JUDGMENT Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—Heard Sri Samir Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Vikas Budhwar, the learned counsel for the respondent workman. 2. The workman was appointed as a Driver in the year 1975 to ply a bus of the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation. The appointment was initially for a short period for one month but the service of the workman was extended for short period from time to time, and eventually, the services were dispensed with in the year 1986. The workman, being aggrieved, raised an industrial dispute, which was referred for adjudication before the Labour Court with regard to the legality and validity of the order of the termination. The Labour Court, after considering the material evidence on record, held that the workman had worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year and that the compensation was not paid and accordingly, the Labour Court directed the petitioner to reinstate the workman with continuity of service and with full back wages. The petitioner, being aggrieved, has filed the present writ petition, which was entertained but no stay order was passed. Consequently, in compliance of the award, the workman was reinstated in service. It has been stated at the bar that the workman is still in service and has another two years to go before he reaches the age of superannuation. 3. Since the award of the Labour Court was not stayed, it was required to be implemented, and accordingly, an application under Section 33-C(1) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act was filed by the workman for the execution of the Award. The Deputy Labour Commissioner, after considering the matter, computed the back wages, against which, the petitioner has filed another writ petition, which has been connected with this writ petition, in which, an interim order was passed staying the recovery of the amount. 4. Sri Samir Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the award on two grounds namely, that the award is an ex parte award, in which, no notice was served upon the petitioner and that an application for the recall of the ex parte award was filed within the stipulated period of 30 days, in spite of which, the recall application was rejected by the Labour Court on the ground that it had become “functus officio”. The learned counsel further submitted that a necessary party, namely, the Assistant Regional Manager or the Depot Incharge was not arrayed as a party, which also led to the non-receipt of the notices and only the Corporation was made a party. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that the award of the Labour Court requires no interference. No doubt, the Labour Court proceeded ex parte and an ex parte award passed against the petitioner but the fault lies solely with the petitioner. The Labour Court has given a categorical finding that the pairokar of the petitioner, who was doing pairwi in other labour matter before the Labour Court, has accepted notice, in spite of which, he chose to remain outside the Court and deliberately did not appear when the case was called out. This finding has not been assailed by the petitioner in the writ petition nor any such averment has been made in the recall application. No doubt, the recall application was filed within 30 days and as held by the Supreme Court, in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others, AIR 1981 SC 606 , a recall application can be filed within 30 days from the date of the publication of the award, during which time, the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal would have jurisdiction to entertain an application and does not become functus officio. To that extent, the order of the Labour Court rejecting the recall application, was not correct. The said application ought to have been entertained. However, such entertainment of the application could not make material evidence in the light of the fact that the pairokar of the petitioner had received the notice, but deliberately chose not to participate in the proceedings. The Labour Court has given a categorical finding that the workman had worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year. This being a finding of fact, the same cannot be interfered in a writ jurisdiction. 6. In the light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that the award of the Labour Court does not suffer from any error of law. The writ petition fails and is dismissed. 7. With regard to the arrears of wages, this Court is of the opinion that the Labour Court committed an error in granting back wages. 6. In the light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that the award of the Labour Court does not suffer from any error of law. The writ petition fails and is dismissed. 7. With regard to the arrears of wages, this Court is of the opinion that the Labour Court committed an error in granting back wages. The reference was raised by the workman after six years from the date of his termination. For this period, the employer cannot be faulted. There is also nothing to indicate that the workman remained unemployed during this period. Consequently, grant of wages appears to be incorrect and to that extent, the award cannot be sustained and is quashed. The writ petition is partly allowed. 8. In the light of the aforesaid, this Court should remand the matter back to the Labour Court to decide the quantum of back wages. Since it is an old matter and the petitioner has also stated at the bar that the workman has been reinstated, consequently, the Court is of the opinion that it would be appropriate, if the Court itself computes the back wages. Considering the facts and circumstances, the Court directs that 20% of the back wages would be substantial and would serve the purpose. 9. In the light of the aforesaid, this petition is partly allowed. The Award is modified to the extent as stated above. The connected writ petition is allowed. The order of the Dy. Labour Commissioner computing the back wages is quashed. The petitioner is directed to compute 20% of back wages within six weeks from the date of the receipt of a certified copy of this order and pay the back wages, failing which, it would be open to the workman to move an application afresh before the Dy. Labour Commissioner under Section 30-C(1) and Section 6-H(1) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. ————