no. 8965 of 2008 (Anil Mishra v. State of U. P. and others ). ( 26 ) FROM the above, it is clear, and there is no dispute between the parties also, that in respect of the co-accused Sajan Lal alias navin Jaiswal in the aforesaid Crime Case also, the detention order under the N. S. Act was passed. 8965 of 2008 (Anil Mishra v. State of U. P. and others ). ( 26 ) FROM the above, it is clear, and there is no dispute between the parties also, that in respect of the co-accused Sajan Lal alias navin Jaiswal in the aforesaid Crime Case also, the detention order under the N. S. Act was passed. However, the said detention order was not approved by the Central government whereupon the said Sajan Lal alias Navin Jaiswal was released from detention under the N. S. Act. ( 27 ) THE submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, as noted above, is that inasmuch as the said Sajan Lal alias Navin jaiswal was released from detention under the N. S. Act, the petitioner also deserves to be released from detention on the principle of parity. ( 28 ) WE have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and we find ourselves unable to accept the same. ( 29 ) QUESTION as to whether a particular person is to be detained under the N. S. Act or not, as also the question as to whether detention order passed in respect of a particular person is to be approved by the appropriate Government or not, are dependant on the facts and circumstances relevant in respect of such person. Merely because detention order has been passed in respect of a particular person and no detention order has been passed in respect of other person, cannot entitle the detenu to get his detention order quashed on the ground of parity. Similarly, in case detention orders have been passed in respect of several persons, and the detention order is not approved in respect of one of the detenus while it is approved in respect of other detenus by the appropriate Government, cannot entitle the other detenus to get detention orders passed in their respect set aside on the ground of parity. ( 30 ) IN Yogendra Murari v. State of U. P. and others, 1988 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 992 : (AIR 1998 SC 1835) (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined as under [paragraph 9 of the said SCC (Cri)]: "9. There is no merit whatsoever in the petitioners grievance of discrimination on the ground that the other co-accused persons have not been detained. There is no merit whatsoever in the petitioners grievance of discrimination on the ground that the other co-accused persons have not been detained. The role of the petitioner and that of the others are not identical and the reasonable apprehension as to their future conduct must depend on the relevant facts and circumstances which differ from individual to individual. It would have been wrong on the part of the detaining authority to take a uniform decision in this regard only on the ground that the persons concerned are all Joined together as accused in a criminal case. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 31 ) THIS decision thus lays down that in a case where there are several co-accused, the reasonable apprehension as to their future conduct must depend on the relevant facts and circumstances which differ from individual to individual. It would be wrong on the part of the detaining authority to take uniform decision in this regard only on the ground that the persons concerned are all joined together as accused in a criminal case. ( 32 ) IN District Magistrate and another v. Kulbir Chand, 1990 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 538 (supra), their Lordships of the supreme Court\held as under [paragraph 2 of the said SCC (Cri)] : "2. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are distressed to find that there was complete non-application of mind on the part of the learned Judges. While it is true that they were entitled to come to a particular conclusion upon the facts of a given case, they could not possibly have quashed the impugned order of detention merely on the ground that detention orders in similar cases had earlier been revoked. Each case has to be decided on its own facts. Accordingly, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court are set aside and it is directed to dispose of the writ petition as expeditiously as possible ; and in any event, not later than four weeks from today. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 33 ) THIS decision thus lays down that the high Court was not justified in quashing the order of detention in respect of the respondent Kulbir Chand merely on the ground that detention orders in similar cases had earlier been revoked. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 33 ) THIS decision thus lays down that the high Court was not justified in quashing the order of detention in respect of the respondent Kulbir Chand merely on the ground that detention orders in similar cases had earlier been revoked. ( 34 ) IN Chandresh Paswan v. State of U. P. and others, [1999 (2) JIC 2 (All) : (1999 All lj 1167) ( FB)] (supra), a Full Bench of this court considered the question of applicability of the doctrine of parity in the matter of preventive detention. ( 35 ) HONble D. S. Sinha, J. as he then was (for himself and for Honble O. K. Seth, J.), held as under (paragraphs 8, 10, 12, 15, and 17 of the said JIC): "8. Application of the principle of parity in reaching the satisfaction contemplated by section 3 of the Act C. N. S. Act-) will necessarily import in it objectivity which is foreign and runs counter to the scheme of the section. The satisfaction of the appropriate Government for ordering detention of each person, by its nature, has to vary on account of variance in perception of nature and extent of the danger for prevention whereof the Act has been enacted. Indiscriminate uniformity in perception is inconceivable. To be precise, subjective satisfaction envisaged bv Section 3 of the Act and concept of parity are incompatible with each other. 10. The initial order of detention of a person is passed under Section 3 of the Act and the final order, either confirming the detention order and continuing the detention of the person concerned or revoking the same, is passed under Section 12 of the Act. Where the Advisory Board reports that there is, in its opinion, no sufficient cause for the detention of a detenue, the appropriate government has no choice but to revoke the detention order and cause the detenue to be released forthwith. Revocation of the detention order and causing the release of the detenue is statutory obligation and compulsion under sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act. It is imperative and no discretion is allowed to the appropriate government. Thus, in the situation covered by the said provision, there is no occasion for application of any parity. 12. Revocation of the detention order and causing the release of the detenue is statutory obligation and compulsion under sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act. It is imperative and no discretion is allowed to the appropriate government. Thus, in the situation covered by the said provision, there is no occasion for application of any parity. 12. The expression may confirm used in sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act impliedly confers on the appropriate government the option and discretion not to confirm the detention order ignoring the report of the Advisory Board certifying the existence of sufficient cause for detention of a detenue. It is for the appropriate government and no body else, to assess and to be subjectively satisfied whether for achieving the object of the Act it is imperative to order preventive detention of a person. Such assessment and subjective satisfaction for exercise of power under sub-section (1)of Section 12 of the Act has to be founded on various diverse and variable factors which may vary in content, intent, nature and extent qua each person. Variance and dissimilarity of such factors constituting substratum of subjective satisfaction of the appropriate Government excludes applicability of the principle of parity. 15. The principle of parity, which is only a facet of and stems from the doctrine of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the constitution of India, cannot be invoked ignoring the limitations prescribed by the statute and dictated by inter alia, nature, purpose, contemporary conditions and standards prevailing in the society, urgency of the given situation and above all, well-being of the people. Unbriddled "right to equality before law" or "equal protection of the laws" is destructive of meaningful enjoyment of the right to equality itself guaranteed by the Constitution and is fraught with the peril of procreating serious disorder and disruption of the society. It is true that right to personal liberty is very precious. But, it is not absolute and cannot be above the public weal. The prime object of all laws is promotion of the well-being of the people, and the welfare of the people is the supreme law. See Latin Maxim saluspopuli suprema lex esto, which means: let the welfare of the people be the final law. 17. Thus, subject to the statutory limitations, disparity in treatment in the realm of preventive detention is legislatively sanctioned and constitutionally permitted. See Latin Maxim saluspopuli suprema lex esto, which means: let the welfare of the people be the final law. 17. Thus, subject to the statutory limitations, disparity in treatment in the realm of preventive detention is legislatively sanctioned and constitutionally permitted. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 36 ) HONble R. R. K. Trivedi, J. opined as under (paragraphs 36 and 45 of the said JIC): "36. From a close scrutiny of Sections 3 (2), 3 (4), 8 (1) and (2), 10 and 11 (4) of the Act, it appears that while passing the order of preventive detention, the detaining authority considers the grounds on which the preventive detention is sought and forms its opinion also on the basis of such other particulars which may have a bearing on the matter. Such consideration does not appear to be confined to the grounds alone which generally pertain to involvement in a criminal case. In sub-section (4) of Section 3, the grounds and other particulars are separately mentioned. The consideration by the detaining authority is one individual his conduct which was prejudicial to the public order and his nature and tendency to commit similar activity in future which are sought to be prevented by passing an order of preventive detention. The involvement of such individual in a criminal case which caused disturbance to the public order is one factor and is not whole of the consideration about him. Under Section 8 the detenu is communicated the grounds and the detaining authority may, in public interest, not disclose other facts which it considers to be against the public interest. Under Section 10 of the act if the order of preventive detention has been made by an officer mentioned in subsection (3) of Section 3, his report is required to be submitted before the Advisory Board together with the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if filed by the detenu. Under Section 11 the area of consideration further widens as the Advisory board may call for such further information as it may deem necessary from the appropriate Government or from any person called for the purpose through the appropriate Government from the person concerned. The person concerned, namely, the detenu is also heard by the Advisory board of its own or if he so desires. The person concerned, namely, the detenu is also heard by the Advisory board of its own or if he so desires. The detenu at the time of hearing may submit any material in his defence for consideration of the Advisory Board. After considering the entire material the report is submitted to the appropriate Government. The report of the advisory Board is made in a separate part. Sub- section (4) of Section 11 provides that except that part of the report, the proceedings of the Advisory Board and its report shall be confidential. Under the scheme and the procedure provided under the Act, the order of preventive detention is passed against an individual on a concentrated consideration about his past and present conduct and likely future conduct, his association with others, his pursuits in life and so many other things connected with him. In view of this, in our opinion, the learned Additional Government advocate rightly submitted that from the grounds alone similarity in two cases cannot be found. From the grounds alone, it is difficult to Judge as to what transpired to the judges constituting the Advisory Board to make a report In favour of or against the preventive detention of an Individual. For applying the doctrine of parity, the complete similarity is necessary which in our opinion, if not impossible, is very difficult to find in respect of two detenus in such cases where the orders have been passed on the basis of subjective satisfaction. 45. Thus, for the reasons stated above, our conclusion is that the order of release from preventive detention cannot be claimed on the basis of parity that the other detenu who was detained on the basis of similar grounds had been released under. Section 12 or 14 of the Act and the contrary view taken by the Division Benches is not correct and they are consequently overruled. " (Emphasis supplied ). ( 37 ) THIS decision thus lays down that the principle of parity cannot be invoked ignoring the limitations prescribed by the statute and dictated by, inter alia, nature, purpose, contemporary conditions and standards prevailing in the society, urgency of the given situation and, above all, well-being of the people. Subject to the statutory limitations, disparity in treatment in the realm of preventive detention is legislatively sanctioned and constitutionally permitted. Subject to the statutory limitations, disparity in treatment in the realm of preventive detention is legislatively sanctioned and constitutionally permitted. ( 38 ) THE consideration by the detaining authority is one individual, his conduct which was prejudicial to the public order and his nature and tendency to commit similar activity in future which are sought to be prevented by passing an order of preventive detention. The involvement of such individual in a criminal case which caused disturbance to the public order is one factor and is not whole of the consideration about him. ( 39 ) UNDER the scheme and the procedure provided under the N. S. Act, the order of preventive detention is passed against an individual on a concentrated consideration about his past and present conduct and likely future conduct, his association with others, his pursuits in life and so many other things connected with him. ( 40 ) IN view of this, from the grounds alone, similarity in two cases cannot be found. From the grounds alone, it is difficult to judge as to what transpired to the Judges constituting the Advisory Board to make a report in favour of or against the preventive detention of an individual. For applying the doctrine of parity, the complete similarity is necessary which, if not impossible, is very difficult to find in respect of two detenus in such cases where the orders have been passed on the basis of subjective satisfaction. ( 41 ) IN Rajesh and others v. State of U. P. and others, [2002 (45) ACC 738 : (2003 All lj 1687) (DB)] (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, 6 accused persons (Khoob Lai, Ram Nayan, Ram Dhyan, rajesh, Deba and Smt. Heera Dei) were involved in Case Crime No. 203 of 2001, under Sections 147, 302 and 120-B of the indian Penal Code but the detention order under the N. S. Act was passed only against 4 accused persons (Rajesh, Ram Nayan, khoob Lal and Deba ). The detention order was challenged by the detenus, inter alia, on the ground of parity. It was submitted that although same allegations were there against the co-accused Ram Dhyan, the detention order was not passed against him. ( 42 ) ACCEPTING the submission, A Division bench of this Court held as under (paragraphs 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42) : 34. It was submitted that although same allegations were there against the co-accused Ram Dhyan, the detention order was not passed against him. ( 42 ) ACCEPTING the submission, A Division bench of this Court held as under (paragraphs 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42) : 34. It has been argued by the learned a. G. A. that the petitioners are not entitled for parity in the case of detention. 35. In this connection, attention of the court has been drawn towards Full Bench decision in the case of Chandresh Paswan v. State of U. P. [1999 (38) ACC 721 : (1999 All lj 1167) FB)], and towards the decision in s. C. Katare v. State of U. P. and others (2001 Cr LJ 4777) : (2001 All LJ 2210 ). 36. We have gone through the decision in the case of S. C. Katare, in which it has been held that in the case of detention parity cannot be canvassed, as ground of detention may be entirely different in different cases. 37. So far as the decision in Chandresh paswan is concerned, the detention order was revoked under sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the National Security Act, as there was no sufficient ground for detention. 38. It has also been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that allegation, against petitioner and Ram Dhyan are the same. 39. It has also been argued that decision in the case of Chandresh Paswan is not applicable because detention order was not passed against the accused Ram Dhyan and there was no question of revoking the detention order under sub-section (2) of the section 12 of the National Security Act. 40. No counter affidavit has been filed by the State Government or by the District magistrate or by any other authority stating that the detention order was passed against ram Dhyan involved in Case Crime No. 203 of 2001 under Sections 147, 302 and 120-B IPC. 41. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in view of the fact that the detention order was not passed against the accused Ram Dhyan. although the allegations were the same, it is clear that detention order passed against the petitioners is not justified and petitioners are entitled to parity with Ram Dhyan. 42. 41. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in view of the fact that the detention order was not passed against the accused Ram Dhyan. although the allegations were the same, it is clear that detention order passed against the petitioners is not justified and petitioners are entitled to parity with Ram Dhyan. 42. As such, are of the view that as allegation in the first information report against Rant Dhyan and the petitioners were the same and detention order was not passed against Ram Dhyan the detention order passed against the petitioners is not Justified. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 43 ) IT will thus be noticed that the decision of the Division Bench in the above case turned on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case. The Division bench emphasised that the allegations against Ram Dhyan and the detenus-petitioners "were the same", and therefore, the principle of parity was applicable. ( 44 ) THUS, the said decision is distinguishable from the present case on the facts. In the present case, a perusal of the first Information Report (Annexure 2 to the writ Petition) shows that the role assigned to Sajan Lal alias Navin Jaiswal was not the same as assigned to other co-accused. ( 45 ) IT is further noteworthy that in yogendra Murari case ( AIR 1988 SC 1835 ) (supra), there were 14 accused besides the petitioner but the detention order was passed only in respect of the petitioner. ( 46 ) AS noted above, their Lordships of the supreme Court held that the detention order was not vitiated on the said ground. ( 47 ) THE Supreme Court decision in yogendra Murari case (supra), was evidently not placed before the Division Bench of this court which decided the case of Rajesh (2003 all LJ 1687) (supra), and as such, the decision of the Supreme Court in Yogendra murari case (supra) was not considered by the Division Bench while deciding the case of Rajesh (supra ). ( 48 ) THEREFORE, with deep respect for the learned Judges constituting the Division bench of this Court in the case of Rajesh (supra), we are of the view that the Division bench decision in the said case is per incuriam on the question of parity, as the same has been pronounced in ignorance of a binding decision of the Supreme Court holding to the contrary. ( 49 ) IN view of the above discussion, particularly in view of the decisions of the supreme Court in Yogendra Murari case ( AIR 1988 SC 1835 ) (supra), and in The District magistrate case ( AIR 2008 SC 2096 ) (supra), as also in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Chandresh Paswan case (1999 all LJ 1167) (supra), we are of the opinion that the principle of parity cannot be applied in the present case, and the detention in respect of the petitioner cannot be quashed on the ground that the detention order in respect of the said Sajan Lal alias Navin jaiswal was not approved by the Central government, and consequently, the said sajan Lal alias Navin Jaiswal was released from detention under the N. S. Act. ( 50 ) THE first submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, cannot, therefore, be accepted : submission No. 2 made on behalf of the petitioner: . ( 51 ) THE second submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, as noted above, is that the subjective satisfaction has not been properly arrived at by the detaining authority in passing the impugned detention order dated 6-12-2007, and the said detention order is liable to be quashed by this Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. ( 52 ) IN order to consider the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to examine the nature of preventive detention and the scope of judicial review of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order. Certain judicial decisions may be noticed in this regard. ( 53 ) IN Kishori Mohan Bera v. The State of w. B. , AIR 1972 Supreme Court 1749, their lordships of the Supreme Court considered the provisions of the Maintenance of Internal security Act (26 of 1971), and observed as under (paragraph 4 of the said AIR) : "4. Certain judicial decisions may be noticed in this regard. ( 53 ) IN Kishori Mohan Bera v. The State of w. B. , AIR 1972 Supreme Court 1749, their lordships of the Supreme Court considered the provisions of the Maintenance of Internal security Act (26 of 1971), and observed as under (paragraph 4 of the said AIR) : "4. The Act confers extraordinary power on the executive to detain a person without recourse to the ordinary laws of the land and to trial by courts. Obviously, such a power places the personal liberty of such a person in extreme peril against which he is provided with a limited right of challenge only. There can, therefore, be no doubt that such a law has to be strictly construed. Equally also, the power conferred by such a law has to be exercised with extreme care and scrupulously within the bounds laid down in such a law. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 54 ) THIS decision thus lays down that a detention law confers extraordinary power on the executive to detain a person without recourse to the ordinary laws of the land and to trial by courts. The detenu is provided with a limited right of challenge only. Therefore, the power conferred by such a law has to be exercised with extreme care and scrupulously within the bounds laid down in such a law. ( 55 ) IN Naresh Kumar Goyal v. Union of india and others, AIR 2005 Supreme Court 4421 their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the validity of a detention order passed against the appellant by the State of bihar under the provisions of the conservation of Foreign Exchange and prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, and opined as under (paragraph 9 of the said AIR): "9. It is trite law that an order of detention is not a curative or reformative or punitive action, but a preventive action, avowed object of which being to prevent the anti-social and subversive elements from Imperilling the welfare of the country or the security of the nation or from disturbing the public tranquillity or from indulging in smuggling activities or from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances etc. Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The authorities on the subject have consistently taken the view that preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The authorities on the subject have consistently taken the view that preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it. and to prevent him from doing so; It. therefore, becomes imperative on the part of the detaining authority as well as the executing authority to be very vigilant and keep their eyes skinned but not to turn a blind eye in securing the detenue and executing the detention order because any indifferent, attitude on the part of the detaining authority or executing authority will defeat the very purpose of preventive action and turn the detention order as a dead letter and frustrate the entire proceedings. Inordinate delay, for which no adequate explanation is furnished, led to the assumption that the live and proximate link between the grounds of detention and purpose of detention is snapped. [see : RU. Iqbal v. Union of India and others, (1992) 1 scc 434 : ( AIR 1992 SC 1900 ) Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, (1982) 2 SCC 403 : ( AIR 1982 SC 1143 ), and Bhawar Lal ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1979)1 SCC 465 : ( AIR 1979 SC 541 )]. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 56 ) THIS decision thus lays down that an order of detention is not a curative or reformative or punitive action, but a preventive action, avowed object of which being to prevent the anti-social and subversive elements from imperilling the welfare of the country or the security of the nation or from disturbing the public tranquillity or from indulging in smuggling activities or from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances etc. Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it, and to prevent him from doing so. ( 57 ) IN Khudiram Das v. The State of W. B. and others, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 550: (1975) 2 SCR 832 , their Lordships of the supreme Court considered the validity of a detention order passed against the petitioner under the provisions of the Maintenance of internal Security Act, 1971, and held as follows (paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the said AIR): "8. Now it is clear on a plain reading of the language of sub-sections (1) and (2) of s. 3 that the exercise of the power of detention is made dependent on the, subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that with a view to preventing a person from acting in a prejudicial manner, as set out in sub- clauses (i) (ii) and (iii) of clause (a) of subsection (1) it is necessary to detain such person. The words used in sub-sections (1)and (2) of S. 3 are "if satisfied" and they clearly import subjective satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority before an order of detention can be made. And it is so provided for a valid reason which becomes apparent if we consider the nature of the power of detention and the conditions on which it can be exercised. The power of detention is clearly a preventive measure. It does not partake in any manner of the nature of punishment. It is taken by way of precaution to prevent mischief to the community. Since every preventive measure is based on the principle that a person should be prevented from doing something which, if left free and unfettered, it is reasonably probable he would do. it must necessarily proceed in all cases to some extent, on suspicion or anticipation as distinct from proof. Patanjali Sastri, C. J. , pointed out in State of Madras v. V. G. Row, ( AIR 1952 SC 196 ) that preventive detention is "largely precautionary and based on suspicion" and to these observations may be added the following words uttered by the learned Chief Justice in that case with reference to the observations of Lord Finlay in Rex v. Halliday, 1917 AC 260 namely, that "the court was the least appropriate tribunal to investigate into circumstances of suspicion on which such anticipatory action must be largely based. " this being the nature of the proceeding, it is impossible to conceive how it can possibly be regarded as capable of objective assessment. " this being the nature of the proceeding, it is impossible to conceive how it can possibly be regarded as capable of objective assessment. The matters which have to be considered by the detaining authority are whether the person concerned having regard to his past conduct Judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances and other relevant material, would be likely to act in a prejudicial manner as contemplated in any of sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of clause (1) of sub-section f (1) of S. 3 and if so, whether it is necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from so acting. These are not matters susceptible of objective determination and they could not be intended to be Judged by objective standards. They are essentially matters which have to be administratively determined for the purpose of taking administrative action. Their determination is, therefore, deliberately and advisedly left by the legislature to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which by reason of its special position, experience and expertise would be best fitted to decide them. It must in the circumstances be held that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as regards these matters constitutes the foundation for the exercise of the power of detention and the Court cannot be invited to consider the propriety or sufficiency of the grounds on which the satisfaction of the detaining authority is based. The Court cannot, on a review of the grounds, substitute its own opinion for that of the authority, for what is made a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of detention is not an objective determination of the necessity of detention" for a specified purpose but the subjective opinion of the detaining authority, and if a subjective opinion is formed by the detaining authority as regards the necessity of detention for a specified purpose, the condition of exercise of the power of detention would be fulfilled. This would clearly show that the power of detention is not a quasi-Judicial power. It was. however, sought to be contended on behalf of the petitioner, relying on the observation of this Court in Bhut Nath mate v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 sc 806 that the exercise of the power of detention "implies a quasi-judicial approach", that the power must be regarded as a quasi-judicial power. It was. however, sought to be contended on behalf of the petitioner, relying on the observation of this Court in Bhut Nath mate v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 sc 806 that the exercise of the power of detention "implies a quasi-judicial approach", that the power must be regarded as a quasi-judicial power. But we do not think it would be right to read this observation in the manner contended on behalf of the petitioner. This observation was not meant to convey that the power of detention is a quasi judicial power. The only thing which it intended to emphasise was that the detaining authority must exercise due care and caution and act fairly and justly in exercising the power of detention. 9. But that does not mean that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is wholly immune from Judicial reviewability. The Courts have by Judicial decisions carved out an area, limited though it be within which the validity of the subjective satisfaction can yet be subjected to Judicial scrutiny. The basic postulate on which the courts have proceeded is that the subjective satisfaction being a condition precedent for the exercise of the power conferred on the executive, the court can always examine whether the requisite satisfaction is arrived at by the authority: if it is not, the condition precedent to the exercise of the power would not be fulfilled and the exercise of the power would be bad. There are several grounds evolved by Judicial decisions for saying that no subjective satisfaction is arrived at by the authority as required under the statute. The simplest case is whether the authority has not applied its mind at all: in such a case the authority could not possibly be satisfies as regards the fact in respect of which it is required to be satisfied. Emperor v. Shibnath Banerji, AIR 1943 FC 75 at p. 92 is a case in point. Then there may be a case where the power is exercised dishonestly or for an improper purpose: such a case would also negative the existence of satisfaction on the part of the authority. The existence of improper purpose, that is, a purpose not contemplated by the statute, has been recognised as an independent ground of control in several decided cases. Then there may be a case where the power is exercised dishonestly or for an improper purpose: such a case would also negative the existence of satisfaction on the part of the authority. The existence of improper purpose, that is, a purpose not contemplated by the statute, has been recognised as an independent ground of control in several decided cases. The satisfaction, moreover, must be a satisfaction of the authority itself, and therefore, if in exercising the power, the authority has acted under the dictation of another body as the Commissioner of Police did in Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas bhanji, 1952 SCR 135 : ( AIR 1952 SC 16 )and the officer of the Ministry of Labour and national Service did in Simms Motor Units ltd. v. Minister of Labour and National service, (1946) 2 All ER 201 the exercise of the power would be bad and so also would the exercise of the power be vitiated where the authority has disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of each individual case by self-created rules of policy or in any other manner. The satisfaction said to have been arrived at by the authority would also be bad where it is based on the application of a wrong test or the misconstruction of a statute. Where this happens, the satisfaction of the authority would not be in respect of the thing in regard to which it is required to be satisfied. Then again the satisfaction must be grounded on materials which are of rationally probative value. Machinder v. King, AIR 1950 FC 129. The grounds on which the satisfaction is based must be such as a rational human being can consider connected with the fact in respect of which the satisfaction is to be reached. They must be relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry and must not be extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute. If the authority has taken into account, it may even be with the best of intention, as a relevant factor something which it could not properly take into account in deciding whether or not to exercise the power or the manner or extent to which it should be exercised, the exercise of the power would be bad. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab air 1964 SC 72 . Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab air 1964 SC 72 . If these are to be found in the statute expressly or by implication matters which the authority ought to have regard to. then, in exercising the power, the authority must have regard to those matters. The authority must call its attention to the matters which it is bound to consider. 10. There is also one other ground on which the subjective satisfaction reached by an authority can successfully be challenged and. it is of late becoming increasingly important. The genesis of this ground is to be found in the famous words of Lord halsbury in Sharpe v. Wakefield, 1891 AC 173 at p. 179: ". . . . . . . when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion. . . . . . . . . according to law and not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague, fanciful, but legal and regular. So far as this ground is concerned, the courts in the United States have gone much farther than the courts in England or in this country. The United States courts are prepared to review administrative findings which are not supported by substantial evidence, that is by "such relevant findings as a reasonable man may accept adequate to support a conclusion. " But in England and in India, the courts stop-short at merely inquiring whether the grounds on which the authority has reached its subjective satisfaction are such that any reasonable person could possibly arrive at such satisfaction. "if, to use the words of Lord greene, M. R. , in Associated Provincial picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury corporation, (1948) 1 KB 223 words which have found approval of the House of Lords in Smith v. Rest Ellor Rural District Council, 1956 AC 736 and Fawceet Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham County Council, 1961 AC 636-"the authority has come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere". In such a case, a legitimate inference may fairly be drawn either that the authority "did not honestly form that view or that in forming it, he could not have applied his mind to the relevant facts". In such a case, a legitimate inference may fairly be drawn either that the authority "did not honestly form that view or that in forming it, he could not have applied his mind to the relevant facts". Ross v. Papadopollos, (1958) 1 WLR 546. The power of the Court to interfere in such a case is not as an appellate authority to override a decision taken by the statutory authority, but as a judicial authority which is concerned, and concerned only, to see whether the statutory authority has contravened the law by acting in excess of the power which the legislature has confided in it. It is on this ground that the order of preventive detention made by the District Magistrate in Debu mahto v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 816 was struck down by this Court. There, in that case, one single solitary act of wagon breaking was relied upon by the District magistrate for reaching the satisfaction that with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services to the community, it was necessary to detain him. This Court pointed out subject to certain reservations that it was difficult to see how "one solitary isolated act of wagon breaking committed by the petitioner could possibly persuade any reasonable person to reach the satisfaction that unless the petitioner was detained he would in all probability indulge in further acts of wagon breaking. " This Court did not go into the adequacy or sufficiency of the grounds on which the order of detention was based, but merely examined whether on the grounds given to the detenu, any reasonable authority could possibly come to the conclusion to which the district Magistrate did. It is true that this ground in a sense tends to blur the dividing line between subjective satisfaction and objective determination but the dividing line is very much there howsoever faint or delicate it may be, the courts have never failed to recognise it. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 58 ) THUS, the following propositions, amongst others, have been laid down in the above decision : 1. The power of detention is a preventive measure. It does not partake in any manner of the nature of punishment. It is taken by way of precaution to prevent mischief to the community. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 58 ) THUS, the following propositions, amongst others, have been laid down in the above decision : 1. The power of detention is a preventive measure. It does not partake in any manner of the nature of punishment. It is taken by way of precaution to prevent mischief to the community. Since every preventive measure is based on the principle that a person should be prevented from doing something which if left free and unfettered, it is reasonably probable he would do, it must necessarily proceed in all cases, to some extent, on suspicion or anticipation as distinct from proof. This being the nature of the proceeding, it cannot be regarded as capable of objective assessment. 2. The exercise of the power of detention is made dependant on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The matters which have to be considered by the detaining authority are whether the person concerned having regard to his past conduct judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances and other relevant material, would be likely to act in a prejudicial manner as contemplated in any of sub-clauses (i), (ii)and (iii) of clause (1) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal security Act, 1971, and if so, whether it is necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from so acting. These are not matters susceptible of objective determination and they could not be intended to be judged by objective standards. Their determination is left to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as regards these matters constitutes the foundation for the exercise of the power of detention. The Court cannot consider the propriety or sufficiency or adequacy of the grounds on which the satisfaction of the detaining authority is based. 3. The Court cannot, on a review of the grounds, substitute its own opinion for that of the authority, for what is made a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of detention is not an objective determination of the necessity of detention for a specified purpose but the subjective opinion of the detaining authority, and if a subjective opinion is formed by the detaining authority as regards the necessity of detention for a specified purpose, the condition of exercise of the power of detention would be fulfilled. This would clearly show that the power of detention is not a quasi-judicial power. 4- However, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is not wholly immune from judicial reviewability. The validity of the subjective satisfaction can be subjected to judicial scrutiny within a limited area. The basic postulate on which the courts have proceeded is that the Court can always examine whether the requisite subjective satisfaction, which is a condition precedent for the exercise of the power of detention, is arrived at by the detaining authority ; if it is not, the condition precedent to the exercise of the power would not be fulfilled and the exercise of the power would be bad. ( 59 ) THUS, in the following cases, based on the propositions as laid down in various judicial decisions, it can be said that no subjective satisfaction is arrived at by the authority as required under the statute : (i) Where the authority has not applied its mind at all, (ii) Where the power is exercised dishonestly or for an improper purpose, (iii)Where the authority has acted under the dictation of another body, as in such a case, the satisfaction is not of the authority itself, (iv) Where the authority has disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of each individual case by self-created rules of policy or in any other manner, (v) Where the satisfaction is based on the application of a wrong test or the misconstruction of a statute, (vi) Where the satisfaction is not grounded on materials which are of rationally probative value, (vii) Where the grounds on which the satisfaction is based are not such as a rational human being can consider connected with the fact in respect of which the satisfaction is to be reached, i. e. , the grounds are not relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry and are extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute, (viii)Where the authority has taken into account, as a relevant factor something which it could not properly take into account in deciding whether or not to exercise the power or the manner or extent to which it should be exercised, (ix) Where the statute expressly or by implication provides for matters which the authority ought to have regard to while exercising its power, and the authority fails to consider such matters, (x) Where the Court finds that on the grounds given to the detenu, no reasonable authority could possibly come to the conclusion to which the detaining authority did. ( 60 ) IN State of Maharashtra and others v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande, 2008 (61)ACC 713 (SC) : ( AIR 2008 SC 1705 ) (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court dealt with the meaning and concept of preventive detention and the necessity of preventive detention. Their Lordships further dealt with the scope of judicial review of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as also the grounds of challenge to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. Their Lordships further dealt with the scope of judicial review of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as also the grounds of challenge to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. Their lordships observed as under (paragraphs 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34 of the said ACC): "preventive DETENTION: MEANING AND CONCEPT 26. There is no authoritative definition of preventive detention either in the constitution or in any other statute. The expression, however, is used in contradistinction to the word punitive. It is not a punitive or penal provision but is in the nature of preventive action or precautionary measure. The primary object of preventive detention is not to punish a person for having done something but to intercept him before he does it. To put it differently, it is not a penalty for past activities of an individual but is intended to pre-empt the person from indulging in future activities sought to be prohibited by a relevant law and with a view to preventing him from doing harm in future. 27. In Hardhan Saha v. State of W. B. , (1975) 3 SCC 198 : ( AIR 1974 SC 2154 ), explaining the concept of preventive detention, the Constitution Bench of this court, speaking through Ray, C. J. stated; "the essential concept of preventive detention is that the detention of a person is not to punish him for something he has done but to prevent him from doing it. The basis of detention is the satisfaction of the executive of a reasonable probability of the likelihood of the detenu acting in a manner similar to his past acts and preventing him by detention from doing the same. A criminal conviction on the other hand is for an act already done which can only be possible by a trial and legal evidence. There is no parallel between prosecution in a Court of law and a detention order under the Act. One is a punitive action and the other is a preventive act. In one case a person is punished to prove his guilt and the standard is proof beyond reasonable doubt whereas in preventive detention a man is prevented from doing something which it is necessary for reasons mentioned in section 3 of the Act to prevent. " 28. One is a punitive action and the other is a preventive act. In one case a person is punished to prove his guilt and the standard is proof beyond reasonable doubt whereas in preventive detention a man is prevented from doing something which it is necessary for reasons mentioned in section 3 of the Act to prevent. " 28. In another leading decision in khudiram Das v. State of W. B. , (1975)2 SCR 832 : ( AIR 1975 SC 550 ), this Court stated; "the power of detention is clearly a preventive measure. It does not partake in any manner of the nature of punishment. It is taken by way of precaution to prevent mischief to the community. Since every preventive measure is based on the principle that a person should be prevented from doing something which, if left free and unfettered, it is reasonably probable he would do, it must necessarily proceed in all cases, to some extent, on suspicion or anticipation as distinct from proof. Patanjali Sastri, C. J. , pointed out in State of Madras v. V. G. Row, air 1952 SC 196 : 1952 SCR 597, that preventive detention is "largely precautionary and based on suspicion" and to these observations may be added the following words uttered by the learned Chief Justice in that case with reference to the observations of Lord Finlay in Tex v. Halliday, 1917 AC 260, namely, that "the Court was the least appropriate tribunal to investigate into circumstances of suspicion on which such anticipatory action must be largely based". This being the nature of the proceeding, it is impossible to conceive how it can possibly be regarded as capable of objective assessment. The matters which have to be considered by the detaining authority are whether the person concerned, having regard to his past conduct judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances and other relevant material, would be likely to act in a prejudicial manner as contemplated in any of sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Clause (1) of sub-section (1) of section 3, and if so, whether it is necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from so acting. These are not matters susceptible of objective determination and they could not be intended to be judged by objective standards. They are essentially matters which have to be administratively determined for the purpose of taking administrative action. These are not matters susceptible of objective determination and they could not be intended to be judged by objective standards. They are essentially matters which have to be administratively determined for the purpose of taking administrative action. Their determination is, therefore, deliberately and advisedly left by the legislature to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which by reason of its special position, experience and expertise would be best fitted to decide them. It must in the circumstances be held that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as regards these matters constitutes the foundation for the exercise of the power of detention and the Court cannot be invited to consider the propriety or sufficiency of the grounds on which the satisfaction of the detaining authority is based. The Court cannot, on a review of the grounds, substitute its own opinion for that of the authority, for what is made condition precedent to the exercise of the power of detention is not an objective determination of the necessity of detention for a specified purpose but the subjective opinion of the detaining authority, and if a subjective opinion is formed by the detaining authority as regards the necessity of detention for a specified purpose, the condition of exercise of the power of detention would be fulfilled. This would clearly show that the power of detention is not a quasi-judicial power. " 29. Recently, in Naresh Kumar Goyal v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 4421 : (2005) 8 scc 276 , the Court said; "it is trite law that an order of detention is not a curative or reformative or punitive action, but a preventive action, avowed object of which being to prevent the anti-social and subversive elements from imperilling the welfare of the country or the security of the nation or from disturbing the public tranquillity or from indulging in smuggling activities or from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances etc. Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The authorities on the subject have consistently taken the view that preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it, and to prevent him from doing so. Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The authorities on the subject have consistently taken the view that preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it, and to prevent him from doing so. It, therefore, becomes imperative on the part of the detaining authority as well as the executing authority to be very vigilant and keep their eyes skinned but not to turn a blind eye in securing the detenue and executing the detention order because any indifferent attitude on the part of the detaining authority or executing authority will defeat the very purpose of preventive action and turn the detention order as a dead letter and frustrate the entire proceedings. Inordinate delay, for which no adequate explanation is furnished, led to the assumption that the live and proximate link between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped. " [see: P. U. Iqbal v. Union of India and others, (1992) 1 scc 434 : ( AIR 1992 SC 1900 ), Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, (1982) 2 SCC 403 , : ( AIR 1982 SC 1143 ) and Bhawarlal ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1979)1 SCC 465 : ( AIR 1979 SC 541 ). "preventive DETENTION : NECESSARY EVIL 1. Liberty of an individual has to be subordinated, within reasonable bounds, to the good of the people. The framers of the constitution were conscious of the practical need of preventive detention with a view to striking a just and delicate balance benveen need and necessity to preserve individual liberty and personal freedom on the one hand and security and safety of the country and interest of the society on the other hand. Security of State, maintenance of public order and services essential to the community, prevention of smuggling and black marketing activities, etc. demand effective safeguards in the larger interests of sustenance of a peaceful democratic way of life. In considering and interpreting preventive detention laws, courts ought to show greatest concern and solitude in upholding and safeguarding the fundamental Right of liberty of the citizen, however, without forgetting the historical back-ground in which the necessity- an unhappy necessity-was felt by the makers of the Constitution in incorporating provisions of preventive detention in the constitution itself. In considering and interpreting preventive detention laws, courts ought to show greatest concern and solitude in upholding and safeguarding the fundamental Right of liberty of the citizen, however, without forgetting the historical back-ground in which the necessity- an unhappy necessity-was felt by the makers of the Constitution in incorporating provisions of preventive detention in the constitution itself. While no doubt it is the duty of the Court to safeguard against any encroachment on the life and liberty of individuals, at the same time the authorities who have the responsibility to discharge the functions vested in them under the law of the country should not be impeded or interfered with without justification [vide A. K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271 : ( AIR 1982 SC 710 ) Bhut Nath v. State of West bengal, (1974) 3 SCR 315 : ( AIR 1974 SC 806 ); State of W. B. v. Ashok Dey, (1972) 2 scr 434 : ( AIR 1972 SC 1660 ); A. D. M, jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, 1976 (Suppl)SCR 132 : ( AIR 1976 SC 1207 ). "subjective SATISFACTION : SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 31. Subjective satisfaction being a condition precedent for the exercise of the power of preventive detention conferred on the executive, the Court can always examine whether the requisite satisfaction is arrived at by the authority ; if it is not, the condition precedent to the exercise of the power would not be fulfilled and the exercise of the power would be bad. 32. A Court cannot go into correctness or otherwise of the facts stated or allegations levelled in the grounds in support of detention. A Court of law is the last appropriate Tribunal to investigate into circumstances of suspicion on which such anticipatory action must be largely based. 33. That, however, does not mean that the subjective satisfaction of Detaining Authority is wholly immune from Judicial reviewabllity. By judicial decisions. Courts have carved out areas, though limited, within which the validity of subjective satisfaction can be tested Judicially. "grounds OF CHALLENGE 34. An order of detention can be challenged on certain grounds, such as. 33. That, however, does not mean that the subjective satisfaction of Detaining Authority is wholly immune from Judicial reviewabllity. By judicial decisions. Courts have carved out areas, though limited, within which the validity of subjective satisfaction can be tested Judicially. "grounds OF CHALLENGE 34. An order of detention can be challenged on certain grounds, such as. the order is not passed by the competent authority, condition precedent for the exercise of power does not exist: subjective satisfaction arrlved at by the Detaining authority is irrational the order is mala fide: there is non-application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority in passing the order: the grounds are, or one of the grounds is. vague, indefinite, irrelevant, extraneous, non-existent or stale : the order is belated: the person against whom an order is passed is already in Jail; the order is punitive in nature ; the order is not approved by State/central government as required bv law : failure to refer the case of the detenu to the board constituted under the statute; the order was quashed / revoked and again a fresh order of detention was made vithout new facts, etc. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 61 ) THIS decision thus lays down the following, amongst others, propositions ; (1) The primary object of preven tive detention is not to punish a person for having done something but to intercept him before he does it. In other words, it is not a penalty for past activities of an individual but is intended to pre-empt the person from indulging in future activities sought to be prohibited by a relevant law and with a view to preventing him from doing harm in future. (2) The need of preventive detention is with a view to striking a just and delicate balance between need and necessity to preserve individual liberty and personal freedom on the one hand and security and safety of the country and interest of the society on the other hand. (3) The basis of preventive detention is the subjective satisfaction of the executive of a reasonable probability of the likelihood of the detenu acting in a manner similar to his past acts and preventing him by detention from doing the same. (4) Subjective satisfaction is a condition precedent for the exercise of the power of preventive detention conferred on the executive. (4) Subjective satisfaction is a condition precedent for the exercise of the power of preventive detention conferred on the executive. Therefore, the Court can always examine whether the requisite satisfaction is arrived at by the authority ; if it is not, the condition precedent to the exercise of the power would not be fulfilled and the exercise of the power would be bad. (5) A Court cannot go into correctness or otherwise of the facts stated or allegations levelled in the grounds in support of detention. However, this does not mean that the subjective satisfaction of Detaining authority is wholly immune from judicial reviewability. By judicial decisions, Courts have carved out areas, though limited, within which the validity of subjective satisfaction can be tested judicially. (6) An order of detention can be challenged on certain grounds, such as, the following : (i) The order is not passed, by the competent authority. (ii) Condition precedent for the exercise of power does not exist. (iii) Subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority is irrational. (iv) The order is malafide. (v) There is non-application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority in passing the order. (vi) The grounds are, or one of the grounds is, vague, indefinite, irrelevant, extraneous, non-existent or stale. (vii) The order is belated. (viii) The person against whom an order is passed is already in jail. (ix) The order is punitive in nature. (x) The order is not approved by state/central Government as required by law. (xi) Failure to refer the case of the detenu to the Board constituted under the statute. (xii) The order was quashed/revoked and again a fresh order of detention was made without new facts. ( 62 ) KEEPING in view the above legal position, let us consider the present case. ( 63 ) THE grounds on which the District magistrate, Gorakhpur passed the detention order dated 6-12-2007 are contained in the grounds supplied to the petitioner, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure 5 to the writ Petition. The "grounds" mean all the basic facts and materials which have been taken into account by the Detaining Authority in making the order of detention and oh which, therefore, the order of detention is based. [see : Khudiram Das v. The State of w. B. and others, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 550 (supra) (para 6)]. The "grounds" mean all the basic facts and materials which have been taken into account by the Detaining Authority in making the order of detention and oh which, therefore, the order of detention is based. [see : Khudiram Das v. The State of w. B. and others, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 550 (supra) (para 6)]. ( 64 ) A perusal of the grounds of detention (Annexure 5 to the Writ Petition) shows that the grounds of detention of the petitioner, briefly stated, are as under : (i) The petitioner with his associates runs the business of travelling agency in front of the Railway Station, Gorakhpur. (ii) The petitioner with his associates is in the habit of carrying illegal arms, and they, with a view to create their dominance, awe and terror in the area, move around together and indulge in such sporadic incidents regarding which no person has dared to lodge report in the police station. (iii) On 21-9-2007, the petitioner along with his three associates, namely, Anil mishra, Ratan Mishra and Sajan Lal alias navin Jaiswal at about 11 Oclock in the night in the public place in Malkin Hotel Premises adjacent to the Main Road in front of the railway Station, killed Gulab Chand Jaiswal, owner of Malkin Hotel, by firing, which gave rise to fear, panic and terror on the spot, and the maintenance of public order and public peace was disrupted. The petitioner and his aforesaid associates created such a situation that all the shop-keepers near the place of occurrence, started closing shutters and doors of their shops. There was confusion and chaos in front of the Railway Station and also on the Railway Station, and the people were running hither and thither. A First information Report was lodged by Rajan kumar Jaiswal (son of the deceased Gulab chand Jaiswal) in regard to the said incident whereupon the case was registered against the above accused. (iv) The incident was prominently published in various newspapers, such as, "danik Jagran", "amar Ujala" and "aaj", on 22-9-2007. A First information Report was lodged by Rajan kumar Jaiswal (son of the deceased Gulab chand Jaiswal) in regard to the said incident whereupon the case was registered against the above accused. (iv) The incident was prominently published in various newspapers, such as, "danik Jagran", "amar Ujala" and "aaj", on 22-9-2007. (v) The informant Rajan Kumar Jaiswal and eye-witnesses of the incident in their statements under Section 161 of the Code of criminal Procedure, while confirming the first Information Report, have also confirmed that around the place of incident, the maintenance of public order and public peace has been disrupted, and panic and terror have arisen amongst the people, (vi) The petitioner and his associates have been continuously threatening the informant as well as other witnesses to compel them not to depose in the Court or before the police. A report in this regard has been lodged by the informant with the Police Station Cantt. being N. C. R. No. 156 of 2007, under section 504/507 of the Indian Penal Code. (vii) The District President- Pramod Kumar agrahari of the Vyapar Mandal, District gorakphur has presented a Memorandum before the Senior Superintendent of Police and the Prabhari Nirikshak, Cantt. in the matter. (viii) The informant has been provided special security by the Senior Superintendent of Police keeping in view the above developments. (ix) The petitioner with his associates is presently in judicial custody in the District jail, Gorakhpur, but he has been making continuous efforts to be released on bail, and there is complete likelihood that the petitioner would be soon released on bail, and there is complete likelihood that after his release, he would again repeat the similar incident which would have adverse effect on the maintenance of public order in the area. ( 65 ) ON the basis of the above grounds, the District Magistrate recorded his satisfaction that there was apprehension that the petitioner would act in a manner which would be against the maintenance of public order in the State, and in order to prevent the petitioner from acting in such manner which would be against the public order in the State, it was necessary to detain the petitioner. ( 66 ) HAVING examined the grounds of detention in the present case, we are of the opinion that the Detaining Authority (District magistrate, Gorakhpur) has properly recorded his subjective satisfaction, and the condition precedent for the exercise of the power of detention is fulfilled in the present case. None of the grounds on which subjective satisfaction of the Detaining authority can be challenged exists in the present case. Subjective satisfaction arrived at by the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur cannot be said to be irrational. It cannot be said that no reasonable authority could possibly come to the conclusion to which the district Magistrate, Gorakhpur did. ( 67 ) AGAIN, it is not a case of non-application of mind on the part of the detaining Authority. A perusal of the grounds of detention in the present case shows that the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur has applied his mind to the basic facts and materials for arriving at his subjective satisfaction. ( 68 ) AGAIN, nothing has been shown that the exercise of power by the District magistrate, Gorakhpur is mala-fide or dishonest or for an improper purpose. ( 69 ) AGAIN, nothing has been shown that the satisfaction recorded is not of the District magistrate, Gorakhpur himself but he has acted under the, dictation of another authority. ( 70 ) NONE of the grounds mentioned in the grounds of detention is vague, or indefinite, or irrelevant, or extraneous, or non-existent or stale. ( 71 ) THE order of detention is not belated. As is evident from a perusal of the grounds of detention, the grounds, inter alia, mentioned the incident, which took place on 21-9-2007, and the continuing developments consequent and subsequent thereto. ( 72 ) THE order of detention again is not punitive in nature. ( 73 ) THE order of detention in respect of the petitioner has been approved by the State government as well as by the Central government. The Advisory Board has also given its opinion that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner, whereupon the State Government confirmed the detention order dated 6-12-2007 for a period of 12 months from the date of detention, namely, 6-12-2007. The Advisory Board has also given its opinion that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner, whereupon the State Government confirmed the detention order dated 6-12-2007 for a period of 12 months from the date of detention, namely, 6-12-2007. ( 74 ) IN view of the above, we are of the opinion that the subjective satisfaction was properly arrived at by the District Magistrate, gorakhpur while passing the detention order dated 6-12-2007 in respect of the petitioner, and the detention order cannot be said to be vitiated. The second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot, therefore, be accepted. Submission No. 3 made on behalf of the petitioner. ( 75 ) SUBMISSION No. 3, as noted above, is that the alleged incident relied upon by the detaining Authority in passing the detention order dated 6-12-2007 could , if at all, affect only law and order. Public order was not disturbed by the alleged Incident. ( 76 ) IN order to appreciate the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 3 of the N. S. Act, which is reproduced below: "3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons.- (1) The Central Government or the state Government may,- (a) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of india, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of India, or (b) if satisfied with respect to any foreigner that with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) The Central Government or the State government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that "with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-section, "actingin any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community" does not include "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community" as defined in the explanation to sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and maintenance of Supplies of Essential commodities Act, 1980 (7 of 1980), and accordingly, no order of detention shall be, made under this Act on any ground on which an order of detention may be made under that Act. (3) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a district Magistrate or a Commissioner of police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, direct, that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (2), exercise the powers conferred by the said, sub-section: provided that the period specified in an order made by the State Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance, exceed three months, but the State government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time. (4) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds on which, the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government: provided that where under section 8 the grounds of detention are communicated by the officer making the order after five days but not later than ten days from the date of detentions, this sub-section shall apply subject to the modification, that, for the words "twelve days", the words "fifteen days" shall be substituted. (5) When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, the State Government shall, within seven days, report the fact to the Central government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in the opinion of the state Government, have a bearing on the necessity for the order. " ( 77 ) SUB-SECTION (2) of Section 3 provides that if the Central Government or the State government is satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, it is necessary so to do, then such Government may make an order directing that such person be detained. ( 78 ) UNDER sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the N. S. Act, the District Magistrate or the commissioner of Police may also be authorised by the State Government to exercise the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 3. ( 79 ) THUS, under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the N. S. Act, the detention of a person may be ordered on the following grounds: (a) With a view to preventing such person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State, or (b) With a view to preventing such person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, or (c) With a view to preventing such person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. ( 80 ) IT will thus, be seen that while "security of the State" and "maintenance of public order" are the grounds for detaining a person under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the N. S. Act, the "maintenance of law and order" is not a ground for detention of a person under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the N. S. Act. ( 81 ) IT is, therefore, necessary to appreciate the distinction between "security of the state", "public order" and "law and order". ( 81 ) IT is, therefore, necessary to appreciate the distinction between "security of the state", "public order" and "law and order". ( 82 ) IN order to appreciate the distinction between the three words "security of the state", "public order" and "law and order", it is relevant to refer to certain judicial decisions. ( 83 ) IN Arun Ghosh v. State of W. B. , AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1228, the grounds of detention, as summarised by the District magistrate, were anti-social activities including rioting, assault and undue harassment to respectable young ladies in the public street of Malda Town. ( 84 ) THEIR Lordships of the Supreme Court explained the distinction between the maintenance of "public order" and its disturbance and the maintenance of "law and order" and its disturbance as follows (paragraph 3 of the said AIR) : "3. The submission of the counsel is that these are stray acts directed against individuals and are not subversive of public order and therefore the detention on the ostensible ground of preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public order was not justified. In support of this submission reference is made to three cases of this Court: Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, 1966-1 SCR 709 : ( AIR 1966 SC 740 ); Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West bengal, W. P. No. 179 of 1968, D/- 7-11-1968 (SC) and Shyamal Chakraborty v. Commr. of police, Calcutta, W. P. No. 102 of 1969, d/- 4-8-1969 (SC ). In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohias case 1966-1 SCR 709 : ( AIR 1966 SC 740 )this Court pointed out the difference between maintenance of law and order and its disturbance and the maintenance of public order and its disturbance. Public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. Pubic 6rder is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance, a man stabs another. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however, much one may dislike the act. Take another case of a town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a member of the other community. This is an act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Take the case of assault on girls. A guest at a hotel may kiss or make advances to half a dozen chamber maids. He may annoy them and also the management but he does not cause disturbance of public order. He may even have a fracas with the friends of one of the girls but even then it would be a case of breach of law and order only. Take another case of a man who molests women in lonely places. As a result of his activities girls going to colleges and schools are in constant danger and fear. Women going for their ordinary business are afraid of being way-laid and assaulted. The activity of this man in its essential quality is not different from the act of the other man but in its potentiality and in its effect upon the public tranquillity there is a vast difference. The act of the man who molests the girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in the even tempo of living which is the first requirement of public order. He disturbs the society and the community. His act makes all the women apprehensive of their honour and he can be said to be causing disturbance of public order and not merely committing individual actions which may be taken note of by the criminal prosecution agencies. He disturbs the society and the community. His act makes all the women apprehensive of their honour and he can be said to be causing disturbance of public order and not merely committing individual actions which may be taken note of by the criminal prosecution agencies. It means therefore that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. The french distinguish law and order and public order by designating the latter as order publique. The latter expression has been recognised as meaning something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. Justice Ramaswami in Writ Petn. No. 179 of 1968 (SC) drew a line of demarcation between the serious and aggravated forms of breaches of public order which affect the community or endanger the public interest at large from minor breaches of peace which do not affect the public at large. He drew an analogy between public and private crimes. The analogy is useful but not to be pushed too far. A large number of acts directed against person or individuals may total up into a breach of public order. In Dr. Ram Manohar lohias case, 1966 1 SCR 709 : ( AIR 1966 sc 740 ) examples were given by Sarkar and hidayatullah, JJ. They show how similar acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on the other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community. The question to ask is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed? This question has to be faced in every case on facts. There is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 85 ) THIS decision thus lays down that public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. This question has to be faced in every case on facts. There is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 85 ) THIS decision thus lays down that public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. ( 86 ) AN act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. ( 87 ) THE question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. ( 88 ) SIMILAR acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on the other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community. ( 89 ) THE question to ask is : "does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed ?. " ( 90 ) THIS question has to be faced in every case on facts. There is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another. ( 91 ) ON facts, the Supreme Court noticed that all acts of molestation committed by the detenu-Arun Ghosh were directed against the family of a particular person and were not directed against women in general from the locality. There is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another. ( 91 ) ON facts, the Supreme Court noticed that all acts of molestation committed by the detenu-Arun Ghosh were directed against the family of a particular person and were not directed against women in general from the locality. The Supreme Court, therefore, concluded that "the conduct may be reprehensible but it does not add up to the situation where it may be said that the community at large was being disturbed or in other words there was a breach of public order or likelihood of a breach of public order. " ( 92 ) IN Parimal Sarkar v. The State of West bengal, AIR 1972 Supreme Court 1653, the detenu along with others looted away rice from the wagon at a Railway Station Yard and attacked the Railway Protection Force party with bombs and ballasts when challenged by them. ( 93 ) THEIR Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the acts of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and his detention was valid. It was observed as under (paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the said AIR): "4. Whether the act committed by the petitioner oh the sole ground communicated to him would amount to a disturbance of public order or is likely to disturb public order has been considered in several recent decisions of this Court one of "which was pronounced only yesterday, in S. K. Kader v. State of W. B. (W. P. No. 35 of 1972, d/- 2-5-1972 : (reported in AIR 1972 SC 1647 ) to which both of us were parties. In that case also the grounds were similar to the ground on which the petitioner has been detained. In fact the second ground in that case is almost identical It was there observed by Mathew, J. :-"the question whether a person has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is one of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. An act by itself is not determinative of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. An act by itself is not determinative of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Similar acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on the other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community. Public order js the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of the law and order. In the final analysis, one must always return to the facts of the case to see whether the acts perpetrated are of such a nature or of such potentiality as to travel beyond the immediate victims and affect the general or local public. A case by case adjudication gives the judicial process the impact of actuality and thereby saves it from the hazards of generalisation. " 5. By the application of the principles set out above, we held that the acts alleged against the detenu in the grounds served on him had the potentiality of affecting the even tempo of the life of the community in the locality by their reverberations and were sufficient to sustain the order of detention on the ground that the acts of the petitioner would disturb or would be likely to disturb the maintenance of public order. 6. The ground in this case as we said earlier being similar, we must hold likewise that the acts alleged to have been committed by the petitioner are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Similar grounds have been considered in three other cases of this Court where it has been held that they disclose that the act or acts alleged against the detenu would disturb or would be likely to disturb public order. (See Nandlal Roy v. State of W. B. , Writ Petn. No. 15 of 1972 : (reported in AIR 1972 SC 1566 ); Netaipada shah v. State of West Bengal, Writ Petn. (See Nandlal Roy v. State of W. B. , Writ Petn. No. 15 of 1972 : (reported in AIR 1972 SC 1566 ); Netaipada shah v. State of West Bengal, Writ Petn. No. 18 of 1972 : (reported in AIR 1972 SC 1650 )and Jagannath v. State of W. B. , W. P. No. 13 of 1972 : (reported in AIR 1972 SC 1564 ) ). " (Emphasis supplied) ( 94 ) THIS decision thus lays down that the question whether a person has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is one of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. An act by itself is not determinative of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. ( 95 ) SIMILAR acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on the other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community. ( 96 ) PUBLIC order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. It is the degree of disturbance and its etfect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of the law and order. ( 97 ) ONE must always return to the facts of the case to see whether the acts perpetrated are of such a nature or of such potentiality as to travel beyond the immediate victims and affect the general or local public. ( 98 ) IN Sk. Kader v. The State of W. B. , AIR 1972 Supreme Court 1647, the detenu along with others, while removing material from the wagon at the railway station yard, attacked the on duty Railway Protection Force party with bombs and ballasts when challenged by them. ( 99 ) THEIR Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the acts of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and his detention under the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 was valid. It was held as follows (paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the said AIR): "4. ( 99 ) THEIR Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the acts of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and his detention under the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 was valid. It was held as follows (paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the said AIR): "4. Section 3 (2) of the Act defines the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order" for the purpose of sub-section (1) of that section. Clauses (b)and (d) of sub-section (2) of S. 3 read as follows:-" (b) Committing mischief, within the meaning of Section 425 of the Indian Penal code, (45 of 1860) by fire or any explosive substance on any property of Government or any local authority or any Corporation owned or controlled by Government or any university or other educational institution or on any public building, where the commission of such mischief disturbs, or is likely to disturb, public order;" " (d) committing, or instigating any person to commit any offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term extending to seven years or more or any offence under the Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959) or the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (6 of 1908) where the commission of such offence disturbs, or is likely to disturb, public order;" the question is, whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner in the grounds communicated to him would amount to commission of offences which would disturb public order or which are likely to disturb public order. 5. The relevant criteria to distinguish in the abstract between acts prejudicial to maintenance of law and order and those which are prejudicial to maintenance of public order are laid down in a number of rulings of this Court (See Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal. (1969) 2 SCR 635 : ( AIR 1970 SC 852 ); Sudhir Kumar Saha v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, AIR 1970 sc 814 and Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West Bengal, (1972) 1 SCR 498 : ( AIR 1972 sc 665 ). (1969) 2 SCR 635 : ( AIR 1970 SC 852 ); Sudhir Kumar Saha v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, AIR 1970 sc 814 and Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West Bengal, (1972) 1 SCR 498 : ( AIR 1972 sc 665 ). The question whether a person has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is one of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. An act by Itself is not determinative of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Similar acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on the other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to breach of the law and order (See Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228 ). 6. In the final analysis, one must always return to the facts of the case to see whether the acts perpetrated are of such a nature or of such potentiality as to travel beyond the immediate victim and affect the general or local public. A case by case adjudication gives the judicial process the impact of actuality and thereby saves it from the hazards of generalization. 7. We think that the acts attributed to the petitioner are such as would bring him within the ambit of Clauses (b) and (d) of Section 3 (2) of the Act. Attacking the R. P. F. Party with bombs at the Chitpur Railway Station yard was bound to cause scare among all the members of the public who would be resorting the station yard and interfere with their activities in getting the goods loaded and unloaded. The acts attributed to the petitioner had the potentiality of affecting the even tempo of the life of the community in the locality by their reverberations. The acts attributed to the petitioner had the potentiality of affecting the even tempo of the life of the community in the locality by their reverberations. We therefore, overrule the contention of counsel for the petitioner that the grounds communicated to the petitioner did not disclose that he indulged in any activity which was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 100 ) THIS decision thus, lays down that the question whether a person has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is one of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. An act by itself is not determinative of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Similar acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on the other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community. ( 101 ) PUBLIC order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to breach of the law and order. ( 102 ) ONE must always return to the facts of the case to see whether the acts perpetrated are of such a nature or of such potentiality as to travel beyond the immediate victim and affect the general or local public, that is, whether the acts have the potentiality of affecting the even tempo of the life of the community in the locality by their reverberations. ( 103 ) IN Ramesh Roy v. The State of W. B. , air 1972 Supreme Court 1678, the detenu and his associates while committing theft of rice from a Wagon at a Railway Station Yard attacked the Police Protection Force Party with bombs when challenged by them and the explosion of bombs created panic in the station area and in the adjoining locality. Following the decision in Parimal Sarkar case ( AIR 1972 SC 1653 ) (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the detention of the detenu under the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 was valid. It was observed as under (paragraph 3 of the said AIR) : "3. From the narration of facts and the relevant dates it would appear that the mandatory provisions of the Act have been complied with. The advocate for the petitioner has no complaint on this aspect of the matter. He, however, on a misapprehension thought that under the provisions of clause (2) of article 22 of the Constitution, the petitioner should have been produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest. He, however, omitted, to notice that clause (3) of the said Article specifically exempts a detention under any law relating to preventive detention such as that authorized by the Act from the provisions of clause (2) of Article 22. It is also contended that the report of the advisory Board was only by one member and that when the records were examined and signatures of all the three members were noticed it was contended that one of the signatures did not look like that of the member who is said to have signed. In a case decided yesterday, a similar question relating to the same Board was raised. There we had held that all the three members of the Board had taken part, that all of them had signed but one of the signatures which looked like a mere stroke was typical of the signature of that member and indicates his having taken part in the proceedings of the Board. In this view we find no validity in this submission. Lastly it is contended that the acts specified in grounds do not amount to disturbance of public order though they may amount to a disturbance of law and order. We have also dealt with this aspect in the decision just now pronounced in Parimal Sarkar v. The State of W. B. (reported in AIR 1972 SC 1653 ) as such we do not intend to reiterate those reasons. We have also dealt with this aspect in the decision just now pronounced in Parimal Sarkar v. The State of W. B. (reported in AIR 1972 SC 1653 ) as such we do not intend to reiterate those reasons. It is also contended by reference to the decision in Keshab Roy v. State of West bengal AIR 1972 SC 926 , that the grounds which were the subject-matter of tion in that decision had specifically mentioned that the acts complained of by the detenu haad created panic and terror in the locality and because of that it was held that those acts were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In this case, however, it is urged that the word terror has been omitted while alleging that the act complained of created panic. The learned advocate contends that the word panic implies that the act complained of to be less violent and consequently has not the effect of the disturbance of public order. We think that this argument is misconceived. panic is a state of mind or reaction to fearsome or gruesome events or even creating unreasoning or hysterical fear, often spreading quickly. It is the effect, the cause being due to many situations. What creates panic can also create terror depending upon the acts with which a person is confronted. We do not think there is any validity in the submission that because the word panic is used, it does not indicate that the act complained of is not prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 104 ) THIS decision thus, reiterates the propositions laid down in Parimal Sarkar case (supra ). It is further laid down that what creates "panic" can also create "terror" depending upon the acts with which a person is confronted. There is no validity in the submission that because the word "panic" is used, it does not indicate that the act complained of is not prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is further laid down that what creates "panic" can also create "terror" depending upon the acts with which a person is confronted. There is no validity in the submission that because the word "panic" is used, it does not indicate that the act complained of is not prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. ( 105 ) IN Kami Biswas v. The State of W. B. , air 1972 Supreme Court 1656, the detenu and his associates armed with bombs, daggers, knives and iron-rods attacked the police party on the railway station platform with- a view to kill them, and to intimidate the public hurled bombs which exploded with terrific sound endangering the Police on duty and created panic and confusion among the passengers. ( 106 ) THEIR Lordships of the Supreme court held that the detenu acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and his detention under Section 3 of the maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 was valid. ( 107 ) IT was observed as under (paragraph 5 of the said AIR) : 5. The distinction between the concept of considerapublic order and that of law and order has been adverted to by this Court in a number of cases. In the case of Dr. Ram Manohar lohia v. State of Bihar, (1966) 1 SCR 709 : ( AIR 1966 SC 740 ) Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) said that any contravention of law always affected order, but before it could be said to affect public order, it must affect the community at large. He considered three concepts, law and order, public order and the security of the State, and observed that to appreciate the scope and extent of each one of them, one should imagine three concentric circles. The largest of them represented law and order, next represented public order and the smallest represented the security of the State. An act might affect law and order but not public order. Just as an act might affect public order but not the security of the State. In the subsequent case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (1970)3 SCR 288 : ( AIR 1970 SC 1228 ) the Court dealt with the matter in the following words: "public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. In the subsequent case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (1970)3 SCR 288 : ( AIR 1970 SC 1228 ) the Court dealt with the matter in the following words: "public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take another case of a town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a member of the other community. This is an act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. "the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order, according to the dictum laid down in the above case, is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon that society. Public order is what the French call "order publique" and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. Public order is what the French call "order publique" and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order, as laid down in the above case, is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed ?" (Emphasis supplied) ( 108 ) THIS decision has, thus, followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. Ram manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 supreme Court 740, wherein the Supreme court observed that any contravention of law always affected order, but before it could be said to affect public order, it must affect the community at large. The Supreme Court in dr. Ram Manohar Lohia case considered the three concepts, namely, law and order, public order and the security of the State, and observed that to appreciate the scope and extent of each one of them, one should imagine three concentric circles. The largest of them represented law and order, next represented public order and the smallest represented the security of the State. An act might affect law and order but not public order, just as an act might affect public order but not the security of the State. ( 109 ) THE Supreme Court in Kanu Biswas case (supra) has reiterated the principles laid down in Arun Ghosh v. State of W. B. , air 1970 Supreme Court 1228. ( 110 ) THE Supreme Court in Kanu Biswas case (supra) has further laid down that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order, is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon that society. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order is : Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed ? The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order is : Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed ? ( 111 ) IN Kishori Mohan Bera v. The State of W. B. , AIR 1972 Supreme Court 1749, the grounds of detention, briefly stated, were holding meeting and deciding to kill Jotedars and rich men of the locadify, attacking one sk. Ismail and trying to assault him bytange and a dagger with intent to kill him, addressing a meeting and impressing upon the gathering to use arms to establish common People Raj in the country and for the same purpose urging killing policemen and gun licensees and collection of arms and ammunitions from them, disregarding the indian National Flag by trampling it under foot and shouting slogans. In the detention order passed under sub-section (1) read with sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, the Detaining Authority stated that he was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to "the maintenance of public order or the security of the State. " ( 112 ) THEIR Lordships of the Supreme court held that the equivocal language in the detention order showed that the Detaining authority was not certain whether he had reached his subjective satisfaction on the ground of danger to the public order or danger to the security of the State. Therefore, their Lordships held that the detention order was vitiated. ( 113 ) IT was observed as under (paragraphs 7 and 8 of the said AIR): "7. In Dr. Lohia v. State of Bihar, (1966) 1 scr 709 : ( AIR 1966 SC 740 ) this Court, explained the difference between the three concepts of law and order, public order and the security of the State and fictionally drew three concentric circles, the largest representing law and order, the next representing public order and the smallest representing security of the State. Every infraction of law must necessarily affect order, but an act affecting law and order may not necessarily also affect the public order. Every infraction of law must necessarily affect order, but an act affecting law and order may not necessarily also affect the public order. Likewise, an act may affect public order, but not necessarily the security of the State. These observations clearly bring out the distinction between each of the three concepts and the three imaginary concentric circles help to delineate the respective areas of the three concepts. A similar distinction between law and order and public order was also drawn in Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of west Bengal, (19s9) 2 SCR 635 : ( AIR 1970 sc 852 ) and a caution was there expressed that the expression public order in S. 3 (1)of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 did not take in every infraction of law and that every disturbance of law and order leading to disorder would not be sufficient to invoke the extraordinary power under such a detention law, unless the act in question was such as endangered or was likely to endanger public order. The true test is not the kind, but the potentiality of the act in question. One act may affect only individuals while the other, though of a similar kind, may have such an impact that it would disturb the even tempo of the life of the community. (See Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 3 SCR 288 : ( AIR 1970 SC 1228 ) also Nagendra Nath mondal v. State of West Bengal, (1972) 1 SCC 498 : ( AIR 1972 SC 665 ). This does not mean that there can be no overlapping, in the sense that an act cannot fall under two concepts at the same time. An act, for instance, affecting public order may have an impact that it would affect both public order and the security of the State. In such a case the power can be exercised on both the grounds, namely, disturbance of public order and danger to the security of the State. 8. In the instant case, however, that is not so, because the impugned order states that the detaining authority was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to "the maintenance of public order or the security of the State. 8. In the instant case, however, that is not so, because the impugned order states that the detaining authority was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to "the maintenance of public order or the security of the State. " The satisfaction of the District Magistrate was on the disjunctive and not conjunctive grounds which means that he was not certain whether he had reached his subjective satisfaction as to the necessity of exercising his power of detention on the ground of danger to the public order or danger to the security of the state. If he felt the necessity to detain the petitioner from the activities described by him in the grounds of detention on the ground that those activities affected or were likely to affect both the public order and the security of the State he would, no doubt, have used the conjunctive and and not the disjunctive or in his order. But, as the order stands, it would appear that he was either not certain whether the alleged activities of the petitioner endangered public order or the security of the State, or he did not seriously apply his mind on the question whether the said alleged activities fell under one head or the other and merely reproduced mechanically the language of S. 3 (1) (a) (ii ). When such equivocal language is used in an order and the detenu is not told whether his alleged activities set out in the grounds of detention fell under one head or the other, or both, it is not difficult to appreciate that a detenu might find it hard to make an adequate representation to government and the Advisory Board. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 114 ) THIS decision has thus, reiterated the difference between the three concepts of law and order, public 6rder and the security of the State as explained in Dr. Ram Manohar lohia case (supra ). ( 115 ) THE Supreme Court has further laid down that every disturbance of law and order leading to disorder would not be sufficient to invoke the extraordinary power under a detention law, unless the act in question was such as endangered or was likely to endanger public order. The true test is not the kind, but the potentiality of the act in question. The true test is not the kind, but the potentiality of the act in question. One act may affect only individuals while the other, though of a similar kind, may have such an impact that it would disturb the even tempo of the life of the community. ( 116 ) EVEN though there is difference between the concepts of "public order" and "the security of the State", this does not mean that there can be no overlapping, in the sense that an act cannot fall under two concepts at the same time. An act, for instance, affecting public order may have an impact that it would affect both public order and the security of the State. In such a case the power can be exercised on both the grounds, namely, disturbance of public order and danger to the security of the State. ( 117 ) IN Shri Amiya Kumar Karmakar v. State of W. B. , AIR 1972 Supreme Court 2259, the grounds of detention furnished to the petitioner mentioned two grounds : 1. Entering into the Toddi Shop of gopinath Behara on 30-7-1971 at about 20. 00 hours, and stabbing him with daggers causing severe bleeding injuries on his person, and terrorising the local people by exploding bombs. Subsequently, the said gopinath Behara succumbed to his injuries at the hospital. Such action created terror and panic in the minds of the local peace-loving people and caused disruption of their normal work. 2. Attacking Ajahar Alikhan with lethal weapons on 31-7-1971 at about 21. 30 hours; and killing him by causing severe injuries on his person, and such action having been done to promote political ideology of the petitioner. Such action terrorized the local peace-loving people who out of fear and panic had to suspend their free movements and normal work. ( 118 ) THEIR Lordships of the Supreme court upheld the detention of the petitioner under sub-section (1) read with sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal security Act, 1971. It was observed as under (paragraphs 6 and 7 of the said AIR): "6. As to the proper connotation and the scope of the concept of public order, as distinguished from the concepts of law and order and security of State, the Act furnishes no dictionary. It was observed as under (paragraphs 6 and 7 of the said AIR): "6. As to the proper connotation and the scope of the concept of public order, as distinguished from the concepts of law and order and security of State, the Act furnishes no dictionary. But these three concepts have by now been matters of discussion in several judgments of this Court wherein a clear differentiation of one from the other has been elucidated. Such differentiation was illustrated in some cases by means of three imaginary concentric circles, the narrowest of them being that relating to the security of the State, the next being that pertaining to public order, and the third, the largest, being that pertaining to law and order, [ (see Lohia v. State, (1966) 1 SCR 709 : ( AIR 1966 SC 740 )]. In other cases, the differentiation was sought to be made on the basis of the degree of disorder affecting in one case the community at large, and in other, specific individuals, and only in a secondary sense public order, in other words, between crimes against specific individuals and crimes against the public. Such a distinction appears at first sight attractive by reason of the simplicity of its test, but on a closer examination of it it fails to cover cases which are marginal and sometimes overlapping. As pointed out in Arun Ghosh v. State of West bengal, (1970) 3 SCR 288 : ( AIR 1970 SC 1228 ) the true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific Individuals only, and therefore, touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not determined of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that is. in its impact on society, it may be very different. The act by itself, therefore, is not determined of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that is. in its impact on society, it may be very different. On the basis of such a distinction, an attack on an educational institution, in the course of which its registers and other papers were destroyed by acts of arson, was held to fall within the area of public order although it was aimed at an individual entity, [see nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West bengal, (1972)1 SCC 498 : ( AIR 1972 SC 665 )]. The criterion thus being the potentiality of the act in question of the degree of its impact on members of the community in the locality in which the act in question is committed, examination of ground No. 2 from that angle would appear to be more appropriate. 7. The act in ground No. 2, no doubt, was an attack resulting in the death of the victim, and though it was said to have been committed by the petitioner along with his associates it would prima face appear to be an act against a specific individual, involving infraction of law and order only. The act in question was similar in nature and quality to other such acts committed by one or more individuals against another resulting in the death of the latter. But it was not committed on account of any animus against the victim or for a motive such as personal vendetta. As the ground of detention asserts, it was committed with a view to promote a particular political ideology, that is to say, against one who did not subscribe to that Ideology and as a warning against those who did not agree with or subscribe to such ideology. Obviously, it was intended to and did in fact terrorise those who did not conform to that ideology, who out of panic abandoned their normal activities for fear that any one or more of them would be the target of such an attack. Viewed from this angle it is difficult to regard such an act as a mere Infraction of law and order, for, such an act committed with such an intent and object and in such circumstances is one which strikes at the normal, orderly life of the community in that locality. Viewed from this angle it is difficult to regard such an act as a mere Infraction of law and order, for, such an act committed with such an intent and object and in such circumstances is one which strikes at the normal, orderly life of the community in that locality. Its impact and potentiality thus affect public order in the sense that it was aimed at bringing about disorder and chaos upsetting the even tempo of life in that locality. It is, therefore, not possible to agree with the proposition that it affected the problem of law and order only and was for that reason extraneous or irrelevant to the object specified in S. 3 of the Act, in relation to which only a valid order of detention thereunder could be made. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 119 ) THE Supreme Court has thus, reiterated that the differentiation between the three concepts, namely, law and order, public order and the security of the State, may be illustrated by means of three imaginary concentric circles, the narrowest of them being that relating to the security of the State, the next being that pertaining to public order, and the third, the largest, being that pertaining to law and order. ( 120 ) THE true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only, and therefore, touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect public order. ( 121 ) THE act by itself, therefore, is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that is, in its impact on society , it may be very different. ( 122 ) THE criterion thus being the potentiality of the act in question or the degree of its impact on members of the community in the locality in which the act in question is committed. ( 122 ) THE criterion thus being the potentiality of the act in question or the degree of its impact on members of the community in the locality in which the act in question is committed. ( 123 ) IN case an act is committed with such an intent and object and in such circumstances that it strikes at the normal, orderly life of the community in a locality, then such an act by its impact and potentiality affects public order in the sense that it is aimed at bringing about disorder and chaos upsetting the even tempo of life in that locality. ( 124 ) IN Babul Mitra v. State of W. B. and others, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 197, the grounds of detention were (1) forcing entry into a school, preventing the school staff from giving the petitioner (detenu) any resistance with threat of violence, and setting fire to the school building resulting in closure of the school sine die ; and (2) having a bomb in the hand and attempting to throw it on the police personnel at the time of the arrest of the petitioner (detenu) with a view to killing them. ( 125 ) THEIR Lordships of the Supreme court upheld the detention order under section 3 (2) of the Maintenance of Internal security Act, 1971. It was observed as under (paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the said AIR) : "7. The last argument is that the grounds of detention are not connected with public order: at worst they may be connected with law and order. The distinction between "law and order" and "public order" has been pointed out succienctly in Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 3 SCR 288 : ( AIR 1970 SC 1228 ). According to that decision the true distinction between the areas of "law and order" and "public order" is "one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question upon society". The Court pointed out that "the act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ but in its potentiality it may be very different. The Court pointed out that "the act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ but in its potentiality it may be very different. " so it is to be seen in the instant case whether the petitioners acts have any impact upon the local community or, to put it in the words of Hidayatullah C. J. in the aforesaid case, "disturb the even tempo of the life of the community of that specified locality. " 8. Taking the first ground of detention, the petitioner along with other persons is alleged to have trespassed into the Moynaguri higher Secondary School by threats of violence to the school staff. The threats of violence paralysed resistance by the school staff. The petitioner set fire to the school building. In the result, the school was closed down sine die. The impact of the petitioners activity is not confined to the school building. The teaching staff was intimidated by threats of violence. It may be presumed that the students were then present in the school. They must also have been scared by the threats of the petitioner. The act of setting fire to the school building would scare the parents and guardians and deter them from sending their wards to the school for reading for fear that the school building might again be the scene of violent activities, jeopardising the safety of their wards. The petitioners activitiy has thus affected an indefinitely large number of persons in the locality. We venture to think that the first ground is accordingly connected with public order. 9. Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West bengal, (1972) 1 SCC 498 : ( AIR 1972 SC 665 ) Moynaguri Higher Secondary School was the scene of the activity of the detenu. In that case it was alleged that he broke open the doors and set fire to books, registers a typewriter, furniture etc. and caused heavy loss to the school. He also placed a bomb in the school premises endangering the life of the teaching staff and students. On another date he set fire the office room and the Head masters room in the school. He threatened the teaching staff of the school with death if they would offer resistance or divulge his name to the authorities. He also placed a bomb in the school premises endangering the life of the teaching staff and students. On another date he set fire the office room and the Head masters room in the school. He threatened the teaching staff of the school with death if they would offer resistance or divulge his name to the authorities. It was urged in that case that the grounds were not connected with public order. The argument was not accepted. The Court said: "the object obviously was vandalism, to disrupt its working by burning its records and to create a scare so that neither the teaching staff nor the pupils would dare attend it for prosecution of studies. The parents dare not henceforth send their wards for fear that the school might be set on fire while they are in it. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 126 ) THIS decision thus, reiterates that the true distinction between the areas of "law and order" and "public order" is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question upon society. The act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ but in its potentiality it may be very different. ( 127 ) THE test is whether the acts of a person have any impact upon the local community, that is, whether such acts disturb the even tempo of the life of the community of that specified locality. ( 128 ) IN Ram Ranjan Chatterjee v. The state of W. B. , AIR 1975 SC 609 , the grounds of detention were -1. Exploding of bombs in thickly populated area ; 2. Extortion of grocery on pain of instant death from a grocer of the locality which caused his customers to flee from the shop; and 3. Extorting money from a person by attacking him and putting him under threat of immediate death, and when such person cried for help and thereupon villagers rushed in, then murderously attacking them with dangerous bombs, whereupon the villagers got panicky and fled away to save their lives. ( 129 ) THEIR Lordships of the Supreme court upheld the detention of the petitioner under Section 3 of the Maintenance of internal Security Act, 1971. It was observed as under (paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the said AIR): "8. ( 129 ) THEIR Lordships of the Supreme court upheld the detention of the petitioner under Section 3 of the Maintenance of internal Security Act, 1971. It was observed as under (paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the said AIR): "8. It may be remembered that qualitatively, the acts which affect law and order are not different from the acts which affect public order. Indeed, a state of peace or orderly tranquillity which prevails as a result of the observance or enforcement of internal laws and regulations by the government, is a feature common to the concepts of law and order and public order. Every kind of disorder or contravention of law affects chat fsic) orderly tranquillity. The distinction between the areas of law and order and public order as pointed by this court in Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 3 SCR 288 : ( AIR 1970 SC 1228 ) "is one of degfee and extent of the reach of the act in question on society". It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. If the contravention in its effect is confined only to a few Individuals directly involved as distinguished from a wide spectrum of the public, it would raise a problem of law and order only. These concentric concepts of law and order and public ordermay have a common epicentre, but it is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror-wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps distinguish it as an act affecting public order from that concerning law and order. 9. Considered in the light of the above principles, it is clear that in the instant case the three grounds of detention, conveyed to the detenu had a direct nexus with public order. The first incident relates to a bomb explosion in which one person died in a thickly populated area. It created panic amongst the local people who were threatened by the detenu, and were restrained under pain of death, from informing the police. The second incident took place on 28-6-1973 in Kistapura Bazar at 8 p. m. The petitioner and his associates tried to extort under pain of instant death, grocery from a shopkeeper. Customers fled away for fear of their lives. The second incident took place on 28-6-1973 in Kistapura Bazar at 8 p. m. The petitioner and his associates tried to extort under pain of instant death, grocery from a shopkeeper. Customers fled away for fear of their lives. Consternation prevailed in the area and all shops in the bazar closed down immediately. Thus the normal pursuits of life by the people of the locality was thrown out of gear, and the public tranquillity in the area was seriously disturbed. In the third incident bombs were recklessly hurled at the villagers causing panic and disruption of even flow of life in the locality. 10. Dipak Boses case AIR 1972 SC 2686 (supra) stands on its own facts. There was no allegation in the grounds of detention that the detenu therein or his associates had exploded bombs to cause terror in the locality; while in the instant case the criminal acts in question actually disturbed the normal pursuits of life by the people of the localities concerned. The terror-tremors generated by these acts prejudicially affected the general people of the localities. Thus the grounds of detention had a direct nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the detention order. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 130 ) THIS decision thus, lays down that qualitatively, the acts which affect law and order are not different from the acts which affect public order. Indeed, a state of peace or orderly tranquillity which prevails as a result of the observance or enforcement of internal laws and regulations by the government, is a feature common to the concepts of law and order and public order. Every kind of disorder or contravention of law affects that orderly tranquillily. The distinction between the areas of law and order and public order is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiallity of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. If the contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinguished from a wide spectrum of the public, it would raise a problem of law and order only. If the contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinguished from a wide spectrum of the public, it would raise a problem of law and order only. These concentric concepts of law and order and public order may have a common epicenter, but it is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps distinguish it as an act affecting public order" from that concerning law and order. ( 131 ) IN case, on account of the acts in question, the normal pursuits of life by the people of the locality is thrown out of gear, and the public tranquillity is seriously disturbed, then such acts have a direct nexus with public order. ( 132 ) IN Ashok Kumar v. Delhi administration and others, AIR 1982 SC 1143 , the grounds of detention were-Armed hold-up in an exclusive residential area like greater Kailash, Kalkaji or Lajpat Nagar in delhi and depriving persons of their belongings like a car, wrist-watch, or cash, or relieving ladies of their gold-chains or ornaments at the point of a knife or revolver. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court upheld the detention order undef sub-section (2) of section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 observing that the particular acts enumerated in the grounds of detention clearly show that the activities of the detenu cover a wide field and fall within the contours of the concept of public order. ( 133 ) IT was observed as under (paragraphs 13, 14 and 17 of the said AIR) : "13. The true distinction between the areas of public order and law and order lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of law and order and public order is a fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. That test is clearly fulfilled in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 14. Those who are responsible for the national security or for the maintenance of public order must be the sole judges of what the national security or public order requires. Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it and to prevent him from doing it justification for such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability and not criminal conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. It follows that any preventive measures even if they involve some restraint or hardship upon individuals do not partake in any way of the nature of punishment but are taken by way of precaution fa prevent mischief to the State. It is a matter of grave concern that in urbanized areas like cities and towns and particularly in the metropolitan, city of Delhi the law and order situation is worsening every day and the use of knives and firearms has given rise to a new violence. There is a constant struggle to control the criminal activities of the persons engaged in such organized crimes for the maintenance of public order. It is difficult to appreciate the argument that the detention here is with a view to punish the detenu for a series of crimes that he is alleged to have committed, but which the law enforcement agency is not able to substantiate. There is no reason why the Executive cannot take recourse to its power of preventive detention in those cases where the Court is genuinely satisfied that no prosecution could possibly succeed against the detenu because he is a dangerous person who has overawed witnesses or against whom no one is prepared to depose. 17. There is no reason why the Executive cannot take recourse to its power of preventive detention in those cases where the Court is genuinely satisfied that no prosecution could possibly succeed against the detenu because he is a dangerous person who has overawed witnesses or against whom no one is prepared to depose. 17. What essentially is a problem relating to law and order may due to sudden sporadic and intermittent acts of physical violence on innocent victims in the metropolitan city of delhi result in serious public disorder. It is the length, magnitude and Intensity of the terror wave unleashed bv a particular act of violence creating disorder that distinguishes it as an act affecting public order from that concerning law and order. Some offences primarily Injure specific individuals and only secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure the public Interest and affect individuals only remotely. The question is of the survival of the society and the problem is the method of control. Whenever there is an armed hold-" up by gangsters in an exclusive residential area like Greater kailash, Kalkaji or Lajpat Nagar and persons are deprived of their belongings like a car, wristwatch or cash, or ladies relieved of their gold-chains or ornaments at the point of a knife or revolver, they become victims of organized crime. There is very little that the police can do about it except to keep a constant vigil over the movements of such persons. The particular acts enumerated in the grounds of detention clearly show that the activities of the detenu cover a wide field and fall within the contours of the concept of public order. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 134 ) THIS decision thus, lays down that the true distinction between the areas of public order and law and order lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts, of law and order and public order is a fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. ( 135 ) THOSE who are responsible for the national security or for the maintenance of public order must be the sole judges of what the national security or public order requires. Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it and to prevent him from doing it. Justification for such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability and not criminal conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. It follows that any preventive measures, even if they involve some restraint or hardship upon individuals, do not partake in any way of the nature of punishment, but are taken by way of precaution to prevent mischief to the State. ( 136 ) THERE is no reason why the Executive cannot take recourse to its power of preventive detention in those cases where the court is genuinely satisfied that no prosecution could possibly succeed against the detenu because he is a dangerous person who has overawed witnesses or against whom no one is prepared to depose. ( 137 ) WHAT essentially is a problem relating to law and order may due to sudden sporadic and intermittent acts of physical violence on innocent victims in the metropolitan city of delhi result in serious public disorder. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular act of violence creating disorder that distinguishes it as an act affecting public order from that concerning law and order. Some offences primarily injure specific individuals and only secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure the public interest and affect individuals only remotely. The question is of the survival of the society and the problem is the method of control. Some offences primarily injure specific individuals and only secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure the public interest and affect individuals only remotely. The question is of the survival of the society and the problem is the method of control. ( 138 ) IN State of U. P. vs. Hart Shankar tewari, AIR 1987 SC 998 , the respondent hari Shanker Tiwari was detained under section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980. This Court (Allahabad High Court)quashed the detention order, whereupon the state of U. P. filed appeal by Special Leave before the Supreme Court. ( 139 ) THEIR Lordships of the Supreme court dismissed the appeal and held as follows (paragraphs 7 and 8 of the said AIR) : 7. These are sufficient to draw the conclusion that conceptually there is difference between law and order and public order but what in a given situation may be a matter covered by law and order may really turn out to be one of public order. We may now refer to two cases of this Court for that purpose. In Arun Ghoshs case, ( AIR 1970 sc 1228 at p. 1230 (supra) Chief Justice hidayatullah stated thus: take the case of assault on girls. A guest at a hotel may kiss or make advances to half a dozen chamber maids. He may annoy them and also the management but he does not cause disturbance of public order He may even have a fracas with the friends of one of the girls but even then it would be a case of breach of law and order only. Take another case of a man who molests women in lonely places. As a result of his activities girls going to colleges and schools are in constant danger and fear. Women going for their ordinary business are afraid of being waylaid and assaulted. The activity of this man in its essential quality is not different from the act of the other man. But in its potentiality and in its effect upon the public tranquillity there is a vast difference. The act of the man who molests the girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in the even tempo of living which is the first requirement of public order. But in its potentiality and in its effect upon the public tranquillity there is a vast difference. The act of the man who molests the girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in the even tempo of living which is the first requirement of public order. He disturbs the society and community His act makes all the women apprehensive of their honour and he can be said to be causing disturbance of public order and not merely committing individual action which may be taken note by the criminal prosecution agencies. " equally useful would be reference to two other cases, Mathew, J. in S. K. Kader v. State of West Bengal, (1972) 3scc 816 : ( AIR 1972 sc 1647 ) approved the ratio of the decision referred to above and indicated (at p. 1649 of AIR) : "the question whether a person has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is one of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. An act by itself is not determinative of its own gravity. In its quality, it may not differ from other but in its potentiality it may be very different. Similar acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand public order on the other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even as specified localities. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. " in Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West bengal, (1972) 1 SCC 498 : ( AIR 1972 SC 665 at p. 669) the Court observed as follows: "the target of arson was an educational institution and particularly the registers and other papers maintained by it. The object obviously was vandalism to disrupt its working by burning its records and to create a scare so that neither the teaching staff nor the pupils would dare attend it for prosecution of studies. The object obviously was vandalism to disrupt its working by burning its records and to create a scare so that neither the teaching staff nor the pupils would dare attend it for prosecution of studies. The acts in question, no doubt, would be acts similarly to those committed by a person who resorts to arson, but in the circumstances, were acts different in potentiality and, therefore, amounted to affecting public order. " 8. In the final analysis, therefore, one has to turn to the facts of each case to ascertain whether the matter relates to the larger circle or the smaller circle. An act which may not at all be objected to in certain situations is capable of totally disturbing the public tranquillity. When communal tension is high an indiscreet act of no significance is likely to disturb or dislocate the even tempo of the life of the community. An order of detention made in such a situation has to take note of the potentiality of the act objected to. No hard and fast rule can really be evolved to deal with problems of human society. Every possible situation cannot be brought under watertight classifications and a set of tests to deal with them Cannot be laid down. As and when an order of detention is questioned, it is for the Court to apply these well-known tests to find out whether the Impugned activities upon which the order of detention is grounded go under the classification of public order or belong to the category of law and order. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 140 ) THIS decision thus lays down that conceptually there is difference between law and order and public order but what in a given situation may be a matter covered by law and order may really turn out to be one of public order. ( 141 ) IN the final analysis, one has to turn out to the facts of each case to ascertain whether the matter relates to the larger circle of "law and order" or the smaller circle of public order. An act which may not at all be objected to in certain situations is capable of totally disturbing the public tranquillity. When communal tension is high, an indiscreet act of no significance is likely to disturb or dislocate the even tempo of the life of the community. An act which may not at all be objected to in certain situations is capable of totally disturbing the public tranquillity. When communal tension is high, an indiscreet act of no significance is likely to disturb or dislocate the even tempo of the life of the community. ( 142 ) AN order of detention made in such a situation has to take note of the potentiality of the act objected to. ( 143 ) NO hard and fast rule can really be evolved to deal with problems of human society. Every possible situation cannot be brought under watertight classifications and a set of tests to deal with them cannot be laid down. As and when an order of detention is questioned, it is for the Court to apply these well-known tests to find out whether the impugned activities upon which the order of detention is grounded go under the classification of public order or belong to the category of law and order. ( 144 ) IN Mrs. Harpreet Kaur Harvinder singh Bedi vs. State of Maharashtra and another, AIR 1992 SC 979 , the detenu was detained under the provisions of Section 3 (1)of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug offenders Act, 1981. Their Lordships of the supreme Court upheld the detention order. It was observed as under (paragraph 21 of the said AIR) : "21. Let us now consider the facts of the instant case. The substance of the grounds on which detention has been ordered is that the detenu is a bootlegger and in furtherance of his activities and to escape from the clutches of law, he even tried to run over, by his speeding vehicle, the police party, which tried to signal him to a stop, exhorting all the time that he would kill anyone who would come in his way. He continued to drive in a reckless speed and dashed against a pedestrian causing injuries to him, where again he had exhorted that anyone who would come in his way would meet his death. Four witnesses - A, B, C, D - who agreed to give statements to the police on conditions of anonymity, clearly stated that they would not depose against the detenu for fear of retaliation as the detenu had threatened to do away with anyone who would depose against him. Four witnesses - A, B, C, D - who agreed to give statements to the police on conditions of anonymity, clearly stated that they would not depose against the detenu for fear of retaliation as the detenu had threatened to do away with anyone who would depose against him. The evidence of these witnesses shows that the detenu was indulging in transporting of illicit liquor and distributing the same in the locality arid was keeping arms with him while transporting liquor. The activities of the detenu, therefore, were not merely "bootlegging" as was the position in om Prakash, ( AIR 1990 SC 496 ), rashidmiya, ( AIR 1989 SC 1703 ) and Piyush kantilal Mehtas cases ( AIR 1989 SC 491 ), (supra) but went further to adversely affect the even tempo of the society by creating a feeling of insecurity among those who were likely to depose against him as also the law enforcement agencies. The fear psychosis created by the detenu in the witnesses was aimed at letting the crime go unpunished which has the potential of the society, and not merely some individual, to suffer. The activities of the detenu, therefore, squarely fall within the deeming provision enacted in the explanation of Section 2 (a) of the Act, and it therefore, follows as a logical consequence that the activities of the detenu were not merely prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order but were prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order". The first argument raised by Dr. Chitale against the order of detention, therefore, fails. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 145 ) THIS decision thus, lays down that where the activities of the detenu adversely affect the even tempo of the society then such activities are not merely prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order but are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. ( 146 ) IN Commissioner of Police And others v. C. Anita (Smt), (2004) 7 SC Cases 467 : ( AIR 2004 SC 4423 ) the validity Of a detention order passed under sub-section (2)of Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 was in question. The Andhra Pradesh high Court quashed the detention order. The commissioner of Police, Hyderabad City filed appeal by Special Leave before the Supreme Court. The Andhra Pradesh high Court quashed the detention order. The commissioner of Police, Hyderabad City filed appeal by Special Leave before the Supreme Court. ( 147 ) THEIR Lordships of the Supreme court allowed the appeal, set-aside the judgement of the High Court, and upheld the validity of the detention order observing that the incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention substantiated the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining authority as tp "how the acts of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. ( 148 ) IT was observed as under (paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10. 11, 12 and 13 of the said SCC): "7. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 with reference to which the order of detention has been passed reads as follows: "3. (2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the Government are satisfied that it is necessary so to do, they may, by order in writing, direct that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also if satisfied as provided in subsection (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section : provided that the period specified in the order made by the Government under this sub-section shall not in the first instance, exceed three months, but the Government may if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time. " the crucial issue is whether the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to public order. While the expression "law and order" is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, "public order" has a narrower ambit, and public order could be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of law and order and "public order" is one of the degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of law and order and "public order" is one of the degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of the public, it could raise problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting "public order" from that concerning "law and order". The question to ask is: "does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed ?" this question has to be faced in every case on its facts. 8. "public order is what the French call "ordre publique" and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. The test to be adopted in determining whether ah act affects law and order or public order is: does it; lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed? [see Kami Biswas v. State of W. B. , (1972) 3 SCC 831 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 16 : AIR 1972 SC 1656 ]. 9. "public order" is synonymous with public safety and tranquillity : "it is the absence of disorder involving breaches of local significance in contradistinction to national upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife, war, affecting the security of the State". Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum, which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. [see Ram Manohar Lohia (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, (1966) 1 SCR 709 : 1966 Cri LJ 608 : ( AIR 1966 SC 740 )10. "public order" "law and order" and the "security of the State" fictionally draw three concentric circles, the largest representing law and order, the next representing public order and the smallest representing security of the State. Every infraction of law must necessarily affect order, but an act affecting law and order may not necessarily also affect the public order. Likewise, an act may affect public order, but not necessarily the security of the State. The true test is not the kind, but the potentiality of the act in question. One act may affect only individuals while the other, though of a similar kind, may have such an impact that it would disturb the even tempo of the life of the community. This does not mean that there can be no overlapping, in the sense that an act cannot fall under two concepts at the same time. An act, for instance, affecting public order may have an impact that it would affect both public order and the security of the State. [see Kishori mohan Bera v. State of W. B. , ( 1972)3 SCC 845 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 30 : ( AIR 1972 SC 1749 ), pushkar Mukherjee v. State of W. B. , (1969)1 scc 10 : (1969) 2 SCR 635 : ( AIR 1970 SC 852 ), Arun Ghosh v. State of W. B. , (1970) 1 scc 98 :1970 SCC (Cri) 67 : (1970) 3 SCR 288 : ( AIR 1970 SC 1228 ) and Nagendra Nath mandal v. State of W. B. , (1972) 1 SCC 498 : 1972 (Cri) 227 : ( AIR 1972 SC 665 ). 11. 11. The distinction between "law and order" and "public order" has been pointed out succinctly in Arun Ghosh case, (1970) 1 SCC 98 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 67 : (1970)3 SCR 288 : ( AIR 1970 SC 1228 ). According to that decision the true distinction between the areas of "law and order" and "public order" is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question upon society. The Court pointed out that (SCC p. 100, para 3) the act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ but in its potentiality it may be very different. [see Babul Mitra v. State of W. B. , (1973) 1 scc 393 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 353 : ( AIR 1973 sc 197 ) and Milan Banik v. State of W. B. , (1974) 4 SCC 504 :1 9 74 SCC (Cri)540 : air 1974 SC 1214 ]. 12. The true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and, therefore, touches the problem of law and ordey only, while in another it might affect public order. The act by Itself, therefore, is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other similar acts; but in its potentiality that is. in its impact on society, it may be very different. 13. The two concepts have well-defined contours, it being well established that stray and unorganized crimes of theft and assault are not matters of public order since they do not tend to affect the even flow of public life. Infractions of law are bound in some measure to lead to disorder but every infraction of law does not necessarily result in public disorder. Law and order represents the largest scale within which is the next circle representing public order and the is mallest circle represents the security of State. "law and order" comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "public order" Just as "public order" comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of state". Law and order represents the largest scale within which is the next circle representing public order and the is mallest circle represents the security of State. "law and order" comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "public order" Just as "public order" comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of state". [see Kuso Sah v. State of Bihar, (1974)1 SCC 185 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 84 : ( AIR 1974 sc 156 ); Harpreet Kaur v. State of maharashtra, (1992) 2 SCC 177 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 370 : ( AIR 1992 SC 979 ), T. K. Gopal v. State of Karnataka, (2000) 6 SCC 168 : 2000 scc (Cri) 1037: (AIR2000 SC 1669) and State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub, (1980)3 SCC 57 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 513: (1980) 2 SCR 1158 : ( AIR 1980 SC 1111 )" (Emphasis supplied) ( 149 ) THIS decision thus, lays down that while the expression law and order is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, public order has a narrower ambit, and public order could be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of law and order and public order is one of the degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. ( 150 ) IF a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of the public, it could raise problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting public order 1 from that concerning law and order. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting public order 1 from that concerning law and order. The question to ask is : "does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed ( 151 ) THE true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similarly in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and, therefore, touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might. affect public order. The act by itself, therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that is, in its impact on society, it may be very different. ( 152 ) LAW and order represents the largest scale within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents the security of State. Law and order comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting public order just as public ordercomprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting security of State ( 153 ) IN State of U. P. and another Vs. Sanjai Pratap Gupta alias Pappu, and others, (2004) 8 SCC 591 : (2004 All LJ 3615) the validity of an order of detention passed under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the N. S. Act was in question. This Court (Allahabad High court) quashed the detention order. The State of U. P. filed appeal by Special Leave before the Supreme Court. ( 154 ) REITERATING the propositions as laid down in Commissioner of Police Vs. C. Anita, (2004) 7 SCC 467 : ( AIR 2004 SC 4423 ) (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set-aside the judgement of the High Court, and upheld the validity of the detention order. ( 155 ) IT was observed as under (paragraph 14 of the said SCC) : "14. C. Anita, (2004) 7 SCC 467 : ( AIR 2004 SC 4423 ) (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set-aside the judgement of the High Court, and upheld the validity of the detention order. ( 155 ) IT was observed as under (paragraph 14 of the said SCC) : "14. The stand that a single act cannot be considered sufficient for holding that public order was affected is clearly without substance. It is not the number of acts that matters. What has to be seen is the effect of the act on the even tempo of life, the extent of its reach upon society and its impact. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 156 ) THIS decision thus, lays down that it is not the number of acts that matters. What has to be seen is the effect of the act on the even tempo of life, the extent of its reach upon society and its impact. ( 157 ) IN Collector and District Magistrate and others Vs. S. Sultan, AIR 2008 SC 2096 , the validity of an order of, detention passed under Sections 3 (1), 3 (2) read with Section 2 (a) and (g) of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, dacoits, Drug Offenders, Gpondas, Immoral traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 was in question. The Andhra Pradesh high Court quashed the detention order. The collector and District Magistrate filed appeal by Special Leave before the Supreme Court. ( 158 ) REITERATING the propositions as laid down in Commissioner of Police Vs. C. Anita, (2004)7 SCC 467 : ( AIR 2004 SC 4423 ) (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set-aside the judgement of the High Court, and upheld the validity of the detention order. It was observed as under (paragraph 11 of the said AIR) : "11. So far as the question as to whether the public order was Involved the grounds of detention elaborately described the acts which created dangerous and terrorized situations in the village and frequently disturbed public peace and public order because of the acts of violence and danger was caused to the lives of the villagers. In all these instances deadly weapons were used causing injuries to various persons. In all these instances deadly weapons were used causing injuries to various persons. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 159 ) FROM the propositions laid down in various decisions noticed above, the following principles, amongst others may be deduced: 1- The distinction between the three concepts, namely law and order public order and the security of the State may be appreciated by three imaginary concentric circles- the outer-most circle representing law and order which is regarded as least serious the next inner circle representing public order which is regarded as more serious than law and order", and the innermost circle representing the security of State which is regarded as the most serious. 2- The nature or quality of the act is not material for deciding whether the act affects law and order or it affects public order. What is relevant, is the potentiality of the act that is, the degree and extent of the reach of the act upon the society, that is, the degree and extent of the impact and effect of the act upon the society. 3- An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its nature or quality it may not differ from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that is, in its impact on society, it may be very different. 4- Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might have different potentiality. Such similar acts might cause different reactions depending on the different contexts and circumstances in which such acts are committed. An act committed in a particular context or circumstance may affect only law and order but the same act when committed in a different context or circumstance may affect public order. 5- What is relevant is not the number of acts, but the extent of reach of the act upon society and its impact. 6- When is public order said to have been affected ? ( 160 ) PUBLIC order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Public order is said to have been affected if the even tempo of life of the community is affected. In case the current of life of the community, i. e. , the normal and orderly life of the community is affected then the public order is said to have been affected. Public order is said to have been affected if the even tempo of life of the community is affected. In case the current of life of the community, i. e. , the normal and orderly life of the community is affected then the public order is said to have been affected. ( 161 ) KEEPING in view the above principles, let us consider the present case. ( 162 ) THE grounds of detention, as communicated to the petitioner, have indicated the running of travelling agency business by the petitioner with his associates in front of the Railway Station, Gorakhpur ; the habit of the petitioner and his associates of carrying illegal arms, and moving around together in the area with a view to create their dominance, awe and terror in the area, and indulging in such sporadic incidents regarding which no person has dared to lodge report in the Police Station ; the petitioner along with his three associates killing owner of a hotel at 11 Oclock in the night on 21-9-2007 in the public place in the hotel premises adjacent to the main road in front of the railway Station by firing, which gave rise to fear, panic and terror on the spot ; as a result of the said incident, all the shop-keepers near the place of occurrence started closing shutters and doors of their shops , and there was confusion and chaos in front of and on the Railway Station, and the people were running heither and theither ; a First information Report having been lodged in regard to the said incident ; the said incident having been prominently published in various newspapers on 22nd September, 2007; the informant and eye- witnesses of the incident confirming the First Information report as also the disruption of the maintenance of public order and public peace around the place of incident; the petitioner and his associates continuously threatening the informant and other witnesses to compel them not to depose in the Court or before the public ; the District President of Vyapaar mandal presenting Memorandum in the matter; providing special security to the informant by the Senior Superintendent of police in view of the said developments ; complete likelihood of the petitioner on release on bail repeating the similar incident which would have adverse effect on the maintenance of public order in the area. ( 163 ) THE grounds of detention, as briefly mentioned above, thus include the past conduct, behaviour and activities of the petitioner and his associates, the incident which occurred on 21-9-2007 when the petitioner and his associates killed a Hotel owner in public place in front of the Railway station, the immediate reaction of the incident on the shop-keepers in the area and the people in front of and on the Railway station, the awe, panic and terror in the area as a result of the incident, the developments following the incident resulting in continued awe, panic and terror in the area, the likelihood of the petitioner repeating his activity on his release on bail. ( 164 ) THE grounds of detention thus show that even tempo of life of the society in the area has been adversely affected. In other words, the maintenance of public order has been disturbed. ( 165 ) THE District Magistrate has recorded his subjective satisfaction that there is apprehension that the petitioner would act in a manner which would be against the maintenance of public order in the State, and in order to prevent the petitioner from acting in such manner which would be against the public order in the State, it is necessary to detain the petitioner. ( 166 ) WE are of the opinion that it was not a case of merely disturbance of law and order but was a case of disturbance of public order, and the detention order was validly passed by the Detaining Authority. ( 167 ) THE third submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot, therefore, be accepted. Submission No. 4. made on behalf of the petitioner. ( 168 ) SUBMISSION No. 4, as noted above, is regarding passing of the detention order under the N. S. Act in respect of the petitioner while the petitioner was already in custody in connection with the aforesaid Crime Case. It is submitted that the requirements to be fulfilled in such circumstances have not been fulfilled in the present case, and as such, the detention order is bad in law. ( 169 ) IN order to appreciate the above submission, it is necessary to refer to certain judicial decisions wherein the point in question has been examined. It is submitted that the requirements to be fulfilled in such circumstances have not been fulfilled in the present case, and as such, the detention order is bad in law. ( 169 ) IN order to appreciate the above submission, it is necessary to refer to certain judicial decisions wherein the point in question has been examined. ( 170 ) IN Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another, 1991 (1) SCC 128 : ( AIR 1991 sc 1640 ) their Lordships of the Supreme court have laid down as under (paragraph 13 of the said SCC) : "13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody: (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him fa) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to question it before a higher court. What this Court stated in the case of Ramesh Yadav ( AIR 1986 SC 315 ) was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. This seems to be quite clear from the case law discussed above and there is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which our attention was drawn since they do not hold otherwise. This seems to be quite clear from the case law discussed above and there is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which our attention was drawn since they do not hold otherwise. We, therefore, find it difficult to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that there was no valid and compelling reason for passing the impugned orders of detention because the detenus were in custody. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 171 ) IN Veeramani v. State of Tamil Nadu, j. T. 1994 (1) SC 350 : (1995 AIR SCW 1730)their Lordships of the Supreme Court have opined as under (paragraph 6 of the said JT) : "6. From the catena of decisions of this court It is clear that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody: if he has reason to believe on the basis of the reliable material that there is a possibility of his being released on bail and that on being so released the detenu would in all probabilities indulge in prejudicial activities and if the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction the same cannot be struck down. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 172 ) IN Surya Prakash Sharma v. State of U. P. and others 1994 (31) ACC 765 : (1995 all LJ 777) (SC), their Lordships of the supreme Court have followed an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1196 , and have held as under (at page 767 of the said ACC) : "the question as to whether and in what circumstances an order for preventive detention can be passed against a person who is already in custody had been engaging the attention of this Court since it first came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, burdwan, (1964)4 SCR 921 : ( AIR 1964 SC 334 ). To eschew prolixity we refrain from detailing all those cases except that of dharmedndra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1196 ,wherein a three Judge Bench after considering all the earlier relevant decisions including rameshwar Shaw (supra) answered the question in the following words: "the decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention : and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression "compelling reasons" in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implied that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 173 ) THE above decisions show that a detention order can be validly passed even if a person is already in custody. However, the following conditions must be fulfilled in such a case : 1- The authority passing the detention order is aware of the fact that such person is actually in custody. 2- The authority has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him: (a) that there is a real possibility of such person being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released such person would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities. 3- It is felt essential by the authority to detain such person to prevent such person from engaging in such activities. ( 174 ) ONCE the above conditions are satisfied, the detention order cannot be struck down. ( 175 ) IN the present case, a perusal of the grounds of detention shows the following : 1- The Detaining Authority was aware of the fact that the petitioner was actually in judicial custody. ( 174 ) ONCE the above conditions are satisfied, the detention order cannot be struck down. ( 175 ) IN the present case, a perusal of the grounds of detention shows the following : 1- The Detaining Authority was aware of the fact that the petitioner was actually in judicial custody. 2- The Detaining Authority had reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him: (a) That the petitioner had been making continuous efforts to be released on bail, and there was complete likelihood that the petitioner would be soon released on bail, and (b) that there was complete likelihood that after his release, the petitioner would again repeat the similar incident which would have adverse effect on the maintenance of public order in the area. 3- In order to prevent the petitioner from acting in such manner which would be against the public order in the State, the detaining Authority was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner. ( 176 ) IT is thus, evident that all the conditions required for passing the detention order in respect of a person who is already in custody, were satisfied in the present case, and therefore, the detention order dated 6th december, 2007 passed by the District magistrate, Gorakhpur (Respondent No. 2)under Section 3 (2) of the N. S. Act in respect of the petitioner was legal arid valid. ( 177 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has however, placed reliance on the following passage of the judgement of the Supreme court in Surya Prakash Sharma v. State of u. P. and others : (1995 All LJ 777) (supra) (at page 767 of the said ACC) : (Para 6 of All LJ)"when the above principles are applied to the facts of the instant case, there is no escape from the conclusion that the impugned order cannot be sustained. Though the grounds of detention indicate the detaining authoritys awareness of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody at the time of making the order of detention, the detaining authority has not brought on record any cogent material nor furnished any cogent ground in support of the averment made in grounds of detention that if the aforesaid Surya Prakash Sharma is released on bail may again indulge in serious offences causing threat to public order, (emphasis supplied ). To put it differently, the satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu might indulge in serious offences causing threat to public order, solely on the basis of a solitary murder, cannot be said to be proper and justified". ( 178 ) THUS, their Lordships of the Supreme court in Surya Prakash Sharma vs. State of u. P. and others (supra) have reiterated the above conditions required to be fulfilled for passing detention order in respect of a person already in custody but on the facts of the said case, their Lordships have opined that the condition Nos. 2 (b) and 3, referred to herein above, were not fulfilled. It has been pointed out that the Detaining Authority had not brought on record any cogent material nor furnished any cogent ground in support of the averment in the grounds of detention that if the detenu, was released on bail, he might again indulge in serious offences causing threat to public order. It has been observed that the satisfaction of the detaining Authority that the detenu might indulge in serious offences causing threat to public order, solely on the basis of a solitary murder, could not be said to be proper and justified. ( 179 ) THE above decision in Surya Prakash sharma vs. State of U. P. and others (supra)is distinguishable from the present case on facts. In the present case, the District magistrate, Gorakhpur has taken into account not only the incident which occurred on 21st September, 2007, but also the antecedent conduct, behaviour and activities of the petitioner and his associates, as also the developments which took place in consequence of and subsequent to the said incident and the continued prevailing atmosphere of awe, panic and terror in the area, and on such consideration, he has concluded that there was complete likelihood that after his release the petitioner would again repeat his activities which would have adverse effect on the maintenance of public order, in the area. The circumstances taken into account by the District Magistrate, gorakhpur provided cogent material for recording satisfaction by the District magistrate, Gorakhpur that there was apprehension that the petitioner would act in a manner which would be against the maintenance of public order, and in order to prevent the petitioner from acting in such manner, it was necessary to detain the petitioner. ( 180 ) THUS, the decision of the Supreme court in Surya Prakash Sharma vs. State of u. P. and others (supra) is not applicable to the present case. ( 181 ) THE fourth submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot, therefore, be accepted. ( 182 ) IN view of the above discussion, it follows that none of the four submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner can be accepted. ( 183 ) THE Writ Petition lacks merits, and is liable to be dismissed. ( 184 ) THE Writ Petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Petition dismissed. .